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Abstract
Although sevæ  poverty and difficult climatic conditions for crop production created 
acute food insecurity among many small maize producers in parts of Honduras in the 
1980s, this diesis focuses on the widespread phomenon of chronic and endemic 
vulnerability found in less critically affected parts of the country. It argues that a major 
cause of food insecurity among small maize producers in the 1980s lay in the complex 
nature of social relations of production and exchange for maize. Nevertheless, policy 
debates and directions in Honduras tended to side-step these conqilexities.
Small maize farmers were vulnerable to food insecurity because of their exchange 
relations with other farmers, traders and state institutions over land, labour, finance and 
output. These exchanges combined commoditized, personalized and non- 
commoditized relations. They also involved inequality and power, reciprocity and 
assistance, as well as forms of economic coercion.
Exchanges of land and labour between commercial and semi-proletarian farmers, as 
wdl as loans made Ity comnMrcial to semi-proletarian frrmers, helped to sustain the 
maize production of both social groups. Although these relations provided some 
security on an unequal basis for semi-proletarian farmers, indebtedness prevented them 
from irnproving their livelihoods from maize. Thus while most commercial farmers 
interviewed were able to make profits from maize production, semi-proletarian farmers 
continued in stagnation.
Petty commodity maize producers as well as commercial farmers tended to establish 
relations with state and state-linked institutions for credit, technical assistance, and 
sometimes for output markets. However, petty commodity producers could also 
erqrerience difficulties in reproducing maize production. In particular, their
incorporation into state-linked projects to increase output and productivity could 
increase the risk of debt and left many in a position of 'insecure transformation'.
Semi-proletarian maize farmers could break the cycle of 'secure stagnation' ty 
organizing collectively to gain land and establish new social relations of production and 
exchange. However, there were many risks and difficulties for these groups, and 
struggling groups might still maintain some relations of patronage to survive.
A key distinction between maize production and trade was that the latter was driven by 
profits while the former continued in production even though many farmers had 
• negative net cash incomes. Traders' profits also depended on social differentiation, by 
wealth and task in trade, as on the differentiation of farmers from whom they purchased 
maize. Personalized relations also helped to ensure profits fix>m trade.
Although maize trade involved many participants and was apparently competitive, local 
traders (including commercial maize farmers) could establish debt relations with semi­
proletarian farmers which put the latter at a disadvantage in output markets, especially 
with respect to the time of maize sales and hence prices received. Market alternatives 
for semi-proletarian farmers were relatively restricted compared to commercial farmers 
and petty commodity producers.
The thesis concludes that policies which only consider market variables in maize 
production and distribution and which propose increasing liberalization and 
deregulation are unlikely to benefit those who are most at risk among Honduran maiyi». 
farmers. Unless the complex social relations which maintain either the stagnation of 
semi-proletarian farmers or the insecure transformation of petty commodity producers 
are addressed, conditions of reproducing maize production are likely to become more 
acute and reinforce food insecurity in the countryside.
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In t r o d u c t io n
This thesis is about rural food insecurity. It focuses on a single crop, maize, and analyses 
the production and reproduction strategies of farmers in the Central American state of 
Honduras during the 1980s. It explains how production and exchange relations can act to 
undermine as well as to maintain farmers' capacities to produce and sustain access to 
maize. In doing so, it debates and adds to existing approaches to food security issues. It 
also identifies some of the shortcomings of food and agricultural policies directed towards 
resolving problems of food insecurity.
(i) Focus and argument of the thesis
Maize is the main food staple in Honduras, especially among the rural and urban poor. 
Survey data gathered at the end of the 1970s indicates its importance for daily 
consumption in the 1980s. Maize provided on average 43% of calories and 37% of 
proteins in the daily diet of urban households in the major cities, although among the 
lowest household groups in terms of cash income it provided as much as 60% of calories 
and 52% of proteins (estimated from SIECA, 1983, Table 1). In the rural areas, maize 
constituted 48% of calories and 40% of proteins among the households stnveyed, 
increasing to 66 and 55 per cent respectively among the lowest income groups (ibid. Table 
3). Although cash income is a misleading measure of poverty in rural areas, these data still 
give an indication of the importance of maize among poor households at the beginning of 
the 1980s.
Maize is a key source of livelihood in rural areas, which contained 60% of the population 
in the 1980s. The agricultural census in 1974 provides basic information about the 
conditions of maize farming at that time. It showed that 85% of all farms produced maize 
for direct consumption and the market. Furthermore, in 1974, the majority of maize-
producing farms (65%) were small farms of 5 Has or less. These small farmers 
constituted (and still do constitute) a key sector of the rural poor^. Maize also provides 
livelihoods and profits for the many traders in grains, as well as for those engaged in maize 
processing: millers, tortilla makers, the food snacks industry, by-product processing (such 
as starch) and, above all, animal feeds.
Given its key role in daily survival for many people, focusing on the production and 
reproduction of maize  ^ has allowed me to examine some of the fundamental issues 
involved in rural food insecurity in Honduras. Focusing on a single crop cannot explain 
the conq)lete range of conditions and relations which create or reduce rural food 
insecurity, but it reveals the types of processes which reinforce the vulnerability^ of rural 
people to food insecurity and which are likely to be replicated in the production and 
reproduction of other crops as well as other means of livelihood.
Rural food insecurity has been an ongoing problem in Honduras. (Some of its 
manifestations are discussed in Chapter 2.) In the countryside, the food insecure were 
predominantly to be found among the very small farmers and landless workers, who 
together comprised a substantial proportion of the rural population. While government 
policies sought to find ways of achieving national food security by increasing food output
^ The other key sector o f poor people is the landless. RuM (1984) calculated that about 50% o f all rural 
families were landless or land poor in the early 1980s. This figure does not include those engaged in 
permanent wage work.
2 I  use the phrases 'reproduction o f maize’ or 'reproducing maize' in this thesis as short-hand for the 
reproduction of maize production and the reproduction o f maize consumption because the latter two are 
cumbersome phrases.
 ^ The concept o f vulnerability to food insecurity is being used here to indicate the ined>ilities o f many 
maize farmers to produce or consume adequate food staples without ongoing debt relations and potential 
or actual entitlement loss. This thesis addresses these issues with respect to maize. These concepts are 
explored in Chapter 1.
and productivity, food insecurity was a feature of life for many rural producers who 
nevertheless helped to supply urban and rural markets with food staples such as maize.
My thesis is based on research carried out in Honduras at different times between 1986 
and 1988. My main concern was to explain the widespread chronic and endemic 
vulnerability among small maize farmers. Thus I did not analyse the conditions of food 
insecurity of those famers who were located in areas of extreme poverty or particularly 
severe climatic conditions, such as in the west and south of Honduras. My fieldwork with 
maize farmers was carried out in the eastern and north-western departments of El Parafso 
and Santa Barbara where a range of conditions was to be found. Traders were also 
interviewed in Danlf, El Parafso as were traders and industrialists in San Pedro Sula, 
Cortés.
My basic argument is as follows.
A major cause of vulnerability to food insecurity among small maize producers in the 
1980s lay in the complex nature of social relations of production and exchange for maize. 
However, policy debates and directions only partially addressed these complex social 
relations. Thus, among some groups of farmers, policies were likely to exacerbate rather 
than improve vulnerability to inadequate production and consumption of maize.
The reasons why small maize farmers were vulnerable to food insecurity lay in the 
exchange relations with other farmers, traders and state institutions over land, labour, 
finance and output as well as in their access to land. These exchanges combined 
commoditized, personalized and non-commoditized relations^. They also involved 
inequality and power, reciprocity and assistance, as well as forms of economic coercion.
^ These and other concepts are addressed in Chapter 1.
Maize farmers can be classified into commercial farmers, petty commodity producers and 
semi-proletarian farmers. Exchanges of land and labour between commercial and semi- 
proletarian farmers helped to maintain the maize production of both social groups. Semi- 
proletarian farmers might also obtain loans of money and inputs from commercial farmers, 
and might sell maize to them, as commercial farmers often engaged in trade. These 
relations provided some security on an unequal basis for semi-proletarian farmers but at 
the cost of being unable to improve their livelihoods from maize. Thus while most 
commercial farmers were able to make profits from maize production, semi-proletarian 
farmers continued in stagnation.
Both commercial farmers and petty commodity maize producers tended to establish 
relations with state and state-linked institutions for credit, technical assistance, and 
sometimes for output markets through the grain marketing board. However, petty 
commodity producers could also e?q)erience difficulties in reproducing maize production. 
In particular, their incorporation into state-linked projects to increase output and 
productivity could increase the risk of debt. Their potential for increasing output was, in 
practice, insecure.
Semi-proletarian maize farmers could however break with the 'secure stagnation' implied 
in land/labour exchanges with commercial farmers. This was evident in the experiences of 
collectively organized farmers who received land through the land reform programme 
established in 1975. However, the thesis shows that there were many risks and difficulties, 
and poor groups might still maintain some relations of patronage to survive, indicating 
their continuing vulnerability.
Output market links were diverse for all maize farmers and had different effects. Although 
TTiaizft trade involved many participants and was apparently competitive, local traders 
(often also commercial maize farmers) could establish debt relations with semi-proletarian
farmers (for example, through pre-harvest sales) which put the latter at a disadvantage in 
output markets. Market alternatives for semi-proletarian farmers were relatively restricted 
compared with other maize farmers, whereas commercial farmers and some petty 
commodity producers could in principle sell maize to the state marketing board and to 
industry, even though transactions costs of such sales were high compared with selling to 
private traders.
However, a key distinction between production and trade was that the latter was driven by 
profits while the former continued in production even with negative cash incomes. 
Traders' profits also depended on social differentiation, by wealth and task in trade, as well 
as in production. Furthermore, although competitive, personalized relations helped to 
ensure profits from trade.
The thesis concludes that policies which only consider market variables in maize 
production and distribution and which propose increasing liboalization and deregulation 
are unlikely to benefit those who are most at risk among maize farmers. Unless the 
complex relations of exchange which maintain either the stagnation of semi-proletarian 
farmers or the insecure transformation of petty commodity producers are understood and 
the policy implications addressed, conditions of reproducing maize production are likely to 
become more polarized between different social groups and reinforce vulnerability to food 
insecurity in the counuyside.
(ii) Contribution of the research
Although there has been considerable debate about food security in Honduras (see 
Chapter 2), analysing how relations of exchange involved in the production of a basic food 
staple might contribute to the vulnerability of producers was not a main concern in the 
1980s. Studies of food staple sub systems in the late 1980s, in which I also took part.
provided an overview of the chain of relations from production to final consumption 
(Johnson, 1988). ^  Thwe were also several 'diagnostic' studies which attempted to present 
a picture of the overall context of maize and other food staple production and distribution 
(for example, OEA/IDRC/CONSUPLANE, 1982). However, these were largely 
descriptive studies and did not consider the complex nature of exchange and its effects.
Other published food security studies around the time of, and since, my own field research 
have concentrated on macro-economic issues (eg Arroyo, 1985; Arias, 1989; Noé Pino 
and Perdomo, 1990). There have also been many publications which relate food security 
and economic policy (eg Aguirre and Tablada, 1988; Brockett, 1987a and 1987b; 
Quezada and Scobie, n.d.), or raise food security issues within the general context of 
economic and agrarian policy (eg Brockett, 1987c; Larson, 1982; Norton, 1988; Ponce, 
1985; USAID, 1989; U.S. Government, 1982). All these studies are concerned with food 
security as it relates to the general supply of and demand for food staples, with economic 
and policies and processes, or with changes in technology, all of which might affect output 
and incomes. They have tended to focus on national market variables, whereas my study 
uses local case material to explain some of the underlying processes which can lead to 
food insecurity among staple crop producers.
There have been some useful papers on the extent of income distribution and rural poverty 
(eg CONSUPLANE, 1985; Molina Chocano and Reina, 1983; Peek, 1984; Torres, 1979). 
They have largely been based on census and survey data in the 1960s and 1970s, and have 
not focused on the actual dynamics of rural social relations. Nutritional surveys were 
carried out in Honduras in the 1960s and again in the 1970s and other evaluations have 
taken place which show the continuing prevalence of malnutrition (Kanbur, 1991; SIECA,
5 These studies were somewhat similar in style and intent to the French filières vivrières approach 
discussed in Bernstein's analysis o f maize in South Africa (1992).
1983; USAID, 1978a). Yet other studies and papers have discussed the need for food aid 
and for buffer stocks, while some analysts have looked at the effects of food aid on 
agricultural production, including that of food staples (eg FAO/FSAS, 1986; Norton and 
Benito, 1987; World Food Programme, 1986). There has also been considerable concern 
about markets for food staples - especially about whether (and how) they should be 
regulated or deregulated (for example, ESQUELf, 1986; Hanrahan, 1983; IHMA and 
CADESCA/ŒE, 1987; IRI, 1985; KSU, 1985; Loria and Cuevas, 1984; Pollard et al, 
1984; USAID, 1978b). This concern has not extended to looking at the relationship 
between different kinds of exchange and how maize farmers might be affected.
The main focus of Studies of social relations in the countryside has been on land 
distribution and tenure. There are many good reasons for this, above all the key role in 
rural life played by control over means of production and because of the concentrated 
nature of this control in Honduras, as in many other Latin American countries. Moreover 
the existence of three land reform laws in the 1960s and 1970s, along with a brief 
reformist period in the 1970s which effected limited redistribution of land, has captured 
the attention of many analysts (eg del Cid, 1977; Brockett, 1990; Brown et al, 1981; 
Bueso, 1987; Molina Chocano and Reina, 1983; Murga, 1977; Parsons, 1975; Pearson, 
1980; Peek, 1984; Posas, 1979; Ruhl, 1984a, 1985; World Bank, 1983). Many of these 
studies have made important contributions to understanding the achievements and limits of 
Honduran agrarian reform. However, they have not generally contained detailed analysis 
of the social relations between social groups in the countryside, nor, with the exception of 
Brockett, have studies about land been linked directly to food security issues.
There have been some insightful studies of the type of (rather than the actual) phenomena 
that concern me in this thesis. For example, Boyer (1982) looked at the changing 
economic rationality among peasants in the southern highlands of Honduras as capitalist 
relations of production spread. This powerful and interesting thesis is written from an
8anthropological perspective and studies the lives and behaviours of farmers in several 
communities in the area. It argues among other things that land concentration related to 
the encroachment of pasture and export crops, and demogrtgrhic growth in a relatively 
densely-populated region, led to food deficits among small producers as well as changing 
agricultural practices resulting in soil depletion. Although Boyer analysed the class 
relations between farmers and the increasingly commoditized nature of production, he did 
not looked at the relations involved in reproducing a particular crop, nor was his study 
related to policy measures and debates.
Kramer (1986) has analysed the relationship between cattle expansion, land distribution 
and migration in the west of Honduras. His thesis is not about food security, however it 
does focus on the econontic conditions of cattle and maize production. Kramer argues 
that migration was not initially a response to capitalist encroachment nor of atteaction to 
urban areas because of higher wages. Migration took place within rural areas and was a 
reaction to a decline in production and wage conditions: migrants were basically looking 
for land. Although this study focuses on cattle and the growth of cattle lands, Kramer 
analyses the strategies adopted by different classes of farmers with respect to cattle and 
itiaiTft production. He also looks at the potential benefits of an integrated rural 
development programme in the area that he studied. The thesis is written fiom a 
perspective of economic maximization but does not analyse how and why producers might 
have chosen (or been obliged) to maintain relations which did not necessarily maximise 
their economic possibilities.
There are two other studies which have particular relevance to my own work. Howard 
Ballard (1987), who also studied cattle, showed the existence and significance of the social 
divisions of labour between cattle farmers and how these social divisions were linked to 
wider processes of capitalist expansion. This study illuminates the nature of class relations 
in the countryside within the production of a particular commodity, beef. It provides an
impressive explanation of who benefits and who loses fiom production and the world 
market for beef. Although cattle are closely and contradictorily linked to food staple 
production in terms of land use, the study is not directly concerned with food insecurity. 
Brockett (1987a, b and c, and 1990) provides useful material on the relationship between 
commercialization and economic and food insecurity firom a macro-economic perspective 
and is also concerned with policy issues. He is, however, primarily interested in how 
access to land has changed with the growth of export crops, and does not look at the 
social relations of food staple production.
(Hi) My approach to food security: debts and contributions
The World Bank has defined food security as 'access by all people at all times to enough 
food for an active healthy life. Its essential elements are the availability of food and the 
ability to acquire it' (World Bank, 1986,1) Food insecurity. On the other hand, is 'the lack 
of access to enough food. There are two kinds of food insecurity: chronic and transitory. 
Chronic food insecurity is a continuously inadequate diet caused by the inability to acquire 
food...Transitory food insecurity is a temporary decline in a household's access to enough 
food' (op cit).
As Chapter 1 of this thesis will argue, I see food security as a reproduction issue. Other 
writers have taken this approach in different ways. For exanrple, de Janvry's analysis of 
the agrarian crisis in Latin America (1981) eloquently argues that the food crisis is a class 
reproduction crisis, or one of social reproduction, while Drèze and Sen (1989) have 
broadened the notion of food security to take in other aspects of welfare involved in daily 
and generational as well as social reproduction. I take a narrower approach by (i) 
focusing on people's cfqracities to continue producing and acquiring adequate food on a 
sustained basis, and (ii) specifically addressing the problems of producing and consuming 
adequate maize among some groups of maize farmers. I believe this approach can
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pinpoint some of the broader problems which affect both class reproduction (de Janviy) 
and a wider concept of food and welfare security (Drèze and Sen).
I am particularly concerned with exchange relations. Exchange is the key mechartism 
through which people acquire resources for production in commoditized economies, 
inaintain their access to resources, and make a living. Furthermore, analysing exchange 
relations can also reveal the underlying distribution and control of means of production 
and use of labour. Exchange can take personalized and non-commoditized forms even in 
commoditized economies and the social relations of, and strategies for, reproducing food 
crops can involve a complex interaction of such processes.
As well as the work of Sen and others on entitlements, I am intellectually indebted to the 
class analysis of agrarian structures which has taken place in the Latin American and 
Anglo-American literature, and the analysis of markets, interlinkages and power that has 
emerged from a South Asian context. This thesis conttibutes this well-established 
literature in analysing the unevenness of commoditization, and the importance of 
personalized and non-commoditized relations even in highly commoditized economies. It 
shows that commoditization is a non-linear process. The thesis also adds to the literature 
which treats markets as social phenomena, including relations of power, rather than 
abstract forces.
(iv) Structure of the thesis
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 explains my conceptual framework 
with reference to pertinent literature. Chapter 2 provides a contextual analysis of the 
problems of food insecurity in Honduras, and addresses gaps in policy debates and 
approaches to the rural economy. The methods I used to carry out my research are 
explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 analyses changes in access to land and implications for
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tnaiyj». production up to the 1974 agricultural census, and looks at how the statistical data 
for my fieldwork sites compare. In Chapter 5 ,1 analyse the social relations of production 
among two communities of maize farmers in El Parafso. Chapter 6 addresses problems in 
maintaining access to maize for consumption and in making a cash income from maize 
among these farmers, while Chapter 7 analyses debt relations and whether farmers' social 
positions were reflected in the prices they received for maize. The conditions of these 
farmers are compared with the experiences of collectively organized maize producers in 
Chapter 8. In Chapter 9 ,1 analyse exchange relations and prices in output markets and 
their implications for maize production. Rnally, my conclusions summarize my 
contributions to theoretical analysis and discuss policy implications.
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Chapter 1
E x p l a in in g  r u r a l  f o o d  in s e c u r it y
Introduction
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the main conceptual issues involved in my 
approach to the food insecurity of rural populations, and relates the issues to current 
. literature. The arguments presented in this chapter and the literature reviewed are directed 
to the particular concern of the thesis, that is, the reproduction of a food staple.
The chapter argues that explaining food insecurity among rural food staple producers has 
to look at producers' capacities to reproduce their food production, and the causes and 
mechanisms of endowment and entitlement loss (Sen, 1981). To do this requires analysis 
of changes in social relations in the countryside, especially those of class, and the social 
conditions through which endowments and entitlements are secured or undermined. 
These social conditions include commoditization, types of exchange relations between 
different social groups (and the social hierarchies and power relations they involve), the 
functioning and organization of markets, and state intervention. However, rural food 
staple producers are not seen sinq)ly as victims of these social conditions and relations but 
as actors who try to find means of defending access to the foods they produce, as well as 
accumulate wealth fiom them. The strategies pursued by different social groups of 
producers therefore also require analysis. Thus while I take a broad political economy 
approach to the problem of food insecurity, I am also concerned with issues that are often 
given less consideration, such as the role of exchange in reproduction, and the complex 
and contradictory nature of action.
My particular concern is to explain the food insecurity of many maize farmers in
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Honduras. As stated in the Introduction, government policies (addressed in Chapter 2) 
have sought to find ways of achieving national food security by increasing food 
production, productivity and incomes, while food insecurity exists precisely among those 
many farmers who help to supply urban and rural markets with food staples. The question 
is what tools of analysis can help to explain the existence of food insecurity among certain 
groups of the rural population as well as show how their food insecurity is linked to the 
wider problem of food insecurity in the national context
1.1 Explaining food insecurity
Most current definitions of food security have broadened out from earlier notions which 
emphasized food supplies and stocks, prevalent during the concern about world food 
shortages in the 1970s .^ More recent definitions like those used by institutions such as the 
World Bank (1986) or the FAO (1986) as well as individual analysts such as Shuttleworth 
(1988) or Barraclough (1991) include concern for all people's sustained access to food as 
well as sustained food availability (whether through national production and/or food 
imports and aid). Thus demand - and whether demand is backed by the wherewithal to 
obtain food - has become as much of an issue as supply. This is evident in the World 
Bank's position, as well as in the perspectives of writers such as Raikes (1988): 'People die 
of starvation, or go hungry, not because there is no food in their country (or region), but 
because they cannot afford it and have no other means of access. Food may indeed be 
physically absent from famine areas. But this reflects the fact that aggregate 'effective 
demand' (demand with the money to back it) is insufficient to draw it there from richer 
areas (or to prevent its outflow to such areas)' (ibid, 1).
j  See, for example. FAO (1983) which discusses the 1974 international undertaldng on world food 
security, involving international cooperation over food supplies, expanding production, having national 
policies for buffer stocks, etc. However, even very recently, the Worldwatch Institute predicted globed 
famine because food supplies would not be able to keep up with population growth (Walker, 1994).
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As stated in my Introduction, the World Bank's approach differentiates between chronic 
and transitory food insecurity. These two types of food insecurity are linked either to 
demand or supply issues, as shown in the stated policy implications. Chronic food 
insecurity is seen as a demand problem whereas transitory food insecurity is largely seen 
an issue which can be resolved through adjustments in food supplies. Policy 
recommendations for chronic food insecurity include identifying the food insecure and 
looking for ways of generating income through investment in agriculture, subsidized 
employment and food, and making changes to institutions blocking agricultural growth 
(for example, allowing women to own land). Recommendations to alleviate transitory 
food insecurity involve supply measures: promoting drought or disease resistant crops, 
and price stabilization through stocks, food aid and the liberalization of trade.
The World Bank's approach clearly recognizes that food insecurity is not simply resolved 
by supplying more food. It explicitly acknowledges that ongoing food insecurity is a 
function of demand and people's capacities to command food whether through their own 
production or purchase. However, the distinction between chronic and transitory food 
insecurity is something of a false dichotomy given that emergency situations principally 
affect those who are already potentially food insecure.
Explaining food insecurity within the boundaries of a society or an economic system thus 
involves many aspects of analysis. For example, Barraclough (1991) lists the following 
characteristics of a secure food system: (a) cqracity to produceAmport/store sufficient 
food; (b) reduction of susceptibility to international markets and political pressures 
through national autonomy and self-determination; (c) seasonal and cyclical reliability of 
food supplies; (d) ecological sustainability; (e) equity of access to adequate food across 
social groups (ibid, 1). In practice, studies of food insecurity tend to look at only some of 
these phenomena - or even at some aspects of them. Exceptions are food systems analyses 
(such as those looking at filières vivrières, mentioned in Footnote 4 of the Introduction)
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which seek to identify bottlenecks in processes of production and distribution, in particular 
where there is concentration of economic interests such as in land or oligopolistic control 
of markets. But these analyses are not generally concerned with micro-level studies and 
the relationship of local phenomena to the broader system.
In general, analyses of food insecurity tend to divide into studies which look at broad 
questions, such as factors determining overall supply of and demand for food, and those 
which look more closely at local conditions of food insecurity, hunger and famine .^ 
However, there are studies and approaches which try to combine the broader issues with 
frameworks for analysing specific phenomena. Key among these is the work of Amartya 
Sen (1981). Sen uses the concepts of 'endowments' and entitlements': owned assets, 
entitlements to goods from one's own production and from selling labour power or trade. 
When people lose or have a reduction in these ownership and exchange entitlements, they 
may become food insecure (or even suffer hunger and starvation). Crucial in Sen's 
approach^ is the role of social relations of production and exchange which may have quite 
specific effects for the access of different groups of people to food. His approach also 
allows for the possibility of examining how local access to food may, or may not, be 
related to broader trends in prices, incomes, control over food production and food 
markets, as well as the role of food policies in affecting people's access to food.
Sen's ideas inform my own work. First, I argue that people are food secure when they are 
able to reproduce their means to produce or acquire adequate food on a sustained basis. 
Food insecurity results from difficulties in reproducing the ability to produce or acquire
2 Examples o f the former are Ender (1983), Lele and Candler (1984), Mclntire (1981), Mellor f798S), 
Raikes (1988), Shuttleworth (1988), World Bank (1986, 1988). Examples o f the latter are Vaughan 
(1987), Watts (1983,1988).
^ As short-hand, 1 call this 'an entitlement approach'.
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adequate food. Such reproduction crises may be short-term or ongoing. Thus I am not 
analysing the nature of economic crisis in Honduras, which has been written about by Noé 
Pino (1988) and Thorpe (1993). In using the concept 'reproduction crisis' among certain 
groups of maize farmers in Honduras, I am referring to these farmers' inabilities to 
produce or consume adequate maize without ongoing debt relations and potential or 
actual entitlement loss. Analysing the production and exchange relations of a particular 
food staple can explain how reproduction crises occur as well as reveal the strategies rural 
people may pursue to achieve some degree of food security.
Second, an entitlement approach to food insecurity among maize farmers in Honduras has 
tremendous empirical value. It involves analysing maize farmers' access to means of 
production, labour and finance and how the social relations of production and exchange 
affect them. However, an entitlement approach does not in itself provide a theoretical 
framework for analysing the mechanisms by which entitlements are affected or changed. 
As Ravallion (1987) has also stated in his study of food grain markets in Bangladesh, we 
need means to find out what causes changes in entitlements. Sen acknowledged this point 
in the final chapter of Poverty and Famines, saying that an entitlement approach provides 
a framework for analysis not a hypothesis about causation. He also stated that we need to 
view the food problem as a relation between people and food in terms of a network of 
entitlement relations' (1981, 159). Thus further concepts are needed to disentangle these 
networks of entitlement relations and to understand how they might change and affect 
different social groups.
The idea that food insecurity, hunger and famine occur when ownership and exhange 
entitlements are undermined means that we need to understand how entitlements are 
reproduced. This requires analysis of the mechartisms through which people have access 
to their entitlements and the means by which they are maintained (or undermined or lost). 
This approach can also be applied to understanding how a particular food crop is
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produced, disoibuted and consumed. Thus, in the case of maize, as well as understanding 
how farmers gain access to their land, whether and how they have access to the labour 
they need, whether they able to provide their maize needs (and to what extent they are 
able to provide the maize needs of wage earners by producing marketable surpluses), we 
also need to know how those processes are sustained or changed.
As I now go on to explain, there are some key concepts of class, exchange, 
commoditization, social hierarchies and power which afford a means to analysing maize 
farmers' access to ownership and exchange entitlements and the mechanisms through 
which those entitlements may be reproduced or changed. Farmers' own strategies for 
survival or accumulation may affect their entitlements, as may interventions by other 
agents, such as the state. I first discuss the concepts of class formation and class relations 
and some of their ramifications for understanding food insecurity (Sections 1.2-1.5), and 
then look at concepts useful to e)q)laining how food insecurity can arise, especially 
commoditization, exchange relations, the role of social hierarchies and the nature of 
survival and accumulation strategies (Sections 1.6-1.8).
12 Food insecurity and agrarian class formation
Analysing class formation is a means of understanding how access to and control over 
land and labour have changed, as well as how the growth of markets has affected social 
relations in the countryside. To see how class formation takes place, persists or changes, 
involves analysing processes of reproduction as well as production. Understanding these 
processes in turn helps to explain the dynamics of poverty and changes in access to 
entitlements among particular social groups.
However, as an explanatory tool, the concept of class needs to be actively constituted 
from empirical and historical realities as well as act as a theoretical construct. It also has
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limits in explaining all dimensions of social relations as recent literature on gender 
relations, and cultural and social identities has made clear (see for example, Pearson, 1992; 
Allen, 1992). Thus my own analysis of class positions among maize farmers in Honduras 
is drawn partly from the theoretical discussion that follows and partly from my own 
empirical research.
Much of the considerable literature on changing agrarian structures and class relations in 
the countryside has largely concerned itself with agrarian transition from pre-capitalist to 
capitalist modes of production and characterizing current class formation. For example, 
some writers on agrarian transition in Latin America (for example, de Janvry, 1981; 
Goodman and Redclift, 1981) have applied the Leninist categories of 'junker' and farmer' 
road to the development of capitalist agriculture and have explored their capacity to 
explain changes in class structures. The junker road inplies agrarian change resulting in 
large estates and a proletarianized workforce. The farmer road is based on smaller-scale 
landholdings worked as family farms (which may or may not employ wage labour). 
Although the two roads are based on different types of access to land and other resources, 
as well as uses of labour, they both imply (to a greater or lesser extent) the loss of some 
producers' entitlements to land - or processes of proletarianization.
Both are, however, models of how social relations in agriculture may change with the 
spread of capitalism. As these writers would agree, the reality is often a diverse 
combination of types of access to land, labour and markets which affect people's capacities 
to produce crops and sustain their production. For example, census and my own 
fieldwork data on land and labour distribution and use in Honduras suggest that neither 
the junker nor the farmer road adequately characterizes the development of social relations 
in agriculture, although elements of both types of development exist. While land 
distribution shows a high level of inequality, there are large numbers of medium-sized and 
small farms. Certain export crops - such as sugar or bananas - can be broadly
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characterized as being grown on plantations using permanent wage labour, but there are 
also other types of sugar and banana production. Cattle-rearing is largely regarded as an 
activity of large landowners using extensive amounts of land and little labour - but studies 
(for example, Howard, 1987; Kramer, 1986) have shown that the cattle sector is complex 
and differentiated. The production of basic food staples is carried out on various types of 
farm and using different types of labour. Although farms producing maize and beans are 
predominantly small or medium-sized and tend to use a combination of family and wage 
labour, maize and bean production may also be combined with cattle herds on large farms 
which have a permanent hired staff as well as using additional seasonal workers.
Similarly, the debate about whether Latin America was feudal before it was ctqxitalist (for 
example, Brenner, 1977; Frank, 1969; Laclau, 1971) also depended on models of agrarian 
transition and the characteristics of particular modes of production based on ideal-typical 
constructs of social relations. This debate tried to explain the origins of present-day class 
relations in Latin America. It tried to evaluate the nature and impact of the spread of 
rapitfllism on Latin American economies. It also considered strategies or paths for future 
development. Above all, the debate attempted to determine whether explanations of 
underdevelopment, poverty and inequality lay primarily in the internal dynamics of 
particular class relations or primarily in the relations between developed and 
underdeveloped countties or regions (or centee-periphery relations).
Although this debate made an important contribution to understanding the relationship 
between internal social stmctures and the world capitalist system, characterizing social 
relations as either feudal or capitalist can result in rigid typologies, while the reality is 
often a messier combination of social interaction and change. Other approaches, such as 
looking at the articulation of modes of production, have questioned the precise nature of 
social relations in the countryside and how they are linked. For example, Bartra (1976) 
and Gonzalez (1979) suggested that present-day economies in Latin America comprised
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more than one mode of production in which capitalist social relations were dominant. As 
well as trying to characterize class formation (especially, but not only, in rural areas), this 
approach also tries to show how the capitalist class is able to extract surplus from non- or 
pre-capitalist (peasant) producers as well as from wage workers, thereby leading to these 
producers' and workers' impoverishment This literature also raises the question of 
whether it is the exploitation of peasant producers that leads to their impoverishment a 
subject which I return to below.
These debates about the historical process of class formation, how classes can be 
adequately characterized in rural Latin America, and what the effects of class formation 
have been for the creation of poverty and food insecurity, raise further conceptual and 
empirical issues. Without denying the importance of theory, there is a danger of 
depending too much on abstract constructs rather than trying to analyse and understand 
actual relations and processes of change between social groups. Thus, within a political 
economy framework, a formal characterization of capitalist and pre-capitalist social 
relations might suggest that the former are constituted by private property, wage labour 
separated from the means of production, and the creation of surplus value realized into 
profits through exploitation and the market, while the latter might comprise landlord- 
tenant relations based on hereditary property rights, servile labour and sets of rights and 
obligations where surplus is extracted through coercion. In practice, aspects of all these 
relations might be found in different contexts in the Latin American countryside. 
Furthermore, they might well be constituted under capitalism either because there is social 
and economic space for their existence or because they may aid processes of survival and 
accumulation.
As later chapters argue, these complex relations are part of the dynamics of how capitalist 
relations have been developing in Honduran agriculture. This complexity can provide 
mechanisms for producers to sustain their farms as well as act to undermine maize
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production.
13  The disappearence and persistence of peasants
Changing class relations are of critical importance to food security. They affect producers' 
entitlements and capacities to sustain food production as well as whether they can 
continue to survive on the land or are forced - economically or physically - to become 
wage workers (or join the ranks of the rural and urban un- and underemployed). Thus 
one key question is whether agrarian transition and class formation have resulted in the 
impoverishment, dispossession and disappearance of peasants, or whether peasants 
continue to survive under capitalism. A second is what the nature of peasant production is 
under capitalism - an issue which I address in later sections.
There has been considerable debate about whethe peasants are disapppearing or not. At 
the beginning of this century, Lenin's seminal work on the development of capitalism in 
Russia (1956, 1977) argued that social differentiation in the countryside would result in 
the disappearance of poor peasants. Later, Chayanov (1966) showed mechanisms by 
which peasant production could survive in the context of changes in the countryside. The 
latter's work, in particular, gave rise to discussion about whether peasants had a mode of 
economic calculation different from capitalists, namely that profits are neither necessary 
nor desired for peasant production to continue. Attempts to explain the persistence (or 
disappearance) of peasant producers who can apparently survive under capitalism have 
continued to intrigue analysts of agrarian change, and also inform my own inquiry.
In the Latin American context, the persistence and disappearance of peasants were 
discussed at length by the campesinistas and descanq>esinistas*. Mexican
^ That is. those who argue that peasants perist under capitalism (campesinistas) and those who hold that 
peasants are becoming proletarians (descampesinistas).
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descampesinista Foladoii (1981) held that there was increasing immiseration of the 
peasantry and proletarianization and strongly criticized those who argued for an ongoing 
role for the peasantry in developing capitalism. He criticized campesinistas for their 
ahistorical view of social relations and argued that the dynamics of ctqxitalist development 
had given rise to different social relations in which peasants were being dispossessed. This 
position implicitly viewed peasants as pre-capitalist producers whose demise was inherent 
in the development of capitalism. However, for Foladori, this was not just a theoretical 
proposition: he based his argument on empirical data such as the increasing amount of 
commoditization in small-scale production (especially the commercialization of output) 
and growing levels of unemployment (ibid, 11,38-39).
By contrast, the campesinistas whom Foladori criticized, such as Stavenhagen, Warman, 
Esteva and Dfaz-Polanco, held that peasants
* were small-scale producers who used family labour and only sold output when cash 
income was needed
* managed to survive under capitalism because they had a special relationship with the 
land which allowed them to subsist without needing to make profits
* could survive because developing capitalism lacked internal markets (and hence required 
the continuing production of use values in peasant enterprises)
* were a homogeneous group facing an external, unequal relationship with a dominant 
class which extracted surplus (in other words, capitalist social relations were imposed 
from the outside but the contradictory relations between crqxital and labour were not 
internal to peasant production and reproduction)
* had non-market mechanisms for individual and collective survival (Foladori, 1981).
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Some of these points concern the social and economic space in which peasants are able to 
survive and are therefore open to empirical investigation. Others raise analytical or 
conceptual questions about whether peasant production is different from capitalist 
production, or whether peasants constitute a class of producers exploited by capitalists. 
However, implicit in both descampesinista and campesinista positions is a debating point 
about who peasants are and what constitutes their means of livelihood. Because peasants 
have been (and are) present in many types of society across many historical periods, they 
are often characterized as having universal and ahistorical behaviours (and hence have 
often been characterized as having a distinct mode of production). However, the variety 
of forms of livelihood, access to resources and use of labour which are observable among 
peasants under capitalism suggests that it is difficult to conceive of them either as having a 
single mode of production or as being a single class with common conditions of existence.
Thus, the concept of peasant is a useful way of describing small-scale producers who 
largely use family labour and engage in simple reproduction, but other analytical concepts 
are required to understand the place (or places) they occupy in capitalist development and 
the processes which threaten or reinforce their survival. Peasants adopt (or are forced 
into) different strategies for survival which often include a diverse range of behaviours, 
market and non-market, which are partly a response to externally imposed conditions of 
production - such as limited access to land - and partly related to the internal dynamics and 
composition of the production unit. Furthermore, peasants may be able to accumulate 
wealth in given circumstances as well as be dispossessed in others. That poor people find 
ways to survive on the land is evident across societies and historical conjunctures. The 
ways they find to do it and whether they constitute a class or not can only be defined in 
relation to specific historical conditions.
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1.4 Peasants, petty commodity producers and semi-proletarians
From the above discussion, it follows that the category of "peasant" has little explanatory 
value in analysing conditions of production and reproduction, and mechartisms of 
appropriation and distribution^. Thus it is difficult to use it either to characterize a 
particular group of people in the countryside whose food security ntight be threatened, or 
to attempt an explanation of food insecurity by exposing conditions of production and 
reproduction as though they were general to peasants. A more differentiated approach is 
required.
I argue along with several other analysts that the concepts of simple or petty commodity 
production and semi-proletarian production help to characterize and have more analytical 
value in explaining types of peasant production under capitalism (see, for example, Bartra, 
R., 1976; Bernstein, 1986, 1990; Chevalier, 1982; Friedmann, 1980; Smith, C., 1984; 
Smith, G., 1985) .^ Furthermore, the debates taken up by these and other writers have 
helped to explain social and economic conditions for peasant survival and also reveal the 
nature and impact of commoditization on peasant livelihoods^.
To take petty commodity production first, there are some differences between writers' 
understandings of the concept and the conditions in which this type of production arises
^  This raises a particidar tension in my own work. Many of the maize producers I  am concerned about in 
my study are called campcsinos. which is usually translated as ’peasants’. In fact, the definition of 
campesino wUhin Honduras can be quite vague - Jrom landless producers, or those who rent or borrow 
small parcels o f land, to producers with several, even tens of. hectares. Campesino is also used 
subjectively by relatively well-off farmers to denote their origins, self-perception o f their social position, 
or a set o f attitudes. I  return to some of these issues in later cheqjters.
^  Although in this chapter I  use the terms peasant or petty commodity producer according to the 
literature being referred to. I  do not use the term peasant analytically in this thesis but only to describe 
small-scale producers who use a high proportion of family labour in production.
^ Alison MacEwen Scott (1986) has summarized the shifts in thinking and some o f the more recent 
debates.
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(or may be undermined). For example, Friedmann (1980) maintains the category of 
peasants to describe producers who might exist at levels of simple reproduction in a 
variety of conditions under capitalism, but whose production is only partially 
commoditized and integrated into the market. She uses the concept of simple commodity 
production to encapsulate production under capitalism which is fully commoditized except 
in the use of labour (as in the case of family-based wheat farming in the United States).
Bernstein also concluded that petty commodity production (PCP) was a more useful, as 
well as a more analytical, category than peasant production for understanding the nature 
and place of small-scale production based primarily on household labour in developing 
capitalist economies (1986,1988,1990,1992)^. However, his position is rather different 
from Friedmann's: The starting point must be to view peasants today as agrarian petty 
commodity producers within capitalism...Petty commodity producers are...both capitalists 
and workers at the same time: they own or have access to means of production which they 
put to work' with their own labour. As capitalists, they employ - and therefore exploit - 
themselves' (1990,72). Thus in talking about peasants, Bernstein describes them as small 
family farmers' but states: "What is distinctive about contemporary peasants within 
capitalism is that they are petty commodity producers subject to processes of class and 
other social differentiation, which can be charted through pressures on sinple 
reproduction on the one hand, and opportunities for accumulation on the other' (Bernstein, 
1992, 30). He also states that the contradictory unity' of capital and labour among petty 
commodity producers can only exist on the basis of a prior separation of capital and
^ Earlier formulations o f his position held that peasant production under capitalism was a form of 
exploitation o f wage labour equivalents by capital. The production o f use values by peasants depresses 
the price o f commodities also produced by them because households cover part o f their reproduction 
costs themselves. Household production wotdd then be a site o f struggle between peasants and capital 
and the state over control o f resources and output in which peasants were frequently subject to a 'simple 
reproduction squeeze' through the effects of commoditization (Bernstein. 1977).
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labour...prior both in theoretical (explanatory) sense and in the historical sense of a 
capitalist social division of labour' (1988, 263). In other words, as with Friedmann's 
concept of simple commodity production, petty commodity production can only exist 
under capitalism because the separation of capital and labour must have taken place first 
However, Bernstein says that PCP is also the form that peasant production takes under 
capitalism. Moreover, Bernstein also sees petty commodity producers as petty capitalists. 
This position clearly distinguishes petty commodity producers fiom peasants in other 
historical periods.
Bernstein rightly points out that these characteristics do not define precisely the nature of 
PCP as it may be found empirically, nor under what precise conditions petty commodity 
producers may arise, persist or be dispossessed. PCP may exist in many diverse forms and 
contexts. But the characteristics of PCP imply that it exists where there is economic and 
social space created by the ways that capitalism has developed. Thus there are many 
different types of PCP, reproducing themselves at different levels of production and 
consumption.
From my own research, I conclude that PCP does arise in the spaces created by the 
uneven development of capitalism, and that it is pursued as an active strategy for survival 
where other employment and income-earning opportunities are scarce. However, as my 
research shows, conditions for the persistence of petty commodity production can also be 
pressured and unstable.
This brings me to the concept of semi-proletarian production. In the literature (eg Bartra, 
R., 1976), this concept has sometimes been used synonymously with the concept of poor 
peasant'^ - those peasants using family labour and engaging in simple reproduction but
^ Whereas petty commodity production has often been used synonymously with middle and rich peasants.
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whose survival depends on doing wage work for others. In fact, large numbers, if not the 
majority, of "peasants' make their living this way in contemporary Latin America. 
Moreover, the notion of semi-proletarian production suggests that such peasants are 
proletarians in the making. However, as my analysis from fieldwork later shows, although 
the threat of proletarianization is ever present, doing wage work can also be a strategy for 
securing resources to produce one's own crops. Thus the direction of change is not 
always obvious.
Using the concepts of petty commodity and semi-proletarian production to characterize 
particular types of production under capitalism thus affords a means to understanding the 
social and economic spaces occupied by peasants, the social relations between them and 
other economic actors, and their strategies for survival (and accumulation), and thareby 
provides an inroad into e>q>laining why certain producers are likely to face food insecurity. 
However, these concepts cannot be superimposed without first understanding the 
conditions of production and reproduction of any given set of producers. In later 
chapters, the categories of petty commodity and semi-proletarian production will be 
constituted from my analysis, not the other way round.
I J  Surplus extraction and food insecurity
Understanding the social positions of peasants and other farmers is only partly about 
finding analytical ways of characterizing change and persistence in rural class formations. 
Equally iirqrortant for explaining rural food insecurity is understanding the mechanisms 
through which people in different social positions accumulate, survive or have their 
capacities to survive undermined. As any class or social group is not a static entity, and 
has an internal dynamic as well as an external relationship to others (both of which may be
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sources of conflict and change)^^, a læy aspect of understanding how class relations and 
social change in the countryside affect people's food security is to analyse those 
mechaitisms of survival and accumulation.
The literature on peasants and petty commodity producers has focused on some important 
areas of debate related to mechanisms of survival and accumulation, in particular, the 
concepts of exploitation and surplus transfers. On one hand, exploitation has often been 
used as a defining characteristic of peasant production in its relationship to otho* rural 
classes, traders and the state (for example. Wolf, 1966; Banaji, 1977; Bernstein, 1977; 
Bartra, A., 1982; Bartra, R., 1976) and has been used to e}q)lain the difficulties peasants 
have in reproducing livelihoods. On the other hand, writers (for example, Gonzalez, 
1979) have investigated mechanisms of surplus transfer which may or may not take place 
through exploitation. Both exploitation and surplus transfers niight lead to food insecuriQr 
among rural producers because part of their labour or output is appropriated by otha^s.
These concepts are problematic in conceptualization and empirical research. Exploitation 
implies looking at social relations in terms of two major classes: ctpitalists and wage 
workers (hence the idea of peasants as wage worker equivalents - see below), whereas 
social relations of production and exchange in developing c^italist economies are more 
complex and varied. Both concepts are based on the notion of value (and surplus value) 
which is difficult to locate analytically in the conditions of developing capitalism as well as 
problematic to research without equating value and price. The latter problem is further 
complicated by the fact that production for direct consumption and the market are often
Recent literature on gender relations, for example, has shown that women and men wit/Un households 
may have different experiences o f their social positions, may experience conflicts o f interest between 
them, and may have different relations to other classes and social groups. See, for example, Dwyer and 
Bruce (1988) for studies o f intra-household relations, Drèze and Sen (1989) for discussion o f cooperative 
conflict within households, and Mackintosh (1989) for an illuminating study o f the relations between nude 
and female contract farmers and their employers.
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combined.
My own position is to be cautious about the use of these concepts in my analysis. My 
approach acknowledges insights from both the Latin American and the Anglo-American 
literature, whUe addressing the causes of poverty, entitlement loss and food insecurity 
from a different direction. Because of the theoretical and en^irical difficulties involved, I 
have chosen to analyse the causes of food insecurity through the problems farmers 
experience in reproducing their productive capacities. The unequal social positions of 
farmers, in access to resources and in exchange relations with other farmers, traders and 
the state, result in unequal benefits from production (manifest in prices rather than values, 
as well as in access to food) and unequal capacities to reproduce livelihoods. These 
processes are made apparent from my analysis in later chapters.
Exploitation in particular is a contentious area both of conceptualization and empirical 
study. In Marxist terms, exploitation involves the appropriation of surplus value from 
wage workers by capitalists who pay workers less than the value that they create. To 
apply this definition to peasants/petty commodity producers would be to put them in the 
position of wage worker equivalents (Banaji, 1977; Bernstein, 1977). While this may be 
appropriate in the case of some contract farmers, for producers who are still in control of 
their means of production and producing commodities directly for the market as well as 
staples for their own consumption, the view of peasants as wage-worker equivalents is 
problematic. Some analysts have stated that exploitation takes place in the relationship 
between capitalist production and non-capitalist production (for example, Bartra, R., 
1976). Yet others have suggested that, for petty commodity producers, exploitation takes 
place within units of production (for example, Bernstein, 1990). I look briefly at examples 
of the last two positions.
Among Latin American writers, Bartra, R. (1976), made a distinction between the
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capitalist and the peasant sector (regarded as non-capitalist). Among peasants, he 
distinguished between petty commodity producers and poor and semi-proletarianized 
peasants. Petty commodity producers were characterized by the use of family labour 
mainly to produce commodities. They did not make profits (and therefore were not 
capitalists) because money made from production was a payment to labour, or net income. 
Bartra included middle and rich peasants in this stratum. However, poor peasants and 
semi-proletarian farmers were on a continuum of even lower levels of simple reproduction 
than petty commodiQr producers: poor peasants used family labour to produce 
predominantly for direct consumption but often resorted to wage labour to survive (in 
other words, becoming semi-proletarians). Moreover, poor peasants were exploited in 
two other ways: (i) in the unequal exchange of the commodities they produced with 
industrial goods, because of the weight of living labour in peasant products compared with 
industrial goods which comprise a higher organic composition of capital; (ii) by usury 
capital which could take advantage of poor peasants' impoverished conditions of 
production and lack of access to formal credit markets.
The semi-proletarianization of peasants, the use of capital in production and high interest 
rates imposed by usurers are empirically observable phenomena. However, in 
distinguishing between the capitalist and peasant sector, Bartra seems to be suggesting 
both that peasants are not part of capitalist production and that some peasants (poor and 
semi-proletarian peasants) are being exploited by capitalists (productive and usury capital). 
This position suggests that petty commodity producers are definitely outside capitalist 
relations of production, while poor peasants are both inside (as semi-proletarians) and 
outside (as direct producers) at the same time, although even as direct producers they are 
still exploited. A critique of such a position is expressed by Bernstein: 'The location of 
small producers in markets for land, credit and other commodities is no different in 
principle fiom that of capitalists. The categories of rent, interest and merchant's profit to
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which PCP may be subject are the same as for c^italist enterprises, and represent 
'exploitation' of the former no more than the latter '(1988,265).
Bernstein holds the other position of interest here. He states that petty commodity 
producers are simultaneously capitalists and workers, and therefore exploit themselves. 
The important contribution of Bernstein is to show how peasants/petty commodity 
producers are centrally located in the development of capitalism and are therefore subject 
to ctqxitalist social relations. However, the concept of self-exploitation is problematic. If 
driven from within die production unit, the peasant/petty commodity producer represents 
two, generally opposing, interests at the same time, and maybe even in the same person. 
That the unit head may set other members to work for him or her as family or other, 
mostly unremunerated labour, may signify exploitation within the unit. However, the 
precise nature of the exchanges would have to be analysed and understood. Furthermore, 
this view does not necessarily take into account the assumptions and perceptions of those 
working in the unit. If the drive to self-exploitation originates from outside the production 
unit, then the social relations between petty commodity producers and other producers, 
traders and the state become critical points of analysis, as does the role of competition. 
These multiple pressures and points of so-called squeezing' (Bernstein, 1977; 1988) make 
the concept of self-exploitation rather imprecise as well as problematic to research.
Surplus transfers from peasants and petty commodity producers to other agents in 
production and trade may or may not involve exploitation. For example, among Latin 
American analysts, Gonzalez (1979) suggested that economic surplus could be transferred 
from peasant production to capital in the following ways; (i) in the labour market, through 
low wages because peasants subsidize their own daily reproduction from farming; (ii) in 
the relationship between peasant production and cqxitalist agriculture, in rent payments 
from sharecropping, or the greater use of labour in peasant agriculture; (iii) in payments 
from peasants to industrial, commercial and financial capital; (iv) through sectoral
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transfers, in differential terms of trade, or the immobility of peasant labour because it lacks 
other job opportunities.
The mechanisms identified by Gonzalez are clearly ways that such farmers may be forced 
(economically and sometimes physically) to part with more of what they produce than they 
would wish to, receive relatively low prices, carry out work without adequate 
remuneration, or pay high interest rates for loans.. Some of these processes may also 
involve exploitation, but they are easier to research using prices rather than values, and 
other forms of social analysis. Moreover, whether involving forms of exploitation or not, 
they make reproducing crops and livelihoods difficult for peasants and, perhaps, for petty 
commodity producers, while benefiting other rural and urban classes. As Bernstein 
suggests for petty commodity producers, lack of exploitation by another class does not 
mean that small producers are not subject to various (and sometimes sevæ) forms of 
extortion and 'squeezing' - often accompanied by political oppression - by different kinds 
of capital, including state capitalist enterprises' (1988,265).
However, the effects of different social relations of production and exchange do not 
necessarily or always result in the disadvantage of peasants and petty comnaodity 
producers. For exan^le, Gômez (1979) (who also distinguished between capitalists and 
peasants) stated that one had to look in both directions at the relationship between peasant 
production and capitalist enterprises: peasants might provide cheap labour for capital but 
working as labourers also allowed them to reproduce their own units of production. 
Similarly, Bernstein says: small commodity producers can also benefit in particular cases 
from certain relations with capital and the state. This is demonstrated by subsidies to 
agricultural production and farm support policies' (ibid, 265-266).
The critical question, then, is what in any given context are the specific mechanisms which 
enable or undermine the capacities of petty commodity and semi-proletarian farmers to
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sustain (or improve) their production. My thesis argues that, in Honduras, many petty 
commodity and semi-proletarian maize farmers are subject to different mechanisms which 
constrain their capacities to reproduce their production. These constraints lie in the means 
by which they gain access to resources and are able to realize the fruits of their labour. 
For petty commodity producers, these constraints (and possibilities) arise in their relations 
to the market, especially that for credit, in which the state plays an important role. For 
semi-proletarian farmers, the constraints involve the terms on which they gain access to 
lanrt and inputs, how they are able to use their labour, the terms on which they can sell 
their output (or retain it for their own use), and so on. Some of these relations may be 
exploitative, but the very limited resources available to semi-proletarian farmers mean that 
reproducing production is inherently precarious and risky.
That there is space for different kinds of maize production in Honduras also raises 
questions about how they are related to each other and how (and whether) they survive, as 
well as the roles they play in the economy. Recent state policies have been keen to 
promote the petty commodity production of maize. However, the existence of petty 
commodity maize production (as well as semi-proletarian production) is interdependent 
with commercial maize production. Analysing the relations between these different types 
of farmer shows not only how maize production is related to wider economic (and power) 
structures, but also how and why food insecurity may be created or sustained for 
particular social groups.
1.6 Commoditization
Debates about rural class formation suggest that changes in social relations in the 
countryside can potentially result in food insecurity through the dispossession of peasants, 
exploitation of poor peasants and rural workers, and surplus transfers of diffaent kinds 
which undermine productive capacities. An integral part of these processes is
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commoditization, a concept and process about which there has also been considerable 
debate (see, for example. Long, 1986).
Commoditization is the generalized production of goods and services for the market. 
Within a Marxist framework, commodities are not just goods and services which are 
exchanged for money, or other goods and services, but they embody labour, and therefore 
value, which is realized in the market. The relative composition of labour in commodities 
and the rates at which commodities are exchanged has been at the heart of discussions of 
exploitation, surplus transfers and unequal exchange raised in the previous section.
HowevCT, there are other concerns about commoditization which inform my approach to 
food insecurity as a reproduction issue:
(i) Commodity production (including the commoditization of labour) may affect class 
relations, for example, in reinforcing the position of one class over another, or in bringing 
about further differentiation.
(ii) Market competition can exert pressures on farmers to increase the productivity of land 
and labour by incorporating more commodities in production, which in turn can result in 
indebtedness and dispossession.
(iii) Commoditization and the development of markets may be uneven: for exainple, 
output might be commoditized much more rapidly than land and labour (Bhaduii, 1983; 
Bharadwaj, 1985). This may mean that non-commoditized as well as commoditized 
exchanges are combined in production with differential effects for farmers.
(iv) Monopolies in production and circulation of commodities can affect the extent of 
competition in commodity exchange and may result in prices which squeeze out producers 
and consumers.
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There is now a considerable literature on these issues and the effects of commodidzation 
on peasant livelihoods. This literature ranges from analyses of how peasants are 
'squeezed' by pressures to commoditize and intensify their production (for example, 
Bemstein, 1977), to explanations of the dynamics of international and national 
commoditization processes with concomitant effects such as the stagnation of national 
food production (for example, Friedmann, 1988, 1990; de Janvry, 1981). There has been 
debate on the nature and extent of commoditization among the rural poor (Long et al, 
1986). Debates on commoditization have also informed discussions of petty commodity 
production (Scott, 1986).
This literature informs my thesis. My main interest is to analyse the nature and effects of 
commoditization in maize production and markets. In particular, my analysis involves 
looking at what is understood by commoditized and non-commoditized relations and 
hence the types of exchange relations which affect productive capacities.
Commoditization is about processes of exchange in situations of competition, or 
markets^ .^ Understanding how commoditization may affect maize farmers therefore 
involves analysing farmers' incorporation into markets for land, labour, finance, inputs and 
ouqxuts, and the benefits which they receive from processes of exchange. However 
because commodity markets may be unevenly developed, farmers may seek other means of 
obtaining access to resources or exchanging goods and services. While such processes 
may be pursued as active strategies, they may also result in tied relations of exchange. 
Thus different types of exchange may have different effects, both for accumulation as well 
as for survival.
A key area of analysis is the appearances and realities of commoditized (and non-
However, as indicated above, markets may be more or less competitive.
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commoditized) lelations.^^ For example, while markets for land may exist, access to land 
for some types of farmer may be by loaning, or exchanging land for labour, or by 
occupying nationally- or municipally-owned or communal land. Thus a small maize farmer 
in Honduras may well be aware of the rental and market value of the land occupied, as 
may the landlord, but the arrangements over access to that land could be defined by other 
criteria - for example, whether the small farmer can provide wage labour at harvest or 
whether the landlord is prepared to loan the small farmer some inputs. These 
arrangements have a non-commoditized appearance but they depend on the existence of 
commodity markets. A sluggish land market (such as existed in Honduras in the 1980s) 
may suggest that loaning land to trusted tenants who provide labour is more beneficial to 
the owner than other uses of that land. However, the arrangement depends both on 
knowledge of alternative market options for the land, as well as factors such as wage 
rates. Furthermore, whether the landowner can loan inputs to the small farmer will in turn 
depend on his access to bank credit for purchasing commodities used in production. Thus 
the tenant farmer and landowner are both operating in land, labour and financial markets in 
which an agreement is made to provide land and secure the wage labour of the tenant.
In my analysis of the social relations of production and reproduction of maize, I have 
called these types of exchange "personalized" relations because they depend on personal 
networks and relations between individuals and families which may also involve elements 
of reciprocity, however implicit and unequal. On one hand, they are not non- 
commoditized since they depend on commoditized relations and markets for their 
existence. On the other, they are not "impersonal" transactions which take place within the 
markets for land and labour. As later chapters show, some of the relations I analyse in 
Honduran maize production have the appearance of being non-commoditized - because
This was a source o f debate between Bemstein and Long (1986a).
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they take the form of favours between patron and client - when in practice they depend on 
the existence of the cash nexus and generalized commodity exchange.
By contrast, non-commoditized relations do not depend on the cash nexus or the market 
for their existence. An example would be the use of family labour in production. 
However, even here, it is important to distinguish between appearance and reality^ .^ A 
notable contribution to research and analysis in this area is Brass's work (1986) on how 
surpluses are accumulated within petty commodity production in Peru through the unequal 
rights and obligations of kin and 'fictive kin'^ .^ In his analysis, non-commoditized and 
commoditized exchange become closely inter-related. As well as being forms of 
reciprocity, kin and fictive kin relations can be used to extract surpluses, gain access to 
labour and keep wages down because of the supposed familial and reciprocal ties. 
However, in the process, kin and fictive kin relations themselves become commoditized.
Personalized commodity and non-commoditized exchange relations are not necessarily 
evidence of a residue of pre-capitalist modes of production that have yet to be fully 
transformed. For example, as Bemstein (1988) has pointed out, the domestic labour 
debate has amply discussed the production of use values and the role of non- 
commoditized production in advanced capitalist societies. In developing capitalist 
societies, non-commoditized relations may be evidence of mechanisms of survival where 
access to resources is limited, or waged employment is either unavailable or poorly 
remunerated. Historical processes of change fiiom precapitalist to capitalist relations may 
well carry with them mechanisms that may have served reproduction in the past (such as
Although it is often difficult to do it in practice. In later clusters, I  do in fact use the term non- 
commoditized to describe the use o f family ledtour.
Fictive Idn is the attribution o f kinship relations to people who may not be blood relatives but who 
have rights and responsibilities similar to family ties.
38
non-commoditized forms of exchange). Their similarity in appearance in the present does 
not necessarily indicate continuing evidence of precapitalist relations. .
Crucial to the importance of analysing commoditization and non-commoditization for 
understanding food insecurity is the differential benefits from different types of exchange. 
In commoditized exchanges, relative prices paid for inputs or labour and received for 
outputs will affect farmers' productive capacities. Personalized exchanges, even if 
reciprocity is involved, may not necessarily take place with equal benefit Likewise, non- 
commoditized exchanges may even involve the extraction of surplus labour, as suggested 
by Brass. Thus, non-commoditized and personalized mechanisms of procuring resources 
OT engaging in different forms of exchange do not necessarily presuppose complementarity 
or reciprocity on an equal basis. They may well (and ficquently do) reflect inequality and 
hierarchical power relations, as well as the often contradictory interests of capital and 
labour inherent in capitalist production. I return to these issues in the next section.
A critical issue for this thesis, then, is whether the existence of non-commoditized and 
personalized relations in maize production and maize markets impedes or promotes the 
reproduction of maize and hence the food security of the farmers. My position is that both 
can occur. On one hand, commercial maize farmers' access to their tenants' labour in 
Honduras cannot be seen singly as an agreement which benefits both parties by pioviding 
workers for one and employment for the other. Material from my fieldwork in later 
chapters shows that such arrangements are partly based on social hierarchies and 
patronage as well as the poverty and semi-proletarianization of peasant labour. On the 
other hand, exchange arrangements between commercial maize farmers and tenants or 
other small maize farmers may also act as mechanisms for small farmers to survive and for 
them to be able to reproduce their own maize production, based though these 
arrangements are on inequality. In other words, they may be evidence of such farmers' 
food insecurity as well as the means by which food security is, at least partially, achieved.
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1.7 Exchange relations, social hierarchies and power
As the discussion of commoditization implies, exchange relations are key to explaining 
how maize farmers are able to reproduce maize production or not. Going back to Sen, 
investigating the relationships between endowments, or ownership, and exchange 
entitlements and how those relationships change can help explain food insecurity. 
Analysing exchange relations shows some of the difficulties people have in maintaining 
their access to resources as well as obtaining adequate food supplies and thereby reveals 
how food insecurity can be created and reinforced.
While this thesis cannot make an anthropological analysis of exchange (see, for example. 
Rival, 1992), my fieldwork shows that exchange is a multi-dimensional process. It may 
involve aspects of custom, reciprocity, mutual advantage, social hierarchy and power, as 
well as market forces and mechanisms of surplus transfer and exploitation. These 
dimensions of exchange exist within capitalist production and markets, and should be seen 
as different survival mechanisms in contexts of highly unequal access to resources and 
concomitant asymmetries in power relations.
Some of the most interesting contributions from economists on the uneven development of 
exchange relations under capitalism have come from India, notably Bhaduri (1983) and 
Bharadwaj (1985). As noted in the previous section, this literature has shown that 
commodity markets may not develop at the same pace. Such a situation could affect 
access to land, labour and output. For example, access to land may involve complex 
arrangements between landlords and tenants, that may in turn be tied to output (as in 
sharecropping) or to use of labour (as in different forms of bonded labour). These are
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known as interlinked transactions -^ .^ In addition, and key to the earlier discussion of 
surplus transfers, certain types of exchange may actually involve coercion or producers 
may be forced to part with what they produce because of debt relations. The latter has 
been termed forced commerce (Bhaduri, 1983,9)^^.
In sum, Bharadwaj states:
(i) The exchange processes are neither uniform nor equal for all 
participants. Not only do the quantitative terms and conditions vary, 
depending on the parties to the exchange, but there can be quantitative 
differences in types of exchanges and the market involvement of individual 
households; (ii) The exchanges are set not only in terms of "prices' but there 
can be non-price factors, explicit and/or implicit, which mainly rely on 
personal dominance and power equations; (iii) The nature of exchange 
involvement as well as the terms and conditions depend largely upon the 
position of the participating household within the resource status 
categories. ..TAere is thus a correspondence between the production status 
as a base and the concomitant exchange relations' (1985, 11; author's 
emphasis).
My thesis shows that some of these characteristics can be found in exchange relations in 
maize production and trade in Honduras, although they are they are culturally specific 
phenomena with their own history and not as complex as writers have shown for South 
Asia. But some of the characteristics outlined by Bharadwaj appear in later discussion of
 ^^  Also known as interlinked markets or interlocking transactions; as well as Bharadwaj and Bhaduri, 
see for example. Hart (1986) and Bardhan (1989).
Bhaduri defines forced commerce as a 'nexus o f involuntary market involvements by the small 
peasants in various forms and arrangements under the compulsion o f debt' (1983,9).
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case material: lack of uniformity in exchange relations, non-price factors emanating from 
social hierarchies, and class position. For example, current-day land-labour linkages in 
Honduras may involve price (the cost of labour or wages, land rents, or the cost of 
fertilizers) but there is a non-price dimension involving social reciprocity, hierarchical 
rights and obligations, and personalized forms of insurance against risk. Furthermore, 
such land-labour relations may take on a different character depending on producers' (or 
landownas ) class positions.
Although relations of exchange in maize production and trade in Honduras are trxxre 
transparent than in some South and South-east Asian contexts, they are nevertheless 
subject to factors which caimot be explained by economics alone. My thesis argues that 
social hierarchies therefore need to be taken into account in analysing the relationship 
between exchange and the reproduction of maize. The social hierarchies are based on 
different forms of production and class position.
In this thesis, the class positions of maize farmers are arrived at (in Chapter 7) from the 
empirical realities of maize production as well as from the more abstract distinctions 
discussed in Section 1.4. The categories I use are commercial farmer', 'petty commodity 
producer' and 'semi-proletarian farmer', as well as using the generic categories of farmer 
and producer to denote anyone producing directly from the land. The two main classes 
are commercial and semi-proletarian farmers: one uses predominantly wage labour in 
production and the other cannot survive without selling labour. Petty comrrxxlity 
producers occupy an intermediate position - they hire some labour, but they do not sell 
labour, they may engage in simple reproduction or may be able to expand their production. 
They are in a subordinate position to commercial farmers, but are also able to be in 
relations of dominance over semi-proletarian farmers. The significance of these categories 
in nsy thesis is that they are based on (i) how producers obtain access to resources 
(including labour) for production, (ii) how maize production is reproduced, and (iii) the
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implications for the food security of the producers.
These classes are based on social hierarchies involving relations of power and patronage 
over access to land, control over labour, and relative wealth (which confers the ability to 
provide favours, make loans and so on). Furthermore, actions of the state which intervene 
in these social hierarchies may reinforce or undermine the relative power which people 
have.
Power and its role in economic life have been given consideration by several writers since 
Bhaduri and Bharadwaj raised the issues in the South Asian context. For example, 
Bardhan (1991) has criticized orthodox neoclassical economics which presumes that there 
is no exercise of power if both parties voluntarily enter a transaction' (ibid, 266). On trade 
relations, for example, he states: Hie concept of power goes beyond the outcome of a 
given exchange and points to the fact that power may be centrally involved in causing the 
existing pattern (and defining the existing parameters) of trade in the first place. Trading 
within a given system of property rights and institutions may be mutually beneficial, but in 
the historical process of defining those rights and institutions, the exercise of power (often 
with violence) by interested actors who would later participate in the trading has been 
quite common' (ibid, 267). Nevertheless, the assumption that economic transactions are 
voluntary, and are determined by supply, demand and price, are key to orthodox economic 
analyses of production and exchange, and are often the assumptions on which food and 
agricultural policies are based. As stated by Baland and Platteau (1993), general 
equilibrium theory in orthodox economics is founded on individual rationality and 
responses to price signals. There is no room in this firamework for conflict or coercion 
even though particular deals may have economic transaction costs' (ibid, 13).
However, the concept of power itself needs addressing. Bardhan points out that the 
concept, as used by economists and sociologists, is problematic and debated. He is critical
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of the behaviourist idea that 'the behaviour of A causes the behaviour of B' because it 
identifies possession with the exercise of power and ignores many of the coinplexities, 
including psychological ones, inherent in power relations. Power does not necessarily 
imply a conflict of interests even if relations are unequal. Furthermore, it is possible to 
know about the existence of power without observing it in action. Bardhan also points 
out that we often equate the source of power (wealth, assets and so on) with defining 
what power actually is. However, for many practical purposes of investigation, analysing 
the source of power (rather than what power is) is the critical issue (1991,274-275).
I concur with much of Bardhan's position. However, in this thesis I analyse how social 
hierarchies based on access to wealth and assets both enable and impede maize 
production, and thus concentrate on the sources of power and their effects. I suggest that 
the patronage which certain commercial farmers are able to afford to their tenants and 
others is symptomatic of the powerful positions that such farmers have in the community, 
and that these relations, which, while they may benefit semi-proletarian farmers, are 
relations of inequality and subordination. Thus my fieldwork analyses how economic 
transactions between farmers as well as between farmers and traders are affected 
(positively and adversely) by the social positions of those involved. These transactions 
may also involve the state. In political economic literature, the power of the state is often 
seen to reside in forces of law and order and the judiciary. However, with respect to rural 
development, the state can wield power through the behaviour of its representatives and 
agents as well as through the economic channels of programmes and projects. This may 
occur because there are opportunities for rent-seeking but agents of the state may also be 
subject to the influence of local power relations.
I thus argue that the relationships between different types of exchange (commoditized and 
non-commoditized), and different agents involved in exchange (farmers, traders, state 
organizations and officials) are subject to different sources and types of power and
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influence and which affect farmers' entitlements and capacities to reproduce their maize 
production. Furthermore, my argument has implications for understanding the relationship 
between different types of exchange and the functioning and development of markets in 
maize production, and thus adds to the now substantial literature in this field (for exan^le, 
Hewitt de Alcântara, 1993; Mackintosh, 1990; White, 1993)^7
1.8 Survival strategies  ^policy and public action
As stated earlier, peasants and petty commodity producers are not singly victims of social 
relations and social change in the countryside. They are also actors and can attempt to 
influence their own productive capacities. Thus, my research analyses how peasants and 
petty commodity producers actively try to ensure access to means of production, labour, 
finance and output markets and to work them to their advantage. In addition, some maize 
farmers organize collectively to try and change the social relations which subordinate 
them
My fieldwork demonstrates that there is space for certain types of action to help 
reproduce maize and secure access to food, even if this action is not always successful. 
This type of action may be seen as part of coping or survival strategies about which much 
has been written in recent years (for example. Chambers, 1989; Davies, 1993; Shipton, 
1990; Watts, 1988,1991). However, as Davies (op cit) points out, the concept of survival 
or coping strategies may implicitly assume that people actually do cope or survive and that 
food insecurity is therefore by definition mostly transitory. In addition, Davies points out 
that policy support for coping strategies could lock producers in sustained poverty. My 
own work shows that while, on one hand, some farmers' strategies for reproducing maize
I  say more aboM conceptualizing markets in relation to Honduran policy issues in Chapter 2, Section 
233.(i).
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are based on relations of inequality with other farmers, on the other hand, policies to 
increase productivity in maize production may well undermine survival strategies - or 
make it difficult for farmers to resort to their earlier practices.
What is the relationship between action by farmers on reproducing maize and other types 
of action, particularly state intervention? Although it would be wrong to think that policy 
on food security and related issues has been the sole prerogative of the Honduran state, or 
of international and national development institutions, in this thesis I mainly address the 
statements and actions from these sources because they are the most accessible for 
investigation in relation to thinking and practice related to or affecting food security. 
However, plans, policies, programmes and projects are the outcomes of processes of 
struggle and conflict as well as negotiation between different interests. The 
implementation of policies is further subject to contention as well as collaboration which 
may affect the outcome.
This idea of policy as a social process has been addressed in the work of Drèze and Sen 
(1989) and Wuyts, Mackintosh and Hewitt (1992), and involves notions of public action 
which may be directed to the public good (Drèze and Sen) as well as being directed to 
private ends or against the good of the majority (Mackintosh, 1992). Although this thesis 
is not about public action as such, it addresses three types of action: that by individuals 
(farmers, traders); that by the state, as manifest in rural development programmes and 
perspectives on food security; that taken by collectively-organized groups of maize 
producers. My analysis draws out some of the connections between these different types 
of action.
1.9 Summary
In this chapter I have traced a framework of concepts for explaining food insecurity
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among maize farmers in Honduras. As stated in the Introduction to my thesis, I see food 
insecurity as a reproduction problem: how and why many maize farmers have difficulty in 
reproducing their maize production and providing adequate quantities of maize for their 
own consumption. My starting point is Sen's concepts of endowments and entitlements 
which provide a useful inroad into analysing the relationships between local phenomena 
which affect food security, such as access to land, labour and income, and broader 
structural issues such as state policies and the development of markets. To understand the 
mechanisms which cause changes in people's entitlements and threaten their edacities to 
reproduce maize, other concepts are needed.
I argue that the class positions of maize farmers are key to their capacities to reproduce 
maize. However, class is an active category constituted and changed through historical 
processes and by the actions of producers. A key question is how class positions affect 
farmers' ctqpacities to reproduce maize. Historically, the accumulation of wealth by some 
rural classes has resulted in the dispossession and impoverishment of others. However, 
the continuing existence of many small maize farmers needs explaining, including the 
mechanisms by which they continue to persist, even in conditions of food insecurity. The 
active constitution of rural classes therefore requires social and economic spaces which are 
to be found in the uneven and variable spread of c^italist relations and increasing 
commoditization of economic life. Thus, under capitalism, peasants may become petty 
commodity producers or survive as semi-proletarians by combining production on the land 
with wage work and other means of earning income.
To exqxlain why such producers may experience entitlement loss or find it difficult to 
reproduce their maize requires understanding the exchange relations which affect their 
access to resources for production and to maize for consumption. On one hand, the 
nature and effects of commoditization are key points of analysis. On the other, social 
hierarchies and power, which affect personalized and non-commoditized exchanges, will
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also influence farmers' capacities to reproduce maize.
In conclusion, analysing exchange relations, conunoditized and non-commoditized, which 
are entered into by farmers to secure their means of production and exert some control 
over the distribution of output, can help to exqxlain rural food insecurity. Power and social 
hierarchies play an important role in these exchanges, as do forms of reciprocity. The 
exchanges can serve both to undermine or enhance farmers' capacities to continue in 
production, as can interventions by the state and other institutions in such a context of 
unequal social relations. Analysing the production and exchange relations of a staple 
which is a source of livelihood and food for most farmers can also help exqxlain wider 
social relations of rural poverty and stagnation. In addition, it can show why it is difficult 
both to raise national output of staple foods and alleviate food insecurity in the 
countryside by technical or economistic solutions alone.
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Ch a pte r !
Ga p s  i n  p o u c y  d e b a t e s  a f f e c t in g  H o n d u r a n  m a iz e  
FARMERS 
Introduction
The last chapter outlined the conceptual framework being used to analyse and explain 
rural food insecurity in Honduras. This chapter critically appraises the implications of 
Honduran food and agricultural policy for the entitlements of maize farmers in the light 
of this framework. It argues that recent debates among analysts and policy-makers 
about food insecurity in Honduras have largely centred on market variables which 
affect the supply of and demand for food staples. Although these debates have 
recognized that food insecurity in Honduras is not solely, or even primarily, a problem 
of national food supplies (although there are deficit regions within the country, and 
there have been food shortages in some areas), there has been little detailed analysis of 
the causes of food insecurity in rural areas.
There has however been considerable concern among analysts and policy-makers for 
the problems of rural poverty and rural producers' access to resources and food. As 
well as the issue of land tenure and distribution, which has preoccupied policy-makers 
from different perspectives since the 1960s, low incomes and generalized poverty have 
been focused on as key problems in urban as well as rural areas. However, in the mid- 
to late 1980s, many policy discussions increasingly centred on issues such as maiket 
integration and reinforcement, regulation, deregulation and pricing. Such concerns also 
affected perspectives on access to land and technologies.
The dynamics of producing maize for direct consumption as well as the market, and the
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reasons for the food insecurity which exists among many maize farmers were thus only 
partially addressed. Policies to increase overall output, or to regulate (or deregulate) 
markets, generally assumed the existence of a commoditized economy in which 
production and market relations required restructuring and modernizing to make them 
more efficient. In this context, peasant production of maize was seen as a subsistence 
activity which engaged only partially with the market. Even so, the role of non-market 
relations, power and social hierarchies and how they might create, maintain or alleviate 
food insecurity among peasant farmers, were not really addressed.
I first explain why food insecurity in general became a policy concern in the 1980s. 
Then I describe the trends in policy orientation in the 1970s and 1980s to contextualize 
the debates about or related to food security issues. In Section 2.3, I analyse the 
debates and measures affecting maize farmers in relation to the conceptual firamework 
provided in Chapter 1. These debates provide the reference points for the analysis 
presented in Chapters 4-9.
2.1 Acknowledging food insecurity in the 1980s
Discussion on food security in Honduras emerged as a policy concern in official circles 
in the 1980s. As well as national concern in different quarters about ongoing poverty 
and malnutrition, food security was also on the agenda of several influential 
international aid institutions. Agrarian and food policy preceding the 1980s were also 
linked to food security issues or resulted in changes which could affect food security. 
Examples are the agrarian reform laws in the 1960s and 1970s and the attempts to 
regulate markets for food staples, in particular, but not only, at the end of the 1970s.
Why did food security become a particular focus of interest and debate among policy­
makers and researchers in Honduras in the 1980s? Some of the reasons lie in the
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results of nutrition and income studies and analyses carried out by government 
institutions and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) at 
the end of the 1970s. There was continuing pressure on the government from peasant 
organizations to act on poverty and landlessness by maintaining the agrarian reform law 
of 1975 and making land available to peasant groups. Other factors were the 
generalized economic crisis facing Honduras in the 1980s and the apparent need for 
food imports. Various international institutions, such as Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme and the European Economic 
Community (EEC), were also concerned about the need for food aid.
2.1.1 Nutrition
Data published at the end of the 1970s suggested that 80% of the Honduran population 
were nutritionally at risk; 60% of urban families and 90% of those in rural areas 
(USAID, 1978a, 1)^ . It was further noted that 83% of rural children and 55-60% of 
urban children under 6 years of age were malnourished^ (ibid, 16) .^ In an essay on 
malnutrition and poverty in Latin America, Kanbur (1991) cited the food poverty lines^
^ By people nutritionally at risk was meant: "that part o f the population which lives continually at 
the edge o f malnutrition and for whom relatively slight changes in incomes.food prices, health, family 
size, or environmental conditions, might create considerable nutritional impact" (USAID, 1978a, 14 - 
my translation).
^ There was no definition ofmalnourishment nor information on how it was measured.
^ A more recent document published by the Honduran Ministry o f Natural Resources (MRN or SRN - 
the Ministry o f Agriculture) and the FAO estimated that: 63% o f the population lutd a less than 
adequate diet in terms o f calories: 45% o f children were malnourished, increasing to 60% in some 
areas: 27% o f urban families had insufficient income to buy a subsistence diet: 44% o f urban families 
could not cover a basic needs basket (SRNIFAO, 1988,1,1421 ).
4 Food poverty line: the cost o f a minimum requirements diet (Kanbur, 1991, 121): Those 
households whose per capita income is below the cost o f such a minimum requirements diet 
are...classified as being in 'destitution' (op cit). The food poverty line or destitution line was 
constructed by Altimir for 1970 (1982). The food poverty line for 1980 was calculated by CEPAL 
(Economic Commission for Latin America - ECLA) (1983). Information on the different 
methodologies and the relationship between the two food poverty lines used is not provided.
51
for Honduras for 1970 and 1980. Although, as Kanbur explains, they are not strictly 
comparable because of different time periods and methodologies, the number of 
households below them were possibly indicative of a worsening trend. Data for 1980 
showed that 57% of households were below the food poverty line compared with 45% 
in 1970. For the rural areas, the figures were 70% of rural households for 1980 
compared to 57% for 1970.
2.12 Poverty and income
There were two important income, expenditure and food consumption surveys in 
Honduras in 1967-68 and 1978-79 .^ These and other studies were concerned about 
income distribution as well as the relationship between malnutrition and poverty. 
Molina and Reina (1983) have compared data on income distribution for the two 
periods. The Gini coefficients (.61 and .51 respectively) indicate an improvement in 
income distribution, but Molina and Reina suggest that the results are doubtful because 
the second study underestimated the incomes of the wealthier groups (ibid, 78). 
Whether there was an improvement on income distribution in 1967-68 or not, the data 
for 1978-79 still indicated that the poorest 30% of the population had only 8% of 
income, while the wealthiest 30% had 69%. In addition to these data, the Higher 
Council for Economic Planning, CONSUPLANE (now SECPLAN), calculated that 
between 1978 and 1984, nominal minimum wages could not cover the cost of the basic 
family subsistence diet (CONSUPLANE, 1985, 17). Further, the CONSUPLANE
Conclusions Jrom these data should therefore be treated with caution. Important with respect to my 
study is that cash incomes in rural areas are not the only (or often the main) means o f acquiring food.
^  The first was a household budget survey carried out by the Hondurm Government and elaborated 
further by the Income Distribution in Latin America Programme directed by ECLA; the second was a 
survey o f family income, expenditure and food consumption carried out by the Honduran statistical 
office (Direcciân General de Estadisticas y Censos, DGEC), supported by the Central Bank (Banco 
Central de Honduras. BCH), USAID and CONSUPLANE (Molina and Reina, 1983,77).
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study showed that increases in average nominal incomes (as opposed to minimum 
wages) were less than price increases between 1979 and 1983 (ibid, 13), indicating a 
decline in real purchasing power. In turn, die World Food Programme declared:
'A major cause of malnutrition is the lack of adequate consumer 
purchasing power. The daily cost of a household food Wisket in 1980 
was about double the minimum daily wage. Since 1966, the prices of 
food items increased over 100%, especially in the case of maize and 
beans where the increases were in the order of 235% and 376% 
respectively. At the same time, the availability of food has decreased.
The growth of per capita food production between 1973/74 and 
1983/84 for Honduras was -6.5%' (World Food Programme, 1986,9).
2.i.3 Rural poverty and action on Umdlessness
There was particular evidence of continuing poverty in the countryside, especially in 
the nature of land distribution. The 1974 Agricultural Census had shown a h i^ y  
skewed distribution of land which had changed little since the first major agricultural 
census of 1952 .^ Nearly 80% of farms had access to only 17% of land in farms in 
1974; 64% of farms were under 5 Has, and there was a growing number of very small 
farms under 1 Ha (17% of all farms compared with 10% in the 1952 census)^. Ruhl 
(1985) categorized any family with a farm of less than 2 Has as Tarwl porar', or unable to 
making a living from that land^. He estimated that 90,000 frmilies were in titis position 
in the early 1980s, in addititm to 125-150,000 landless families (1985,73).
The Gini Coefficient for land distribution based on data in the 1952 census m u .75; in 1974 it was 
.76 (Howard. 1987.470).
^ Calculated from data in SRN, 1985.
^  Although popiUation density in the rural areas is far less in Honduras them in neighbouring El 
Sedvaeior. land is less fertile and more is reqmred to establish tm economically viable farm. Durham 
(1979) has noted that land itferdlity plus skewed land distribution resulted in severe pressures on the 
land in Honduras in the 1960st when many Stdveuloretm farmers came to Honeiuras but were later 
expelled as a result o f the ’soccer war' between the two countries in 1969.
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Thus although Honduras had had programmes of land reform since the 1960s, they had 
not resolved the problem of access to land for many rural people. In 1962, after 
pressure from peasant organizations, the National Agrarian Institute (INA), a parastatal 
body, was set up to distribute and ajudicate land; public lands  ^were made available to 
individual farmers. In 1972, Decree Law No 8, which was preceded by further peasant 
unrest, obliged landowners to rent out unused land. Finally, in January 1975, after land 
invasions and demonstrations by peasant organizations. Decree Law No 170 specified 
criteria for land redistribution from existing farms based on efficiency, land use and 
ceilings on farm size (INA, 1978). Redistributed land would be given to collectively 
organized groups of landless and near-landless peasants. By 1980, land reform had 
succeeded in providing land to 22% of landless and near landless producers (Ruhl, 
1984a, 53). Only 15% of this land was expropriated or purchased private land finom 
other farmers. The largest proportion (44%) was newly colonized public land, and 
another 13% was public land reclaimed frx>m illegal occupants. Twenty-eight per cent 
was land no longer being used by the United States banana companies in northern 
Honduras (Ruhl, 1984b, 124).
The number of landless and land poor was growing rather than declining in the early 
1980s and land fragmentation continued^^. Ruhl (1985) calculated that it would take 
50 years for landless and land poor to obtain land at the distribution rate then in 
operation. However, in the 1980s land distribution was largely superceded in offrcial 
focus and energy by a USAID-funded land titling project targeting farms between 5 and 
50 Has (USAID, 1982), a policy change I address in Section 2.3.1.
^ Public lands, also known as ’national’ or ’ejidaV lands, are under the jurisdiction o f the state or 
local municipality. They are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
The process o f land degradation and fragmentation efter the 1974 Census and 1975 Agrarian 
R^orm Act has been documented for Southern Honduras by Boyer, 1982.
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2.1,4 Rural poverty and unemployment
Along with access to land or other resources for production, access to work and 
adequate remuneration were, and still are, serious problems. Estimates of 
unenaployment are notoriously difficult in economies with high numbers of self- 
enq>loyed and temporary wage workers. Hernandez suggests that 41% of the 
economically active population was unemployed in 1986, based on calculations made 
by the Colegio Hondureno de Economistas (Honduran Economists' Association) 
(Hernandez, 1987,194).^^ Undererrq)loyment is a generalised problem but even rrxne 
difficult to estimate. Peek (1984) cites the Economic Commission for Latin America's 
data on kbour absorption in Honduran agriculture which show a large labour surplus 
on small farms and full onployment only on farms larger than 20 Has (only 12% of all 
farms according to the Agricultural Census of 1974) (ibid, 1984, 19). Further, 
according to Peek, wage anployment did not absorb the labour surplus and estimates 
indicated that 'on a year-round basis, 34.3 per cent of rural labour was unemployed' (op 
cit). My own calculations concerning maize farms also indicated the existence of a 
large quantity of surplus labour in rural areas (Johnson, 1988,23).
2dS  Economic and political crisis
Honduras was in economic crisis in the early 1980s. The crisis was characterized by 
voy low and negative real growth rates, growing external and fiscal debt^^, and real 
per capita incmne declined (Noé Pino, 1988,159 and 161). Official data showed a rise
The extent to which these data take mto account types o f work often excluded from statistics, 
particularly those done by women, is unclear.
Hernandez (1987) shows that the fiscal deficit increased from 4.4% o f GDP to 16% o f GDP in 
nominal terms between 1970 and 1985, The biggest leap took place in 1979-80 from 6 to 13% (ibid, 
163). Be^veen 1981 and 1985, total public debt increased in nominal terms from $3.4 billion to $5 8 
billion (ibid. 187).
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in unenq>loyment and undeienqiloyment and (with the posâble exception of the 
agricultural sector) declining real wages (ibid, 162-3). Noé Pino craicludes: Although 
the economic condition of the majority of the population was already severe at the 
beginning of the decade, there was a substantial drop in the standard of livii% for most 
Hondurans from 1980 to 1984' (ibid, 163).
As Noé Pino also points out, the economic crisis in the early 1980s was accompanied 
tty political changes. Military control of the government wt^ replaced with a 
democratically elected government, accompanied however with an alarming increase in 
physical repression. Land invasions by peasants became a terrorist act and strikes were 
curtailed (ibid, 164). Honduras was also a focus of United States foreign policy 
tiecause of its proximity to Nicaragua. The country became a site for hticaraguan 
contra-revolutionary activities, and the United States increased its military 
establishment and aid programme.
2.1.6 Food production, imports and aid
Although declining foreign exchange earnings from a number of agricultural and 
extractive products in the early 1980s were an additional component in the economic 
crisis (Noé Pino, 1988, 169), food staple production increased in the early 1980s 
relative to the 1970s, although it still showed some fluctuations (see Figure 2.1 which 
shows output trends for maize). There had also been incremental increases in maize 
yields over the 1970s figure 2.2). However, as Hgure 2.3 shows, national maiœ 
output per capita diminished, and while it could not necessarily have been predicted at 
the beginning of the 1980s, food grain outyut goierally stagnated or declined again in 
the latter part of the decade (Noé Pino and Perdomo, 1990,21).
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Figure 2.1 Honduras: maize output, 1970-85
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Figure 22 Honduras: maize yields, 1970-85
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Figure 23 Honduras: m^ze output per capita, 1970-85
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Source: calcuUtted from data provided by Banco Centred de Honduras. Departamento de Estutüos 
Econômicos, and CONSUPLANE
Noé Pino and Perdomo associate the increase in food staple production with 
contraction in the wider economy in the early 1980s, and the subequent decline in food 
production with the programme of economic reactivation directed towards export 
crops in the later years. Whatever the explanation for food output trends, fluctuations 
(widi incremental growth) in grain harvests remained a concern in the extent to which 
national food supplies could be provided fiom local production. The declining per 
capita production was also a worrying phenomenon given the shortage of foreign 
exchange to pay for food imports such as maize, which had increased during the 1970s 
and were still evident in the early 1980s (see Hgure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4 Honduras: exports and imports o f maize, 1970-85 (MT)
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In addition to grain imports, food aid grew and changed in nature in the early 1980s. 
These trends were indicative of the changing economic and political context described 
above. Between 1978 and 1983, food aid increased from 21,295 MT to 108,393 MT 
(World Food Programme, 1985, 13). Of total food aid, cereals as a component 
increased from 56 to 90% in the same period (pp cit). Furthermore, wheat and wheat 
flour^^ increased from 19 to 80% of food aid {op cit) and PL480 Title 1 increased from 
zero to 73% of the food aid received (ibid, 14)^ .^ A relatively small proportion (6-7%) 
of food aid was emergency aid. However, while food aid in 1979 was directed to
Data from the 1967-78 and 1978-79 income, erqtenditure and food consumption surveys show 
some substitution o f maize by wheat, particularly in urban areas (Instituto Hondureno de Mercadeo 
Agrkola(IHMA)IComisi6n Econômica Europea(CEE), 1981, Table 6). In the 1967-78 survey, no 
wheat was appareruly consumed. In 1978-79, the per capita consumption o f wheat in urban areas 
averaged 12 kgs a year. In rural areas, it had increased to 3 kgs.
PL480 Title 1 is long term, low interest loans used to buy grain which can be sold through 
commercial channels (World Food Programme, 1985,14).
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piojects -^ ,^ by 1983, most of it was non-project aid, or basically soft loans and grants 
which were used to try and improve output and productivity in the rural sector. 
Although project aid declined as proportion of food aid, the absolute amount increased 
by 600% in this period because of the presence of refugees from Nicaragua and El 
Salvador (iW, 18).
2.1.7 Concluding comment
These phenomena and trends, and the extent to which they were made public and 
addressed in the media or acted on by rural and urban organizations as well as related 
in offrcial documents, created a heightened awareness of food security issues in 
government ministries and aid institutions. They were also indicative that food 
insecurity was an ongoing problem. However, there were some gaps in approaches to 
understanding food insecurity and associated policy proposals, as I explain in Section 
2.3.
2.2 The changing context o f agricultural andfood policy debate
This thesis concentrates on two main areas of action on food. One is the discussions 
and policy measures among state institutions and influential international institutions in 
Honduras, such as USAID, which are directly related to or affect food security 
(especially with respect to maize) and are discussed in this and the next section. The 
other is the interplay of relations and strategies for survival and accumulation between 
maize farmers, and between farmers and traders, which is analysed from my fieldwork 
data in later chapters.
The key trend affecting policy changes with respect to food and agriculture was the
Food for work schemes and food assistance to vulnerable groups.
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move from what I would call reformist state 'interventionism' (Thomas and Potter, 
1992, 139) in the early 1970s to the gradual spread of neo-liberal policies intent on 
reinforcing the market and reducing direct state involvement in the economy, 
increasingly evident in the 1980s.
The 1950s and 1960s in Honduras were a period largely concerned with agricultural 
modernization for which the state was to provide some of the conditions. Land reform 
was debated, some modest measures implemented and the National Agrarian Institute 
(Instituto Nacional Agrario - INA) was set up to supervise land distribution. The 
Central Bank of Honduras (Banco Central de Honduras - BCH)and the National 
Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento - BANAFOM) were also established. 
One of the functions of BANAFOM was to set prices, purchase and store basic grains 
although its role in the grain market was far less than that of private trade. Honduras, 
along with four other Central American states, was involved in the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) until the war with El Salvador in 1969. CACM was 
established to promote import substituting industrialization and at that time, Honduras 
was regarded as a potential provider of food staples for the region.
State intervention in the economy became more prominent in the early period of the 
1970s, through the creation of public institutions to help direct investment, as well as 
the accelerated process of land reform and other measures to redistribute wealth and 
promote production in rural areas. There was 'intense data gathering' (Arriaga, 1986) 
for plarming during this period and later in the decade, such as the nutrition studies 
mentioned above and the Agricultural Census (1974). In addition to trying to increase 
rural ouqrut and incomes, the government took a further measure to try and control the 
supply of food staples in urban areas by creating a chain of cheap goods' stores 
throughout the country (Agenda del Banco Nacional de Fomento para el Suministro 
de Productos Bdsicos - BANASUPRO). Basic grains were supplied to these stores by
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BANAFOM.
However, the changing economic context at the end of the 1970s, and external political 
changes manifest in the Sandinista Revolution on Honduras's borders in 1979, gave rise 
to a review of state intervention in the econmny and the direction of particular policies. 
Even so, the 1978-83 National Development Plan for the agricultural sector continued 
to support an interventionist position. It stated that 'as well as its promotional, support 
and regulation functions and control of agricultural activity, the state will participate 
directly in the execution and operation of strategic projects, above all when its 
intavention is considered necessary to guarantee that the results of development 
specifically benefit low income groiqrs' (CONSUPLANE, 1978,38; my translation).
Thus the state was seen as having a role in promoting food production ly  small farmers 
and in partially regulating food markets and prices. The National Basic Grains 
Programme {Programa Nacional de Granos Bdsicos) and the Honduran Institute for 
Agricultural Marketing (Instituto Hondureno de Mercadeo Agrtcola - niMA) were set 
up at this time, as wdl as the Agricultural Development Bank (Banco Nacional de 
Desarrollo Agrtcola - BANADESA). The National Basic Grains Programme 
comprised a council including rqrresentatives from the Ministry of Natural Resources 
(Ministerio de Recursos Naturales - MNR), BANADESA, the INA, IHMA and the 
planning body, CONSUPLANE, to coordinate programmes of technical assistance, 
credit, machine hire services, agricultural inputs and to maintain a price support policy.
On the return to civilian government in 1982, regional economic and political crises 
meant that there was increasing pressure - from external creditors such as the IMF and 
World Bank, and policy advisers such as USAID - to chan^ the direction of economic 
policy and, in particular, reduce the role of the state in the ectmomy. A key source of 
external pressure to change policy direction in the 198(k came from the United States
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government. On the re-establishment of civilian government, the United States 
embassy presented its proposals for policies to revitalize the Honduran economy (so- 
called Reaganomics for Honduras'). In summary, these were to:
a) strengthen and streamline public administration
b) emphasize productive activities as well as social welfare measures
c) divest non-productive state enterprises
d) reform banking regulations to increase saving
e) set higher prices for forestry products
f) give more incentives to mining
g) promote foreign investment in tourism
h) eliminate price ceilings on some baâc products while giving adequate support to 
farmgate prices for basic grains
i) give investment incentives to world market products
j) plan use of resources better - eliminate large, costly projects
k) continue land reform by land titling and enabling the renting of land (Peckenham and
Street, 1985,247-249).
These proposals indicated the first steps to reducing state intravention in the eoonmry, 
and tins process was gradually reinforced during the 1980s. Althou^ the proposals 
woe trying in part to reinforce Honduras's comparative advantage* in agro-exports to 
earn mtne foreign exchange and help reduce fmeign debt, they did not encourage full- 
scale liberalization. Some acknowledgment is made of the need to contain poverty so 
while pice libaalization for some products was suggested, controls on farmgate pices 
were also urged. Although land distribution in terms of expropriation or colonization 
was not mentioned, giving secure tenure was supported. These were the first steps to 
encouraging a proper land market which was to be promoted with some force by the 
end of the decade.
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The influence of liberalization was evident in the Immediate Action Plan for 1984/85' 
drawn up by CONSUPLANE at the end of 1983, in contrast to the perspectives of the 
National Development Plan for 1978-83 cited above. The action plan emphasized the 
following measures:
a) to strengthen exports and ensure an adequate supply of food stuffs
b) to reduce unemployment and reactivate the economy
c) to promote and increase the private sector in the economy with the Government 
providing favourable conditions for investment (World Food Programme, 1985,11).
This brief account of changes in Honduran government thinking and policies in the 
1970s and early 1980s, and the external influences on them, provides a starting point 
for analysing food security and food policy debates in the 1980s. As we shall see, these 
debates reflected some of the reformist and interventionist thinking of the 1970s, as 
well as the pressures to liberalize in the 1980s.
2.5 Gaps in debates and proposals relating to rural food  insecurity
In Chapter 1, I argued that the following concepts were key in analysing rural food 
insecurity: class position, commoditization, exchange relations, social hiaarchies, 
powa" relations, and strategies for survival and accumulation. I now argue that these 
concepts, and the processes they help to explain, were only partially addressed by 
policy analysis and rq)proaches in the 1980s. .
23.1 Policies affecting access to and control over land
Land is a key aspect of the ownership entitlements of maize farmers. How maize 
farmers gain access to land - and the types of exchange relations that may be involved - 
affect their capacities to produce and reproduce rriaize, both for their own consurrytion
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as well as the market
- ■ ' .
There was a radical shift in policy direction between earlier policy measures on land
during the 1970s and those developed during the 1980s. The former were centred on
land reform which, in rhetoric, tried to create different Qypes of farm based on collective
as well as invidual property. The latter were more consciously directed to creating and
reinforcing a small farmer class.
Officials and advisers in both the 1970s and the 1980s debated and drew up policies 
which would affect the land, finance and technical inputs for maize production. A 
common feature was that state ministries and supporting institutions attempted to 
intensify production - by increasing access to land, providing security of tenure, and by 
setting up credit schemes so that farmers could purchase new technical inputs, and 
simultaneously further commoditize their production. Producing maize (and other 
grain) surpluses for the market was as much a concern among policy-makers as 
increasing farmers' productivities and incomes. However, given the differentiation of 
maize farmers, which I analyse in later chapters, increasing market pressures have 
differential effects on food security.
The Ley ide Reforma Agraria of 1975 was probably the most developed offrcial 
statement of land tenure relations in the 1970s. Its proposal to transform the agrarian 
structure by substituting the latifmdio and nUnifimdio Ty a system of property, tenure 
and land use which guarantees social justice in the countryside and increases 
production and productivity in the agricultural sector' (INA, 1978, 13; my translation) 
acknowledged the highly unequal distribution of land embodied in the latifimdio- 
ndnifundio system as well as the nature of relations between landowners and landless 
and land poor.
The latifundio-minifundio relationship is the classic historical characterization of
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agrarian structures in Latin America. Its historical evolution from the encomienda 
resulted in estates {haciendas or latijundios) operating in relation to different types of 
peasantries: those who provided labour service to landlords in return for small plots of 
land on the estate (in Central America, known as colonos), and peasants who operated 
their own small plots of land {minifundios) externally to the estates (or minifundistas). 
In Honduras, the combination of capitalist development in agriculture and legislation 
reduced the incidence of the internal peasant-landlord relations.
The 1975 legislation recognized the existence of differentiation the countryside based 
on access to land, but had a particular perspective on transformation of agrarian 
relations. Proposed measures included modernizing the latifundios, regrouping 
minifundios into larger, and apparently more economically viable, farm units^ ,^ 
terminating forms of land tenure which involved older (pre-capitalist) relations of 
labour service and share-cropping^^, and the collectivization of redistributed land in the 
hands of peasant groups, empresas asociativas (or joint enterprises) and cooperatives. 
As weU as providing land to landless and land-poor producers and security of tenure to 
small farmers, these measures were intended to transform the nature of agrarian 
relations and make them more accessible to modernization and capitalization.
Thus the notion of agrarian transformation in the 1975 law, drawn up tmder the 
reformist military government of General Lôpez Arrellano by officials and advisers who 
saw a chance of restructuring social relations in the countryside (see for example.
It was proposed that the minifundios (holdings wider 5 Has) should be expropriated, regrouped 
and allocated to the best farmers with the most dependants. Other minifundistas would be allocated 
land or compensated (INA, 1978, 27). The minifundios were seen as symptomatic o f land 
fragmentation, and considered ecologiccAly destructive and unproductive because o f the intensified 
land use and techniques o f cultivation employed fibid. 21).
^ ^  Some renting arrangements were also brought into question.
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Santos de Morals, 1975), ' inçlied doing away with pre-capitalist relations, and 
substituting them with modem farms based on a combination of private and collective 
ownership. However, implementation met with landowner resistance, and political and 
personnel changes among the military rulers also served to moderate the orginal 
intentions of the law. Furthermore, it is unclear from the literature that the forms of 
security, as well as insecurity, which different types of access to land might have 
provided for poor farmers were acknowledged by the law. In particular, the existence 
of a semi-proletarian population in rural areas which enters into different arrangements 
to obtain land remains a problem area for legislation as my research will show.
As redistributionist policies gave way to reinforcement of market forces, privatization 
and commoditization of land tenure relations became key aspects of further policy 
debate and recent legislation on land. The two main areas of debate focused on land 
titling and the creation of land markets. A considerable number of farms had national 
(or public) land and as the redistributive policies of the 1970s declined, government 
bodies, backed primarily by USAID, tumied their attention to the privatization of this 
land. A land titling programme was begun in the early 1980s after the return to civilian 
democracy, and legislation to create and reinfmce land markets was passed in the early 
1990s.
Documents on land titling avoided the issue of unequal land distribution and of semi- 
proletarian production. However, they did have an interesting analysis of land tenure 
relations. The perspectives of the land titling programme were encapsulated in this 
extract from a USAID background project paper:
'...the implementation of agrarian reform legislation has over the years 
focused exclusively on the creation, legalization, training, servicing, and 
titling of beneficiary groups. While 246 campesino groups received
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provisional property titles during the period 1975-81, only 17 
provisional titles were issued to individuals. The Suazo governments^ 
wishes to turn this around; adjudication efforts will emphasize the 
legalization of tenure of individual, family farm units of production.
The new (1982) administration of the INA shares this view. It is firmly 
committed to an agrarian reform based on the principles of private 
property...INA must concentrate on settling the land tenure situation of 
thousands of Honduran farmers who productively occupy thousands of 
hectares of national lands...Many of tiiese farmers have occupied their 
land for years, some have inherited the usufruct rights to their land fiom 
their ancestors and a few have purchased these rights from previous 
"owners". More importantly, they are farmers for whom the provision 
of expensive, government financed consolidation services would not be 
required.' (USAID, 1982,6)
The document goes on to say:
'The present structure of land tenure in Honduras can be described as a 
mixture of fee simple and neofeudal systems. The latter system itself, 
and the fear it engenders in fee simple holders of larger properties, 
adversely affect farmer incentives to increase productivity...Farmers in 
Honduras are uncertain of their future control over the land. This 
uncertainty is not unique to small producers; it is characteristic of all 
landholders. Small producers are largely untitled or possess titles of 
dominio M l [use rights] which are defective in that they do not bestow 
on the individual the ultimate right to definitively own the land he 
works. Larger producers, many of whom do not have legal titles 
granting full ownership rights, work their land not knowing when or if 
their rights of ownership will be challenged by an application of the 
agrarian reform law or by illegal invasion. Wwking under a cloud of 
uncertainty, landholders normally plan only in the short term...' (ibid,
10).
I have cited this document at length for two reasons. On one hand, it shows an 
awareness of the complex nature of land tenure relations in the Honduran countryside 
and how customary access, loaning, renting can simultaneously provide a means of 
livelihood (and accumulation) as well as being a source of risk and precariousness. On
Dr Roberto Suazo Cdrdova was president o f Honduras from 1982-86.
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the other hand, the document's main concern with these land tenure relations is because 
they are presumed to damage incentives to increase productivity, undertake innovations 
and prevent the formation of and access to ct^ital in the countryside (op cit). How 
different forms of tenure are linked, and the plight of those with access to tiny plots of 
land or no land at all are not addressed. Thus the project is not directed at the landless 
or land-poor, but what are called 'small, peasant farmers' (ibid, 11), specifically those 
having use rights to national or public land. As Fandino (1989) has commented, the 
policy does not take into account the widespread existence of semi-proletarian farming.
The land titling project was to be directed initially to coffee farmers, who were (and 
are) a key source of export earnings and government revenue. However, its orientation 
prefigured a more general move towards privatization and commoditization of land in 
farms. These processes could have potentially negative effects on the livelihoods of 
some groups - such as semi-proletarian and some petty commodity maize producers 
borrowing (and effectively renting) land. The plots used by semi-proletarian farmers in 
particular would be too small to be titled. Furthermore, if these farmers rented or 
borrowed such land from otho* farmers, they could in principle be dispossessed if the 
land was reclaimed by its 'owners' for titling.
A later USAID document on agricultural strategy for Honduras (1989) may have 
foreseen some of these problems and proposed reducing the mmimuin farm size for 
receiving titles to 2.5 Has (ibid, 59). This still would have excluded many farmers who 
rented or borrowed small plots, as well as semi-proletarian farmers who may have had 
access to plots of national land of as little as 1 manzam (.7 Ha).
The same document identifies the inability to rent land and ill-functioning land markets 
as key issues for the future of Honduran agriculture. The status of rented land in the 
1975 reform was unclear. On one hand, it was placed in the category of indirect land
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use forms (explotaciôn indirecta) which were to be abolished (INA, 1978,27). On the 
other, certain types of land use were not to be touched by the reform, especially that 
for export crops (ibid, 28). This left food staple production on rented land in a grey 
area. Although my fieldwork shows that renting land was common among small 
farmers, interviews indicated that landowners often only let out land to a few, trusted 
people. Thus proposals to allow the renting of land would not necessarily resolve the 
problem of access to land by small, land-poor and landless fiarmws, although a 
suggested land tax to encourage and intensify productive use of farm land (USAID, 
1989, 59) might eventually have freed up some land for small producers. However, 
implementing generalized taxation can only work if the infrastructure is there to 
implement it
These moves to create and reinforce private land ownership were followed by a new 
law, the Law for the Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector (Ley 
para la Modernizaciôn y el Desarrollo del Sector Agrtcola) of 1992. Measures 
included: permitting the sale of national land in farms of up to 200 Has which had been 
farmed for more than three years; changing the definition of minifundio to farms of less 
than 1 Ha rather than 5^ ;^ allowing renting of national land; and permitting joint 
investment ('coinversion’) in farming between different types of farm, including 
between collective and individual enterprises^^ (La Gaceta, April 6 1992, 6-7). As 
data in later chapters will substantiate, these proposals were likely to have mixed 
effects for maize farmers because of the exent of their social differentiation.
In conclusion, the land tenure changes outlined in the 1980s by USAID and later
Proposals for the eradication and regrouping o f these landholdings were the same as in the 1975 
Agrarian Reform Law (see Section 2.1.3 above).
I f  one o f the parties only provided land, sihe would receive rent.
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reinforced in Honduran legislation also intended to transform agrarian relations, but 
through the privatization and commoditization of land. From these changes, a class of 
small and medium farmers (petty commodity producers) was to be reinforced. While 
these policy ideas recognized the uneven development of land markets, they risked 
jeopardizing the means and relations though which many small farmers acquired access 
to land.
2J3  Policies directed to productive capacities
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was an ongoing programme to increase credit and 
technical assistance to maize farmers, largely run by the MRN with administrative 
backing from BANADESA (for credit) and the IHMA (which helped to recuperate 
loans from maize sales made to it by those receiving credit). In the 1970s, credit 
programmes were to run in parallel with land reform to reinforce the production of 
collectively organized peasant groups. In the 1980s, more attention was given to 
individual farmers.
In principle, such policies could help enhance producers' entitlements and capacities to 
reproduce maize. However the literature discussed below and my own research 
suggest that credit and technical assistance programmes did not generally reach farmers 
with very small plots, semi-proletarian farmers, and some types of peasant groups. 
Furthermore, the effects of creating and reinforcing petty commodity production and 
the potential risks faced by such farmers were not apparently foreseen. Thus on one 
hand, many maize farmers were excluded from credit and technical assistance 
programmes. On the other, where implemented, credit and technical assistance 
programmes could increase the risk of debt for many petty commodity producers of 
maize by putting additional pressures on them to commoditize production, when their 
possibilities of producing marketable surpluses and repaying their loans were often
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slim.
Peasant organizations often argued that they could not set up viable enterprises to 
produce basic grains (maize, rice, beans and sorghum) because of lack of access to 
credit. In the 1970s, most credit and technical assistance for organized groups and 
cooperatives was for producing export crops. Posas (1979) cited the INA policy of 
that time: The production of basic grains will be promoted principally in the areas and 
enterprises where there are no other production altematives...or in those situations in 
which the diversification of production is not viable because [groups are] just 
establishing themselves' (ibid, 104-105; my translation). As well as the articulated 
demand for credit and technical assistance fiom peasant organizations, there was 
pressure from foreign aid donors to make these services available to small individual 
producers of basic grains. For example, a World Food Programme report in the 1980s 
stated that the problems of achieving self-sufficiency in basic grain production - an aim 
of the 1982-86 National Development Plan - was the lack of sufficient resources at 
national level to implement an adequate technical assistance and credit scheme for small 
farmers'^  ^ (World Food Programme, 1986, 3). Evidence on bank credit fiom the 
1980s indicates that small maize farmers did not generally receive loans. My estimates 
based on data from the main agricultural lending bank, BANADESA, suggest that, in 
the early 1980s, about 90% of credit for maize went to farmers with more than 35 Has 
of land (Johnson, 1988, 60). At the end of the decade USAID stated that less than
The report went on to say: ‘small producers suffer from low yields due to their productive 
structure and lack o f support services, technological tranffer, efficient distribution systems and 
utilisation o f improved seeds, fertilizers and credit. They cannot overcome their situation on their 
own. Therffore, it is important that the government and interruaioned donors encourage and support 
the development o f farmer organizations that would permit higher productivity, higher production 
volumes, lower imput (sic) costs, better storage facilities, commercialization circuits and easier access 
to technical assistance and credit' (U>id, 5). It is irUeresting that this position (similar to that taken by 
the FAO and CEE during the same period) was rmning in parallel with the more libered economic 
views put forward by USAID.
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10% of all grain farmers received institutional credit at all (1989,39).
Even so, at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s, with assistance and intervention 
from external funders, special programmes known as Desarrollo Rural Integrado (DRI 
- Integrated Rural Development) were set up (Gâlvez, 1986^ )^. These projects were 
directed to the development of areas where most small farmers, whether organized in 
peasant groups or working individual plots, were producing the main food crops of 
maize and beans. Their objectives were to help diversify production into vegetables 
and fruit crops and promote marketing, as well as provide credit and technical 
assistance. For example, in one of my fieldwork areas, the DRI's mission was to: (i) 
increase the incomes of over 2,000 rural families by diversifying production; (ii) 
integrate organized groups, cooperatives and small individual farmers into local 
agricultural committees; and, (iii) improve nutrition and reduce dqrendence on 
producing basic grains through crop diversification (MRN/DARCO^^ et al, 1984,1-2). 
The means for carrying out these objectives were primarily credit programmes and 
technical assistance, financed 90% by the European Economic Community (Gâlvez, 
1986, 26). However, the possibly negative effects of debt arising fix>m increasingly 
commoditized production promoted by credit schemes was not evident in the 
documents. My data suggest that this was a serious problem for some of the farmers 
that I interviewed.
In practice, the DRIs were designed to assist and reinforce the production of petty
Gâlvez's view was that 'in the case o f the DRIs in Honduras, the policy o f rural development does 
not appear as a proposal from a private pressure group, nor from the peasants, nor from the 
government. It rather originates as a particular policy arising from an arudysis o f trends in the 
intertuuiotud economy by centres o f finance or international developmeta and which have decided to 
promote a policy o f support for Third World governments by initiating programmes and projects 
directed towards small producers' (ibid. 9; my translation).
23 Direcc^n Agrtcola Regional Centro Oriental
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commodity producers. They were not directed at the needs of semi-proletarian 
farmers. In the experience of the MRN/European Economic Community project 
mentioned above, such farmers fell outside the credit scheme. The analysis carried out 
by Gâlvez argues that poor farmers were effectively excluded because they did not own 
land and it was expected that they would therefore not want to invest in production and 
make technical innovations (ibid, 13-14). Gâlvez further points out that the supposed 
participatory and integrative nature of the programmes was made difficult by the social 
differentiation of the producers involved. In the DRI I became familiar with, extension 
workers had to try and negotiate the complexity of social relations in the communities 
in which they worked, as well as try to implement a programme of technical change.
Thus, policies directed to credit and technical assistance in Honduras reflected several 
dilemmas for food security and food policy. How was it possible to reach even the 
smallest farmers with limited finance, when they were often atomized (hence the 
attempts to integrate farmers into agricultural committees through the DRIs)? Could 
credit and technical assistance reinforce the food security of maize farmers only if other 
social relations of production and exchange were changed? Cbuld credit and technical 
assistance programmes help to change social relations which mq>eded maize production 
and help provide individual farmer as well as national self-sufficiency^  ^ in maize? Or 
were such programmes really a means to pressurize farmers into making maize sales 
which undermined their consumption needs to pay back their debts - in other words, a 
form of institutionalized forced commerce ? My fieldwork throws further light on
24 Note that, as other analysts o f Honduran food and agricultural policy have pointed out (for 
example, Norton, 79S8), I do not regard self-sifficiency in maize as the same as food security in 
maize. As well as by increasing national output, national food security in maize may also be achieved 
by a combination o f imports and national output if  people have adequate incomes to buy maize, and if  
the government is able to finance imports without incurring unwanted debts or undesired political and 
economic ties.
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these issues in Chapters 5-7.
2J.3 Market efficiency and market incentives
Much of the policy discussion and many of the measures of the 1980s, in particular, 
centred on how to make markets operate more smoothly and with as few price 
distortions as possible, while simultaneously trying to implement a pricing policy which 
would act as an incentive to maize producers and not penalize maize consumers. I 
argue that notions such as market efficiency and market incentives are insufficient alone 
to analyse the effects that market forces might have on maize farmers.
The extent of documentation, articles and studies on different aspects of basic grain 
markets in the 1980s is notable (for example, Aguirre and Tablada, 1988, 1989; 
Economic Perspectives, 1986; Hanrahan, 1983; KSU, 1985; Larson, 1982; Loria and 
Cuevas, 1984; Norton and Benito, 1987; Pollard et al, 1984; Quezada and Scobie, n.d.; 
USAID, 1978b). I cannot deal with all the issues and points of debate which were 
raised by this literature. The issues I focus on here are state intervention in output 
markets and prices, and the role of price incentives.
(i) State intervention and prices
Whether and to what extent the state should intervene in grain markets was a policy 
issue raised by the perceived weaknesses of the grain marketing board, IHMA. As 
indicated in Section 2.2, serious state intervention in maize markets started with 
BANAFOM grain purchases in the 1950s. In 1978, the IHMA took on the functions of 
price stabilization to urban consumers and providing guaranteed prices to farmers, as 
well as those of controlling all imports and exports of grains.2  ^ However, evaluations
2^ Apart from its monopoly o f imports and ejq>orts, the IHMA has in practice only controlled a m all 
percentage o f the marketed grain produced in Honduras - most trade is in the hands o f private Praders
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of the IHMA's role (for exan^le. Economic Perspectives, 1986) suggested that state 
intervention in markets should be reduced and refined.2<^
There were many problems with state intervention in maize markets in Honduras in the 
1980s. The IHMA was underfinanced. There were difficulties with price setting; when 
guaranteed prices were considerably higher than farmgate prices, IHMA did not 
necessarily have the financial capacity to buy, and it was suggested that the IHMA did 
not actually help to increase farmgate maize prices (USAID, 1989, 12). The majority 
of farmers, especially small ones, did not in practice sell maize to the IHMA, either 
because they did not receive institutional credit whose terms would have involved the 
possibility of repaying part of their debt through sales to the IHMA, or because of the 
lengthy and costly process of transporting maize and having it valued. IHMA projects 
to attempt to reach other than large commercial farmers, such as organized peasant 
groups and cooperatives, through rural storage programmes also had financial and 
managerial difficulties.
Thus, as in other parts of the world, the state marketing board in Honduras came under 
criticism. The conclusions from the criticisms were to propose limiting or reducing the 
nWA's role and that of state intervention in grain markets in general. For example, 
the 1986 evaluation of the IHMA made for USAID suggested that the IHMA should be
(and millers, in the case o f rice). One estinute o f IIIMA’s partipation in national trade was that it 
purchased an average o f 8% o f marketed maize (in my estimates fluctuating between 1 and 16% o f 
marketed maize between 1978 and 1985 [Johnson, 1988, 180bJ), 12, 8 and 3% o f beans, rice and 
sorghum respectively; 78% o f all IHMA’s purchases and sales were maize, the rest being 19% beans, 
8% rice and 4% sorghum (Economic Perspectives, 1986, ii).
2é Personal interviews with IHMA personnel between 7986 && indicated differences o f opinion 
between external funders o f the IHMA as to its appropriate role. For example, the Ewopean 
Economic Community, which was supporting an IHMA project for establishing regional grain silos to 
be managed by organized peasant groups, favoured a much more interventionist IHMA than USAID. 
While critical o f IHMA operations, the . FAO also advocated measures to make its activities more 
efficient but did not make any proposals for privatization or deregulation (FAO/FSAS, 1986).
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a market facilitator, should have price bands just for maize and beans, in^vening only 
when farmgate prices W1 below or consumer prices rose above them. It should also 
privatize its storage facilities, and generally assist market efficiency by providing 
information about harvests and prices, and by improving the control of grain quality, 
weights and measures (Economic Perspectives, 1986). These proposals were further 
reinforced in a USAID strategy paper for the agricultural sector, which also promoted 
removing most, if not all, price controls and cmnpensating the poor with a targeted 
food aid programme (USAID, 1989).
The proposal to limit state intervention in markets to the role of facilitating efficiency 
reflects a particular perspective on how markets function, how prices are determined 
and the importance of price in allocating resources, goods and services. Although die 
1986 USAID view did not advocate complete deregulation, it was characteristic of 
widespread attempts to establish greater free trade in food grains in the 1980s (Haniss 
and Crow, 199222). There were a number of problems with this approach - 
conceptually and in how it could affect food security.
Measures to dægulate food markets are generally based on economic models which 
use a rather abstract conception of market forces. Siqiply and demand, through the 
price mechanism, are seen as the best and most effidoit allocators of resources, goods 
and services^ .^ Furthermcne, people are seen to enter economic transactions
22 Harms and Crow have made a usefid analysis and sumnuay o f these processes and their effects 
in Somalia, Bangladesh and Malawi.
2^ It should be noted that there are quite sophisticated formulations o f this position as well as o f 
critiques wühin orthodox economics. For example, Timmer (1986) states: 'Markets are fragile 
instruments for the efficient allocation o f resources, but they are tenacious in providing contrary 
signals to a government whose price policy is badly out o f line with available resources' (ibid. 149). 
Timmer argues that prices are key signals to decision-makers involved in supply and demand. In food 
markets, price acts as a means o f adjustment from one disequilibrium to another. Governments 
should help the more painful aspects o f these processes by keeping transport costs down, providing 
better access to credit etc. However, this view still presupposes that producers are able to make
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voluntarily. But even under capitalism, transactions can include coercive elements. As 
stated by Bhaduri: "Exchange is a surface phenomenon of economic life - reflecting the 
underlying economic and social organization of production. Consequently, exchange 
relations are not general, but specific to each mode of economic organization that 
shapes them' (1983,1).
The social content of exchange relations and the uneven development of markets, 
which may be part of the development of capitalism and people's strategies for 
accumulation and survival, can affect supply and demand, and hence prices. As argued 
by Indian economist, Bharadwaj, agricultural prices are determined by a combination of 
structural conditions of production which affect how and whether marketable surpluses 
are produced, and different market relations and networks into which output is sold 
(Bharadwaj, 1990,9).
This perspective inches that price policies alone cannot resolve the problems of 
increasing output and productivity, nor the structural issues underlying food insecurity. 
This is in contrast to a 1980s World Bank view, cited by Barker (1989) which 
suggested that peasants would respond to price increases resulting fiom deegulation 
by increasing their output and productivity, as long as other aspects of markets (for 
exarrq)le, transport) worked smoothly (ibid, 104). Howeve, othe issues need to be 
taken into account: peasants' social positions, the uneven effects of commoditization, 
and the role of other social processes in decisions about livelihood strategies. As 
economist, C.P. Timmer, has pointed out (1986), understanding the potentially wider
different kinds o f decisions based on price information and are able to make choices about investing 
their resources. Many semi-proletarian and petty commodity producers will not necessarily have 
other options or the social and physical mobility to take adveuitage o f price signals. As Bardhan 
suggests, peasants may engage in strategic behaviour which is only partially integrated into the 
market and involves (non-market) links to provide insurance against (market) risks (1989,6).
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effects of price policies requires a political economy approach. .
My own position is closer to that argued by Junankar, in his discussion of peasant 
responses to price signals, namely that The matrix within which a rich, powerful, 
ctq>italist farmer operates is very different from that in which a small peasant operates' 
(1989, 179). Thus, if peasant maize farmers, or petty commodity and semi-proletarian 
producers, in Honduras are part of capitalist relations of production and distribution, 
but resort to non-commoditized or non-market mechanisms of reproducing taaize 
production and access to maize (as well as operating in the market), price and price 
changes will not necessarily have the expected effects. Furthermore, semi-proletarian 
farmers, who are usually net purchasers of maize, will not necessarily benefit if 
farmgate (and therefore consumer) prices rise. As stated by Bharadwaj, 'The question 
is therefore not so much whether prices matter but their differential impact 
Furthermore, the question is not only whether the price policy is effective but whether 
it produces the effects desired' (Bharadwaj, 1990,25).
(ii) The role of price incentives
Some of the problems raised by this discussion were present in other aspects of 
Honduran debates on price policy, for example protectionism and price incentives. The 
issue of protectionism is related to the role and nature of state intervention. In the 
early 1980s, some analysts (for example, Hanrahan, 1983; ()uezada and Scobie, n.d.) 
had concluded that maize producers were being protected and subsidized by the 
guaranteed prices set by the IHMA and the IHMA's control and sale of all maize 
imports (at prices related to IHMA's stabilization price to traders). However, Aguirre 
and Tablada (1989) calculated not only that average real farmgate prices had declined 
between 1978-88 (see Figure 2.5), but that the nominal and effective rates of protection 
for maize and other basic grains producers were negative. They concluded that
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production was not as subsidized or inefficient as had been thought in the earlier 
analyses. They also argued that there was a transfer of resources fiom maize producers 
to traders and industry which actually acted as a disincentive to production. In price 
terms, improving' farmers who used new technologies woo being discouraged fiom 
producing because of the transfer of resources taking place through the imported 
coinponent of inputs^ .^ In other words, ternis of trade were unfavourable to maize and 
otiier basic grains farmers. Aguirre and Tablada promoted the idea of more transparent 
markets, especially for inputs, which they thought would lead in turn to a better 
distribution of resources, higher output and productivity and would raise agricultural 
wages and incomes. However, aware of the differraitiation among maize producers, 
they were also strong proponents of differentiated policies in technology change and 
pricing structures (although were not explicit about how such policies would be 
inq>lemented).
Figure 2 J  Honduras: nominal and real farmgate prices for maize, 
1978-88
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Source: calculated from Aguirre and Tablada, 1988, Table 22 (prices indexed to 1978 - ibid, 21)
A study by CONSUPLANE estimated that companies importing and marketing chemical inputs 
had gross profit rates o f 70-78% for fertilizers and even more for herbicides and insecticides 
(CONSUPLANE. 1986, Appendix 17).
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There are two issues involved in this debate. One is whethw price incmtives to farmers 
would help increase marketed output and achieve self-sufficiency in maize. The other, 
of particular concern here, is whether price policies (combined with other measures in 
Aguirre and Tablada's view) could help achieve food security among maize producers 
inqnoving their exchange entitlements. Again, key questions are the diffoentiation 
of producers, the degree of commoditization of production, what means producers use 
to acquire land and inputs, and what interlinkages exist between the different processes 
of exchange they engage in and how exchange affects their productive edacities. 
However Aguirre and Tablada concentrated on market variables and did not analyse 
the links between the Qfpes of production they identified. Although their analysis 
anployed a sophisticated use of data, dieir recommaidations might have had 
unanticipated effects.
(in) Conclusion
In conclusion, while one of the key areas of debate during the 1980s was the role of 
markets and prices in increasing maize ouq>ut, there was little analysis of markets as 
social phentmiena comprising diffmott interests and ctqpadties to participate. The main 
absences were any recognititm of the role of non-market exchange in producing and 
reproducing maize, and how social differentiation and local power relations rrü^t 
affect the capacities of farmers to respond to price signals in the ways expected. This is 
not an argument against policies to increase farmgate prices or control the prices 
farm inputs (assuming, as Bharadwaj pointed out, that such policies can have the 
desired effects). It is an argument for understanding betto* the social relatitxis in which 
maize is produced, the strategies of survival and accumulation used ly  producers, and 
how market and non-market fences affect them.
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2.4 Summary
This chapter has provided some of the context of policy discussions on maize 
production and rural food insecurity in Honduras during the 1980s. It has argued that 
an increasing awareness of food security issues developed during the 1980s as a result 
of nutritional and poverty studies in both urban and rural areas, pressures fiom peasant 
organizations on land, and increasing food imports and aid in a context of economic 
crisis. This awareness coincided with a changing political and policy context. As 
Honduras moved from military to civilian government, it also moved fiom an era of 
reform and state intervention in the economy to a period of increasing liberalization, 
partly resulting from external financial and policy pressures. This meant that although 
there were attempts to effect redistributive measures in the countryside in the 1970s 
which would have helped some maize farmers, tendencies towards reinforcing market 
forces in the 1980s would have been likely to maintain unequal social relations 
adversely affecting many small farmers. The role of social relations in production and 
exchange, and the effects that social hierarchies and forms of non-market exchange 
might have on access to land, credit and technical assistance programmes, and the 
organization and functioning of markets and prices, were only partially evident in policy 
debates.
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Ch a pte r s
R e s e a r c h in g  m a iz e
Introduction
This chapter explains how I researched the relations of production and exchange of 
maize in Honduras. Research is a dialectical process relating the abstract and 
theoretical with the tangible and empirical, each of which is constantly informing the 
other. Thus initial assumptions and questions are often challenged. Research is also 
often much more unpredictable than text books would have us believe, although this 
aspect is not always evident in how research results are presented. Data analysis and 
reflection take place alongside data collection, but it is only in writing up that evidence 
and e>q)lanation are linked.
The outcomes of research can never provide final or complete e}q)lanations of 
phenomena. In the social sciences they contribute to ongoing debates about social 
organization and change. It is the hope of this researcher that they also contribute to 
the process of bringing about changes for the better of the rural poor in Honduras.
I look first at some of the general questions and issues involved in carrying out this 
research and explain the use I have made of data and evidence which existed before I 
did my fieldwork. Then I outline the stages of my fieldwork and explain how I carried 
it out, pointing out some the problems and surprises.
3.1 General questions and issues
The main questions when I started this research were (i) what were the obstacles 
preventing farmers fiom producing adequate maize for direct consumption and
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inq)eding them from reproducing or expanding the crop in the following season? (ii) 
what role was played by exchange relations in creating or reinforcing these obstacles? 
These questions arose out of earlier work on a maize sub-system study which was part 
of a Central American project on agricultural production, biotechnology and food 
security (Johnson, 1988). I began working with some general theoretical ideas about 
the social differentiation of producers, how commoditization might affect productive 
capacities, and how the uneven development and control of markets might have 
different effects for different types of producer. Thus, there were many issues of 
interest to me in maize production and maize markets at that time.
There were absences and preconceptions of my own that I had to contend with. One 
was that I was not an agronomist and had much to leam about the processes of 
growing, harvesting and processing maize. Another was that although I had visited 
Honduras several times during the latter half of the 1970s to look at projects being run 
by peasant organizations, I had no real experience of life in the Honduran countryside. 
I had a relatively simple view of rural social relations and was to discover that they 
were much more complex than I had initially thought. I also had certain assumptions 
about the nature of trade, partly arising from field studies in other parts of the world 
(for example. Crow, 1987; Harriss, 1980) and partly fiom anecdotal information and 
press reports in Honduras. For example, I thought that there would be evidence of 
oligopolies in trade affecting prices, that farmers' relations with traders would be their 
main source of indebtedness, and that social differentiation among fiumas would result 
in different farmers receiving different prices. I neither proved nor disproved the first 
point: maize markets appeared competitive in the areas I worked in but I would 
hesitate to say that the large traders in urban market centres exerted no control over
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trade^. I discovered that more in^ortant as a source of loans and potential debts were 
other local farmers (who may, however, also have engaged in some trading) rather dian 
the truckers and traders who came from outside the community  ^ Finally, my evidence 
on price differentials suggested, if farmers were grouped into class categories they 
could be shown to receive a different average price, but individual prices received could 
vary across the spectrum irrespective of social position. Thus I had many things to 
leam.
To research my main questions, I undertook two main areas of work. The first was to 
look at all existing data and studies on maize and to talk to as many people as I could 
(ministry officials, other researchers, agronomists and extension workers, and peasant 
group organizers). The second was to interview maize farmers (individual producers 
and those orgartized in peasant groups), traders, and those running companies which 
processed maize, as well as extension workers in the fieldwork areas. I return to the 
interviewing process below and discuss my secondary sources and initial contacts here.
The main source of statistical data (apart fiom those which had been gathered and 
processed in other studies) was the agricultural censuses and surveys. There had been 
three major agricultural censuses, in 1952, 1966 and 1974. These censuses contained 
data on land distribution, forms of tenure, land use, farms, area occupied by specific 
crops and output, livestock and use of machinery. Published data existed by municipio 
and department as well as farm size. Some of the data had been well-worked.
 ^ Other studies o f basic grains markets in Honduras have implied that there is a high level o f 
competition, tdthough not necessarily a high level o f 'market efficiency’ (Chapter 2) with respect to 
infrastructure, storage, weights and measures etc (eg IRI Research Institute, 1985; Loria and Cuevas, 
1984; Pollard, Graham and Cuevas, 1984).
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summarized, and digested m many subsequent studies .^ As no-one seemed to have 
analysed precisely how changing access to land might have affected the entitlements of 
maize producers, I extracted and computerized data on land distribution, tenure and 
use, as well as data on maize production, fiom the 1952 and 1974 censuses, for further 
processing. I chose these data in part because they used compatible measurement 
categories, but mainly because they represented information on two key periods of 
Honduran agrarian history: the modernization processes beginiting in the 1950s, and 
the era of land reform in the 1970s (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). These, as well as 
other data fiom an agricultural survey in 1984, data on commercialization, imports and 
exports fiom the IHMA and the MRN, and economic data fiom CONSUPLANE and 
the BCH, formed the backbone of my initial attempts to understand the place of maigie 
in the Honduran economy. Some of tins secondary data work is analysed in Johnson 
1988, but further analysis relevant to this thesis is presented in Chapter 4.
Although aware at the time of the problems of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation (some of which I was also to encounter in my own fieldwork), I knew 
that the changes in land distribution, use and tenure observed fiom the 1952 to the 
1974 censuses had generally been accepted in official and academic circles in Honduras 
as indicative of real trends. (Post 1974, the data are less comprehensive.) However, I 
am aware of the serious and well-founded criticisms of census and survey data (and 
statistics in general), particularly of their conceptual frameworks and the manner of 
their collection, as well as the use of questionnaires or schedules in fieldwork (which I
^ Notable among which is del Cid (1977) who analysed data from the 1952 and 1966 censuses for a 
study on 'agrarian reform and dependent capitalism’.
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L return to below) .^ I should thus point out that my use of these data in this thesis is to 
indicate trends rather than provide a definitive analysis of land and maize production in 
the Honduran countryside. They indicate how Honduran agrarian structures changed 
over time, and suggest how these structures might have been at the time of try 
fieldwork.
Apart from reading available studies, the other means of gaining a basic understanding 
of the dynamics of maize production and markets was by talking to as many people as 
possible. I interviewed people in the MRN, IHMA, CONSUPLANE, INA, BCH, and 
various dq>artments in the hfirtistry of the Economy. I also talked to members olE 
NGOs working with maize producers, and quizzed agronomists and individuals 
working with peasant organizations on production processes, knowledge of markets, 
and social relations in the villages where they worked. Some of these notes have found 
their way into this thesis.
Maize is ubiquitous in Honduras, but there is considerable regional variation in the 
precise forms of and agreements over access to land, the quality of the land available, 
techniques of production used and yields, how people orgartize access to labour, and 
the extent to which they can produce marketable surpluses (or have to sell maize). 
Some regions, particularly the north and east, were increasingly seen by policy-makers 
as the grainbowl of the country, while in otha: areas, notably parts of the west and 
south, maize was regarded as a rather precarious, subsistence crop^. Furthermore,
Ustfrd critiques have been articulated by writers on research and policy issues in rural areas such 
as Chambers (19S3) and Gill (1993)-. and authors in the field o f gender and devehpmentijbr example 
Dixon-Mueller, 1985; Jackson, 1991; Poats et al, 1988.
4 The differences and changes in number e f maize farms, area and output for the departments over 
the 1952-74 period can be seen in Appendix 3.1. Cff particular note is the growth in maize area and 
output in the departments ofAtldntida, Colân, Cortés, El Paralso, Olancho and Yoro, all o f which lie 
in the north, north-east and east o f Honduras. Some o f these departments were sites for colonization 
o f new lands. By contrast, a few  depcatments have substantUdly increased thebr number o f maize
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although there were regional grain markets, the key centres were in three major cities, 
Tegucigalpa, the capital, San Pedro Sula in the north, and Choluteca in the south. How 
was I going to decide where to do my fieldwork, and how generalizable would ny 
findings be?
I discuss the choice of my fieldwork sites below. On the extent to which I would be 
able to generalize from my findings, I decided to take the following approach. First, as 
my research progressed, I would compare my experiences with those of agronomists, 
peasant leaders and others I knew working in different parts of the country. This 
would not necessarily establish the veracity or general nature of my findings but would 
provide a context and sounding board. Second, was to recognize that case studies 
would enable me to research social relations. Case studies permit the collection of 
different kinds of detailed information which can in turn be set in (and inform analysis 
of) the wider context.
3.2 Doing JUld research
Work constraints required relatively easy access to fieldwork sites and the use of 
existing contacts (or to be where I could readily make them). I also wanted be situated 
where there were established grain market centres so that I could explore links between 
these markets and the farmers I would be interviewing. In addition, I wanted to look at 
two different areas of the country, to situate my fieldwork within the wider context, 
analyse different types of maize production, and investigate different market places. I
farms without equivalent increases in area and output. CholMeca and Valle are two examples, 
located in the poor and relatively arid south o f the country. Ocotepeque, an underdeveloped 
department in the west, actually lost farms and area planted with maize during this period, primarily 
because o f substantial out-migration (Kramer, 1986), although output was sustained because o f 
increased yields.
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thus wanted to interview different types of maize farmer, including peasant groups, as 
well as a range of traders, from petty traders to large wholesalers. I also wanted access 
to those working in industrial processing to understand the nature of industrial demand 
for maize, although much of this material subsequently fell outside the scope of this 
thesis.
Combining these requirements with different kinds of contacts led me to carry out my 
fieldwork in two stages. The first was in Danlf and the valley of Jamastrân in the 
eastern department of El Parafso, near the Nicaraguan border (see Figure 3.1). It was 
carried out during the period of land preparation for sowing the primerai crop in 1987. 
Here, I interviewed 28 individual farmers and members of 4 peasant groups fiom 
different peasant organizations in two villages called Chichicaste and Jutiapa, both 
located in the Jamastrân Valley. I then interviewed a cross-section of traders, 8 in all, 
in the town of Danlf. In addition, I carried out further interviews with personnel 
working in the local integrated rural development project (DRI), the INA and the 
IHMA, as well as talking to other informants in the area. The second stage of my 
fieldwork took place about a year later and was located in the rural communiy of Quita 
Sueno in the valley of ()uimistân in the department of Santa Bârbara, and the city of 
San Pedro Sula, in the neighbouring department of Cortés (see also Figure 3.1). In this 
part of my fieldwork, I interviewed the members of 10 peasant groups in ()uita Sueno 
who formed a sectorial, or section, within a national peasant organization, and also 
talked to other informants such as extension workers and members of a local 
cooperative as well as one or two village traders mentioned by the groups. In the city
^  There are two maize crops in Honduras. The first, called the primera, is usually sown in May!June 
and harvested between September and January. This is the main crop. A second crop, the postrera or 
segunda. is sown mainly in the northern fertile and rainy areas in the early months o f the year and 
harvested around AprillMaylJune, although some farmers in other parts o f the country also manage to 
cultivate a second luirvest.
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of San Pedro Sula I interviewed 9 of large wholesalers, and managers in 10 companies 
which processed maize. Again, I also talked to other informants in the Chamber of 
Commerce and in the IHMA. A summary of the two stages of my fieldwork is 
presented in Table 3.1.
I now describe the fieldwork process in more detail. Rather than taking it in 
chronological order, I first explain how I interviewed maize farmers, in both Jamastrân 
(El Parafso) and Quita Sueno (Santa Bârbara). Then I discuss some of the issues 
involved in interviewing traders and describe what I did. Finally, I briefly outline 
interviewing industrialists, although few of those data are included in this thesis.
Table 3.1 Summary o f fieldwork stages
1987 1988
Villages o f Chichicaste 
and Jutiapa, Valley o f 
Jamastrân, in the 
Department o f El 
Parafso
Interviewed 28 farnios 
and members of 4 
separate groups fiom 
diffoent peasant 
organizations; other 
informants: extension 
workers, DRI 
personnel, INA
Community o f Quita 
Sueno, Valley o f 
Quimistân, in the 
Department o f Santa 
Bârbara
Interviewed members 
of 10 groups forming a 
section of a national 
peasant organization; 
other informants: 
extension workers, 
members of a local 
coopaative, local 
traders
Town o f Danlf, in the 
Department o f El 
Parafso
Intaviewed 8 traders; 
other informants: DRI 
personnel, IHMA, other 
personal contacts
. City o f San Pedro Sula, 
in the Department o f 
Cortés
Interviewed 9 
wholesalers and 10 
industrialists; other 
informants: persoimel 
in the IHMA and 
Chamba of Commerce
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32.1 Interviewing individual mainte fanners and peasant groups in El Para&o
El Parafso lies on the eastern side of Honduras, near the Nicaraguan border. Its main 
market centre, Danlf, is about 100 kms or one and a half hours' journey by road from 
the capital of Honduras, Tegucigalpa. Danlf is a market town but also has some local 
agro-industry, including tobacco processing, saw mills, and a slaughter house and 
meat-packing plant and, at that time, was also the site of an IHMA granary. Apart 
from basic food crops, especially maize and beans, the department of El Parafso 
produces coffee, cotton, tobacco, sugar cane and beef.
Jamastrân is the largest valley in the department and is seen as one of the growth areas 
for maize production in Honduras, although it is not as key in terms of area and output 
as some of the departments in the north and north-east (see Appendix 3.1 and Foomote 
4 above). Although marketed maize leaves the area for urban centres during the 
harvest, it is also brought in for local sale in the lean season. Maize is not however the 
main crop in terms of land area. Pasture occupies most of the land, and tobacco and 
cotton are important crops. Coffee is grown in the mountainous areas bordering the 
valley.
The villages of Chichicaste and Jutiapa are located in the Jamastrân Valley. Chichicaste 
is a village of over 1,000 inhabitants, including migrants from other parts of El Parafso 
as well as Francisco Morazân, who arrived during the fifties and sixties looking for 
land .^ It is 37 kilometres from Danlf at the end of the valley, on the edge of the 
mountainous border with Nicaragua. The land in the village and surrounding hamlets is 
a mixture of narrow valleys and hills. Jutiapa has about 2,500 inhabitants, also
^ Although there was migration into El Paralso in the 1950s and 1960s, there were even more people 
who left the department during this period, particularly for Francisco Morazân and the capital, 
Tegucigalpa (Howard Ballard, 1987,608,616,619).
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including first generation migrants, but many families have spent several generations 
there. It is located some kilometres down a dirt road off the main route through 
Jamastrân, about half-way between Chichicaste and Danlf, but about 30 kms fiom 
Danlf. The land is mainly flat although there are more undulating areas in the hamlets 
near the hilly, coffee-growing areas near Danlf and the nearby capital town of El 
Parafso. The location of these villages is shown in Figure 3.2.
I chose these villages for the following reasons. First, there were differences which 
would allow some comparison of relations of production and exchange.^ The villages 
were different in terrain and in distance from markets. An initial visit suggested that 
Jutiapa was integrated into the commercialization of agricultural production in the 
valley, and was surrounded by large farms engaged in commercial crops and beef 
production. Young people (in other words, teenagers and young adults) were more 
evident in Jutiapa than in Chichicaste suggesting that work was available. There was 
also public transport connecting the village to Danlf. Chichicaste appeared (in relative 
terms) more isolated fiom commercial developments in the valley, and the limits ©f its 
undulating terrain (as well as the concentration of landownership in the valley) meant 
that large farmers were colonizing land further afield, especially in the department of 
Olancho. Being near the Nicaraguan border, Chichicaste was subject to some of the 
side effects of the war taking place in Nicaragua. On one hand, trucks of Honduran 
troops would pass through the village on their way to a nearby camp, and there were 
stories of Nicaraguan Contra coming to the village to buy provisions. On the other 
hand; the village had become a focus for infrastructural improvements, such as piped
Because these villages have some different characteristics, in the analysis o f my fieldwork I  
sometime treat the data separately because important variations are apparent. When data differences 
are insignificant, I  put the data for the two villages together.
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water pumped up from the nearby River Guayambie (evay second day), and better 
roads, as well as services such as mobile health brigades from the United States.
The second reason was that both villages were widiin relatively easy reach fiom Danlf 
which I could use as my organizational base. Furthermore, the MRN was running an 
integrated rural development project (a DRI) in the area and had operational extension 
offices in both Chichicaste and Jutiapa which I could use as additional sources of 
information and as a means of contacting a range of maize producers. In Danlf I had 
access to infcmnation held by the regional office of the MRN and contacts there were 
able to help me find accommodation in the villages. Die INA also had an (Æfice in 
Danlf as did the IHMA. Furthamore, there was a local, and dynamic, maize market 
where I would be able to interview traders.
To obtain the collaboration of the MRN and the extension offices, I had to be 
interviewed by the heads of the local office in Danlf. Although I had been given a 
recommendation from officials in Tegucigalpa, local staff rightly wanted to establish ny 
credentials. I was then introduced to a number of staff who could help with 
information in Danlf and then to the heads of the extension offices. Other staff helped 
with local information and introductions.
Because of the existence of the DRI, there was ctmsiderable information in both Danlf 
and the villa^ extension offices about local production condititms and farmers 
participating in the project. As I did not have time to do a general household survey 
from which to select a sample, I decided to ask the extension workers to help me 
identify maize farmers as well as introduce me to some of them. I wanted to interview 
different types of maize producer, including some of the very large farmers as well as 
collectivdy-oiganized peasant groups. I dœided to base ny selection on farm size - 
irrespective of means of access to land - rather than area planted with maize. Diis was
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in part because the latter can change fiom year to year, and in part because I wanted to 
test evidence leaned fiom the agricultural censuses on the type and degree of intensify 
of land use by farm size .^ I also tried to interview maize farmers in proportion to the 
numbers in each farm size category, according to the distribution indicated in the 1974 
census. However, I found that estimates of land area often changed in the course of 
interviews and it was difficult to stick to my categories. A category not included in the 
census was peasant groups aiui I selected two in each village, making sure that they 
were «ffiliataH to different national peasant organization (or independent). Finally I 
wanted about half nfy interviewees to be participants in the DRI, to see what effect the 
project was having on dieir productive capacities. The other half was a mixture df 
farmers who received no credit or technical assistance, as well as those who obtained 
credit from banks. The resulting distribution of interviewees (with the hindsight of 
more precise information on the land they held) is given in Table 3.2. Although this 
distribution was not quite what I had originally intended, in practice I was successful in 
interviewing a range of maize farmers, and was able to build up a picture of different 
fypes of production and mechanisms of reproduction.
I carried out all the interviews by myself and only in one instance was accoirqranied by 
an extensionist. It was certainly much easier to have relaxed interviews if project staff 
woe not present Although I was not regarded as associated with the DRI, nfy foidgn 
status meant that I wtK sometimes seen as a potential source of aid. Furthermwe, I 
made the initial mistake of carrying an interview schedule and trying to fill it in as the 
interviewee talked, rightly criticized by Gill (1993). Although many informants w«e 
used to being questioned in that way because it was a method often used Ify the MRN 
extensionists, I rapidly realized that it severely limited the nature of the interview, and
^  Broadly, the larger the farm, the lower the proportion o f land dedicated to maize and vice versa.
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that answers frequently did not fit with the nature or order of the questions, or with my 
preconceptions. Thus I immediately dropped that procedure and carried a small 
notebook, trying valiantly to remember my list of questions. Thereafter, interviews 
became much more non-linear in approach and often revealed information about issues 
other than those I had noted on my list, which was extremely useful for building up a 
broader pictme of social relations. For example, it was as a result of this that I became 
increasingly aware of the personalized links between farmers. I used my schedules only 
to organize my notes when I wrote them up after the interviews, and my field diary 
acted as a means of systematizing the additional information I had gained.
Table 32  Distribution o f maize farmers interviewed in Jamastrân
Chichicaste Jutiapa
Farm size 
grouping (Has)
Project
participants
Non-participants Project
participants
Non-participam
<1 1
1-5 2 4 1 1
5-10 1 1 2
10-20 4 2 1
20-50 1 1
>50* 3 3
Total individual 
farmers 8 8 5 7
Peasant groups 1 1 1 1
* Over 80% o f maize famdng takes place in farms o f less than 50 Has; I  therefore <Ud not specify farm 
size groupings for hoger farms than this.
These are the basic topics I investigated in these interviews:
1. Personal data, including
- Birth place
- Length of time in village
- Reasons for moving
- Other occupations
2. Others living in the house, and immediate family
-Who
-Ages
- Occupations/work
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3. Faim data, including
-Farm size
- Number of plots and siœs 
-Type of land
- Tÿpe and source of tenure
4. Sources of income
-Farming
- Wage work
- Other
5. Sources and conditions of credit
6. Animals kept
7. Crop production, including
- Maize area planted 1986-87
- Maize area intending to plant 1987-88
- Beans area planted 1986-87^
- Beans area intending to plant 1987-88
- Other crops planted 1986-87
- Other crops intending to plant 1987-88
8. Quantities and type of hired labour, purchased and rented agricultural inputs, source 
and means of acquisition
9. Costs of production {primera) 1986-87 (maize and beans, including land, labour, 
inputs, machinery)
- Payments for land
- Cost of credit
- Land preparation costs
- Sowing costs
- Cultivation costs
- Harvesting costs
- Post-harvest costs
10. Oufyut
- Quantity harvested 1986-87
- Losses (and reasons)
9 Beans are the complementary food staple to maize and are often interplanted with mcuze although 
may also be grown separately (especiaUy as a commercial crop). Although I  included questions about 
bean crops in my fieldwork, analysis o f the data does not form part o f this thesis.
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11. Destination of output 1986-87
- Sales
- To whom
- Prices received
- Time of sales
- Output needed fw direct consumption (including seed, animals etc)
Although I wanted as precise data as I could obtain on these topics (which were broken 
down further in the interview process as well as being a means to discussing other 
aspects of production and exchange relations), I was aware that some issues (such as 
land, or income from maize) were sensitive areas and that farmers might be careful 
about what they told me (or, as Gill (1993) has pointed out, tell me what they thought I 
wanted to hear). Other problems were farmers' remembering data precisely, or my 
being able to convey to them clearly what I wanted to know. All my interviewees 
(among maize farmers) were men^ ,^ and it was often useful if other family members 
(especially wives) were present at the interviews because they might contradict or 
substantiate data, and provide additional information.
Other informants were useful m a number of ways. They provided additional 
information on maize production and trade, different aspects of social relations in the 
area, problems with local projects, and general gossip. They were also useful for cross­
checking some of my data (as were some of the data held on official records of DRI 
project participants).
The production o f food steqile crops such as maize and beans is largely the domain o f men, while 
processing and utilization is ‘women’s work’. Women do have farms but often use or hire male labour 
to work them. Wives and children can also provide family labour in weeding or harvesting. But the 
control o f the labour processes in production and the destination o f output (and income) is generally 
in the hands o f men.
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322 General note on interviewing peasant groups; interviewing groups in Santa 
Barbara
Interviewing organized producers is a different process from interviewing individuals. 
In general, the groups wanted to be present as collective entities in the interview, even 
if not all members participated. Members wanted to hear what was asked and what 
was said. The groups were socially and politically aware and I had to establish my 
credentials: thus one group in Jutiapa met with me first to consider whetho: tiiey would 
agree to being questioned about their productive activities; before interviews could be 
carried out in Quita Sueno, Santa Bârbara, I had to obtain permission from the national 
organization in Tegucigalpa to which the groups belonged, then meet with the 
committee of the local cooperative who wcnked together with the groups, and be 
introduced tt> the group leaders and erq>lain the purpose of my presence.
Collecting precise data by group interviews is an even more precarious process than 
interviewing individuals. Although, members of groups often corrected each other 
OV0 T information given, it was often difficult to disentangle data about group and 
individual activities. Some groups did not always want to reveal exactiy how diey had 
organized tiieir production, or what problems tiiey faced. Some groups presented a 
rosy picture of their activities, while others ençhasized their poverty.
These issues led me to have rather differrait foci in the two sets of interviews, hi 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, I followed most of the production questions I had used with 
individual farmers, although I had to take into account that they usually had collective 
as well as individual maize plots. In Quita Suefio, Santa Bârbara, I concentrated on the 
histories and mtne general and qualitative eiqperiences of the groins rather tiian trying 
to obtain a lot of precise production data. I wanted to gain an impression of how maize 
production had changed for them since they became organized. Neverdieless, in both
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cases, I did consider many of the variables analysed among individual farmers: access to 
and use of land; access to credit; use of labour and technology; output, inctxne and 
consumption; access to markets and prices; relations with traders; reladms with other 
farmers.
I came to interview the groups in Quita Sueno partly because I had sought the help of a 
national peasant organization in locating groups who would be prepared to discuss the 
changes they had erqrerienced over time in production and exchange relations, as well 
as the history of how they became organized. As I also wanted to spend some time in 
San Pedro Sula, in the north of Honduras, interviewing traders and industrialists, I also 
hoped to find peasant groups in reasonable geographical proximity. The national 
leadership of the peasant organization was sympathetic to my research, and directed me 
to the groups in Quita Sueno who had established themselves successfully on land diey 
had clainted fiom a decerned landowner.
Quita Sueno lies in the Valley of Quimistân (see Figure 3.3) in the north-western 
department of Santa Bârbara. There woo some rimilarities between tiiis fieldwork site 
and the Valley of Jamastrân in El Parafso. There was amain route cormecting the 
Quita Sueno area to the city of San Pedro Sula on the east and which went to Copân 
and the Guatemalan border in the west. Quita Suefio was about the same distance 
away fiom San Pedro Sula as Danlf was fiom Tegucigalpa (althou^ the road was 
better in Santa Bârbara). However, the nearest market town rimilar to Danlf was La 
Entrada, in the opposite direction fiom San Pedro Sula towards the Guatemalan 
border. (It also had an IHMA granary.) As in Jamastrân, the Quita Suefio groups were 
situated in a la r^  valley, "tire main source of development in the north of the 
department' (SECPLAN et al, 1986,4; nfy translation). However, while the groups in 
Jamastrân were located in villages or related hamlets some distance fiom the main road
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through the valley (which, furthermore, was not the main road to Tegucigalpa), the 
Quita Sueno groups were actually on the main route to San Pedro Sula. This made for 
differences in the extent of competition in trade relations between the groups in the two 
areas. Furthermore, being located on a main road contrasted with many of the Quita 
Sueno group members' earlier situation of relative isolation in the mountains.
Agriculture in this part of Santa Barbara, as in El Parafso, was centred on cattle and 
basic grains, as well as sugar cane, with coffee in the hilly areas. Much of the farmland 
in the (^imistàn valley was used as pasture. Similar to El jParafso, Santa Barbara was 
also a department where there was net-outmigration. Migrants had anived fiom the 
poorer departments of Copân, Ocotepeque and Lempira during the 1950s and 1960s, 
but ^eater numbers had left Santa Barbara than arrived in the 1960s. They mainly 
went to Cortés (Howard Ballard, 1987, 608, 617) where there was the possibility of 
finding wage work in farming as well as in the industrial centre of San Pedro Sula. 
Hnally, in common with El Parafso, there was an integrated rural development project 
(a "DRI')^ ,^ although its activities were not a focus for this part of my research.
The peasant groups in Quita Sueno provided me with some useful perspectives on the 
changing nature of agrarian relations, partly because they were keen to talk about their 
role as actors in the changes. With these groups, I decided to carry out an inquiry that 
compared their relations of production and exchange in maize when they were landless 
farmers who had rented or borrowed small plots of land, with the relations experienced 
as orgattized groups having land of their own. The main areas covered in intraviews 
were:
1. Membership of group and origins
Programa de Desarrollo de Santa Bârbara • PRODESBA
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2. Sources of work and income prior to obtaining group land
3. Perspectives on class relations and changes in the countryside (before organization 
and at time of interview)
4. Land
- previous means of access and use
- previous payments for land
- history of obtaining current land and legal position
- current land use
5. Maize production (before organization and primera, 1987-88)
- use of biochemical inputs and mechanization
- access to and use of labour (and payments)
- access to credit
- costs of production
- output and yields
6. Destination of maize output (before organization and 1987-88)
- sales (quantities, to whom, time and prices)
- group and household consumption needs
Not all the groups answered questions on these areas consistently. Although the 10 
groups had jointly claimed the land they were now on, which had been divided equally 
between them, and although they formed a section (or sectorial) within a peasant 
organization, they had different attitudes, not only to their internal operation and 
priorities, but also to meeting and discussing with me. Again, I tried to do as much 
cross-checking as I could with other informants in the area.
32.3 Interviewing traders in Danli and San Pedro Sula
I interviewed 8 maize traders in Danlf (1987) and 9 in San Pedro Sula (1988). Danlf is 
the main market centre for El Parafso and for the producers in the Jamastrân Valley. 
San Pedro Sula in the department of Cortés is the main industrial centre in Honduras 
and site for the maize trade in the high output areas of the northern regions. Much of 
the maize grown in the Valley of Quimistân went to San Pedro Sula. As well as a focal 
point for the personal consumption of maize, and distribution to other market centres
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Anther south, many of the food processing companies which buy maize are located in 
or near the city^ .^
The populations of the two centres were very different, although they were difficult to 
estimate at die time of fieldwork. Although Danlf had eiqianded as an urban centre and 
market town during the late 1970s and 1980s, it was still a relatively small place. The 
smallest of the twelve largest cities in the 1974 population census only had 12,456 
inhabitants (del Qd, 1988,280), and Danlf did not feature among these. Howevra, the 
municipio of Danlf, as an administrative unit, enconqiasses quite a large area. San 
Pedro Sula, on the other hand, had an estimated 150,881 inhabitants in 1974 {ibid), and 
was said to have about 56,000 Amilies (possibly 336,000 inhabitants) in 1986 (Esquelf, 
1986, [iv]). The urban population of the department of Cortés was estimated at 
387,432 in the 1988 peculation census. Most of this population would have been 
located in San Pedro Sula.
I chose these two centres for the following reasons. In Danlf, I wanted to see how a 
market centre local to farmers I had interviewed operated. Danlf, which also had an 
IHMA granary, was also a market in which maize flowed in several directions. Maize 
was brought into Danlf at harvest time firom the surrounding rural areas. This maize 
was either sold for local consunction or was taken to Tegucigtlpa or Choluteca (in the 
south) for further sale (equally, traders would come from Tegucigalpa and Œoluteca to 
buy maize). Although El Parafso was regarded as a surplus maize producing area at 
harvest time, during the scarce period before harvest, maize was in deficit and flowed 
into the department from Tegucigalpa^^.
There v>as no industrial processing o f maize in Danlf, although there were plants in Tegucigalpa.
As well as the urban market, Danlf traders supplied coffee producers in the area with maize, as 
well as deficit areas outside El Parafso. In addition, given that Nicaraguan Contra and refugees, as
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Of the major maize market centres, I chose San Pedro Sula because I wanted to see a
substantial and dynamic market in operation. As well as being the main maize market
for the north of Honduras, some parts of which have two harvests a year, it was an
industrial centre and site for many maize processing companies. San Pedro Sula also
lay on the route to the main port, Puerto Cortés, through which maize imports and
exports passed. In addition, the San Pedro Sula markets supplied maize to Tegucigalpa
and Choluteca, as well as other deficit areas, in the scarce period. Informants were
later to describe the growth of maize trade in the area:
'When we began [19 years ago], there were only 10-15 maize traders 
(wholesalers). Now there is a lot of competition.'
Until the 1960s, maize used to come in on the train. When I started 
[1955], there were only 10 warehouses. San Pedro Sula used to be a 
village - now it's a city and demand has increased. There are now many 
traders in the market'
Interviewing traders is often experienced as problematic. The perceived social position 
of traders and the speculative nature of trade suggest that traders will be resistant to 
revealing too much about their operations. This view is implied in theoretical analyses 
of the role of trade as well as in popular perceptions of traders. For example, from a 
political economy perspective, trade is seen as an activity which does not create value 
but helps to realize value - and therefore capital for reinvestment - by circulating 
commodities. This view sees traders as parasitic on the value generated in production 
as well as functional to the process of c^italist expansion (Harvey, 1984). That 
traders make profits ftom the process of exchange rather than production has also
well as Honduran military, were camped in the region, there were also other sources o f demand for 
maize at this time.
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suggested Üiat trade may act as an obstacle or deterrent to production because profit 
rates may be higher in the former (Kay, 1975).
These theoretical perspectives are often paralleled in everyday views of traders, their 
functions and the way they make profits. Nevertheless, some researchers have 
managed detailed and substantial investigations of traders, and special methodologies 
have been developed for interviewing traders (for exan^le. Crow and Murshid, 1989; 
Harriss, 1979). Furthermore, traders' responses, gaps and silences in interviews reveal 
much about the nature of trade and the traders' attitudes.
Although some of the commonly held views and perceived characteristics of traders 
were found in my fieldwork - and undoubtedly affected the interviews - stereotypes 
were also challenged. For example, a common image of a typical trader' in Honduras 
was of an ill-dressed man with a wodge of bank notes in his shirt pocket - someone 
who simultaneously exuded the symbols of poverty and wealth. He might not be 
literate, have no bank account, keep no records, but despite his poor appearance, he 
was probably relatively well-off. Above all, traders were seen to be cautious, resisting 
giving information about their businesses.
By contrast to this image, in one of my locations, the majority of maize traders 
interviewed were women. In the other location, many had bank acounts and some kept 
their own financial records. A trader who may have been wearing a vest when agreeing 
an appointment, dressed up for the interview. While some, especially older traders, 
were not schooled, others were highly literate and numerate. Traders also responded 
very differently to the prospect of being interviewed - some of my notes are indicative:
He gave the ingression he didn't want to be interviewed but when I 
explained the purpose of it, he surprisingly began to talk...and gave 
much more discriminating answers than [another trader].
107
His wife had told me that he was planning to go out, but [when he 
appeared] he took me upstairs to the flat and we sat down at the table 
and talked for 45 minutes without interruption.
We talked standing up in the back of the store where he could observe 
everything that was happening. [Unlike the previous occasion] he was 
looldng quite smart with a white shirt and red trousers.
This interview had been postponed fiom the day before because the 
trader had forgotten [and had gone out]. When I arrived today, he was 
well-dressed (previously he had been in a vest and unshaven), and it 
seemed as though he was waiting for me. He apologised for having let 
me down.
Most traders had their own agendas about what they were prepared to discuss, as well 
as issues they diligently avoided. Examples from my notes again:
Difficult interview [to extract information] - she had had problems with 
the tax office...was also aware that traders are often accused of 
speculation and mentioned the case of a journalist who had come asking 
lots of questions and then published an article in the press.
He started by saying that he wouldn't be able to tell me much - he had 
no schooling and I was doing a doctorate.
There was also a problem of accuracy and memory (as with producers):
He said he had been recording price changes in a notebook but had lost it.
Initially he said that prices had changed little in recent years.
In practice, I found intraviewing traders in Danlf more difficult than in San Pedro Sula. 
Several were suspicious. Furthermore, maize trade was a relatively sensitive topic at 
that time because of the proximity of Danlf to the Nicaraguan border. As a foreigner, I 
could have publicized activities, or declared traders' interests to officials. In general, in 
spite of Harriss's well-documented and tested methods for interviewing traders (1979), 
I do believe that there are many reasons for their resisting giving too much detailed 
information to researchers.
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Nevertheless, my first interviews with traders in Danlf allowed me to test some early 
ideas about the functioning and organization of trade. I did not select a random sanq)le 
fiom all the known traders in the Danlf market-place, but talked to a diverse range of 
traders (wholesalers and wholesaler/retailers) who were mentioned or pointed out to 
me by reputation^^. This process allowed me to see some of the links between them 
and with other traders as well as farmers. These interviews, as well as information 
about maize trade and traders gleaned fiom farmers in Jamastrtin, made it clear that 
maize trade was a varied activity with many participants. It also made me realize that it 
was mq)ortant to understand the operations of wholesalers who managed large 
quantities of grain and were therefore likely to set the patterns of trade for urban maize 
markets.
In San Pedro Sula, I interviewed large wholesalers in the main maize market of 
Medina-Cüoncepciôn. I had considerable help fiom the Chamber of Commerce and the 
IHMA in getting general information on traders and in identifying those who were 
considered among the largest. I was also able to go with a young employee of the 
Chamber of (Commerce who carried out regular price surveys to be introduced to 
particular traders.
The main topics I questioned traders about were as follows:
1. Origins of the trader
~2. Trading histories and previous occupations
3. How started (capital sources)
4. Type of trade (wholesalefietail)
Their reputation might have been for size o f operation, honesty, accessibility, as well as notoriety
etc.
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5. Com m odities traded
6. Other economic activities
7. H ow  financed trade
8. W hether financed other traders
9. S torage
- space
- location
- cost
10. A ccess to transport and transport costs
11. O rganization
- employees
- telephone
- accounting
- trading netw orks and contracts
12. Turnover data
13. Source o f  m aize purchases
14. Destination o f m aize sales
15. Prices
O ther informants were invaluable in both Danli and San Pedro Sula for cross-checking 
inform ation and obtaining other m arket data, including serial price data, and 
perspectives on the operation o f m aize markets. Price data are one o f the m ost difficult 
kinds o f data to  collect and corroborate. Although there is often m uch recorded 
inform ation on prices, I found many discrepancies in the information traders gave me, 
as well as betw een traders' data and official sources, and among the official sources 
themselves.
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32.4 Note on interviewing industrialists in San Pedro Sula
My puipose in interviewing industrialists was to see how industrial demand might affect 
maize markets in Honduras and what links industrialists might have with traders and 
farmers. At the time of my fieldwork, I was interested in what processes affected the 
flows, distribution and destination of maize, and from limited background data and 
discussions with IHMA sources, I thought that industry might have some influence 
over what happened to maize as well as the prices paid to producers. There was very 
little secondary information on industrial processing of maize; what existed was 
relatively superficial and partial.
Some indication of the nature of industrial demand for maize is outlined in Table 3.3 
which provides a brief profile of the conqranies I contacted. At that time, they 
comprised the majority of the firms using maize as raw material in San Pedro Sula and 
the bulk of the commercial demand in that part of the country^ .^ I estimate that these 
con^anies* m aize needs approximated 18-25% of average national maize output in the 
1980s; however, part of these needs were met by imports.
While I draw on the material from my interviews in this thesis, links with the food 
insecurity of rural maize producers were difficult to establish and I have not therefore 
addressed this part of my fieldwork in much detail. The kind of information provided 
by industry was useful for cross-checking my data fiom traders and the IHMA in San 
Pedro Sula (and vice versa). In addition, my interviews with industrialists provided me 
with a much broader praspective on the nature of maize markets as a whole and the 
role of maize in the Honduran economy.
Firms excluded are the tortillraias. or tortilla makers.
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In locating and arranging to interview diem, I had help from the Chamber of Cmnmerce 
in San Pedro Sula, through which I was able to have an official introduction and set up 
appointments. This official backing for my research was useful in the world of industry 
and did not have the potentially negative connotations that it can have among small 
maize farmers or even traders. I was also able to carry out my interviews in a more 
structured way than with farmers and most traders. Although interviewees may have 
had. reasons for evading my questions, the interviews were extremely inftmnative. As 
with traders, the gaps and silences were also instractive.
Ttüfle 33  Industrial use o f maize among selected companies in San Pedro Sula, 1988
Year activities started - ' Activities
PROINCESA 1984/5 Maize flour
BOQUITAS FIESTA 1968 Maize-based snacks
ALCON 1961 Animal feeds
ARROCERA
CENTROAMERICANA
■ 1961 Carbohydrate extraction for the 
beer industry; proteins sold to 
animal feed companies
INDUSTRIAS SULA 1969 Maize-based snacks and drinks
ALCOFA 1982/83 Animal feeds
AUSA 1960 By-product processing: maize 
starch: oil: glucose
AUMENTOS DIXIE SA. 1977 Maize-based snacks
MOUNO HARINERO SULA 1945 Maize flour (but mainly wheat 
milling)
AVICOLADESULA 1973 Poultry feeds
Questions put to the 10 industrialists I intraviewed were based on die following areas:
1. Industrial histray
- years of operation
- how started
- ownership
- what produce, quantities, changes etc
2. Demand for maize
- quantities
- type of maize needed
- from whom bought and how
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- timing of maize purchases 
-prices
- cost of maize relative to costs of production
- storage possessed by company
3. Industrial development
- use of industrial capacity
- problems in obtaining raw materials
- demand far industrial products and perspectives
3 3  Summary
In this chapter, I have explained the main aspects of the processes I engaged in to 
research the production and exchange relations of maize. I have discussed my use of 
secondary data and informants in key institutions, and have outlined how I did try 
fiddwmk. As I stated initially, research is a dialectical process. I was constandy 
reflecting on my initial ideas about the role of exchange relations in the production and 
reproduction of maize as I carried out try investigation. I was acutely aware of the 
limitations of what I was doing (and how I was doing it) - but that is because research 
is a two-way process and feeds back intt> the thoughts and activities of the researcher.
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Chapter 4
C h a n g e s  a f f e c t i n g  m a iz e  p r o d u c t io n , 1952-74 
Introduction
This chapter sets maize production in Honduras in its historical context and outlines 
some of the key changes between the two major censuses of 1952 and 1974. As 
explained in Chapter 2, this period eiqperienced considerable commoditization and 
growth of capitalist relations in agriculture, as well as being a time of important reforms 
in the agricultural sector. Data from this period therefore act as a baseline for analysing 
the problems in reproducing maize production in the 1980s.
The chapter argues that food insecurity in maize has been a problem in Honduras since 
colonial times. Peasant production of maize has always been prevalent, as has the 
appropriation of maize from peasants by large landowners and urban traders. 
However, the nature of peasant production of maize has changed over time, and with 
the growth of maize markets, maize has become a crop grown on diffraent types of 
farm. The majority of producers trying to make a living fiom maize are minijundistas 
(until recent legislation, farmers with under 5 Has). Many of these small farmers have 
experienced a reduction in their endowments in land. These trends, as well as evidence 
of comnaoditization of land and crop production, suggest that small maize farmers in 
particular are under pressure to intensify production. Analysis of aggregate data fiom 
census and survey statistics can help explain only some aspects of changes in maize 
production, however. It is through the case material in subsequent chapters that 
strategies and problems in reproducing maize among different types of producer are 
analysed.
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The chapter first provides a historical perspective on current maize production. It then 
analyses the changes shown by census data between 1952 and 1974. Hnally, it looks 
specifically at the changes in El Parafso and Santa Bârbara, the two departments in 
which I did fieldwork.
4.1 Historical perspectives on current-day maize production
Maize has long had a dual role in the Honduran economy. It has been a food produced 
for the direct consumption of farmers. It has also been a surplus food, extracted by 
coercion as tribute during colonial times, or sold as a commodity and consumed by 
urban populations as well as non-maize producers in rural areas. These two functions 
have been intimately related historically through the control and use of land, and the 
provision of food requirements for the labour force. Looking at the broad outlines of 
how these relations have changed over time helps to identify some of the parallels in 
more recent changes affecting maize production.
In pre-Colum bian times, many varieties of maize were planted using the barbecho 
system which involved two or three times as much fallow as culivated land. Under 
Spaitish colonialism, maize continued to be produced by the indigenous population for 
direct consumption. It was also appropriated by the colonists for their food needs and 
those of their workers (slaves and forced labour), who were primarily engaged in 
mineral extraction. Agriculture only became important to the colonizers when mineral 
wealth declined in the latter part of the sixteenth century.
The main social processes affecting maize production under Spanish colonialism were 
the extraction of tribute in goods and labour service through the encomienda system.
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and the appropriation of land (mercedes de tierraŸ. Tribute payments of goods were 
primarily in the form of maize and were affected by a variety of factors. Originally the 
colonisers required wheat, not maize, to be paid in tribute to meet their dietary needs. 
However, the techniques of wheat cultivation were not known by the indigenous 
population and the Spanish were obliged to teach people how to grow wheat and 
provide the technology if they wanted to have wheat paid in tribute (Newson, 1986, 
107). The Spanish produced some wheat in the central valleys of Honduras in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, although it competed with cattle for land (ibid, 
149). However, most indigenous peoples consumed maize or root crops, and beans, as 
their main staples. Over time, the colonisers also adopted maize and beans as their 
staple foods and maize became the most important item of tribute.
The labour of the indigenous population was also extracted in the mines and by other 
types of labour service. One result was that maize farmers had less time in which to 
cultivate their fields and had great difficulty in producing sufficient maize for their own 
needs as well as for tribute payments. This situation was compounded by a decline in 
the indigenous population because of the harsh conditions of labour service. In 
addition, community officials, called jueces de milpd^, were supposed to regulate 
ouqiut, both for local consumption as well as tribute payments, but did not always 
carry out their responsibilities by making sure enough maize was planted. Producers 
often had to make up their tribute, or their own maize needs, by buying maize at high 
prices from local merchants (ibid, 197).
i  The early Spanish colonists were granted rights to levy tribute in goods or labour from the 
indigenous populations. This was called encomienda. They were also granted rights to land 
(mercedes de tierra) in return for military service for the Spanish crown.
^ Literally.judges o f the maize fields.
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The other main process affecting maize production during this time (as well as later) 
was the appropriation of land. Although the colonizers were apparently concerned 
about the availability of land for maize production - including for indigenous food 
needs so that the population would not become a burden on the colonial state (ibid, 
211) - estates expanded and much land was taken over for cattle grazing, as well as for 
export crops such as sugar cane. Cattle grazing had the most profound effect on land 
use and has been closely correlated with social status and the agrarian class structure in 
Honduras until the present time. In 1590, there were 30,000 head of cattle in the then 
ruling department of Comayagua (ibid, 141), more than a third of the 82,393 counted 
in the most recent Agricultural Census of 1974. "...(I)t was said that six or seven of the 
richest cattle owners held such power over the city's [i.e. Comayagua's] affairs that it 
was impossible to pass ordinances prohibiting cattle from grazing in the valley in order 
to develop the production of maize and wheat. " (op cit). By 1804, there were 0.5 
million cattle in the "province' of Honduras (op cit), only rather less than a third of the 
1.8 million counted 170 years later.
These social processes involving land, labour and tribute were further compounded ty 
problems in technical conditions of maize production such as variations in rainfall and 
pests. There were considerable fluctuations in maize output and frequent maize 
shortages which continued into the eighteenth century, by which time maize farmers 
often preferred to pay tribute in cash rather than kind (ibid, 218-219). Maize markets 
existed alongside tribute extraction, and maize shortages led to price fluctuations from 
which producers could benefit
In post-colonial times, the growth of the export crop economy in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century had further implications for land appropriation and use. 
Although coffee and other crops were important exports in post-coloitial times, the 
single most influential process in the growth of exports, as well as in creating a wage
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labour force, was the commercialization of banana production in the north of Honduras 
in the late nineteenth century. While banana expansion started with many small and 
medium farmras exporting fruit to New Orleans, real growth occurred when transport 
concessions were granted to three main United States companies at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. After building port facilities and railway lines, and making early 
investments in factories and a bank, these companies were conceded vast tracts of 
previously unused and nationally owned land, and developed banana plantations 
directed to the US market (Arancibia, 1985,37-39).
Thus the latifundio-minifundio pattern of land holdings (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1) 
which started under Spanish colonialism continued in the growth of export crop 
production and ongoing concentration of land. The latifiutdios had substantial areas of 
pasture as well as domestic and export oriented crops (until relatively recently, using 
the labour of colonos - or peasants internal to the estates) while the mnijundistas 
generally produced basic food staples.
Although maize continues to be produced by small farmers for their own consumption 
and to supply urban and rural food demands, the precise nature of the relations between 
small and larger farms and estates (including how land is obtained and used, and how 
labour is orgartized and appropriated) has changed over time with the development of 
cîqiitalist relations of production, and the increasing integration of the Honduran 
economy in the world market. By the 1974 agricultural census, maize was also 
produced in substantial quantities on large farms, as will be seen in the next section. 
Furthermore, my fieldwork demonstrates that, although there were still non­
commoditized relations within farms in the 1980s, and personalized as well as 
commoditized links between different types of farm, maize production by both small 
and large farmers was highly commoditized. In addition, maize markets expanded as 
the numbers of wage workers and landless increased in rural areas and as urban
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populations grew. Whereas about 13% of the Honduran population lived in the ten 
largest cities in 1930 (del Cid, 1988, 176-177), about 31% of the population lived in 
urban areas by the 1950 population census. By the 1980s, maize was as critical for the 
daily reproduction of urban and rural wage and informal sector workers, especially 
those with lower incomes, as it was for small maize farmers.
The daily reproduction link between rural and urban maize consumers through product 
markets is accompanied by a connection in the labour market, as many of the urban 
poor and rural wage workers were formerly maize producers. The cattie-maize 
relations in the countryside in more recent times show one of the ways that this link 
between rural maize producers and urban maize consumers has come about
As already mentioned, pasture land long took precedence over maize and other basic 
grains. Between 1952 and 1974, the expansion of land under pasture developed 
rapidly, as the next section shows. This expansion involved an enclosure process which 
removed small maize farmers from land they had been farming (but did not necesarily 
have title to). In addition, wealthy farmers used landless labour to help clear previously 
unused forest land. Such farmers occupied land (with or without title) and rented out' 
small parcels to landless producers who cleared it and used it for their own maize 
production for one or two seasons. These tenants then sowed the parcels with pasture 
before returning them to the landlord. In return for these cleared and empastured plots, 
tenants often had to pay sacks of maize to the landlord as rent in kind, as well as help 
him put up fences to enclose the land (interviews in El Parafso, 1987, and Santa 
Bârbara, 1988).
Although maize was produced in these small and precariously held lands by what was 
effectively the landlord's own labour force, and may also have been produced by the 
landlord himself, the enclosure process prevented land being used for maize production
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on a more general scale. Furthermore, the enclosures had adverse effects for many 
small maize farmers because the unequal distribution of land combined with population 
growth led to demographic pressures on the land available to them and eventual 
displacement in many cases.
Thus landlessness and near-landlessness became serious problems in Honduras. It has 
been estimated that between a third and one half of the economically active population 
in rural areas was working as day labourers by 1974 (Table 4.1). However, landless 
labour has only partially been absorbed into permanent wage work by thé export crop 
economy and its associated linkages, and there is widespread use of temporaiy labour 
as well as ongoing migration to urban centres and other rural areas. The ability of this 
population to earn adequate wages and provide for its own food security is precarious, 
as shown by data in Chapter 2. Although it is not the focus of this thesis, food 
insecurity among the rural and urban waged population and informal sector is the other 
side of food insecurity among rural maize farmers.
Table 4.1 Rural landlessness by region in Honduras as indicated by population engaged in day 
labour (based on 1974 population census data)
Region Percentage o f the economically active population 
in rural areas working as day labourers
South 33
West-central 30
North 49
Litoral Atlântico 54
North-east 42
East-centrtd 41
West 54
Source: SIECA, 1984, various pages
This brief historical overview indicates some of the areas in which maize production 
and producers might be at risk: inadequate access to land for many, hiraarchical social 
relations between different fypes of farmers, and a complex and evolving relationship 
between the demand for and supply of maize (and the means of its appropriation and
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distribution). Food insecurity among maize farmers was already a problem in colonial 
times and continued to be so in the 1980s.
4 2  Changes effecting mmze production from 1952-1974
Census data from 1952 and 1974, and later survey data, can provide a clearer picture of 
changes in more recent times and how they affected maize farmers. Analysing access 
to and control over land by maize farmers between 1952 and 1974, and the links 
between these data and those on maize production, can identify key areas of risk and 
potential loss of endowments and entitlements in land that some farmers faced in the 
1980s. The coinplex nature of the risks involved is presented in later chapters.
The censuses catégorie farms ly  farm size groups. Up to 5 Has, the data are 
categorized by each additional hratare (that is, less than 1 Ha, 1-2 Has, 2-3 Has, and so 
on). Although the agrarian reform law of 1974 grouped all these farmers and called 
them minifundistas, I have grouped them slightly differently into a category of less than 
1 hectare, and then 1-5 Has. Singling out farmers having less than 1 hectare gives a 
picture of the trends operative for the smallest and most vulnerable farms, while the 1-5 
Ha category will still indiratte trends for minijundistas as a whole. Thereafter, the 
censuses use increasingly broad farm size categories; in hectares: 5-10, 10-20, 20-50, 
50-100,100-200,200-500,500-1,000,1,000-2,500, and greater than 2,500. I conform 
to these in the presentation of the data.
However, I also refer to small, niedium and large farmers in this and later chapters. I 
use these categories to approximate a classification often used in Honduran texts (for 
exangrle, del Qd, 1977) which is based on the supposed carrying ctgracity of the land, 
again ly  farm size. Thus, del Qd, who was one of the first sodal scientists to attempt 
to characterize the nature of rural class relations using systranatic analysis of statistical
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data, uses the categories of landless workers, tiny farms, sub-family farms 
(rninifundios), family farms, multi-family farms (medium and large). Excluding landless 
workers, my small, medium and large farmers correspond as follows:
Fctrm category 
(Johnson)
Farm category 
(del Cid)
del Cid 
(mamanas* and 
hectares both used)
Johnson
(hectares)
Small Tiny farms 
(microfincas) 
Sub-family farms 
(fincas subfamiliares. 
minifundios)
<1-9 <1-5
Medium Family farms (fincas 
fymiliares)
10-49 5-50
Large Multi-family farms 
(medium and large) 
(fincas 
multifamiliares:median 
as. grandes)
50-499 (medium) 
500 + (large)
50f**
* 1 hectare = 1.43 mamanas
** Although this measure can incorporate relatively moderate sized to huge farms, most maize 
production is infcums of less than 50 Has.
These measures are crude ones. Ten hectares of coffee-growing land cannot equate to 
10 hectares of arid and denuded hillside where only basic food staples may be grown. 
The size and composition of family' (and therefore its needs in land) is variable. 
Furthermore, using the notion of family' is similar to using the notion of household 
with all the ensuing assumptions about who household heads are, who controls 
resources, who provides income (and from what), who makes decisions, and so on. 
However, these categories act an initial means to group farmers before the social 
relations are better understood and other criteria can be employed.
Given that well over 80% of farms produced maize according to the 1974 census, 
general changes in distribution and tenure of land are likely to have affected most maize 
farmers, particularly in farms up to SO Has where m aize farmers predominate. Thus I 
first analyse general changes in land distribution, tenure and use and then see how they 
relate to the data on maize production.
123
42.1 General changes in land distribution, tenure and use
The evidence fiom census data for 1952 and 1974 shows a reduction in fann sizes, 
particularly critical for small farmers, growing privatization of farms and access to land 
(suggesting that land was gradually being commoditized), and commoditization and 
intensification  ^of land use. I look at the evidence on these processes in turn.
(i) Declining access to land
The period between 1952 and 1974 saw a 25% increase in the number of farms in 
Honduras with only a 5% increase in land in farms (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Average farm 
sizes fell for all farms but the loss of land is especially important among the 
minifundistas (1-5 Has), for whom declining farm size and fragmentation threatened 
future viability as supposedly self-sufficient units of subsistence. Furthermore, although 
the increase in the number of smallest farms (less than 1 Ha) and land area in those 
farms increased in similar proportion, such farms carmot provide income and maize for 
the direct consumption of an average family in Honduras, where much of the land is not 
as fertile as in neighbouring countries (Durham, 1979).
^  Two types o f intensification are discussed in this chapter: the intensification o f maize and other 
crop production, involving incorporation o f further land in farms mto cultivation: and attempts to 
increase productivity o f a given area o f land.
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Tcüfle 42 Distribution o f farms by farm size in Honduras, 1952-74
Farm size 
grouping 
(Has)
1952 Percentage of 
farms in group
1974 Percentage of 
farms in group
Percentage 
change 1952- 
74
<1 15,394 10 33.771 17 119
1-5 73.617 47 91.010 47 24
5-10 28.092 18 28.264 14 1
10-20 18.620 12 19.220 10 3
20-50 13,752 9 15.170 8 10
50-100 3.865 2 4.433 2 15
100-200 1.514 1 1.971 1 30
200-500 803 <1 1.057 <1 32
500-1,000 284 <1 276 <1 -3
lfiOO-2300 126 <1 129 <1 2
2300+ 68 <1 40 <1 41
Total 156.135 100 195.341 100 25
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
Table 43 Distribution o f land in farms by farm size in Honduras, 1952-74
Farm size 
groining 
(Has)
1952
(Has)
Percentage o f 
land in group
1974
(Has)
Percentage of 
land in group
Percentage 
change 1952- 
74
<1 9.991 <1 21.542 1 116
1-5 192.241 8 217.351 8 13
5-10 201.554 8 201.274 8 <-l
10-20 259.213 10 268.145 10 3
20-50 417.317 17 461.216 18 11
50-100 265.929 11 301.228 11 13
100-200 207.726 8 266.697 10 28
200-500 244.129 10 313.207 12 28
500-1,000 193.844 8 183.769 7 5
1,000-2300 183.977 7 185.980 7 1
2300+ 331.283 13 209.350 8 -37
Total 2.507.404 100 2.629.859 100 5
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
(ii) Privatization of land
In a situation of highly skewed land distribution, access to untitled, rented or borrowed 
land may easily be affected ly  the encroachment of the wealthy and powerful. Renting 
small plots can be precarious and subject to the whims of the landowner. However, the 
varied nature of access to land in Honduras, and the existence in particular of national 
land, can provide opportunities to farm which might not be available if all land were
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privately owned. Thus the conditions of access to land are an important issue for maize 
farmers in being able to sustain their production. Furthermore, different forms of 
tenure are imbued with different kinds of risk. Although census data do not reveal haw 
farmers actually gained access to their land at the time of survey, they show the general 
type and distribution of tenure relations and how they changed during that period.
There were three main types of land tenure in the 1952-74 census period:
(a) Tierra propia: privately owned land to which the owner has a title and is regarded
as having full rights over the land, or domnio pleno; this land can be bought and sold
,
as well as inherited.
(b) Tierra nacional or ejidal: this is national or public land and may be owned by the 
state (tierra nacional) or by the local municipalify (tierra ejidal)^ who give 
concessions to use rights, or dominie ûtil. National or ejidal land cannot legally be 
sold, although it is often passed on to children, and there is often confusion as to who 
has legal rights over such land, as indicated by the USAID analysis cited in Chapter 2. 
Much national land has been occupied without permission, especially by large 
landowners (del Cïd, 1977,14), as well as by small or previously landless producers.
(c) Tierra arrendada: rented land, usually for a determined period, such as an 
agricultural season or a year. Payments can be made in money or kind and are fixed 
(ibid, 13). Aftra the 1975 agarian reform law, renting land became a grey area in spite 
of the fact that it had become more common (Table 4.4), and in practice it has 
continued.
4 Below. I  also used the category o f national land to encompass both types o f public land.
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As well as these three main categories of land tenure, there were also other historical 
forms. One was aparceria, or sharecropping. The othra was colonato, where a 
farmworker had a plot of land on the employer’s farm for which he or she might pay 
nothing (except the obligation to work for the landowner) or might make a payment in 
cash or in kind (ibid, 13, and informants in Santa Bârbara, 1988). The 1975 reform 
sought to abolish these types of land tenure. Finally, there wrae farmers who squatted 
on private or ppblic land without right of access having been given. In the censuses, all 
these three categories were grouped as other forms'.
In the censuses, data were categorized by single tenure (farms with access to only one 
type of land) and mixed tenure (farms combining different fypes of land tenure). 
Analysing these data shows that between 1952 and 1974 there was a proportional 
increase in privately-owned farms and rented farms, and a substantial decline in the 
proportion of farms having other forms' of tenure (see Table 4.4). Even by 1952 the 
forms seen as pre-capitalist by the land reframers of the inter-census period, such as 
aparcerta and colonato, conq>rised only 8% of farms with single tenancies. Most 
farms with these other forms' of land (over 17,000 or 11% of all farms) were based on 
non-legal occupation or squatting (del Cid, 1977,148).
There were also signs that smaller farms in particular had reduced access to national or 
ejidal land, traditionally an important source of means of production for these farmers. 
Hrstly, although the proportion of national land held in farms does not seem to have 
changed much, there was a decline in the proportion of smaller farms having access to 
national land and a percentage increase of this type of land in largra farms. These data 
may also reflect the ^ w in g  colonization of new land among large farmers during this 
period. Secondly, although the proportion of farms with mixed tenancies is relatively 
small overall, the decline in these frams has particularly affected sm aller farms, 
suggesting that the range of access to different types of land was ditrdttishing.
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Thus the nature of land tenure was changing and particularly affected the type of access 
to land by smaller farms (which were those predominantly producing maize). Although 
access to national and privately-owned land predominated among farms with more than 
10 Has, for the smallest farms, renting land increased, and other forms of access to 
non-owned land declined. These trends suggest a particular loss of entitlements to land 
by very small farmers, within a context of overall reductions in farm size.
The trends are demonstrated even more clearly by looking only at farms with a single 
type of tenure (the majority of farms in both censuses - 83% in 1952 and 87% in 1974). 
The number of privately-owned farms nearly doubled and those with rented land nxne 
than doubled, whereas farms occupying national land increased by only 9% and there 
was an 92% decline in those based on other forms' of tenure (Table 4.5). Small farms 
below 5 Has showed considerable growth in both privately-owned and rented tenure. 
The substantial decline in other forms' of tenure among these small farms ,^ and the 
increase in rented farms indicate that relations between landowners and landless were 
changing.
Although the number of farms with private and rented land increased dramatically, the 
actual land area in these categories increased relatively much less’ This is principally 
because the total land area in farms increased far less than the number of farms between 
1952 and 1974. The data for farms with a single type of tenure show that the privately- 
owned land area increased by only 10% (Table 4.6) compared with 97% for the 
number of farms (Table 4.5). Rented land increased by 81% (Table 4.6) compared 
with an increase of 227% in the number of farms with this land (Table 4.5). However,
The increase in ’other forms’ o f tenure among some very large farms may represent concessional 
land holdings such as those held by banana companies as well as the formation o f cooperative or 
collective landholdings under the earlier land reform laws.
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Table 4.6 Changes in land area in single tenure farms by type o f land tenure, 1952-74
Land area 
(Has)
Percentage o f 
total land area 
in single 
tenure farms
Change in 
land area, 
1952-74 (Has)
Percentage 
change in land 
area, 1952-74
Private land 1952 1,159,668 58
118,477 10
1974 1.278.145 60
National land 1952 616,871 31
75,568 , 12
1974 692,439 33
Rented land 1952 77,544 4
62,843 81
1974 140.387 7
Other forms 1952 158,412 8
-139,159 -88
1974 19,253 1
Total land in 1952 1,878,934 101*
single tenure 251,290 13
farms 1974 2.130,224 101*
* Greater than 100 because o f rounding
Source: calculated from data in DGECi 1952 and 1974
although rented land as a proportion of land in farms overall was a very small element, 
it was significant as a key source of land for small farms at the time of the 1974 census. 
Furthermore, the decline in farms and land area in other forms' between 1952 and 1974 
suggest that landowners might have taken back land from sharecroppers or colonos and 
then rented it out, placing the tenancy on a (^ferent footing.^
Thus while land markets may not have been highly developed at the time of the 1974 
census, privatized land relations (including renting land) were on the increase. 
Furthermore, instead of having colonos or sharecroppers, landowners could choose to 
have the more flexible system of renting out land to their own workers to whom they 
would pay a wage as temporary or permanent labour. As the data on day labouring in 
Table 4.1 above show, there was no shortage of wage workers by 1974. However, my
^ Others in non-legal occupation o f land might have had their tenure formalized in some form.
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fieldwork data will later demonstrate that tenancy relations between semi-proletarian 
maize farmers and large landowners in the 1980s also exhibited personalized 
characteristics.
Even though the census data show that private land was becoming more prevalent than 
previously, access to national or ejidal land, particularly for smaller farmers, continued 
to be key to survival For mnijundistas with less than 5 Has, who were mainly maize 
farmers, national and rented lands together provided the main source of land. Sixty p a  
cent of land in farms with a single type of land tenure had national and rented land, 
while only 38% had private land (DGEC, 1952 and 1974, and Johnson, 1988, 113). 
Thus, for these farmers, sustaining their means of access to national and rented land 
would be key to sustaining production. However it is likely that the genoal growth in 
private tenure (later reinfarced Ity legislation) in a situaticm of unequal land distribution 
wouUl eventually lead to greater land concentration and put these farmers even further 
at risk.
(Hi) Commoditization o f land use
Evidence that commoditized relations were on the increase during the 1952-74 period 
is provided by census data on land use. Product markets tend to develop more rapidly 
than land markets (Bharadwaj, 1985). In the 1952-74 period, comnooditization 
affected land use in particular ways.
Tbe biggest chan^ in land use was the growth of pasture land for «tensive cattle 
ranging (see Table 4.7), which was a response to new markets for Honduran beef 
exports in the United States, which continued into the 1980s (Howard Ballard, 1988). 
This change was a source of increased social diffm«tiation in the countryside. First, 
the expansion of extensive cattie-grazing led to expulsions and migrations, as argued 
above, arui demonstrated eloquently Ity lùamer (1986) and Howard Ballard (pp cit).
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Second, the extensive nature of land use involved in cattle rearing involves a particular 
attitude to land and land productivity which is different fix>m growing export or food 
crops: large areas were deforested for pasture, as shown by the decline in woodlands in 
Table 4.7, while improving the quality of pasture was relatively rare. Third, cattle 
require relatively little labour compared with crop production, and the more land there 
is under cattle as opposed to crops, the less ability the countryside has to absorb the 
landless labour which pasture expansion has helped to create.
Table 4.7 Changes in land use in farms, Honduras 1952-74
Land use 1952
(Has)
Percent o f 
total land in 
farms
1974
(Has)
Percent o f 
total land in 
farms
Absolute
change
1952-74
(Has)
Percent
change
1952-74
Annual
crops
296.411 12 366,344 14 69,933 24
Permanent
crops
174,653 7 212,011 8 37,358 21
Fallow 424.767 17 140.291 5 -284.476 -77
Pasture 822,562 33 1,347,777 51 525,215 64
Woodland 528.551 21 193.071 7 -335,480 -63
Wasteland 198,814 8 339,975 13 141.161 71
Other 61,646 2 30.390 1 -31,256 -51
Total 2,507,404 100 2.629,859 100 122,455 5
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
However there was also an increase in the use of arable land in farms. The areas under 
annual and permanent crops^ both increased by over 20% (although there was only a 
5% increase of land in farms overall), indicating an expansion of basic grain and food 
crops and growing export crop production. Thus there was a general intensification of 
land use in farms, in large part directed to the market. Substantial areas of land were 
taken out of fallow and woodlands disappeared. However, wasteland in farms also
^ Annual crops include food staples such as maize, beans, rice and sorghum, root crops, vegetables, 
sugar cane. Permanent crops include coffee, bananas and other tree crops such as African palm, 
cotton etc.
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increased. This suggests that some of the newly colonized land may have been of poor 
quality. More probably it indicates that there was arable land loss through over- 
erq)lcHtation arising fiom declining farm sizes and lack of access to other land, 
especially among smaller farmers.
These trends varied with farm size. Some were inversdy associated with farm size: for 
exanqile, the increase in pasture land w*  ^ greatest arrK>ng farms larger than 20 Has 
farms which comprised 85% of pasture in farms (while 69% of pasture was in farms 
larger than 50 Has). However, although 80% of armual crops was in farms of less than 
50 Has, the largest proportional increases in area planted with armual crops was in 
farms over 100 Has. For permanent crops, 62% of the cropping area was in farms of 
less than 50 Has in 1974, but the biggest source of relative increase in area planted was 
in medium sized farms between 10 and 200 Has and in very large farms of over 1,000 
Has (calculated fiom Johnson, 1988, Table 53).
The increases in pasture land have already been explained. The changes in armual crops 
and their relatitmship to farm size may well have been the result of marketing and price 
incentives adopted by the state during this period: thus, while only 10% of maize 
output came fiom farms over 50 has in 1952, 17% was produced Ity them in 1974 
(ibid. Table 57). However, there was also a 164% increase in area cultivated with 
armual crops in farms of less than 1 Ha (ibid. Table 53), also indicating the growth of 
very small farms, mainly on rented land as shown above, which were producing food 
staples. The trends in permanent crops are indicative of increasing production for 
erqrort during this period, primarily affecting the larger farms.
4 J 2  Changes affecting maize production
Given that over 80% of farmers grew maize in 1974, the inqrlicatitms of the broad 
trends described above are that (i) maize farm sizes declined; (ii) national land was an
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important source of land for maize farmers under SO Has, as was rented land for 
minifundistas and very small farmers; however, a growing number of farmas would 
also have their own land; and (iii) maize production was expanding on larger farms as 
well as being intensified on smaller ones. Only some of these contentions can be 
substantiated (or contradicted) by census data, which I analyse below. Other issues are 
illuminated by my fieldwork evidence, which explains processes that cannot be revealed 
in census data such as the nature of the relations between socially differentiated 
farmers, how access to land was actually negotiated, and how it was retained or lost.
(i) Distribution of maize farms and access to land
There was a 31% increase in the number of maize farms between 1952 and 1974, fiom 
125,812 to 165,953 (DGEC, 1952 and 1974). This percentage is greater than the 
increase in the number of farms in general (25%). Thus the proportion of farms 
growing maize was 85% of the total in 1974 compared with 80% in 1952 (Table 4.8). 
As stated in the Introduction, maize is a key crop for small farmers, and, as might be 
expected, the proportion of farms growing maize varies inversely with size in both 
1952 and 1974 (Table 4.8).
Table 4.8 Number o f farms growing maize by farm size, Honduras 1952 and 1974
Farm size 
grouping
1952 1974 Change 1952- 
74
Percentage o f 
edl farms in 
stratum, 1952
Percentage o f 
all farms in 
stratum, 1974
<1 9,212 27.489 18.277 60 81
1-5 61.000 78.942 17.342 84 87
5-10 23,957 24.545 588 85 87
10-20 15.893 16.603 710 85 86
20-50 11.370 12,596 1,226 83 83
50-100 3.004 3.413 409 78 77
100-200 1.005 1.378 373 70 70
200-500 486 715 229 61 68
500-1,000 145 193 48 51 70
1JOOO-2J500 66 64 -2 52 50
2.500+ 24 15 -9 35 38
Total 126.812 165,953 39.141 80 85
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
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Establishing whether maize farms declined in size can only be inferred from the weight 
of maize farms among farms in general, as the area of total land in farms growing maiza 
is not given by the census. There are also no data on the forms of land tenure in maize 
farms, but again these can be inferred with a reasonable degree of security fiom general 
census data on land tenure patterns. As stated above, rented and national land would 
appear to have been important sources of land for many maize farmers, although 
privately-owned farms would also have been on the increase. How some maize farmers 
gained access to land in practice is explained further in Chapter 5.
(ii) Land use in maize farms
It is possible to say more fiom the censuses about land use in maize farms than about 
access to land. The area under maize increased by 18% between 1952 and 1974 fiom 
219,276 to 258,559 Has (DGEC, 1952 and 1974), however the overall area of land in 
all farms grew by only 5%. Thus the proportion of land in farms being used for maize 
was increasing (see Table 4.9), probably because of increased access to markets, as 
weU as the growth of small farmers cultivating maize for direct consumption.
The trend was accompartied by a rise in average yields fiom .76 MT/Ha to 1.20 MT/Ha 
and an 85% increase in output (Johnson, 1988,118,120). Furthermore the distribution 
of maize output between farm size categories changed. Although there was an increase 
in output fiom all farm categories, 17% came fiom farms of over 50 Has in 1974 
compared with 10% in 1952, a doubling or tripling of output fiom these farms in 
absolute terms (ibid, 117-118). Farms having less than 1 Ha of land also more than 
doubled their output, even though they only counted for 6% of total output in 1974. 
Output increased by 264% among these farms while the number of maize farms of this 
size increased by 198% and the area harvested with maize, 165% (op cit).
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Table 4.9 Maize farms: estimated percentage o f land used for growing maize within farms by farm  
size, Honduras 1952 and 1974
Farm size grouping 
(Has)
Estimated percentage o f farm 
area used for maize, 1952
Estimated percentage o f farm 
area used for maize, 1974
<1 100 100
1-5 49 58
5-10 26 26
10-20 16 17
20-50 10 10
50-100 6 7
100-200 3 6
100-500 2 5
500-1,000 1 5
1,000-2J500 1 3
2,500+ <1 1
Note: there are no data on the total land area in farms growing maize. These data were calculated by 
dividing the area planted with maize by the average amount o f land per farm for all farms in the 
stratum. This gives a reasonable estimate given the weight o f farms growing maize in the total 
number o f farms.
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
Thus while there was a general expansion in the area used for growing maize, and 
considerable expansion in outyut, the growth in yields also suggests that there was an 
intensified use of inputs and labour occurring within farms, giving rise to increasing 
productivity, however gradual. This intensification within farms is also evinced by the 
general increase in the proportion of land used for maize. Furthermore, the smaller the 
farm, the greater was the proportion of land used for cultivation. As well as indicating 
the importance of maize for small farmers (especially those with only 1 Ha of land), 
these data show that less land was being left to fallow in these farms, leading to 
possible long-term degradation and entitlement loss .^
(iii) Reproducing maize production
Although maize output from large farms provides substantial marketed surpluses and is 
important for national maize supplies, the conditions of reproduction and survival of
^ Trends o f this nature have been established for the south o f Honduras by Boyer (1982).
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small nuiize farms are critical for rural food security. These conditions are analysed in 
Chapters 5-7 on the basis of my fieldwork. However, clues from survey data collected 
since the 1974 census are shown in Table 4.10. This table shows the extent of off-farm 
income Ity farm size, calculated in a 1982 surv^, and the use of wage labour in maize 
production based on data from a survey in 1984. The data show an opposite but 
complementary relationship between farm size and wage labour relations: the analler 
the farm size, the greater the off-farm income as a percentage of total income; the 
greater the farm size, the greater the use of wage labour in maize production. To the 
extent that maize producers on small farms cannot reproduce their maize (or other 
crops) fiom tiieir own production, one would expect them to be en^ged in wage or 
other income-gaiaating work on and off the farm. What is unclear is the extent to 
which the smallest farmers (who would generally have been maize produces) provided 
pemmnent or terxq)orary wage labour for large maize farmers, perhaps in return for 
access to small plots of rented land. Later chapters analyse the evidence for such a 
relationship, particularly as they were found in El Parafso.
Table 4.10 Extent ofoff-fitrm income by farm size (all farms, 1982) and use o f wage labour in nuzize 
production by farm size (1984), Honduras
Farm size groupmg 
(Has)*
Off-farm income as percentage 
o f total farm income, 1982
Use o f wage labour as 
’ percentage o f total required 
labour days, 1984
<2 58 <1
2-3J 50 <1
35-7 40 2
7-14 30 14
14-35 21 27
35-70 14 43
70-140 15 70
140-350 4 93
350-700 10 94
700+ 3 96
* These farm size groupings are different from previous tables because the original data were 
measured in manzanas
Source: calculated from Secretarla de Recursos Naturales, 1982,47-48 and DGEC, 1984, 
tmpublished data
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4 3  Chattes effecting maize production in El Para&o and Santa Bdrbara, 
1952-74
Changes in access to land and growing commoditization have affected maize farma-s in 
El Parafso and Santa Barbara similarly to the general trends identified for Honduras. 
However, there were some specific characteristics in each of these departments which 
are pertinent to the analysis presented in later chapters using rry fieldwork data. As 
with the genaW trends, it is also possible to draw some initial conclusions about the 
nature of social relations in tire countryside.
I look at the same variables as in Section 4.2: changes in land distribution and Arm 
size; changes in forms of land tenure; changes in land use; changes in maize production 
and tiieir relationship to farmers' entitlements in land. I present data on these variables 
and draw out the differences from national trends, and their implications.
43.1 Evidence o f pressures on access to land
Increasing pressure on land and declining farm sizes are evident from the data on El 
Parafso and Santa Barbara, although in both instances the pressure was apparentiy less 
acute than the natiorral figures would suggest For El Para&o, farms and land in Arms 
erqranded more than the avoage rate of eqransion for Honduras - at 35% and 23%, 
compared to 25% and 5%, respectively. Thus the difBaence between the increase in 
farms and increase in land was not as great as fw Ae rest of Honduras.
Nevolheless, El Parafso was a department of net out-migration as well as land 
colonization during Ae census period (Chapter 3), Aus some mcrease m land 
concentration may have occurred. In fact Ae Gini coefficients for Ae two census 
periods were slightly higher than Aose for Honduras (.77 and .78 compared wiA .75 
and .76 [Howard BaUard, 1988,470]) but Ad not mcrease prc^ortionately more tiian
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for Honduras as a whole. Howevor, if Ae changing Astribution of farms and farmland 
arc presented graphically (Figures 4.1a and b), it is evident Aat Ae real growA in Aims 
was among Aose under 5 Has, and Ae growA in land in farms was primarily m farms 
of 50 to 2,500 Has. Hie largest farms showed an sqiparendy dramatic loss of land 
which may be explained by fragmentation through mheiitance (or Astribution to Amily 
members to avAd expropriation in Ae land reform), resulting in fewer large farms.
For Santa Barbara, slightly different trends from Aose in El Parafso are discernible. 
Farms mcreased by 17% (lower than Ae national average) while land m Arms mcreased 
by 15% - higher Aan Ae national average, and nearly matching Ae mcrease m farms. 
One might Aerefore expect Ae Ghn coefficients to have remained relatively static but 
in fact Aey increased more Aan Ae national average fix>m .75 to .79. AlAough not a 
large mcrease, where Ad this relatively greater degree of concentration come fiom?
Again, if Ae Astribution is presented graphically (Figures 4.2a arid b), we can see that 
(i) Ae biggest proportional mcrease in farms was in Ae smallest farms of less than 1 Ha 
(wiA an eqmvalent increase in land), (ii) land in farms of 1-20 Has rranained static or 
even dedmed slightly, and (iii) land mcreased among Ae larger farms, especially Aose 
between 100-500 Has and in Ae very few Arms (tmly 4 ly  1974) having mme tiian 
2,500 Has. Thus alAough Arms and land increased roughly equally overall, Ae 
ricewed Astribution of land became even mœe skewed.
140
Figure 4.1a El Paralso: distribution o f farms by farm size
group. 1952 and 1974
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Figure 4.1b El Paralso: distribution o f farmland by farm size 
groiqt, 1952 and 1974
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Figure 42a Santa Bârbara: distribution o f farms by farm size
group, 1952 and 1974
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Figure 42b Santa Bârbara: distribution o f farmland by farm  
size group. 1952 and 1974
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Source for Figures 4.1a-42b: calcidated from DGEC. 1962 and 1974
These trends of increasing pressure on land for small farmers in boA departments were 
reinforced by changing land tenure relations, as elsewhere in Honduras. BoA 
departments experienced a three or fourfold mcrease in Ae number of rented farms, 
and in El Parafso Ae number of privately-owned farms more than doubled (Figures
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4.3a and b, and 4.4a and b). Howeva, in El Para&o, .Aere were still means of gaining 
access to land Aat was not privately owned: farms wiA national land mcreased by more 
than 30% and national land in farms more than doubled. FurAermore, national land 
became an increasmgly significant source of land for small and medium farms of over 1 
Ha during this period (Appendix 4.1), alAough, as in Santa Bârbara, renting land 
became much more common than owning it or having access to national land for Arms 
of less Aan 1 lA . In fact, for Ae equivalent farmers in Santa Bârbara, Ae main source 
of land by 1974 was by renting (AppaiAx 4.2). These changing forms of tenure for 
anall farmers & evidence of Aeir mcreasing mccnporation mto comnooditized relations 
given Ae decline in obtainmg land through oAer forms', in oAer words aparceiia, 
colonatos or occupying land wiAout any formal arrangements.
FurAermore, Aese data suggest a change in Ae social relations between landowners 
and tenants, a rektionship which I analyse for Ae 1980s in later chapters. The change 
was substantiated for Ae census period by informants in Santa Bârbara. Their account 
explained that Ae land enclosures for cattle pasture fiom Ae 1950s onwards had 
required large numbers of campesmos to help clear land and fence it off for cattle, as 
described in Section 4.1 above. This process of renting out small parcels of land to 
campesinos for limited periods raised dramatically Ae number of tenant Armers (^  
well as Ae number of lanAess when Aey were Aeteafter Asplaced). After land was 
fenced off and put to pasture, informants stated that landowners in Ae valleys <mly 
rented out land to Aeir own worlœrs, while renting on a more general scale continued 
m Ae mountainous areas.
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Figure 43a El Paralso: number o f single tenure farms by type o f tenure, 
1952 and 1974
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Figure 43b El Paralso: land in single tenure farms by type o f tenure, 1952 
and 1974
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Figure 4.4a Santa Bârbara: number o f single tenure farms by type of 
tenure, 1952 and 1974
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Figure 4.4b Santa Bdrbara: land in single tenure farms by type o f tenure, 
1952 and 1974
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Source for Figures 43a-4.4b: cedcidated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974 
4.32 Evidence o f commodiHzatwn in land use
Similar trends to Ae national picture are evident wiA respect to commoditization. 
BoA El Parafso and Santa Bârbara are departments wiA considerable production of 
export crops and livestock products and growA in land use for Aese commodities took 
place between 1952 and 1974. Santa Bârbara, which had a relatively greater proportion
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of land under permanent crops than El Para&o, actually eiqierienced a relative decline 
in Ae proportion of area dedicated to annual crops, which cranprise predonmiantly 
food staples^. However, pasture land experienced Ae biggest growA in land area, 
especially in Santa Bdrbara (Figures 4.5a and b). FurAermore, alAough land area in 
farms mcreased relatively more for boA El Parafso and Santa Bdrbara Aan 
nationallyfQ, much of Ae land for Ae large mcreases in pasture came fiom cutting 
forest and taking over fallow and wasteland (Ae 'Other* category in Ae figures).
Figure 45a El Paraho: Imd use in farms, 1952 and 1974
□  1974
Annual Permt. Pasture 
Type o f land use
Other
^  Further analysis o f census data reveals that while maize firm s increased from 76 to 79% o f all 
farms in Santa Bârbara, maize area harvested declined from 8 to 7% o f land informs.
^0 Santa Bârbara had the largest total land area in farms o f all departments in 1974 and El Paralso 
came third.
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Figure 45b Santa Bârbara: land use in farms, 1952 and 1974
□ 1974
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Source for Figures 45a and b: calcidated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
Thus, as well as increasing commoditization of land use in boA departments, 
mtensification was also taking place. By 1974, a very small proportion of land in farms 
remained fallow (see Appendix 4.3) suggesting Aat cropland was particularly subject to 
intensification. This trend seemed to apply to export crops raAer Aan food staples. In 
El Parafso, Aere was an mcrease of over 100% of land in coffee and tobacco, and of 
over 4,000% in cotton (Howard Ballard, 1988, 600-601). Moreover, in Ae Jamastrdn 
Valley in El Parafso, it was estimated in 1980 Aat about 40% of land in farms was used 
for crop production, which included maize, beans, rice and vegetables, as well as 
tobacco and cotton (MRN/DARCO, 1984,29). In fact, crop production was almost as 
inqmrtant in area as pasture in Ae valley. Santa Bdrbara also increased its area in 
coffee, and had Ae second largest area in sugar cane of all departments in 1974 
(DGEC, 1979, 47). However, alAough Ae land area in maize production in boA 
departments mcreased absolutely in this period, Ae average proportion of farm land 
used for maize production actually declined in many farms, as is seen below. AlAough 
not fully conclusive fiom Aese data alone, Ae cormnoditization and intensification of
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land use for export crops and for pasture were likely to have put further pressures on 
Ae production of maize and oAer food staples.
433 Endence of intensification in maize production
The evidoice for intensification in maize production presents a more conoplex picture 
than nationally in boA department. AlAough Awe was an mcrease in Ae number of 
farms growing maize (particularly, but not only, among farms of less than 5 Has) and 
an increase in overall area (see Figures 4.6a and b, and 4.7a and b), Aere was a decline 
m average farm area harvested wiA maize in farms of less Aan 100 Has in El Parafso 
and farms of 1 to SO Has in Santa Bdrbara. FurAwmore, Ae decline cannot be 
explained tmly Ity Ae ^neral decline in farm sizes (which was not vwy substantial in 
Santa Bdrbara, except in farms undw 5 Has) because reductions in average maize area 
harvested were consi^rably greater than reductions in average farm size (see Appendix 
4.4). However, as nationally, Ae mcreases in output and yields suggests Aat Ae use of 
mputs and labour was bemg mtensified to mcrease productivity (Figures 4.6c, 4.7c, and 
Table 4.11). The genwal changes in output and yields would also have been affected 
Ity Ae grow A in land used for maize in some of Ae very la r^  farms, particularly in El 
Parafso - also m line wiA national trwids. '
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Figure 4.6a El Paralso: number o f maize farms by farm size group, primera
1952 and 1974
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Figure 4.6b El Paralso: maize area harvested by farm size group, primera 
1952 and 1974
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Figure 4.6c El Paralso: maize output by farm size group, primera 1952 and 
1974
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Figure 4.7a Santa Bârbara: number o f maize farms by farm size group, 
primera 1952 and 1974
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Figure 4.7b Santa Bârbara: maize area harvested by farm size group, 
primera 1952 and 1974
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Figure 4.7c Santa Bdrbara: maize output by farm size group, primera 1952 
and 1974
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Source for Figures 4.6a-4.7c: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
Land use for maize was undoubtedly affected by the increase in pasture and export 
crop production as suggested above. In addition, small farmers may have been able to 
increase their incomes through wage labour, or may have had to undertake wage labour 
to survive, and would therefore have had less time to devote to maize production. 
Thus, as suggested by national data, some small maize farmers may have been working
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as wage labour for large maize farmers. If this were so, farmers would have been under 
pressure to increase their yields through changes in techniques of production, which 
along with the incorporation of larger farmers into maize production would also have 
increased overall maize ouq>ut. Although it is not possible to substantiate these 
hypotheses further from the census data, later chapters illuminate some of the complex 
relations involved in the intensification of maize production in the 1980s and the 
strategies pursued by different types of farmer.
Table 4.11 El Paralso and Santa Bârbara: average maize yields. 1952-74 (bfflHa)
Departments 1952 1974 Absolute change 
1952-74
Percentage
change
1952-74
El Paralso .69 .93 .24 35
Santa Bdrbara .91 1.33 .41 45
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
4.4 Summary
This chapter has argued that reproducing maize production and providing adequate 
maize for national consumption needs have been affected by problems in access to land, 
and forms of forced appropriation and commerce since colonial times. In more recent 
years, evidence in the agricultural censuses of 1952 and 1974 shows that maize farmers 
experienced increasing pressures in access to land, as well as processes of 
commoditization and intensification. Threats to land, particularly among small farmers, 
were manifested in land fragmentation, declining farm sizes, increasingly difficult access 
to public lands, insecure tenure, and the considerable expansion of farmland used for 
pasture. Given the weight of maize farms in the overall number of farms, and their 
predominance in farms of less than 5 Has, small maize farmers were particularly 
vulnerable to these changes. Further pressures on maize farmers were evident in the 
increasing commoditization and intensification of land use, including that used for 
maize with the growth of maize farming in large farms. Nationally, data indicate that
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smaller farms w æ  using an increasing proportion of their land for maize. Increases in 
yields also suggest an intensification of inputs and labour as well as of land use. Data 
on off>faim incomes and use of labour further suggest that small maize farmers were 
providing wage labour for large maize-producing farms.
Although many of these trends are mirrored in the census data for the departments of 
El Paraiso and Santa Barbara, where I carried out fieldwork, the pressures resulting 
from threats to entitlements in land, commoditization and intaisification appear to 
involve mtne conq)lex relations than can be analysed fiom census data alone. 
Succeeding chapters will look further at these relationships, especially in El Parafso.
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Appendix 4d
El Paraiso: distribution o f types o f land tenure informs with a single type o f tenure by farm size, 1952
(percent)
Farm size 
groining
Privately
owned
Rented land National land Other forms Total
<l 17 5 32 47 100
1-5 18 3 38 41 100
5-10 23 3 45 29 100
10-20 29 3 46 22 100
20-50 41 3 39 18 100
50-100 48 4 34 14 100
100-200 66 5 23 5 100
200-500 69 4 24 3 100
500-1,000 86 0 14 0 100
lSm-2500 100 0 0 0 100
2fOO+ 100 0 0 0 100
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
El Paraiso: distribution o f types o f land tenure in farms with a single type o f tenure by farm size, 1974
(percent)
Farm axe 
grouping
Privately
owned
Rented land National land Otherjbrms Toted
<l 27 46 27 1 100
1-5 33 25 42 0 100
5-10 37 5 58 0 100
10-20 34 2 63 0 100
20-50 32 1 67 0 100
50-700 36 1 63 0 100
700-200 41 3 54 1 100
200-500 65 4 30 1 100
500-7.000 76 3 21 0 100
7.000-2.500 80 0 13 7 100
2500* 100 0 0 0 100
Source: calculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
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Appendix 4.2
Santa Bârbara: distribution o f types o f land tenure in fa rm  with a singie type o f tenure by farm size.
1952 (percent)
Farm size 
grouping
Privately
owned
Rented land National land Other fo rm Total
<1 10 12 19 59 100
1-5 15 14 25 46 100
5-10 28 4 52 16 100
10-20 31 2 58 9 100
20-50 37 1 58 4 100
50-100 53 2 42 3 100
100-200 62 2 35 2 100
200-500 84 1 14 0 100
500-1,000 85 4 11 0 100
1.000-2500 100 0 0 0 100
2500+ 50 50 0 0 100
Source: calculeued from DGEC. 1952 and 1974
Santa Bârbara: distribution o f types o f land tenure in farms with a single type o f tenure by farm size,
1974 (percent)
Farm size 
grouping
Privately
owned
Rented land National land Other fo rm Total
<1 12 66 19 3 100
1-5 20 40 38 3 100 IT
5-10 35 7 55 3 100 *.
10-20 35 3 60 2 100 ■
20-50 39 2 56 3 100
50-100 46 2 49 3 100
100-200 62 3 32 3 100
200-500 78 0 20 2 100
500-1,000 83 4 13 0 100
ljOOO-2500 87 13 0 0 100
2500+ 100 0 0 0 100
Source: cedculated from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
Appendix 4.3
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Land use informs, El Parafso and Santa Bdrbeaa, 1974
El Parafso Santa Bârbara
Land use 1974 Percent o f total 1974 Percent o f total .
(Has) land in farms (Has) land in farms
Annual crops 31,223 13 25.376 10
Permanent crops 15,445 6 34.279 13
Fallow 7,961 3 16,436 6
Pasture 132.337 54 150.816 57
Woodltmd 27.745 11 16,851 6
Wasteland 26.260 11 19.631 7
Other 2,508 1 2,548 1
Total 243.246 99* 265,937 100
* Less than 100 because o f rounding 
Source: calculated from DGEC. 1979,31-32
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A p p en d ix  4.4
El Paraiso and Santa Bârbara: changes in average farm sise and maize area harvested, 1952-74
(percent)
, El Paraiso Semta Bârbara
Farm size Change in Change in Change in Change in
grouping average farm size etverage maize 
area harvested
average farm size average maize 
area harvested
<1 -1 -12 -4 0
1-5 ' -10 -12 -7 -14
5-10 1 -14 <1 -15
10-20 -2 -11 <1 -17
20-50 4 -11 2 -14
50-100 -4 30 -<1 -5
100-200 -1 75 <1 6 ,
200-500 2 5 1 33
5 0 0 -ljm -1 735 2 129
ljOOO-2500 -4 379 8 107
2500+ -16 1.606 43 0
Toted -8 -2 -2 -17
Source: calculeued from DGEC, 1952 and 1974
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Ch a p te r s
P r o d u c in g  m a iz e  i n  E l  Pa r a is o : o b st a c l e s , r is k s  a n d  
STRATEGIES 
Introduction
This chapter shows that the social relations of maize production in the 1980s were both 
complex and contradictory. The different spaces and possibilities open to Honduran 
maize farmers were located in social hierarchies which dqiended on access to resources 
and labour. These social hierarchies provided the basis for power relations which 
affected how exchanges over goods and services took place, as well as who benefited 
fix>m them. On one hand, relations between different types of maize farmers were 
hierarchical and unequal and served to undermine productive ctqiadties; on the other, 
they also helped those farmers with least resources to sustain their maize production. 
While all maize farmers were subject to risk, risk averting strategies for the poorest 
farmers - which included their relations with wealthy farmers - still left them in a 
precarious and vulnerable position. Within this context, the state's policies to increase 
maize production among small and medium farmers were directed towards the 
increasing commoditization of all relations and processes. Such policies sought to 
modernize' the social and technical conditions of production as well as improve 
productive capacities. However, they also introduced new Qrpes of risk, especially 
financial, which could leave these maize farmers highly vulnerable.
The analysis in this chapter thus concentrates on the contradictory nature of social 
relations in the countryside in terms of its effects on the productive capacities of maize 
farmers. The contradictions I examine are those of risk and security, survival and 
intensification, and the role of personalized and non-commoditized relations in
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commoditized production. This approach is different fipom that which analyses the 
conditions of maize farming by such criteria as farm size or destination of output, often 
found in the Honduran literature.
The chapter uses field data from the villages of Chichicaste and Jutiapa in the Jamastrtin 
Valley in El Parafso to analyse the inter-relations between maize farmers, as well as 
between farmers and state institutions. For the moment, I continue to use the word 
'farmer' to denote all those who grow maize, whether on a hectare of land using their 
own labour or as part of the activities of a large farm using hired workers. While this 
term may seem highly undifferentiated given that a landowner and cattle farmer 
growing maize is unlikely to be operating under the same conditions as a small 
producer renting a single hectare plot, it is easier and less confusing at this stage to talk 
about the conditions of maize farming without imposing a set of labels which may not 
adequately characterize the nature of that production. Nor, as argued in Chapters 1 
and 4, does it seem appropriate to impose a class structure' on maize farmers before 
discussing the conditions under which maize is produced. Thus my only distinction for 
the moment is by farm size into small, medium and large farmers (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2). The number of farmers in each group and village is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Number o f small, medium and large farmers interviewed in Chichicaste andJuticpa, 1987
Farm size group Farm size range (Has) Chichicaste
interviewees
Jutiapa interviewees
Small <1-5 7 5
Medium 5-50 6 4
Large 50f 3 3
Total <l-50f 16 12
I take a step-by-step approach to building up a picture of social relations, starting with 
access to land and then looking at labour use, access to credit and use of technology. 
Some preliminary conclusions about the nature of social relations and how they
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affected maize production are drawn. The implications for farmers' capacities to 
reproduce maize production and access to maize for consumption are discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7.
In Chapter 3, I pointed out some of the differences between the two villages of
)
Chichicaste and Jutiapa. In analysing my data, these differences are sometimes 
important and sometimes not so significant When there are key differences between 
the two villages, I treat the data separately. When not, I combine them.
5.1 Obtaining land
Understanding how farmers obtain land, and what mechanisms enhance or undermine 
their access to land, is crucial to explaining social relations in the countryside as well as 
whether farmers are able to reproduce their maize production. This section examines 
the social relations of land tenure among maize farmers in Chichicaste and Jutiapa in 
the mid-1980s, and looks at the concepts of risk and security in farmers' access to land. 
I argue that access to land for maize production among small farmers finequently 
involved processes of hierarchical exchange between anall and large farmers which 
were not apparent hom aggregate data such as those in agricultural censuses and 
surveys. These exchanges involved risk as well as a means of achieving security in 
access to means of production.
Arriving at these conclusions involves unravelling the often corrqrlex land tenure 
relations and people's perceptions of them. The formal categories of census data or the 
stated property status of qrecific farms need to be compared with farmers' own land 
stories. Thus, there are several questions that can be asked about maize farmers in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa. How did the forms of access to land compare with the census
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data for the area? How did fiomers obtain dieir land in practice? How did they hold 
on h) it?
5.1.1 Land tenure patterns in Chichicaste and Jutiapa
As well as evaluating the extent to which the Danlf area (which includes the Jamastrdn
. .
Valley) seoned typkal of El Parafso prior to ny  fieldwoik, analysing 1974 census data 
on land tenure allows comparison of apparent trends in the 1970s with how maize 
farmMS chaiactaized dieir access to land in Jamastrân in the 1980s. Fw both Danlf 
and the department, national land farms formed the largest proportion followed by 
private and rented farms, although the percentage of rented farms in the Danlf area was 
greater than for El Parafso as a whole (Figure S. la). National land accounted for a 
relatively l a r ^  area in farms than private land in the Danlf area, while the tq^sire  was 
true for El Parafso as a whole (Figure 5.1b). These data point to the continuing 
importance of access to national land in the mid-1970s in Danlf, as well as indicating 
that private and rented farms were also hnportant forms of tenure for many farmers.
The privatization of land affected differrait farmers in different ways. Disaggregating 
some of tiiese data for Danlf showed that . 88% of privately-owned land was held by 
only 20% of farms with that land. However, the rented land area in farms was a very 
anall proportion of land for both the namcipio and the dq>artment, indicating that only 
the smallest farms ^ e ra lly  rented land. Although national and ejidal land were 
irnpwtant sources of land for all farms in the Danlf area, most of the national land 
(73%) was held ly  only a relatively small proportion of national land farms (31%). 
There was even one farm which alone had over 400 Has of ejidid land while five fiums
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between them had aparently occupied 1,300 Has without any form of legal tenure 
(other forms')^.
Mixed forms of tenure were genoally in a minority although more common in the 
department as a whole than in Danli. Disaggregation of the mixed tenure data for Danlf 
showed that those who combined rented land with other forms of tenure appeared to be 
medium farms of 10-20 Has, while those who obtained access to both national and 
private land tended to have larger farms averaging 80 Has in size. Both these 
observations paralleled the trends for wholly rented, national and private farms: the 
larger the farm, the more private and national land; the smaller the farm, the more 
important was access to rented land.
Figure 5.1a Distribution o f farms by tenure. Danli and El 
Paraiso, 1974
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They were obviously not colonatos or share-cropper.
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Figure S.lb Distribution o f land area in farms by tenure, DanU
and El Paraiso, 1974
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LJ El Paraiso
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Type o f tenure
Source for Figures 5.1a and b: calculated from DGEC, 1974
As pointed out in Chapter 3, El Parafso was a department of population expulsion as 
well as a pole for migration and colonization between the 1950s and 1970s. The 
department is varied in terrain, and although many areas e)q)erience relative isolation 
and poverty, the Jamastrân Valley was a location for migrant farmers. In both 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, about half of the interviewees stated that they had come to the 
villages to obtain land. The average length of residence by migrant interviewees in both 
villages was about 20 years, although some had been there as long as 30 or 40 years. 
In Jutiapa, migrant interviewees were mainly from other villages in El Parafso, whereas 
in Chichicaste most had come from other departments, mainly Francisco Morazân and 
Choluteca where there was relative poverty, density of population and pressure on 
land. Migration patterns among interviewees appeared to arise fiom their netwoiks of 
contacts rather than time of migration. Several migrants in each village had come fiom 
the same place of origin.
It is difficult to know how and whether these population movements affected land 
tenure relations. Only some aspects of the patterns of land tenure apparent in the
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cencus data were evident from ny  fieldwork data in the 1980s. In the twelve year gap, 
increasing privatization of land had probably taken pl^e^. Although I do not claim 
that ny  data are representative of the general trends in the villages, privately-owned 
and rented farms appear as the most important categories of land tenure from my 
fieldwork. However, how farmers talked about their land was in much vaguer 
categories than the apparently clear distinctions made by the census. In addition, to 
understand die significance of different land tenure relations, they have tt> be seen in the 
context of, and in relation to, other aspects of production.
Thus a first look at data given ly  interviewees in the villages of Chichicaste and Jutiapa 
indicates that land was generally in angle forms of tenure and privately-owned, 
although some famters did gain access to national or ejidal land, and others had 
borrowed land (usually from family members) (Table 5.2a). Howevo", there was 
greater incidence of mixed forms of access to land in farms up to 50 Has than apparent 
from the census a decade before, but even disaggregating these data still presents a 
picture of largely privately held land, whether owned or rented by the user (Table 
5.2b).
There were differences between the two villages not evident from these tables and 
which suggest that land tenure relatitms were more precarious in Chichicaste tiian 
Jutiapa and also more dqrendent on relations with other farm ^. For exanq)le, all the 
small maize farmers I interviewed in Chichicaste rented or borrowed part, if not all, of 
tiieir land, whereas only one snail farmar interviewed in Jutiapa stated that he rented 
land, while another had borrowed part of his. There was also greater incidence of 
renting land among medium fanners in Chichicaste, whereas none of the equivalent
^ I  do not know o f any analysis in the Honduran literature to establish tMs generalization.
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interviewees in Jutiapa stated that they rented land, although one indicated that he cady
had use lights (rinimmo i2a7) tt> the land he farmed.
Table 52a DistribMion o f farms by stated type o f land tenure among farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987 (all farms)
Number o f farms by stated tw e o f land tenure
Farm size 
group (Has)
Number in ’ 
fiom  size 
groiuf
Private Rented National Other Mixed
<1-5 12 2 2 1 2* 5
5-50 9 5 0 1 0 4
50+ 6 6 0 0 0 0
Total 28 13 2 2 2 9
* 'Other' land was loaned in these instances
Table 52b Distribution c f farms by stated type ofnuxed land tenure among fanners interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987
Number o f farms by stated type o f mixed tenure
Farm size 
group (Has)
Number in 
group
Private and 
rented
National and 
rented
Private and 
national
Other*
<1-5 5 3 0 0 2
5-50 4 3 0 0 1
Total 9 6 0 0 3
* Other: <1-5 were private and loaned; the 5-50 farm combined private, rented cmd gjidtd land
Ccxnparing ny data with those collected in a limited survey made for the integrated 
rural development project (DRI) confirm the complexity of access and rights to land ,^ 
and how difficult diey are to investigate. How people define or talk about their land 
may not tally with juridical categories and frameworks, a point made in the USAID 
documents supporting land titling (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). On one hand, the DRI 
data showed that most land in these villages was privately held and the ranainder 
rented, consistent with data that I collected (DARCO, 1985a and b). On the other 
hand, the survey did not indicate any evidence of farmers having use rights to national 
land in Chichicaste, although it found that use rights were more common in Jutiapa 
than my own data suggest
^ As well as possUtle Udosyncracks in die two sets o f data.
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5 .1 2  Large farm ers
Having access to substantial amounts of land gave large maize farmers a special 
position in maize production: they had the possibility of producing maize on a 
considerable scale; they could confer land on others; they could provide employment 
As we shall also see later, they could command bank credit, could buy agricultural 
inputs, and could hence supply workers and tenants with agricultural supplies. The 
nature of their access to land, and their attitudes towards land use, therefore affected 
relations to other maize farmers.
All but one of large farmers I interviewed were bom locally. This contrasts with the 
incidence of migration among the other farmers interviewed. Although most came 
from established families in the area, the large farmers I interviewed were not the 
largest landowners in the Jamastrân Valley. However, property, power and influence 
were evident in relative scale among them. They were often reluctant to provide data 
on how they came to acquire such large areas of land. It was also difficult to obtain 
precise data on actual landholdings • although easier to find out how much land was 
used for crops and how many cattle they owned, fix>m which it was possible to 
approximate the total land held .^ However, their land stories' are indicative of their 
wealth and social positions as landowners and large farmers.
I interviewed six large farmers. They all produced some maize although some were 
more dedicated maize farmers than others. Above all, they all had cattle. Two, living 
in Chichicaste, already had considerable amounts of land which they had either 
inherited or come into through marriage (Table 5.3) but they were also expanding their
^ For example, one farmer stated that he needed 2-3 manzanas (1.4-2 Has) per head o f cattle, a 
common estimate especially for unimproved pasture land.
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cattle production into newly colonized national land in the next-door department of 
Olancho. Land expansion still seemed possible from Chichicaste if farmers were 
prepared to ride through the mountains and cut down forest. In the heart of the 
Jamastrân Valley in Jutiapa, however, possibilities for expansion were more 
constrained. One of the large farmers I interviewed was going to rent further land (for 
maize) from a well-known local landowner.
Of the farmers I interviewed, the largest offered a clear example of land tenure relations 
involving patronage. Although he described himself as a campesino and came from 
humble origins, over 30 years he had accumulated a large amount of land to become 
the reputedly largest landowner in Chichicaste. This farmer's self-definition in relation 
to his origins was overlaid by behaviour appropriate to a landowner. He rented land to 
his permanent workers and, as we shall see, was a source of agricultural inputs for 
them. This farmer had given land to his sons. Some sons worked with him and others 
had their own farms.
Table 53  Access to land by six large maize farmers in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987
Large farmer Estimated farm size 
(Has)
How obtained land Percentage o f land 
used for maize
1 52 Inherited from father 20
2 66f Not known 21
3 125-h Not known 16
4 200f Joint inheritance with 
brother
17
5 300f Inherited and newly 
purchased land
3
6 600 Through marriage, 
purchase, and possible 
access to national land
8
Whether they considered themselves old-style hacendados (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1) 
or not, the farmers interviewed saw their farms as commercial enterprises. All received 
bank credit which financed their use of purchased seeds, fertilizers and machinery. 
They all employed some permanent wage labour, and all wwe either concerned with
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expansion or with obtaining maximum profits from their farms. Thus two were 
considering dedicating more land to pasture than food crops because they thought it 
would yield higher returns. Another was increasing his maize area by renting land. 
While some were expanding their farms by acquiring new land, others were seeking to 
intensify production on their existing farms.
However, owning large amounts of land was also a means to obtaining social or 
political as well as economic influence. Two of the three large farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste were among the three main landowners in the village and were treated with 
considerable respect. The three Jutiapa farmers interviewed were involved in local 
politics or had other businesses. Nearly all the six farmers had some connection with 
the integrated rural development programme (DRI). Furthermore, at least two had 
been identified by the programme as 'lideres productivos'. This may have been an 
indication that they were considered progressive or model farmers, but it may also have 
been a reference to their economic and social importance.
I shall return to the position of these large farmers in maize production. The relations 
between these farmers, and others in their social position, and the small maize farmers 
of Chichicaste and Jutiapa formed a critical, but contradictory, part of the processes of 
survival and accumulation.
5.1 J  Snudl and medium farmers
Small and medium farmers had diverse strategies for gaining access to land. Although 
many farmers, including small ones, inherited plots of land from family members, 
inherited land was often combined with other forms of access. Thus farms were often 
composed of several small plots (see Table 5.4). The most common pattern for small 
farmers in both villages was to have access to two parcels of land, one of which was
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usually rented or borrowed. Medium farmers often had access to three or four plots,
although usually with a single ype of tenure.
Table 5.4 Number o f plots perform among small and medium maize farmers in Chichicaste and
Jutiapa, 1987
Farm
size
group
(Has)
Number 
o f plots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
<1-5 Number
of
farmers
4 6 1 1 0 0 0
5-50 with this 
number 
o f plots
1 1 5 1 0 0 1
Analysing data on land that was reported as rented, borrowed or occupied in another 
form, shows that among small and medium farmers interviewed, renting predominated 
(Table 5.5). However, gaining access to land was frequently dependent on personal 
contacts and developing some sort of mutual exchange relationship. Furthermore, 
many farmers (especially small ones) relied on their relationships with family members 
and landownas to provide them with land, whether as a loan or on a cash rent basis. 
Access to land often had the nature of a favour', even when rent was paid. There was 
a range of phrases used to explain the relationship: 'me presta una manzana' or 'me da 
una manzana' or 'me alquila una manzana'. These phrases did not necessarily translate 
literally into 'he lends me a manzana'^  'he gives me a manzana' or 'he rents me a 
manzana' in terms of what actually happened. For example, within families, the term 
rent' might have been used, but not necessarily paid. Even renting land from 
landowners who were not relatives did not always mean that rent was paid. Equally 
giving' (whether within families or between larger and small farmers) usually meant 
loaning' (although it could also have meant renting').
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Table 5 3  Type o f access to unowned land by small and medbtm nuuze farmers in Chichicaste and
Jutiapa, 1987
Number o f plots by land source and type o f access
Type o f access FromfamUy
member
From landowner 
or large maize 
farmer
National land Private land
Rent 0 7 0 0
Borrow 3 1 0 0
Occum 0 0 2 2
There were, however, some differences between the two villages. As stated above, 
there was greater incidence of renting land among small farmers in Chichicaste than 
Jutiapa as well as greater reliance on the goodwill of landowners. This may reflect 
idiosyncracies in the data. Nevertheless, further analysis of data for Chichicaste show 
that there was a range of ways in which small farmers obtained land, and that these 
ways often involved iixq)licit or explicit exchanges with landowners, which may or may 
not have been cranmoditized. While inheritance and acquiring land through fruxnlies 
were important, access to loaned or rented land may have been based on forms of 
patronage, for exanqrle, when there was a prior relationship with the jandowno" (as in 
one case, when farmer and tenant originated from the same village), or when tenants 
carried out wage work fen: a landowna:.
5.1.4 Paying forrented or borrowed land
Some of the strategies used by Chichicaste and Jutiapa maize farmers to obtain land 
were responses to changes resulting firom the spread of commercialized crop 
production and the enactment of legislation. On one hand, land had become a 
commodity through gradual privatization which was being reinforced by state policies 
in the 1980s: private land could be bought and sold, people knew its market price and 
its rental value. On the other hand, there were constraints on privatization and the 
development of land markets, especially the continuing existence of national or ejidal
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land which was held legally, or non-legally, by individual farmers .^ With the decline of 
I colonos, and the uneasy context for renting land, landless and land poor had to find 
other means of obtaining land, and large farmers had to find ways of obtaining labour.
In Chichicaste and Jutiapa, it is possible to see a range of responses (see Table 5.6). 
The number of responses recorded in the table is greater than the number farmers 
renting or borrowing land because some arrangements varied. Furthermore, the table 
does not take into account those who occupied private or national land without any 
title or payment. There were one or two medium farmers in this category.
Chichicaste farmers were prepared to discuss their land tenure arrangements more 
readily than those in Jutiapa and might have skewed the evidence summarized in Table 
5.6. Nevertheless, I had a strong impression of less cong»lex and personalized 
relationships around gaining access to and paying for land in the Jutiapa area than in 
Chichicaste. Thus, only one small Jutiapa farmer stated that he 'rented' a plot of land 
from his brother but did not in fact pay a cash rent, although he did provide labour on 
his brother's farm. Another small farmer who had the use of a privately-owned plot, 
which he hoped to buy with financial help from the DRI, occasionally also rented land 
for cash payment A third also rented land for cash payment only. In general, land 
tenancies seemed to be based on the cash nexus in Jutiapa, which can perhaps be 
explained by the commoditization of production more generally in the heart of the 
valley (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2) and the difficulty of finding land that was not 
already occupied.
^  Furthermore, non-lcgtü national land in the hands o f large farmers was potentially under threat o f 
appropriation as part o f land r^orm or. more likely, occupation by organized peasaru groups.
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Table 5.6 Type o f contractual arrangement for rented or borrowed land among small and medium 
maize farmers in Chichicaste and Jiaiapa, 1987
Number o f farmers in each group
Casf rent Renttn kind No rent N.d.*
Small
and
medium
farms
(Has)
Number
ingroup
Works
for
owner
Does not 
workfor 
owner
Works
for
owner
Does not 
workfor 
owner
Works
for
owner
Does not 
workfor 
owner
Chichicaste
<1-5 8 3 1 1 0 1 2 0
5-50 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 1
ÏÏÊM Jutiapa
<1-5 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
5-50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
* N.d. = no data ,
However, responses to pressures on land in Chichicaste were complex and diverse. 
They combined commoditized relations such as paying cash rents - which, however, 
were often established on a personalized basis because of the patronage of the 
landowner in other farm activities - and non-commoditized relations if land was loaned, 
either by the patron/landowner or relatives .^ Thus the combination of ways of "paying' 
for land among small farmers is stiiking: (i) cash rents with or without wage labour, (ii) 
rent paid in kind with wage labour (usually a sack^ of msixe/manzana)', (iii) no rent but 
the farmer worked for the landowner; and (iv) no apparent obligations at all. One anall 
farmer stated that he rented a plot from a large farmer who originated from his village 
and for whom he now also worked. He either paid rent in kind or in cash. Paying in 
kind for land seemed relatively unusual in this area in the 1980s, and- with the 1980s' 
land prices and rents, it would have been worth more to a landowner to charge a cash
^ This does not mean that the landowner or family member derived no benefit from the arrangement: 
the loan o f land might well have been linked to other exchanges.
A sack is the same as a carga • about 2 quintals (about 200 lbs or 91 kgs).
172
rent rather than one or two sacks of maize per manzana^. However, this small farmer 
had an established relationship with the landowner, and the agreement was evidence of 
the range of possible arrangements that could be made. The type of agreement that 
they had established might hold particularly if the tenant were a worker on the owner's 
farm. Thus another small farmer stated that he was not asked to pay any rent at all by 
the owner of his land for whom he also worked (even though the owner was not a 
family member), while others claimed both to pay cash rents as well as undertake 
waged work.
However, renting arrangements for medium farmers in Chichicaste appeared to be 
based on the cash nexus and involved no waged work. It is more difficult, however, to 
locate these farmers in terms their relationships to landowners and how they perceived 
their access to land. Often medium farmers who did not own all their land had 
aspirations to buy it although their financial capacity to do so was often limited. 
Information from interviews indicated that some had been small or rather poor medium 
farmers who were beginning to expand their production by renting extra land. To do 
this, they might have had access to institutional credit, such as from the DRI.
S.I.5 Land and exchange relations: balancing risk and security
The above analysis demonstrates that knowing the farm size of maize farmers cannot 
alone provide the basis for making assumptions about the nature of maize production, 
especially how land is obtained and how access to it is sustained over tinte. In 
Chichicaste, exchanges over land and labour were part of maintaining access to land for 
small farmers (as well as to labour for landowners). On one hand the existence of the
^ In Chichicaste. rents ranged from Lps7S-100lmanzana (or Lpsl07-143/hectare), whereas one or 
two sacks o f maize per manzana might hive sold on the market for Lps34-68 at harvest-time.
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large farmers and their extensive landholdings acted as an obstacle to obtaining land for 
many small maize farmers (particularly if such holdings included national land). On the 
other, setting up a relationship with a large farmer enabled small maize farmers to gain 
access to land, and as we shall see later in this chapter, to other agricultural inputs.
These exchanges combined different characteristics. Firstly they depended on 
commoditized relations: even though rents were not always exacted in practice, the 
rent was a known amount based on local land values, and labour provided to the 
landowner was paid a wage. Thus the exchanges were more or less part of markets for 
land and labour. Whether the land was obtained through a land market is a moot point. 
The land was available because the tenants worked for the landowners in many cases. 
There was, however, a generalized demand for wage labour (which I analyse in the 
next section). Second, the exchanges were personalized. They were based on 
patronage (perhaps resulting from a relationship established long ago), good will, and 
trust largely based on an employer-employee relationship, as well as the different (and 
unequal) economic advantages to small and large fanners. Even so, these processes 
involved risk because human relations can be fragile and are prone to disruptions and 
disagreements as well as being affected by pressures to commoditize and mechanize 
production. A further look at these relations substantiates this point.
Five of the seven small farmers interviewed in (Chichicaste had con^lex ways of gaining 
access to land for maize production and faced different types of risk and security. On 
one hand, four out of the five had the patronage of landowners/large farmers who 
rented or loaned them land. These landowners/large farmers also employed them as 
workers. The fifth had been loaned a .7 Ha plot fiom his father. Paradoxically, his 
father had access to a considerable amount of potrero - or scrub land used for grazing 
but not fit for cultivation. This farmer could not continue to rely on his father for land.
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and was planning to rent land in the future from the largest landowner in the village, for 
whom he already did wage work.
In all these cases, land could be withdrawn (as could the opportunity for wage work). 
However, the relationship between small and large maize farmers provided a range of 
possibilities (for land and labour) which privately-owned small plots did not. If one 
tenancy fell through, it was often possible to find another under similar conditions. For 
exainple, one small bean and pig farmer, who was not included in these data, had had 
three successive tenancies in which he had not had to pay rent but had worked for the 
landowner. When each tenancy fell through, which, in his case, seemed to be because 
of bad relations with the landowner, he sought land with another large maize farmer 
who could also provide wage work.
By comparison, most of the small farmers interviewed in Jutiapa did not have land 
tenure relations involving the same con^lexity. Only in one case did access to land 
involve an agreement to carry out wage labour. In that case, the farmer provided 
labour for his brother's farm and used his wages to finance maize production. The 
exchange was based on rights and obligations within the farmer's family and could be 
seen as an example of the exploitation of kinship relations for accumulation within petty 
commodity production, described by Brass (1986).
Although the conditions of access to land combined aspects of security and risk for 
small maize farmers, the quantity of land held affected farmers' edacities to produce 
maize, especially if the land had to support a large number of people. As well as the 
continual redistribution and fragmentation of land implied by farmers' obtaining plots 
fit)m their families, several farmers also had to provide for a considerable number of 
dependants. For example, one small farmer in Jutiapa, who rented a plot of land as 
well as having inherited plots from his grandmother and father, had to provide for his
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parents and grandparents as well as wife and children. Another exarrq)le is the 
Chichicaste farmer mentioned above who borrowed land from his father. He was one 
of a household of seventeen and had to contribute to their upkeep from his farm output 
and his waged work. In both Chichicaste and Jutiapa, the small amounts of land 
available for cultivation meant that financial margins among small farmers were narrow, 
as will be seen in Chapter 6.
As well as amount, the quality of land available to medium as well as small farmers also 
affected maize production. The case of the small farmer in Chichicaste whose father 
had potrero but little agricultural land was an example. Anotha- exarnple is a medium 
farmer in Chichicaste who had inherited 14 Has of potrero, but had obtained access to 
about three and a half hectares of ejidal land for growing maize. Without the potrero, 
this farmer would have been classified as a small maize farmer. By contrast, other 
medium farmers in both villages had access to sufficiently good land which they could 
use for maize and other crop production, as well as land which they used for a few 
cattle.
For some medium farmers, owning land for maize production was only part of their 
livelihood possibilities. Apart from those who had cattle, some had non-farm 
livelihoods based on trade. Two medium farmers - one in each village - had a village 
store. Maize production was just one means of earning a living. For these farmers, 
land could act as a security against the fluctuations of trade, and trade could help 
finance farm activities. Large farmers also engaged in trade, primarily directed to the 
marketing of farm products, particularly maize and beans. The relationship between 
farming and trading will be discussed in Chapter 9: ownership of land and the social 
position and relations with others that are associated with it had itrqx>nant effects for 
maize markets as well as maize production.
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That maize production had more or less importance for small, medium and large maize
farmers is also demonstrated by patterns of land use. My data parallel the patterns
shown by census data: the smaller the farm, the greater the proportion of land used for
maize, and vice versa. Thus, as Table 5.7 shows, a high percentage of land in small
farms was used for maize, less than half of land in medium farms was cultivated with
maize, and less than 20% for the large farmers interviewed. However, these averages
should be treated with some caution because within each farm size group there was a
range of land types and access to labour, as well as amounts of land and strategies for
land use. Thus, for example, one medium farmer in Chichicaste, according to this
stratification, used 100% of his land for maize, while another who had mainly potrero
used only 20%. The data for large farms in Chichicaste are certainly skewed because
the largest farm was estimated at having about 600 Has. This again shows some of the
dangers in making assumptions about maize production based on farm size alone.
Table 5.7 Estimated proportion o f land used for maize among farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and
Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
CfticMcaste Jutiapa
Type o f 
farm
Farm
size
group
(Has)
Avge. 
farm size 
(Has)
Avge.
maize
area
(Has)
Propor­
tion o f 
land 
used for 
maize
Farm
size
group
(Has)
Avge. 
farm size 
(Has)
Avge.
maize
area
(Has)
Propor­
tion o f 
land 
usedfor 
maize
Small <1-5 2.2 2.1 97% <1-5 2.6 1.8 70%
Medium 5-50 13.9 4.4 32% 5-50 14.5 3.8 27%
Large 50+ 317 23 7% 50+ 130 23 18%
Noting these considerations, there were, however, some differences in land use 
between the two villages. Only 70% of land in small maize farms was apparently used 
for maize in Jutiapa compared with 97% in Chichicaste. These data suggest that access 
to markets for otho* products may have been greater in Jutiapa than Chichicaste at that 
time. Certainly, there was greater prevalence of growing fruit trees among Jutiapa 
small farmers (see Appendix 7.1). However there was a relatively greater proportion
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(although similar average area) of land used for maize among large farmers interviewed 
in Judapa than in Chichicaste. Again, the possibilities for commercial maize fanning 
might have been greater in the heart of the Jamastrân Valley than in Chichicaste and 
some Jutiapa farmers might have been prepared to dedicate a substantial part of their 
farms to it.
5.1.6 Conclusions
This analysis provides an initial and critical contribution to the debates in Honduras 
about whether secure land tenure would promote increased ouQ)ut, productivity and 
improve livelihoods. Security of tenure was usually used synonymously with private 
ownership in the 1980s debates. However, for the small farmers I interviewed, security 
lay not only in ownership but in the ability to rent or borrow land, generally in 
conjunction with an exchange of other favours and obligations. In other words, 
security of access to land was based on personalized as well as market exchange 
relations. That this security also involved the risk that the personalized relations could 
be disrupted is evident. Howeva:, the margins of financial risk in maize production 
were high for these farmers, and it was not necessarily more secure to own a small plot 
than to rent or borrow it. Furthermore, establishing personalized relations with large 
farmers also offered small farmers wage employment which they could use to 
supplement their income fiiom maize, pay debts and continue producing maize. As will 
be seen in Chapter 7, debt is a serious problem in maize production. Among some 
small and medium farmers who were being encouraged to take loans through the DRI 
and invest further in their production (including the possibility of buying land), 
incurring debts could be a threat to the supposed incentive of private ownership. For 
these farmers, incentives to improve plots of land and invest in production could not 
just rely on private ownership of land alone.
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5.2 The use o f  labour in maize production
In Sen's terminology, labour is an entitlement with dual characteristics. It has the 
character of an ownership entitlement: in a capitalist economy, one is entitled to one's 
own labour power, and thus to the trade-based and production-based entitlements 
related to one's labour-power' (1981,2). It also acts as an exchange entitlement: labour 
power can be exchanged for a wage (or goods and services). If the rights to one's own 
labour power, or the ability to exchange labour power for wages are undemninftri, food 
security may also be undermined. Thus understanding how maize farmers gain access 
to labour and the nature of exchanges involved are essential to understanding farmers' 
capacities to produce and reproduce maize.
I have already indicated that labour can act as part of the means of exchange for land 
between small and large maize farmers. As well as developing an nndm-stanHing o f  this 
relationship, there are other aspects of access to and use of labour which need 
analysing. For example, how land^ and labour are combined within farms also helps to 
eiq)lam how maize is produced and reproduced as well as providing a means to 
characterize different types of production (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4 and 1.5). Thus 
there are two sets of relations that require analysis: (i) the relations within farms in 
terms of labour use; (ii) the relations between farms in providing and exerting mmmanH 
over labour.
capitalist farming, land is capital. I  hesitate to use the concept capital to encompass all forms o f 
access to land here, given the rather precarious basis on which that access is achieved by some 
farmers. The definition o f capital in this context is thus a debating point.
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S2.1 Large farmers
In Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, it was noted from survey data that there was a positive 
relationship between farm size and use of permanent wage labour in maize production, 
and an inverse relationship between farm size and off-farm income (Table 4.10). I 
suggested that small maize farmers were most probably providing labour for large (and 
possibly medium) maize farmers. Was this in fact the case? If so, how did medium and 
large maize farmers ensure access to this labour? And how did small maize farmers 
work their own plots if they were providing labour for others?
Comparing my own findings with the earlier survey data, evidence in both villages 
confirms an inverse relationship between farm size and use of permanent labour in 
maize production (Table 5.8). Only the large farmers interviewed employed permanent 
labour. However, these farmers also employed a certain amount of seasonal labour, 
particularly at harvest time, but also during sowing. There were differences between 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa in this respect; I estimate that about^^ 32% of labour employed 
by large farmers in Chichicaste was seasonal, compared with about 16% for Jutiapa 
(Table 5.9). This difference reflected different strategies for obtaining workers, 
although it would also have been affected by the composition of the farming household 
and who else was available to work in maize production.
The proportions o f seasonal labour in this and subsequent tables should be taken as a guide rather 
than exact figures. The average seasonal labour days per hectare are calculated from fieldwork data; 
I  use the CONSUPLANE estimate o f 73 days/hectare for the total labour required (CONSUPLANE, 
1978). Although total labour needs will vary according to techniques o f production used, there was 
sufficient similarity in techniques across the farms, as well as differences which would have reqmred 
both more or less Icdtour, that I  have stayed with this blanket estimate.
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Table 5.8 Type o f labour used in maize production among small, medium and large farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987
Number of farms in group using this type of  labour
Farm size 
group (Has)
No. of farms in 
group
Own labour Family labour Fermant, wage 
labour
Seasonal wage 
labour
mJChichicaste 16 12
<1-5 1 6 3 0 5
5-50 6 6 3 0 5
50+ 3 (3)* 1 3 3
Jutiapa # # # # # = J 11
<1-5 5 5 5 0 4
5-50 4 3 2 0 4
50+ 3 (3)* 1 3 3
* These large farmers contributed labour to maize production but it was not always clear in what 
capacity; they were all farmers in that they did not leave the supervision of the farm in the hands o f a 
foreman; thus part of their role would have been supervisory.
Table 5.9 Estimated proportion of seasonal labour in total labour required in maize production for 
small, medium and large farmers in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Estimated proportion ofseasona 
needed per hectare of maize
labour days in total labour days 
'averages by farm size group)
Farm size group (Has) Chichicaste Jutiapa
<1-5 30% 16%
5-50 38% 37%
50+ 32% 16%
F or example, the largest farm er in Chichicaste had a substantial w orkforce o f 15 
perm anent w orkers - but he also planted 49 Has o f maize, as well as growing beans and 
keeping a large cattle herd. H e was also opening up new lands for pasture. Thus one 
can see that this farm er used different types o f  access to  labour, some o f  which were 
em ployed in all farm  activities and others o f which were employed during peak times o f 
crop production. H ow ever, to secure access to a fixed amount o f labour, he rented out 
small p lo ts o f  land to  his 15 workers. Seasonal labourers did not have plots, but one 
small farm er w ho did tem porary w ork for this large maize farm er was hoping to  rent 
land from  him in the future and become m ore securely attached to  the farm. Another 
exam ple o f  a  rather different but related strategy was the largest farm er I interviewed in 
Jutiapa w ho had 6 perm anent w orkers. This farm er also used other, casual labour, at 
harvest tim e w ho w ere very small maize farmers with less than a hectare o f land.
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Furthennore, large farmers in both Chichicaste and Jutiapa combined labour in different 
kinds of farming activities as well as combining different types of labour. In addition, 
at least one farmer had other businesses on the side which his permanent workers may 
have helped^  ^with.
The land-labour relationship which appears to be within the farm, notable particularly in 
the case of the largest Chichicaste farmer, cannot be seen as the same as the category 
of colonato or as labour service in the pre-capitalist sense. The workers did not live 
within the farm as colonos did - they only had access to a plot of land for which they 
paid a rent (in either cash or kind, according to one interviewee). The workers were 
also paid the standard rural wages. However, while this relationship was 
commoditized, it also had a personalized quali^ because the small producers would 
also receive other favours such as assistance with seed or fertilizer. In other cases of 
small farmers renting land from large farmers they worked for, their attitude was of 
assisting the large farmer rather than just being his labourer. In addition, with respect 
to rent, one or two said the equivalent of 'well, the rent is this much, but he doesn't 
actually charge it'.
5.2.2 Small farmers
While these arrangements enabled large maize farmers to tap into sources of labour, 
those who provided labour often needed to procure labour outside the family to help do
H  After writing this part o f the chapter, I  realized I  had used the work 'help' several times during 
discussions o f labour use. Although in English, this may not be the most appropriate term to use, it is 
often used in the Spanish: 'me ayuda en la casa/la ftnca', literally, 'he or she helps me in the house/on 
the farm' but meaning 'he or she works for me in the houselon the farm'. However, the phrase 
indicates more than an employer!employee relationship and implies personal loyalty and obligation. 
The same phrase would not be used to encapsulate the work relationship in, for example, a public 
mstitution. As many o f the mterviewees used the phrase to indicede something about their 
relationships with others, I  have decided to keep it in the text where appropriate.
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the work on their own farms. Thus, it is notable from the data in Table 5.8 that 
seasonal labour was used by small farmers as well as by medium and large farmers, 
although this phenomenon was more pronounced for Chichicaste than Jutiapa. 
Although it is not easy to explain this difference, it provides evidence of the uneven and 
non-linear characteristics of commoditization. Some small farmers might have been 
cultivating more land than their own and their family labour could cope with (a problem 
mainly arising with vety young farmers with small children, or those farmers whose 
children had left home). However, the data suggest that small farmers had often to 
substitute for their own labour which was being employed in wage work. A third 
possibility is that maize farming was only a secondary concern. Disaggregating the 
data for small farmers can help to illuminate some of these issues.
Of the Chichicaste small farmers, 5 out of 7 employed seasonal labour, while 6 out 7 
carried out wage work for others for at least part of the time during the agricultural 
year (Table 5.10). The amounts of wage labour varied from 'sometimes' to being a 
regular worker for the owner of rented plots. For all of them, the proportion of total 
labour on their maize plots which came from seasonal workers was estimated at 
between about 30 and 50% (Table 5.11). The two farmers in the group who did not 
use seasonal labour had family members^  ^ to help in maize production. A third who 
probably had family help borrowed land from his brother, although this fanner is 
included in the group because of his farm size, in fact his main source of work and 
income was a village store - another reason why types of maize production cannot be 
classified sirrq)ly by farm size. There was also some relationship between use of 
seasonal labour and maize area planted - in general, the larger the area, the more 
seasonal labour was used, except when family labour was available (see Table 5.11).
In other words, sons or other nude relatives.
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Am ong Jutiapa small farmers, by contrast, although 4 out o f 5 farmers employed 
seasonal w orkers, all five farmers had help from  family labour with maize production 
(Table 5.10). Given that only one o f these farmers carried out wage work, nearly all 
were able to dedicate their labour to their own m aize plots, thus the am ount o f seasonal 
labour required was m uch less. I estimate that the proportion o f total labour that was 
seasonal ranged from  only 4% to the biggest user o f 39% (Table 5.11). It can be seen 
from  the table that the biggest user o f seasonal labour also had access to  family labour 
and actually planted about twice as m uch m aize as the others.
Table 5.10 Access to labour and use of own labour for maize production among small farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987
Number of farmers who
Number in 
group
Used own 
labour
Used family 
labour
Employed
seasonal
labour
Did wage 
work
Had other 
major 
income 
source
Chichicaste 1 6 3 5 6 1
Jutiapa 5 5 5 4 1 0
Table 5.11 Area planted with maize and access to labour of small farmers interviewed in Chichicaste
and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Small farmer Area planted with 
maize (Has)
Had access to 
family labour
Sold own labour Estimated 
percentage of 
farm labour that 
was seasonal
AM .7 No Yes 33
RG 1 No Yes 34
JAC 1.4 Yes Yes 0
JC 2.1 No Yes 51
JS 2.1 Yes Yes 0
OF 3.5 No Yes 42
AC 4.2 Yes No 51
RZ 1.4 Yes Yes 12
RR 1.4 Yes No 4
RM 1.75 Yes No 22
DU 3.5 Yes No 39
FC 1.05 Yes No 0
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523  Medium fanners
The relationships of land and labour analysed for small farmers have characteristics that 
might be asoibed to semi-proletarian farming. However, there was no clear example 
of die ideal-qrpical petty commodity production discussed in Chapter 1 in which oqiital 
(land) and own or fiimily labour are combined. Although some of the small faimas in 
Jutiapa approximated this description, wage labour was nearly always used, albeit on a 
seasonal basis. Thus the medium farmers interviewed in both villages fairly consistendy 
used seasonal labour, which supplied an estimated average of 37-38% of their labour 
needs (Table 5.9 above). Even so, there was one anomaly among medium farmers in 
Chichicaste, which again shows how grouping farmers ly  farm siœ can be deceptive. 
Not only did diis farmer not employ seasonal labour in maize production, but he (and 
his sons) ^stanadtally did wage work for large maize farmers in the area. This 
suggests that the farmer's landholdings were either not as secure as he gave to believe, 
or that the land was not very suitable for maize cultivation (the farmer sowed only 2 
Has with maize compared with 3-6 Has for the other medium farmers).
Given that the average use of seasonal labour is arrnlar for medium farmers in both 
villages, combining the two sets of data and mdaing diem area of planted maize 
shows smne limited association between increased use of seasonal labour and 
increasing area planted, excqit when family labour was available (Table 5.12). 
However, there are several cases among those planting larger areas which show 
different patterns. For example, the first farmer who planted 4.9 Has, used 
considerable seascmal labour as well as family labour. This farmer worked in 
ccmjunction with his brothers and ovaall they had a cmisiderable amount of land, part 
of which was used for catde grazing as wdl as other crops and animals, all of which 
may eqilain the high demand for seasonal labour. The second farmo" who planted 4.9 
Has was in debt and may have tried to reduce his ejq)enditure on wages, in spite of
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apparently having no family help on the farm. The farmer who planted 5.6 Has had one 
son to help him, but also had bank credit which would have assisted him with the hire 
of seasonal labour. The first of the farmers planting 6.3 Has had no assistance fix)m his 
vety young family. The position of this farmer is more difficult to explain: he had a 
reputation for being hard-working and ambitious and may therefore have worked 
longer hours than other farmers. It is also probable that the seasonal labour used on his 
farm was underestimated.  ^ .
Table 5.12 Use o f family and seasoned labour by area o f pleaded maize among mediumfarmers in 
Chichicaste and Jidiapa, primera 1986-87
Area planted with maize (Has) Farmer used family labour Estimated proportion o f farm 
labour thed was seasoned ' 
(percent)
1.4 Yes 35
2.1 Yes 0
2.8 No 52
3.5 No 40
4.2 No 40
4.9 Yes 60
4.9 No 27
5.6 Yes 53 •
6.3 No 34
6.3 Yes 33
52.4 Conclusions ,
Some conclusions fi'om this analysis are as follows.
(i) Relations within fanns
Patterns of labour use indicate that non-commoditized as well as personalized and 
commoditized processes were involved in producing maize, eq)ecially among small and 
medium farmers. There were combined strategies for labour use within most farms, 
whether small, medium or large. Very few farms among those investigated used (Hily 
the farmer's labour, and most used seasonal wage labour as well as family labour, while 
large farms also had permanent workers. However, the use of seasonal labour for
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maize production in small farms was associated with farmers' own wage employment 
elsewhere, as well as some instances of no family labour being available.
(ii) Relations between farms
The means of securing labour by some large farmers, notably, but,not only, in 
Chichicaste were closely linked to the means of securing land by small farmers. Further 
evidence of these exchange relations is shown in Table 5.13: five of the seven farmers 
listed did wage work for those who provided them with at least part, if not all, of their 
land for maize production, and one was plarming to establish this arrangement 
Although this land-labour exchange generally occurred as forms of patronage and 
mutual, but hierarchical, assistance between employers and employees, it could occur 
within families as in the case of one small farmer in Jutiapa. These phenomena suggest 
that (a) kin relations might become commoditized (Brass, 1986), (b) personalized 
relations might depend on commoditization for their existence, and (c) 
commoditization might take place within a personalized context
Table 5.13 Evidence o f land and labour exchanges between small and large maize farmers, 
Chichicaste and Jidiapa, 1987
Small farmer Source o f land Source o f wage employmerd
AM Father (Future: Landowner 1) Landowner 1
RG Landowner 2 Landowner 2
JAC Landowner 2 Landowna 2 
Landowna 3
JC Landowna 4 Landown^4
JS Landowner 1 Landowna 1
OF Landownw S Other
RZ (Jutiapa) Brother Brother
(Hi) Implications for maize production
My analysis suggests that land-labour exchanges were more important in Chichicaste 
than in Jutiapa, and, although hierarchical, served both small and large farmers. 
However, this type of security for small farmers would easily be undermined if large
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fanners decided to reallocate land to pasture rather than maize (thereby requiring less 
labour and needing the small farmers less), or if pressures from commoditization and 
competition with other farmers led to the replacement of labour by machines. 
Furthermore, the hierarchical nature of these social relations acted as a means of 
appropriating the labour of small farmers and procuring rents. Although such 
exchanges provided a certain amount of security for small farmers, they also made it 
difficult for such farmers to improve or expand maize production.
S3 Financing production
How maize production was financed is another area in which relations between farmers 
played a significant role. Financial relations can be a means for appropriating surplus. 
Depending on how they operate, they can also act as an obstacle to reproducing maize 
for some farmers. However, as explained in Chapter 2, rural credit has been a focus of 
government policy and relations with banks and state institutions have influenced the 
productive capacities of maize farmers.
With respect to maize, the National Agricultural Development Bank, B ANADES A, has 
generally provided credit to large as well as some medium farmers. Integrated rural 
development projects (DRIs) provided credit at somewhat lower interest rates (11 
rather than 13%) to those small and medium farmers who could not obtain bank credit 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). Beneficiaries^  ^of this programme fell into the following 
four main categoiies^^:
Women's and youth groups, as well as local artesans who could provide production inputs, were 
also to be integrated into the programme.
The terminology is that o f the DRI. Unfortunately, the documentation seems to corftate farm size 
with area cultivated (see MRN/DARCO, 1984, 72). I f  categorized by area cultivated, the small 
farmers being considered in the project proposal woidd have been cultivating larger areas o f maize
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* small fanners (3 Has) using basic technologies
* medium farmers (7 Has) using basic technologies
* medium farmers (14 Has) using more advanced technolo^es
* agrarian reform groups (60 Has) and cooperatives (MRN/DARCO, 1984,44-45).
Although the credit programme was designed tt> meet the needs of farmers who did not 
have sufficient collateral to obtain credit from BANADESA, extensionists suggested 
that assessment of farmers' collateral was implknüy taken into account. Décidons 
about loans were tqrparently made in Danli, not by village extensionists who knew the 
farmers, thus it was suggested that credit recipients were often those who looked best 
on p«q)er. There was concern from some extensionists that credit was going to farmers 
who had more land than indicated in the criteria, or who had other sources of income. 
From the documents, the programme was to be located in the main valleys, not the 
mountainous zones* and was to exclude one valley because of its isolation and lack of 
infrastructure. In practice, it seemed that the project was likely to intensify the 
production of established small and medium farmers, as well as reinfmce the potential 
of collective groups.
Credit often involves a social relation of a hierarchical kind with the lendK - whether 
the lender is an institution or a person. \^ th  institutional credit, the hierardiy is based 
on the payment of interest to the lender (which in economic terms would at least cover 
the opportunify cost of investing that money elsewhere). Witii informal loans, the 
hierarchical relatitmship may reside in rights and obligations agreed betweei creditor 
and debtor, and which may be as subtle as "returning favours'. In addition, the social
than most o f the small farmers linterviewed. The census data for 1974 indicated that farms o f up to 5 
Has only had a cidtivated area o f maize averaging 15  Has. In practice. 3 Has o f maize might have 
been grown on a farm o f up to 30 Has in size. Thus it was unclear from the DRI criteria what actually 
constituted a small farmer. Similar points might be made about the other farm size groups.
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relations of credit and debt may also lock those who are subordinate in the hierarchy 
into forms of exchange which undermine rather than assist the reproduction of crops.
In practice, for most small as well as some medium farmers, financing production 
involved a variety of sources. For example, Cuevas and Graham, who surveyed credit 
recipients in rural cooperatives in Honduras, found that 44% of cooperative members 
who did not receive institutional credit, borrowed informally. Moreover, 41% of those 
who received some kind of institutional credit, also borrowed informally (1981, 32). 
Typical sources of infimnal credit came from suppliers of agricultural inputs and 
equipment, those who provided transport or loaned machinery, truckers and traders, 
ftiends, relatives and money-lenders.
I  anticipated that the main source of informal credit among maize farmers would be 
from truckers and traders^ .^ I was surprised to find that large and some medium 
farmers lent money (to be repaid in sacks of maize^^), or provided agricultural inputs to 
be reimbursed later. To those sources of informal credit identified by Cuevas and 
Graham, I would also add landowners, especially those who rented out land and 
provided services to other maize farmers.
As one might expect from the foregoing. Table 5.14 shows the majority of medium 
farmers I interviewed receiving credit fiom the DRI, and all the large farmers obtaining 
credit from BANADESA. Although four out of 12 small farmers received DRI credit, 
the remainder either received no credit at all or made pre-harvest sales to finance
Informal opinion has it that small maize producers often borrow from traders at exorbiumt 
interest rates: stories are told o f traders turning up in their lorries and negotiating pre-paid fixed 
prices at sowing times or when the maize is still young. This type o f extortion was also carried out by 
maize farmers involved in trade.
Pre-harvest sales - etqtlained below.
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production. More detailed analysis of these data shows that there were two small 
farmers in each village who received credit from the DRI. In Chichicaste, they were 
the two largest farmers in my small farmer category, one being the farmer who also had 
a village store. In Jutiapa, the apparent relationship between farm size and obtaining 
credit was not so obvious, although among my small farmer interviewees, the two who 
had credit with the DRI seemed the most dynamic and hard-working.
Table 5.14 Sources o f credit among small, medium and large maize farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size 
group (Has)
No. o f 
farmers in 
group
No. o f 
farmers with 
institutional 
credit
Received
creditfrom
BANADESA
Received 
creditfrom 
the DRI
Had credit 
from pre­
harvest 
sales
Said 
received no 
credit
<1-5 12 4 0 4 3 5
5-50 10 9 1 8 0 1
50+ 6 6 6 0 0 0
Total 28 19 7 12 3 6
How did the small farmers with no institutional credit obtain finance? Was receiving 
credit from the DRI potentially a good alternative? I focus on those small famœrs who 
apparently received no credit at all or who made pre-harvest sales to obtain finance, 
and some of the problems faced by those farmers who did receive loans from the DRI.
Among the Chichicaste small farmers, there were three who stated that they did not 
receive my credit. However, they did in fact borrow on a personalized basis. One 
related that he bought all his agricultural inputs from the large landowner for whom he 
worked and from whom he planned to rent land in the future. He irrq)lied that the 
inputs (seeds, fertilizer etc) were held on credit and were repaid at harvest. The large 
farmer, meanwhile, obtained access to agricultural inputs using his credit from 
BANADESA. Another small farmer who rented land as well as working for this same 
large farmer had a similar arrangement, as did a third with the large maize farmer for 
whom he worked and from whom he rented land in a nearby hamlet
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In Jutiapa, there were two small farmers who did not appear to receive any credit. One 
had a large family with some adult children, two of whom worked on the farm. A 
brother also "helped" - in other words, maize production was financed through frmily 
labour and joint income. The story of the other, however, eloquently demonstrates the 
diverse means of financing small-scale maize production;
This farmer came to the agricultural extension office to see me because 
he had heard I wanted to interview him and thought it was because he 
was to receive credit in the programme [the DRI]. He had t^plied 
before u> the programme but had not been successful. It was unlikely he 
was going to receive credit this year either. He currently works for his 
brother to earn money to finance his maize production. He had received 
bank credit some years before. The first year, he had had a bad harvest 
and had had to sell a bullock to repay the loan. The second year, he was 
drafted into the military after which it was difficult to obtain bank credit 
again (he did not spec^ why). Before this, he had made pre-harvest 
sales to finance maize production. Now he would like to have an 
independent source of credit rather than having to work for his brother, 
but he would also rather work for family than borrow money at high 
rates of interest from someone else in the locality.
Thus this farmer used his wage income to finance his maize production. The 
implication of not doing so was that he would have to return to making pre-harvest 
sales.
Pre-harvest sales worked in the following way. Farmers could obtain a loan fiom 
someone else - in these cases, a larger, but not necessarily large, farmer - on the basis 
of repayment in sacks of maize at harvest time. However, the repayment effectively 
amounted to a 100% interest rate because the fanner was loaned half the expected 
value of the sacks. The most minimal reason a small farmer did this was to purchase 
fertilizer. Extensionists claimed that, at one time, the cash value of two sacks of maize 
in this type of exchange was equivalent to one sack of fertilizer. However, the terms of 
trade had moved against maize with proportionately greater increases in the price of 
fertilizer, and this arrangement was no longer as "beneficial" to the small farmer as it
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used to be. Whatever the price ratios, the lenders were taking advantage of the poverty 
of the borrowers.
Among those interviewed, there were three small farmers who were forced into this 
position. In Chichicaste, one small farmer had a diversified strategy for financing his 
maize production. First, he had assistance with ploughing from the large maize farmer 
who rented out land to him and charged him a cheaper than market rate because of the 
land-labour relationship. Second, he sold four sacks of maize at the pre-harvest rate to 
finance his fertilizer. This deal was made with a medium farmer who was receiving 
credit from the DRI. Thus, this case is an instance of a farmer receiving institutional 
credit, and then making further loans with the money, also found by Cuevas and 
Graham (1981). Another small farmer sold 12 sacks of maize on a pre-harvest basis to 
an unknown purchaser to finance production costs, but also hinted that he had "help* 
firom the landowner for whom he worked. A third small farmer in Jutiapa made pre­
harvest sales to finance ploughing and seed, and indicated that his arrangement was 
with a well-known, large landowner in the Jutiapa locality who was known both to 
trade in maize as well as hiring out his machines to other farmers.
Reproducing the means of access to finance was a key part of reproducing maize 
production for all farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa. However, for small 
farmers this process involved sets of exchange relations, often, but not always with 
large maize farmers. Thus adding a column on credit to the data in Table 5.13 above 
shows that exchanges over land and labour also included help with finance in several 
cases (Table 5.15). While these exchanges were set in the context of commoditized 
production (including large farmers' access to bank credit), they fiequently involved 
forms of patronage and ties based on mutual, if unequal, benefit Small farmers might 
also take steps to diversify their financial arrangements because they could not or did
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not want to rely on a single source. Taking small loans from different people meant
that even if harvests were bad, one creditor at least would probably be satisfied.
Teible 5.15 Sources o f finance among small farmers involved in land and labour exchanges with large 
maize farmers, Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farmer. Source o f land Source o f wage 
employment
Source o f finance
AM Father (Future: 
Landowna 1)
Landown»-1 Had loan of inputs firent 
Landowner 1
RG Landowna 2 Landowna 2 Had loan of inputs from 
Landowno' 2
JAC Landowner 2 Landowna 2 
Landowner 3
Made pre-harvest sales 
to a medium farmer
JC . Landowner 4 Landowner 4 Made pre-harvest sales 
but also had 'help' fiom 
Landowno'4
JS Landowno' 1 Landownw 1 Had loan of inputs firom 
Landowno’ 1
GF Landowner S Other DRI
RZ Brother Brother Financed production 
fiom wage woik
Although many farmers wanted to participate in the project, obtaining credit from the 
DRI was not necessarily an advantageous alternative. Institutional credit of this kind - 
which was directed towards increasing output - involved a process of fairly detailed 
costing, perhaps including the use of agricultural inputs or processes farmers would not 
have contemplated previously (such as mechanized ploughing, using biological inputs, 
or increasing the use of wage labour), or would not necessarily have purchased in the 
quantities assumed in the costing. Extensionists in Chichicaste and Jutiapa estimated 
the cash costs of production for farms using 'técnica bâsica' at about Lps430-S00/Ha, 
while for 'produccion técnificada' they might be over Lps1,000/Ha. However, as the 
next section shows, although use of machines and biochemical inputs varied with farm 
size, nearly all farmers used some mechanization, weedkiller and fertilizers, which maHp. 
the extensionists' distinctions rather vague. Furthermore, the cost of labour was usually 
included in loans, suggesting that there was an element (implicit or otherwise) which
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contributed to the consumption needs of the fanner and family labour, given that hired 
labour only provided part of the total labour requirements (see, for example. Table 
5.12).
Thus the amounts lent to farmers could be quite high, as indicated by the estimates 
from interviews and data in agricultural extensionists' records shown in Table 5.16. All 
amounts over Lps200/Ha came from institutional credit sources, and all the loans to 
large farmers came from BANADESA. The remainder were from the DRI. The data 
in the table show that those receiving credit from the DRI were estimated generally to 
have higha: loans per hectare than farmers being financed by BANADESA. Although 
the latter might have been able to finance part of their production costs firom their own 
capital, medium and some small farmers could well have been encouraged to take out 
greater loans than they might have wished, and that in practice were difficult to repay. 
Small farmors in particular could easily be landed with a large debt to a single source of 
finance if their returns to maize production were lower than expected. For all farmers, 
the size of these loans, in repayment terms, was considerably higher than indicated in 
the table when interest was taken into account
Table 5.16 Estimated amounts o f credit (all types, excluding interest) received per hectare by small, 
medium and large farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Juticqta, primera 1986-87 (LpslHa)
Farm
size
grp-
(Ha)
No. 
receiv­
ing a 
loan
<100 100-
200
200-
300
300-
400
400-
500
500-
600
600-
700
700-
800
800+
<1-5 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
5-50 9 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 1
50+ 6* 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0
* There were two large farmers for whom these data were unclear and are not included.
SJ.l Conclusions
Interviewing farmers in Jamastrân suggests that there was a tension for small farmers 
between the social relations of survival (through access to informal finance and loans of
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agricultural inputs, usually based on patronage) and the social relations of 
intensification (based on the exigencies of and problems associated with access to 
institutional credit). By this I mean that to engage in simple reproduction at existing 
levels of consumption and sales, small farmers relied on their relations with those who 
had land, relative wealth and access to institutional finance. If, however, such farmers 
wished to break fiom those relations, they would be required to apply more cash, 
agricultural inputs and labour to their existing land and would be dependent on finance 
fiom an institutional source. As explained in Chapters 6 and 7, in practice, small 
farmers' (and some medium farmers') strategies to ensure different forms of security 
and guard against insecurity often left them in situations where they would have to 
make sales of maize needed for consumption to pay debts. These sales {q>plied as much 
to those who had loans firom institutional sources as to those who had informal credit. 
Although indebtedness was not just a small farmer problem, the margins of survival for 
small farmers were much narrower than for medium and large farmers. For this reason, 
it is also understandable that farmers tried to divasify risk if they could, a possibility 
which was not necessarily open to those receiving institutional credit
5.4 Access to technologies
As well as being an issue of policy concern (Chapter 2), access to technologies in maize 
production is a point of differentiation between types of farmer. Thus analysis of their 
use can help explain social relations in the countryside. Lenin's classic study of the 
development of capitalism in Russia (1956,1977) showed how iniportant it was to take 
instruments of labour and techniques of production into account, as well as land and 
labour, to understand different types of production. My analysis here serves to show 
the relations linking farmers as well as the differences between them. Thus, on one 
hand, farmers were in fact differentiated by farm size in their access to technology. On
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the other hand, small as well as medium farmers used a surprising amount of purchased 
inputs in inaize production. These findings question assumptions made in some 
analyses of technology use in Honduras^ The striking feature about technology use 
' by small farmers in Chichicaste and Jutiapa is that technologies were frequently made 
available through their relations to large farmers, as well as, in a few cases, access to 
institutional credit
'■ i '  '  . . .
Since one of the aims of the DRI was to improve output and productivity by increasing 
the use of new technologies and machinery in production, one might expect to see 
differences in technology use between those who received credit in the DRI and small 
and medium farmers who were neither part of this programme nor received bank credit. 
However, although there were some differences, they were not as great as I 
anticipated. I argue that this phenomenon can be, at least partly, explained by relations 
of patronage between small and large farmers, and, in some cases, between members of 
families.
Although there is variation in techniques of production between farmers (as well as 
between regions of the country, depending on resources, climate and terrain) 
cultivation practices have some identifiable similarities. I briefly describe the basic 
elements of maize cultivation for the Jamastrân area and then analyse the technologies 
used in practice by Chichicaste and Jutiapa farmers.
Land preparation can involve several processes. Some farmers cut down the weeds 
and stalks from the previous season using a machete, and then bum them, or they may
For example, Aguirre and Tablada (1989) thought that the adverse terms o f trade between maize 
and new techiologies which they analysed in the 1980s effected only medium and large farmers 
because it was assumed that only they had widespread use o f stu:h commodities in production (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.33(H)).
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apply weedkiller. Extensionists encourage fanners either to put animals in the fields to 
keep unwanted plants down as well as fertilize the land with dung, and/or to plough in 
last year's growth. Some farmers were doing the latter in Chichicaste and Jutiapa. 
Ploughing and furrowing is done with oxen or tractor on relatively level ground; on 
hillsides, the ground is broken and furrowed with a hoe. Equally, sowing is usually 
carried out using oxen, although large farmers may use tractors. On hilly ground, (or if 
the farmer cannot afford to hire oxen), a hoe and chuzol^ might be used. A month 
after sowing, the maize plants are banked up and urea is applied Weedkiller might be 
used or weeds might be removed with a hoe. At this time, insecticides would be 
applied if necessary. If the farmer plans to sow beans to grow up against the maize 
plants, he might also put down slug pellets. Usually, when the maize cobs are grown, 
the stalks are bent and the leaves removed with a machete or by burning so that the 
bean plants can use the maize stalks as supports. If beans are not going to be sown, the 
stalks might still be bent and the cobs left on for some time. Otho’s who want to 
harvest early might not do this, beans are planted against the maize, the maize is not 
harvested (by hand) until the bean plants have been pulled up to dry. Thus a maize 
crop sown in May/Iune might not be harvested until December/January. The tnaizp. 
cobs are then shelled, often by machine as well as by hand
Technologies used in these cultivation practices in (Zhichicaste and Jutiapa varied ly 
farm size, particularly between small and medium farmers, on one hand, and large 
farmers on the other. There were also some differences between the two villages. This 
differentiation between farmers and villages is immediately more noticeable in the 
degree of mechanization than in the use of biochemical inputs. For exan^le, firom
Chuzo: a hollow piece o f wood about 15m long and Scms wide with a mechanism to open the hole 
at one end and deposit the seed in the ground (OEA, 1982,18).
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Table 5.17, it can be seen that in Chichicaste, only 3 out o f 7 small farmers and only 
half o f  the m edium  farmers interviewed hired the use o f tractors to plough the land, 
w hereas the large farm ers all used tractors, w hether their own o r hired. (Very few 
farm ers actually ow ned tractors, and those w ho did hired them  out to o ther farmers.) 
The rem aining smaU and medium farmers used a combination o f oxen (often hired) and 
tracto r o r only oxen (with one small farm er using a hoe). H ow ever these data contrast 
w ith those from  the Jutiapa interviewees, w ho all used a tractor to  plough the land, 
regardless o f  farm  size. Sowing was mostly done by oxen across all farms in both 
villages, although again, ah the large farmers in Chichicaste used a tractor, as did the 
largest farm er interviewed in  Jutiapa. M echanized shelling was carried out by 15 out o f 
16 farm ers in Chichicaste and 8 out o f 10 in Jutiapa. Again, few farmers had 
m echanized shellers and those w ho did hire them  out. Am ong my interviewees, only 
one large farm er in each viUage had both a tractor and a sheUer. In both vihages, there 
seem ed to  be only one o r tw o tractors that were readily available for others to hire.
Table 5.17 Use of mechanized inputs by small, medium and large maize farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Number of farmers preparing land with 
the use of
Number of farmers sowing 
maize with the use of
No.
using
Farm
size
group
(Has)
No. in 
group
Hoe Oxen
only
Oxen + 
tractor
Tractor
only
Chuzo Oxen Tractor Mechd
sheller
Chichicaste
<1-5 7 1 2 1 3 2 5 0 6
5-50 6 0 0 3 3 0 6 0 5
50+ 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 3
Total 16 1 2 4 9 2 10 3 15
Jutiapa
<1-5 5 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 2
5-50 4 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 3
50+ 3 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 3
Total 12 0 0 0 12 0 11 1 8
U se o f  biochemical inputs shows some similar patterns o f differentiation between 
farm ers, although there w ere few er observable differences between the tw o villages.
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F or example, urea was universally used by all farmers in both villages (Table 5.18), 
although in slightly varying amounts as we shall see. By contrast, chemical fertilizers 
were used rarely by small and medium farmers, although applied by all the rich farmers. 
All the large farmers interviewed also used weedkiller and purchased improved seed. 
In Chichicaste, very few small farmers bought im proved seed, although m ore than half 
w ere know n to use weedkiller. M ost medium farmers used both. In Jutiapa, most 
small as well as medium farmers used both. How ever, inferences from  the seed data 
should be treated with caution, as it was comm on practice to  buy seed every other year 
and several farmers interviewed had selected seed from  last season's crop, while others 
m ight not have been planning to buy seed the following year.
Table 5.18 Use of biochemical inputs by small, medium and large maize farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size 
group
Number in 
group
Used
weedkiller
Used 
improved seed
Used urea Used chemical 
fertilizer
Chichicaste
<1-5 7 4* 1 7 2
5-50 6 5 4** 6 4
50+ 3 3 3 3 3
Total 16 12 8 16 9
Jutiapa
<1-5 5 4 4 5 1
5-50 4 3 3 4 1
50+ 3 3 3 3 3
Total 12 10 10 12 5
* Two data sets unknown 
** One data set unknown
W hile these data establish that the patterns o f  mechanization and type o f  fertilizer use 
varied by farm  size, were there indications that the quantities o f  agricultural input use, 
such as seed o r weedkiller, also differed between small, medium and large farmers? 
The data in Table 5.19 confirm  that in general, with increases in farm size, there were 
increases in quantities o f biochemical inputs used, although medium farmers appeared 
to  use less weedkiller than small farmers in Chichicaste and less weedkiller and seed 
than small farmers in Jutiapa. It is however clear from  these data that large farmers
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used considerably m ore o f all bioechemical inputs than other farmers. Although not as 
clear, my interview data indicated that these differences also existed in the use of 
m achines, for example, in the num ber o f ploughings.
Table 5.19 Average quantities o f biochemical inputs used by small, medium and large maize farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87 (KgslHa)
Farm size group 
(Has)
Weedkiller Seed Urea Chemical
fertilizer
Chichicaste
<1-5 1.98 2.1 123 19
5-50 1.84 9.7 127 43
50+ 2.2 17 130 108
Jutiapa
<1-5 1.56 13.3 130 13
5-50 1.13 10.7 130 16
50+ 1.78 19.8 152 87
As stated at the beginning o f this section, access to  credit could enable maize farmers 
to  purchase technological inputs and potentially use greater quantities than other 
farm ers. As all the large farmers received credit, and as it has been established that 
their use o f  inputs w as greater than for o ther farmers, it is m ore instructive to  com pare 
small and m edium  farm ers w ho either did not receive credit, or who obtained it through 
the D R I (Table 5.20).
As one m ight expect from  previous data, there was greater use o f chemical fertilizers 
am ong both small and m edium  farmers obtaining institutional credit than those without. 
In Chichicaste, there was also apparently greater use o f urea among credit-receiving 
small farm ers, although less so among the medium farmers. The data for medium 
farm ers are, how ever, idiosyncratic because they include one indebted farm er among 
D R I ciedit-recipients w ho was trying to  keep his costs o f production as low as 
possible, and the 'non-credit' group consisted o f  only one farm er w ho in fact had 
obtained credit from  BA NA DESA. The seed data are inconclusive, although, again, 
these data  w ere affected by the com m on practice o f only buying new seed every other
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season. R ather m ore weedkiller was used by credit-recipients among both small and 
medium farmers in Jutiapa than among those who had no institutional finance. The 
data are m ore inconclusive for Chichicaste which may be explained by strategies to  
substitute labour with using weedkiller in some cases, either because farmers 
themselves had to  do wage work, o r because using weedkiller was cheaper than the 
am ount o f working hours required to hoe the weeds on a particular farm.
Table 5.20 Relationship between access to credit from the DRI and average amount of biochemical 
inputs used among small and medium maize farmers, primera 1986-87 (KgslHa)
Farm size 
group (Has)
Credit status Weedkiller Seed Urea Chemical
fertilizer
Chichicaste
<1-5 Non-DRI 1.98 14.6 106 0
DRI 1.95 0 166 65
5-50 Non-DRI 2.15 0 130 0
DRI 1.78 19.6 126 51
Jutiapa
<1-5 Non-DRI 1.3 16.67 130 0
DRI 2.6 8.1 130 33
5-50 Non-DRI .7 0 130 0
DRI 1.3 14.3 130 22
I do not present the data on access to  credit, farm size and mechanization because clear 
patterns cannot be found, although a num ber o f conclusions can be drawn. The fact 
that all Jutiapa farmers interviewed used (hired) tractors for ploughing irrespective of 
farm  size o r w hether they received institutional credit showed that, even if tractors 
w ere used m ore intensively by large than small farmers, tractor use as such was not a 
source o f differentiation. H ow ever, information from  interviews in Chichicaste also 
indicates that tractors were used by some small non-DRI farmers although a greater 
range o f techniques o f  preparing the land and sowing were evident among small 
farm ers as a whole. Som e practices were related to  the type o f  land held (for example 
using hoes o r oxen for breaking up the soil on hilly ground), others to  the lack o f 
resources o f  the farm er (using oxen rather than tractor). H ow ever, the apparently
202
diverse patterns in these data suggest that there were different strategies among some 
small farmers to gain access to different ^ e s  of technology even though they did not 
usually have institutional credit
Although small farmers without institutional credit came off worst in securing access to 
purchased technological inputs, use of such inputs was still generalized. Thus, the 
critical issue for small farmers without institutional credit was how to secure access to 
them. One mechanism was to use their networks with (and the patronage of) large 
maize farmers, and borrow inputs until they could be repaid at harvest time. Adding 
the data on exchanges over technological inputs among small farmers not receiving any 
institutional credit to those already documented in Table S. IS in the previous section 
clearly demonstrates this point (Table 5.21). Some farmers were dependent almost 
exclusively on a single landownerAnaize farmer for their land, technical inputs as well 
as a source of wage work. Others had diversified their networks, although there were a 
limited number of farmers fit>m whom tractors could be hired. For exarr^le. 
Landowners 1 and 4 had tractors, but Landowners 2 and 3 did not. Thus RG hired a 
tractor firom Landowner 4 (who also had a mechanized sheller), although he obtained 
land and some inputs from Landowner 2, as well as doing wage work for him It 
should be noted that a crucial component of these exchanges was that the large farmers 
themselves obtained considerable credit and were able to buy supplies in bulk, as well 
as, in some cases, being able to buy machines which could then be hired out
A second mechanism was that one or two farmers were able to use their relationship 
with other family members to obtain some inputs (see also Table 5.21). One Jutiapa 
farmer in particular was dependent on his brother for land, finance and animal traction, 
but went to one of the main sources of tractor hire - a local landowner and maize 
farmer - to hire a tractor to plough his maize field. Although not shown in the table, it 
was also notable from interviews that relations between brothers, fathers and other
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relatives played a role in gaining access to  land and inputs, as well as labour, for
m edium  and large farm ers too.
Table 5.21 Exchange networks of small maize farmers not receiving institutional credit in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Source of
Farmer Land Wage
work
Oxen Tractor Mechd.
shelling
Weed­
killer
Seed Urea
Chichicaste
AM LI
(1987)
LI LI LI LI Other LI LI
RG L2 L2 L2 L4 L4 L2 None L2
JAG L2 L2
L3
L3 None None Other N(Mie Pre-harv
sales
JC 14 L4 None None L4 Other None 14
JS LI LI LI None LI Other Other Other
RZ Broth. Broth. Broth. L6 None Other Other Other
RM N/A N/A Broth. L6 None Other Other Other
FC N/A N/A L6?* L6?* None Other L6?* Other
Note: L = Landowner; Broth. = Brother; NIA = Not Applicable 
* FC implied he made pre-harvest sales to this landowner to pay for these inputs.
Finally, several small farm ers resorted to pre-harvest sales. N ot all the pre-harvest sales 
show up in Table 5.21 because farmers were not always precise about how they had 
used the m oney from  these sales (see how ever the footnote to  the table). A notable 
absence here is that JC  in Chichicaste had claimed to  have sold 12 sacks o f maize on a 
pre-harvest basis to  pay for inputs. A lthough this money may well have gone towards 
paying w age labour on his own farm, alm ost all his other inputs cam e from  Landowner 
4 w ith w hom  he m ay therefore have had an extensive debt^^.
Overall, these different strategies m eant that the interlinkages between the activities o f 
small and large farmers w ere also based on small farmers' need to  buy comm odities to  
try and maintain output and productivity (especially if part o f the farmers' labour was
19 Farmers were often cautious about specifying from whom they had received a loan or to whom 
they had made pre-harvest sales.
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being used elsewhere). Thus small farmers were in considerable social and economic 
debt to the large farmers to whom they were so linked.
In general, large farmers had a key position in the technical conditions of maize,
production and their social and economic position was not only important for small
farmers. Those who had access to tractors and shellers, for example, were able to hire
out their services to many different types of farmer, including other large farmers,
enhancing the economic status of particular large farmers in the villages (Table 5.22).
Table 5.22 indicates how many times each landowner who possessed oxen, tractors or
shellers hired them out to interviewees. Given that the number of interviewees is a
relatively small sample firom both villages, the data cannot indicate the extent to which
an oligopsony existed, although in Chichicaste, it was well-known that Landowner 1
and Landowner 2 were the main sources of tractor hire. In Jutiapa, Landowner 6 was
cited as someone who was a key source of machine hire. One of the large maize
farmers I interviewed (Landowner 8) also hired out his tractor regularly. However,
although many other farmers used large maize farmers as sources of machine hire, and
personal links with them would have been important to procure the services, the
relationship was fundamentally a cash transaction and qualitatively different from that
between the small and large farmers where other types of exchange occurred.
Table 522 Sources o f machine or animal hire among sm ül, medium and large farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa. primera 1986-87
Chichicaste Jutiapa
Number o f farmers hiring oxen or 
machines irom these sources
Number o f farmers hiring oxen 
or machines from these sources
Farm
size
grp
No. 
in grp
LI L2 L3 lA Fam­
ily
No in 
grp
L6 L7 L8 Fam­
ily
<1-5 7 2 1 1 4 1 5 3 1 2
5-50 6 4 4 1
50+ 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
Note: L -  Landowner; not all farmers are accounted for in these data; in addition, some farmers used 
more than one source.
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5.4.1 Conclusions
Maize production in Chichicaste and Jutiapa in the mid- to late 1980s required cash to 
purchase inputs and hire machines (as well as to pay for labour), among all farmers. 
How finance for technological inputs was obtained and how it could be repaid were 
critical issues. For small farmers, loaning or obtaining inputs from their employers and 
patrons to be repaid at harvest was key to maintaining their production, whereas access 
to institutional credit played an important role for medium and large farmers. While the 
quantity of biochemical inputs used among small and medium farmers seemed to have 
some association with access to rural credit, diffoences in mechanization seemed to 
vary more with farm size and type of land rather than access to credit
5.5 The social relation of maize production: summary and conclusions
I now summarize the main findings of this chapter and draw some preliminary 
conclusions about analysing class relations in maize production. With respect to land, 
it is evident that private forms of land tenure, including renting land, predominated 
among the farmers I interviewed. However, the privatization of land tenure did not 
preclude otho* forms of access to land, whether through occupation of national land or 
obtaining land through family links. It also included transactions over rented land 
which were based on personalized as well as commoditized relations, particularly 
between small and large farmers.
This combination of personalized and commoditized relations between small and large 
farmers also characterized exchanges between them over access to labour, finance and 
agricultural inputs. Moreover both personalized and commoditized elements were 
often evident in the same transaction. Thus, landowners who loaned or rented out land 
would fiequently employ the tenants as workers, would loan them agricultural inputs to
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be repaid at harvest and might even take payment from them in the form of pre-harvest 
sales. Large maize faimos in fact had an important role in the villages with respect to 
their control over machines and their access to bank credit which enabled them to 
purchase agricultural inputs in bulk. Their patronage could be very useful for both 
small and mediiun farmers in securing the means of producing maize.
The processes of maize production were highly commoditized even though they 
included personalized exchanges. Even among small farmers, as well as the existence 
of private property in land, rents were paid; labour was hired; farmers sold their own 
labour, seed, fertilizer, weedkiller, and insecticides were purchased; machines woe 
hired; and, as Chtqtter 6 shows, a ctmsidaable proportion of the maize produced was 
sold. This commoditization was reinforced by rural credit, both that stipplied by banks 
to large (and some medium) maize farmers, and that supplied ly  rural credit schema 
such as those operated by the DRIs. Credit was made available for the purchase or 
hiring of agricultural inputs and the hiring of labour. However the amounts estimated 
could put farmers in difficult situations when it came to repayment. Therefore a 
corollary of commoditization was debt. Chapter 7 shows that many farmers' capacities 
(and strategies) to rq)ay debts w%e limited and involved selling maize diey needed for 
personal consumption.
My analysis thus shows that commoditized, perstmklized and non-txxmmoditized 
processes of exchange were not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they worked 
hand in hand as part of farmers' strategies for survival and accumulation. That there 
was space for these processes to co-exist resulted from the unequal access to resources 
and maize farmers and the hierarchical nature of social relatimts.
Analysing the social relatitHis of access to land, labour, finance and inputs also shows 
how processes were intoiinked in maize production. However, I do not claim that
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these relations were identical to or had the prevalence and conq)lexity of interlinkages 
analysed in other parts of the world such as India (Chapter 1, Section 1.7). 
Furthermore, the outward nature of the ties I have analysed often had the appearance 
of commoditized relations» and the personalized elements of the transactions were often 
implicit and not superficially observable.
Obtaining (and sustaining) access to resources for maize production thus involved a 
complex and contradictory set of processes. For many farmers, some of them involved 
structural obstacles to obtaining the resources for production, such as unequal land 
distribution and control over land, or institutional difficulties in obtaining credit. Other 
processes concerned strategies for survival which had contradictory effects. For 
example, the high rates of interest paid in pre-harvest sales meant that farmers would 
either have less maize to eat after harvest or less cash income than if they had been able 
to keep that maize for consumption or sell it in the market (see Chapter 6). The 
strategies to produce maize also involved different kinds of risk, whether in personal 
relations with other farmers, or the risk of taking too high a loan to intensify 
production. Among small farmers, whose margins of survival were relatively narrow 
compared with other farmers, risk was often spread in different directions - combining 
own and rented land, and using different landowners as sources of loans, enqrloyment 
or inputs. In some respects, the highest risks were erq)aienced by medium farmers 
with institutional credit as large debts could seriously undermine their capacities to 
continue producing maize.
This analysis provides new insights into understanding social relations in the Honduran 
countryside. I have shown, for example, that class cannot be defined merely on the 
basis of farm size. Key in analysing class relations (and how they change) is an 
understanding of how producers obtain access to resources and labour, and the nature 
of the exchanges they engage in with each other to do so. Furthermore, although the
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market is an inqwrtant and generalized mechanism of exchange, personalized relations 
are used to protect class positions as well as acting as a means of survival. Some of the 
relations I have analysed in this chapter may have involved expldtation (Chapter 1, 
Section. 1.5). However the line between exploitation and mutual, but unequal, 
assistance can be difficult to disentangle. Finally, diis analysis has also demonstrated 
that using the categories 'capitalist' and "peasant' would not have been appropriate to 
delineating the social relaiicHis in maize production, nw particularly useful in 
understanding its dynamics.
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Ch apter  6
Re p r o d u c in g  MAIZE IN E l  PARAiso: v u l n e r a b iu t y , 
SURVIVAL AND ACCUMULATION
Introduction
fri tiiis and the next chapter, I argue that different types of indebtedness are one of the 
most inqwrtant processes in undermining farmers' abilities to keep enough maize f<n: 
their own consunqttion and to reproduce and e^qiand maize production. As well as 
illuminating  the nature of social relations which surrotmd maize production and its 
reproduction, this argument, and the findings that substantiate it, question policies 
which attenq>t to increase production and productivity in the countryside through rural 
credit without any other changes to social relations. A much more careful assessment 
of the dynamics (and difficulties) of reproducing maize is required, as well as the 
potential effects of financing the commoditization of production.
Debt can arise for different reasons and in different ways. Certain types of debt are 
based on exchan^s between farmras (including within fiunilies) over access to 
resources for production. Others arise fiom difficulties in paying back institutional 
loans. One consequence is that some farmers have to sell maize needed for household 
consunq)tion, which increases their financial hardship when diey have to buy maizi» 
before the next harvest Another is that many farmers are unable to obtain net cash 
incomes fix>m maize sales after covering cash costs and loans. Furthermme, debt can 
potentially pile up over time, threatening farmers' access to further credit as well as 
their endowments in means of production and entitlements in consumption and income. 
However, my data suggest that many of the farmers I interviewed required finance
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from other economic activities or loans from informal or institutional sources to sustain 
maize production.
In these circumstances, personalized, as well as non-commoditized, relations can 
actually assist the reproduction of maize production for many farmers, even though 
increasing output might be impeded. Such farmers face what I call secure stagnation'. 
Secure stagnation means that farmers continue to produce maize even if they make 
little money from it, are often unable to keep sufficient maize for their own needs, and 
may only be able to sustain their production by permanent debt relations and 
obligations with a patron, as well as by doing wage work. Thus, although 'secure 
stagnation' involves ways for such faimers to continue producing maize, supplying their 
own maize needs from production is precarious. Those who try to increase their 
output and productivity for their own needs and for the market through access to 
institutional loans are involved in what I term "insecure transformation'. Insecure 
transformation characterizes the production of the more individualised farmers who 
may often face difficulties in repaying loans, either because of severe harvest losses or 
because their loans were higher than their edacity to meet payments. Insecure 
transformation occurred among some small and medium farmers but large farmers 
could also face indebtedness. Large farmers did, however, have a wider range of 
options and greater resources for covering debts.
Chapter 6 analyses the problems faced by farmers in obtaining access to adequate maize 
for household consumption, and in making a cash income from maize. Chapter 7 takes 
a closer look at indebtedness and social relations affecting the prices received for maize 
by different types of farmer. In drawing some conclusions about farmers' strategies for 
sustaining production, I also suggest how understanding problems in reproduction 
enriches our understanding of the social positions of maize farmers.
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A methodological note: farmers often gave vague answers to questions about costs of 
production, output W  prices because this information could pinpoint their economic 
position in ways which might have felt threatening - whether they were doing well or in 
debt. Hence the discussion in this and the next chapter assumes that there are margins 
of error. When there is serious doubt about data, it is explained. In addition, as 
characterizes the methodology of this thesis, weight is given to subjective data as well 
as objective measurement, in particular to farmers' own perceptions of their situations 
and the difficulties that beset them. This is particularly irrqrortant when apparently 
objective data are misleading or uncertain.
Finally, as in Chapter 5, when it is important to do so, I distinguish between the data 
firom the two villages, and when not, I combine them.
6.1 Access to maize for consumption
This section argues that keeping enough maize from harvested output for direct 
consumption could be particularly problematic for small farmers, but could also be 
difficult for some medium farmers. The problem of retaining adequate quantities of 
maize lay in the debt relations into which most small farmers entered as well as the tight 
margins of these farmers when faced with crop failure. Sales entered into to cover 
debts firom cash costs of production left farmers with shortages for their own 
consumption.
Maize farmers in Honduras have often been characterized by whether they produce 
maize primarily for their own consumption or for the market. For example, a USAID 
study which analysed the characteristics of small farms (in this case, those under 35 
Has) producing predominantly maize and beans stated that "The destination of output is 
probably the most useful measure of the extent of orientation towards subsistence
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production' (1978c, IS; my translation). This study found regional variation in how 
much maize was sold (in the El Parafso area, it was estimated at an average of 25%). 
There were also differences by farm size. Global estimates suggested that farms with 
more than 5 Has of land tended to sell about half their output, whereas the smallest 
farms in the study (less than 3 Has) sold less than 20%. A later study by Aguirre and 
Tablada (1988) characterized farmers with under 5 Has as those who produced to eat, 
those with 5-100 Has as those who produced to eat and sell, and farmers with more 
than ICX) Has as those who only produced maize for commercial reasons. While this 
broad characterization may have some relationship to farmers' intentions, my data 
below show that different practices come into play within farm size groups and should 
be taken into account in understanding farmers' consumption and sales strategies. For 
exan^le, my interviews found no farmers who produced maize only for direct 
consumption. Many small farmers might have liked to keep most of their harvest for 
domestic consumption but were unable to because they had to repay loans. 
Furthermore, even the smallest farmers were iiitegrated into the cash economy and 
needed cash income from maize to pay for other consumables as well as production 
inputs.
Thus, even though they are based on small samples, my data indicate that the 
destination of maize output is both more complex and more commoditized than often 
thought. For exarrqrle, looking at data on sales, in Chichicaste, all but one of the 
interviewees sold more than 60% of his maize (see Table 6.1). In Jutiapa, the range 
was more dispersed, but only two sold less than 50% of output. These two anall 
farmers sold only 31% of their maize, approximating the USAID findings.
The data show some variation between farm size groups in the two villages. Thus, 
calculating the average proportion of maize sold at harvest by farmers in each farm size 
group, I found that 78% of the maize produced by small farmers was marketed in
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Chichicaste while 70%  was sold in Jutiapa (final column o f Table 6.1). For medium 
farm ers, post-harvest sales averaged 83% o f output in Chichicaste and 63% in Jutiapa. 
F or large farm ers, the figures were 66% and 81% respectively. These averages are 
high com pared with the data sources cited above. How ever, they also indicate that 
large m aize farmers also kept maize for their own use as well as producing 
commercially^.
Table 6.1 Maize sales at harvest as a proportion of harvested output among farmers interviewed in
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Percentage of output sold before and at harvest*
Farm
size
group
(Has)
Number 
in group
<50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100 Propn. 
of output 
sold by 
farm size 
group
Chichicaste
<1-5 7 1 1 1 2 2 78
5-50 6 1 1 3 1 83
50+ 3 1 2 66
Jutiapa
<1-5 1 5 2 1 1 1 70
5-50 4 2 2 63
50+ 3 2 1 81
* Includes pre-harvest sales and any rent payments in maize
D id this apparently high level o f sales mean that many farmers had considerably more 
ou tpu t than they needed for their own requirem ents or, on the contrary, that they did 
not have enough maize to  m eet consumption needs? D ata on consum ption needs were 
collected by asking farmers to  estimate what they needed for their 'gasto'. The phrase 
gasto w as used by farmers to describe the food needed for household members, any 
m aize required for animal fodder, and might also include a store o f  maize for small
J J n  fact, the relatively low average proportion of maize sold for large farmers in Chichicaste 
resulted from the considerable quantity of maize retained by one farmer in particular. Some of this 
would have been sold at a later date, however.
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sales th roughout the year w hen cash m ight be needed. M any producers also kept seed 
grain from  their harvests, although with the use o f new grain varieties, seed was only 
retained in alternate years. In addition, the gasto could include maize to  feed workers, 
especially w here perm anent labour w as employed, but there seem ed to  be no hard rule 
regarding the provision o f food to perm anent em ployees or tem porary workers.
Com paring the gasto w ith w hat farm ers had stored rather than sold after harvest gave 
an estim ate o f the extent to  which consum ption needs were being covered from  ow n 
production. The results show ed that 9 farm ers out o f 28 had consum ption deficits in  all 
- 6 small farm ers and 3 medium  farmers (Table 6.2). Seven o f  the 9 w ere in 
Chichicaste, reinforcing the impression o f relative poverty among maize farmers in this 
village com pared w ith Jutiapa. H ow ever, the reasons for these differences lie partly in 
the rate o f  pre-harvest losses and low er output am ong small farmers in Chichicaste than 
in Jutiapa, as w ell as other factors which I shall com e to.
Table 6.2 Maize available for household consumption after harvest sales, Chichicaste and Jutiapa,
primera 1986-87
Farm size group 
(Has) (1)
Number in group 
(2)
Maize deficit to 
stated needs after 
harvest sales (3)
Enough maize for 
stated needs after 
harvest sales (4)
Maize surplus to 
stated needs after 
harvest sales (5)
Chichicaste
<1-5 7 5 1 1
5-50 6 2 3 1
50+ 3 3*
Jutiapa
<1-5 5 1 4
5-50 4 1 1 2
50+ 3 1 2*
Tatad 28 9 IÔ 9
calculating their likely needs, it was clear that they had surplus maize for further sale - see text.
6.1.1 The problems o f consumption deficit farmers
There w ere several pressures on retaining adequate quantities o f maize for 
consum ption. As m entioned, one arose because many farmers experienced pre-harvest
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losses, some of them heavy (see Appendix 6.1). These losses resulted from a disease 
known locally as mafz muerto, a type of fungus which attacks the cobs. Extensionists 
reported that the disease had been common for several years in the area and was 
associated with the use of improved seeds. Although I found a range of improved 
seeds being used by farmers, the new varieties and hybrids had introduced a degree of 
homogeneity in seed type, making crops more susceptible to the spread of such a 
fungus. Locally produced and selected seeds (mafz criollo) which were more disease 
resistant (but gave lower yields) were increasingly uncommon.
Thus almost all the farmers in both villages with consumption deficits after harvest sales 
were known to have lost considerable quantities of maize because of ntatz muerto 
(Table 6.3, Column 3). Two small farmers in Chichicaste had lost half their potential 
harvests, as had one medium farmer. A further medium farmer in Chichicaste also 
admitted to high, but unquantified, losses. For one of the small farmers, losses 
apparently amounted to about half the stated household needs.
Table 6.3 Characteristics o f consumption deficit farmers in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, post-primera
1986-87
Farmer (1) Total output 
deficit (oMput 
minus food 
needs) (2)
Propn. o f 
maize crop 
lost through 
disease (%) 
(3)
Would still 
have had food 
deficit with no 
losses (4)
Had to make 
pre-harvest 
sales (5)
Other maize 
farmers in or 
related to 
house-hold (6)
<1-5 Has farm size group (small farmers)
AM Yes 40 Yes No Father
JAC Yes 50 Yes Yes Sons?*
JC No 29 No Yes None
JS No 50 No No None
GF No n.d. n.d. No None
FC No 31 No Yes Sons?*
5-50 Has farm size group (medium farmers)
FR No 50 No No Sons?*
MA No High n.d. No None
CU No 33 No No None
n.d. = no data
* These sons (and sons-in-law) had their own means o f maize production or separate farms but may 
have contributed to the father’s household
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Had these maize losses not occurred (or been low), the proportions of harvest retained 
for consumption might have been higher for many farmers interviewed. However, it 
would be wrong to conclude from this that the problem of retaining maize for 
consumption was simply a technical one. The precaiiousness of the technical 
conditions of crop production was combined with the difficult social conditions under 
which many farmers tried to make a living and provide their consumption needs from 
maize.
Thus, another problem for deficit farmers was how maize was distributed and used 
rather than the absolute quantities produced. On one hand, interviews revealed that 
only two small farmers among those with maize consumption deficits (both in 
Chichicaste) were found actually to have produced less than their stated needs (Table
6.3, Column 2), and would still not have met their requirements even if they had not 
lost maize (Column 4). On the other hand, for the three faimers who made pre-harvest 
sales (Column S), data firom interviews indicate that two would not have had a 
consumption shortfall if they had not had to hand over sacks of maize to their creditors 
at harvest-time.
That consumption deficit farmers experienced pressures from different sources 
(affecting how much maize they could keep for direct consumption, as well as their 
ability to purchase maize when their own supplies were finished) is illustrated by the 
following accounts:
(i) AM was not the only maize producer in the household but his total 
output constituted just over 50% of household maize needs. AM's 
father also rented land and did wage work and may have been able to 
produce the remainder of the maize needs (Table 6.3, Column 6). 
However, AM had had high losses from malz muerto and his father may 
have had the same problem. He had also sold a high proportion of his 
maize because he had been provided with inputs for farming from the 
large farmer he worked for and would have had to repay them at 
harvest. The household comprised 17 people and it was stated by
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women in the family that there was an overall consumption shortfall 
How was this deficit going to be paid for? Although AM's sales were 
calculated to cover his costs of production, he would have had difficulty 
contributing to maize purchases from this source of cash income.
(ii) JAC had a maize consumption deficit before he made any maize 
sales. Having received pre-harvest credit, he also had to pay his debts in 
maize. Although this farmer may have been exaggerating his situation, 
it was clear that other sources of income were going to have to finance 
maize purchases. It was however possible that adult sons who had 
moved out of the parental household and had their own maize 
production might have contributed to the welfare of their parents (Table
6.3, Column 6).
(iii) JC was JAC's son. His case provides a paradoxical position of a 
farmer who apparently seemed to sell more than he needed to to cover 
any debts arising from production costs and was left with a deficit of 
maize for household consumption. JC also had a pre-harvest debt to 
repay, but this does not account for the logic of this strategy. The «üy 
explanation was that he urgently needed cash for other things at the time 
of harvest. In any event, at the time of interviewing, he had used up the 
maize he had kept for household consumption, perhaps because he was 
using his maize to assist his father, JAC.
(iv) The case of JS presents a classic picture. In spite of losing half his 
maize crop, he produced more than enough maize for household 
consumption but was not actually able to retain it. The maize sold 
would have been little more than enough to pay rent on his land (which 
according to JS was three sacks of maize [roughly, 270 kgs] or the cash 
equivalent). He would also have had to pay for mechaitized inputs 
loaned firom the farmer from whom he rented land. Thus he would have 
had to finance maize purchases firom other income sources such as his 
wage work.
On one hand, consumption deficit farmers were not necessarily the smallest farmers or 
those with least resources. Thus one small and one medium farmer with consunq)tion 
deficits (GF and MA in Table 6.3), who were receiving also credit firom the DRI, had 
insufficient maize to carry them through to the next harvest, as well as being in debt to 
the project. On the other hand, some farmers would have been able to alleviate their 
consumption deficits from other consumption or income sources. So, for example, one 
of the deficit small farmers (FC in Table 6.3) was the elderly head of an extended fiimily
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household where survival depended on a combination of farming and wage work and 
other people would have contributed to maize consumption needs. A deficit medium 
farmer (CU) had outstanding loans to the DRI but also had several sources of income 
which he could resort to and would have been able to buy maize.
These deficit stories show the vulnerability of some maize farmers. However, different 
conditions of production and strategies adopted were combined to try and make up 
consumption shortfalls. Thus among deficit farmers, there were (a) farmers who had 
access to very small amounts of land not just for maize but for farming in general and 
combined their efforts with wage work and close social ties with local landlords; (b) 
those who were able to combine their production with that of extended family members 
and were therefore less dependent on the fruits of their individual labour, and (c) 
farmers who were trying to increase their output by participating in rural credit 
schemes.
The deficit stories and production strategies are also illustrative of the different 
exchange relations which the farm ^ were engaged in and the resulting pressures they 
were under. Many of the small deficit farmers rented all or part of their land. Fulfilling 
their obligations to landowners was key to maintaining access to land for future 
production, even if this resulted in not having enough maize for household 
consumption. Likewise, paying back institutional and personalized loans was also a 
means of ensuring access to finance in the future. Thus acquiring maize for household 
consumption and further cash income - both to pay for maize as well as other needs, 
including investing in the new crop cycle - was going to have to come firom other 
sources and would depend on these farmers' abilities to make money firom other crops 
and/or wage work, as well as maintaining relations which provided them with access to 
services and inputs.
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What is apparent from these data is that many farmers worked with tight margins. 
Those who had an ongoing source of land and/or wage work with a landowner could 
make this unequal relationship part of their reproduction strategy even in times of 
adversity. But those going it alone' with project credit - becoming increasingly 
individualized and commoditized - could be extremely vulnerable. Thus MA in Table
6.3, who had a young fiimily and insufficient resources to take advantage of his 
inherited wood and grazing land, had pursued the rural credit option with disastrous 
consequences because of his sevae harvest losses. Posâbly JAC, an older man who 
had a small amount of rented land, did wage work, and had a landlord-patron and sons 
to bail him out, was in a mme secure position, even though his poverty had forced him 
to sell maize at pre-harvest prices during the sowing period to finance part of his 
production.
6.12 Farmers who met their consumption needs
What charactmzed the non-consumption deficit farmers? They fell into two main 
categories: medium farmers receiving credit from the DRI, and large farmers recdving 
bank credit who combined m aize production with cattle. The group that fell outside 
these categories is that of small farmers in Jutiapa who, with one exception, did not 
seem to have had ccmsumption deficits (Table 6.2). Wlty should this be so? Why did 
they seem to be less vulnerable than those in Chichicaste?
Having to sell maize at harvest time seemed to be the biggest obstacle to small farmers 
being able to retain enough maize for household <x>nsunq)tion. There is a considerable 
range of data on sales for both villages within each farm size group and individual 
decisions would require specific e3q)lanation. However, on average, small farmers in 
Chichicaste sold 78% of their harvests compared with 70% in Jutiapa (Table 6.1). This 
difference is not remarkable. However the absolute amount of maize actually available
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for consunqjüon was affected Ity the higher output and average yields among small 
farmers in Jutiapa than in Chichicaste (see Table 6.4). The higher output and yields 
might have resulted from differences in technical conditions outlined in Chapter S: 
better (and flatter) land, different farming techniques using greater mechanization (see 
Table 5.17), and greater use of improved seed and urea (Tables 5.19 and 5.20). Social 
conditions for anall farmas were also different between the two villages. As discussed 
in Chuter 5, small farmers in Jutiapa were not generally engaged in exchan^ relations 
with landowners which might have impeded their productive capacities (even if they did 
provide a degree of security for some Chichicaste farmers). Thus small farmers in 
Jutiapa might have been able to invest more time and attention - and money if they had 
credit from the DRI - in maize production, hi otha: words, they might not have been 
subject to the stagnatmy influences of being tied into debts and obligatitms that 
affKted many of the small farmas interviewed in Chichicaste.
Table 6.4 Area sown, output and yields o f small maize farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and 
Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Small farmers (<1-5 
Has)
Average area sown 
(Has)
Average output (Kgs) Average yields 
(KgslHa)
Chichicaste 2.1 3896 1843
Jutiapa 1.9 SOSS 2727
What about medium and la r^  non-deficit farmers? Although there were some harvest 
losses among almost all farmers interviewed, irre^ective of size, most medium and 
large farmers in both villages were able to retain enough maize for household needs 
(see Table 6.2). It is difficult to measure how much of the maize held for the gasto was 
actually surplus to stated needs after sales and repayment of debts, since maize would 
also be kept for emergencies and small sales to pay for medicines, children's education, 
and other ctmsumer items during the year. However, there is evidence of real maize 
surpluses among the large farmers in both villages. In Chichicaste, the large farmers 
stated that the maize they kept was what they needed for their gasto. For all of them.
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the amounts are far higher than any baric consumption needs (even taking into account 
food for permanent workers), hi all cases, some maize would have been used fw 
fodder (part of the gasto), but it is evident that maize was being stored for future sales. 
Basically, the large farmers sold enough maim to cover costs and meet immediate cash 
needs at harvest time, but would then hold on to maize to benefit from price rises later.
6.13 Conclusions
The following genoalizations can be drawn from the data on the opacities of farmers 
to produce and retain adequate maize for household consumption:
(i) small farmos in Chichicaste had difficulties in retaining sufficient maize fw 
household consumption needs;
(ii) some small/medium farmers in both villages who were trying to increase dieir 
output through rural credit also had difficulties; the reasons for this will be eiplored 
further in the next chapter;
(iii) most medium and all large farmers in both villages were able to retain adequate 
maize for household needs;
(iv) large farmers appeared to have maize surplus to their overall needs after initial 
harvest sales.
Analyring maize consumption deficits and unravelling some of the individual sttnies 
behind the aggregate data has raised some inportant methodological issues for 
understanding the capacities of different types of farmer to provide their own maize 
needs. Behiiul the generalizations are conplex sets of relations and decisions which the 
quantitative data alone do not reveal and which affect farmers' real opacities to 
reproduce m aize production. However, it is also often difficult to distinguish the
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idiosyncratic factors in data from cases which hide specific but revealing relations and 
problems. Apparently exceptional cases of individual farmers or differences between 
the same farm size groups in different locations can also be difficult to interpret. As in 
my comparison of Chichicaste and Jutiapa small farmers, behind these figures are 
individual 'stories' as well as (often subtle) differences in technical and social relations 
which help to explain them. Issues such as the demographic structures of particular 
households, the extent to which there were other sources of maize or other sources of 
income to help pay off debts, whether farmers had contracts to sell pecific quantities 
of maize at harvest irrespective of their losses, whether the producer was simply a Tiad' 
farmer or manager, and so on, also play a part. I now look further at how some of 
these relations played a role in the extent to which producers were able to make an net 
cash income from maize.
62  Making ctah income from maize production ^
Whether farmers make cash income from maize production affects their capacities to 
finance other aspects of daily life. It also affects the extent to which farmers can 
purchase inputs for maize production in the next season without resorting to loans, or 
can reduce the proportion of costs that is covered by loans. This section argues that, 
for many farmers, cash income from maize was extremely variable, and for many it was 
a low or negative return to cash costs of production as well as to farmers' labour.
This argument is based on analysis of interview data on costs of production and income 
received from maize sales.  ^ Cash and non-cash costs of production are complex to 
measure when there are non-commoditized relations involved and when family labour
^ References to costs o f production and to income in this section refer only cash costs and cash 
income.
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plays an inportant role in production. In this analysis, I have included all purchased 
inputs (including the cost of cash loans) but have not put a cash value on the fanner's 
or femily labour. Thus the difference between total costs of production and total 
money received from sales is farmers' net cash iiKxmie from maize production, which 
may or may not have been shared with other members of the household or relatives 
who provided labour in maize production. For most fannras, I have thus also taken 
this as an estimate of their returns to labour. In the case of large farmers who hired 
permanent labour and who themselves might have played a supervisory role, the 
difference between costs and sales could be regarded as profit. I have, however, used 
the term net income for all farmers, with the rider that this may conprise an 
unmeasured conponent of profit for some farmers.
Farmers were often vague about the quantities of inputs they purchased and how much 
they cost. Not only would many farmers have difficulty in remembering what they 
pent, but some costs might also have been exaggerated if farmers had financial 
problems and thought that help could be obtained through my presence. The situation 
was further complicated by the fact that some farmers received credit firom the DRI and 
that records differed on how much was made available to them, hi ^neral I have taken 
the farmers' word over the data in the files, as farmers did not always take out all the 
credit that they had been offered. Data on prices were also difficult to record 
accurately, particularly if farmers made sales at different times to different traders. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between costs of production and prices received fit in 
general with the farmers' own accounts of tiieir financial situations and demonstrate 
some of the problems they faced. In general, nty data should be regarded as estimates 
based on what farmers told me, which I cross-checked with official records when 
available or against data provided by other informants.
224
As stated, net income is the difference between the total cash value of costs and sales. 
In calculating total cash costs. I have included estimates for maize purchases for the 
consumption deficit farmers based on official data on market prices. In calculating the 
total value of sales, I include the cash received firom harvest sales and that estimated 
firom furtho" maize sales during the year where possible, also based on official price 
data.^ I first look at farmers with negative net incomes firom maize, then those who 
obtained positive net incomes. I then compare some of the assunptions made about 
maize production by the DRI with my analysis, and take a closer look at the 
implications for returns to labour for small and medium farmers. Finally, I comment on 
the position of large maize farmers.
62.1 Negative net income fanners
Calculations firom my data show that 9 out of 27 fa rm ^ actually had negative net 
incomes from maize farming (Table 6.5). These farmers were not identical to the 9 
who had consumption deficits, however - clearly some farmers had made decisions to 
keep enough maize for domestic consumption at the epense of their cash incomes 
firom maize. In other words, either other activities were helping to pay for maize 
production, or these farmers were in debt
As with consumption ^ficits, the data on negative net incomes are complex. Negative 
net incomes were not just confined to small fanners, and positive net incomes did not 
characterize all medium and large farmers. There were also some apparent differences 
between the two villages (as th^e were on ccmsumption deficits). As might be 
expected, those with negative net incomes in Chichicaste were small as well as some
^ However, it was not always possible to make estimates for further maize sales even if it was evident 
that farmers had real surpluses over their gasto needs.
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medium faimers. In Jutiapa, although I only have complete data for 4 out of the 5
small farmers, only one had a negative net income while 2 out of 4 medium farmers did
so, as well as one large farmer. Moreover, as stated, these data include estimates of
money received from further maize sales, not just those made at harvest
Table 65  Number o f farmers with positive and negative net incomes from maize farming by farm size 
group, Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Chichicaste Jutiapa
Farm size 
group (Has)
No. o f 
farmers in 
group
No. with 
positive net 
incomes
No. with 
negative net 
Incomes
No. o f 
farmers in 
group
No. with 
positive net 
incomes
No. with 
negative net 
incomes
<1-5 7 4 3 4 3 1
5-50 6 4 2 4 2 2
50+ 3 3 0 3 2 1
Total 16 11 5 11 7 4
However, a further qualification is needed. The negative net incomes in Jutiapa were 
relatively low as a return to cash costs compared with those in Chichicaste (Table 6.6). 
Among small farmers, negative returns ranged from 12-89% of costs for Chichicaste 
whereas for the one small farmer in Jutiapa, the deficit was 6% of costs. The two 
medium farmers with negative net incomes in Jutiapa had negative returns of only 1 and 
5% of costs from my calculations, whereas the two in Chichicaste had deficits 
amounting to more than 12 and 20% of their cash costs. Paradoxically, the Jutiapa 
farmer who fared worst was the large negative net income farmer whose deficit 
amounted to 14% of his costs.
Table 6.6 Negative net cash incomes as percentage o f estimated cash costs o f production among 
maize farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size group 
(Has)
Chichicaste Jutiapa
Farmers Percent Farmers Percent
<1-5 JAC 89 RR 6
JS 81
GF 12
5-50 FR. 12 NL 1
MA 20 CU 5
50+ VM 14
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Thus, in general, although there w ere negative net incomes in Jutiapa, the combined 
data  on incom e and m aize consum ption support the case for small (and probably 
medium) farm ers being relatively better o ff from  maize production than those in 
Chichicaste. H ow ever, it is apparent from  the data that ju st breaking even, let alone 
m aking a positive net incom e from  harvest maize sales, w as no t necessarily easy for 
many farm ers. Taking the tw o villages together, the data show that there were 
generally m ore cases o f  consum ption and/or incom e deficits am ong small farmers 
(Table 6.7). Even so, individual social and technical conditions and strategies affected 
m edium  as well as small farm ers' capacities to m ake a net incom e from  maize.
Table 6.7 Farmers experiencing a negative net income and!or a maize consumption deficit, 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size group (Has) Farmer Negative net income 
from maize
Maize consumption 
deficit after sales
<1-5
AM X
JAC X X
JC X
JS X X
W X X
RR X
FC n.d. X
5-50
FR X X
MA X X
NL X
CU X X
50+ VM X
(Total) (12) (9) (9)
Thus, on one hand, although small farm er AM  had a consum ption deficit, he apparently 
had a positive net incom e from  harvest sales for a num ber o f  reasons: he had relatively 
low  costs o f  production and no interest to  pay on a cash loan because he had been 
•helped' by his em ployer, he had how ever sold a high proportion o f  his maize to repay 
the costs o f  his inputs to  his em ployer, even though he had also lost maize because o f 
mafz muerto; he belonged to  a household which was not dependent on his m aize alone
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to meet consumption needs and might therefore have sold maize for other cash 
requirements. However, in practice, the household had insufficient maize for 
consumption and his and/or other people's income would be needed to purchase maize. 
On the other hand, 3 of the 6 farmers who had both a consumption deficit and a 
negative net income from maize (see shaded rows of Table 6.7) were medium farmers, 
and 4 had received institutional loans from the DRI. In all 4 cases, the loans were 
higher than their estimated cash costs of production. It would be wrong, however, to 
assume that the medium farmers were all as vulnerable as the small farmers. Medium 
farmers often had a wider range of income sources to draw on, although we shall also 
see that this was not invariably the case.
6.2.2 Positive net income farmers
Further analysis of interview data suggests that making a positive, as opposed to a 
negative, net income fiom maize depended on a number of conditions, although not all 
of them needed to be present simultaneously for the farmer to make money. These 
conditions included: a) high yields (implying low pre-harvest losses in many cases); b) 
the quantity of maize sold (which in turn depended on the area sown and output) 
including the ability to put aside maize for further sales. I look first at maize yields, and 
second at the relationship between area sown, output and income from sales.
(0 Yields
I compared the yields of farmers with positive net incomes from harvest sales with (a) 
those expected from farmers using what the DRI documents called "basic technologies' 
and (b) the anticipated yields from farmers using improved technologies and techniques 
of production (see footnote to Table 6.8). The majority of positive net income farmers 
(16 out of 18) had higher yields than those expected from basic technologies and half 
obtained yields equivalent to those anticipated from improved techniques (Table 6.8).
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Table 6.8 Yield characteristics o f maize farmers obtaining positive net incomes (including potential 
income from further, post-harvest sales), Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size group (Has) Number in group No. with yields 
equivalent to or higher 
than anticipated from 
using basic 
technologies*
No. with yields 
equivalent to those 
anticipated from using 
improved technologies*
<1-5 7 7 5
5-50 6 5 2
50+ 5 4 2
Total 18 16 9
* These are based on yield figures used by the DRI. Estimated yields for different farm sizes before 
the project started (i.e. using basic technologies) were: 3 Ha farm: 1 flOO Kgs/Ha: 7 Ha farm: 2,000 
Kgs/Ha; 14+ Ha farm: 2,600 Kgs/Ha. Yields from improved technologies were estimated as: 3 Ha 
form: 2,500 Kgs/Ha; 7 Ha farm: 3JOOO Kgs/Ha; 14+ Ha farm: 3fi00 Kgs/Ha 
(MRNIDARCOICEE/BOOM, 1984,168).
As analysed in Chapter 5, Section 5.4, most farmers interviewed had already 
incoiporated the use of inqnroved seeds, urea, weedkiller, and some degree of 
mechanization, whether they had received institutional credit or not. Although my data 
are patchy, for some farmers these relatively high yields were combined with low pre- 
harvest losses, but even farmers who had erqrerienced quite high losses generally 
obtained higher yields than those estimated for production using more basic levels of 
technology. The high yields obtained by many of the small farmers were notable and 
suggest that this was an important element in achieving positive net incomes.
The obverse is generally true fw the 9 negative net income farmers discussed in Section 
6.2.1. Most of them (6) had low yields (Table 6.9). Furthermore, dieir production 
data revealed hig^ pre-harvest losses for 6 of the 9 farmers. These data confirm the 
fragili^ of making income from maize if there are high pre-harvest losses and support 
the arguments for the need to increase farmers' output and productivity made by those 
working in the DRI, as well as by such analysts as Aguirre and Tablada (1989). 
However, as will be seen below, the assumed increases in costs of production to
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achieve increased output could also undermine farmers' capacities to make money from 
maize.
Table 6.9 Yield characteristics cfmmze fanners obtaining negative net incotnes, Chichicaste and
Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size group (Has) Number in group No. with yields lower than 
anticipated from using basic 
technologies*
<1-5 4 3
5-50 4 2
50+ 1 1
Total 9 6
* Yields lower than those cited in the equivalent footnote to Table 6.8 
(Ü) Area, oatpai and income firom sales
J
Farmers might be expected to invest more in maize production if they obtain , increased 
returns, enabling them to satisfy maize consumption needs as wdl as make a net 
income. These were general policy concerns in the 1980s as outlined in Chapter 2, as 
well as being an immediate goal of the DRIs. However the evidence for actually being 
able to make money from maize is patchy in reality: several of the farmers who had 
positive net incomes did not in fact earn very much from maize.
Figures 6.1-6.4 show data for 16 of the 18 positive net income farmers, organized by 
maize area sown (a range of less than 1 Ha to nearly 14 Has). The two largest farmers, 
who each sowed 35 and 49 Has, are not included as their data provide a distorted 
picture when presented graphically.
As one might expect, absolute maize sales increased with the area sown (Figure 6.1) - 
farmers' output was goierally greater and diey wore able to sell more maize. However 
the overall proportion of maize sold at harvest did not have a close relationship to area 
sown (Figure 6.2), even including the sales made after, rather than at, harvest. 
Although the total range of sales is between 60 and 100% of ouQ)ut, there is a
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bunching around the 80% mark for most farmers. The lowest and higest values (see 
arrows) were both small farmers. In the case of the one who sold 100% of his output, 
household maize needs were provided by another farmer in the consumption unit. The 
other who sold only 56% was a Jutiapa farmer who had the lowest cash costs of 
production of the small farmers in the village and partly financed his maize production 
by wage work for his brother. He thus would not have had high debts to repay at 
harvest.
Looking at the evidence on total net income earned from maize, there was a general 
increase with area sown, as one might expect because of the greater output (Figure 
6.3), but the dispersion of values shows that an increase in income fiom maize with 
area farmed was not automatic. The outliers at the lowest and highest income levels 
are particularly illustrative of this. This view is corroborated by Figure 6.4 which 
shows positive net income per hectare. Again, there is considerable dispersion of 
values, and the figure may even suggest a decline in income per hectare with area sown. 
Up to 5 Has sown with maize, net income levels were bunched around the Lps2- 
400/Ha mark with some outliers. Thereafter, net income per hectare was erratic.
231
Figure 6.1 Maize sales Jbr positive net incarne fimners by area 
sown, Chichicaste â id  Jutiapa. primera 1986-87
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Figure 62 Percentage of output sold by positive net income 
farmers by maize area sown, Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 
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Figure 6.3 Positive net income by maize area sown, 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
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Figure 6.4 Positive net incomelHa by maize area sown, 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
6 8 
Area sawn (Has)
10 12 14
The abilities of fanners to make money from maize were affected by pre-harvest losses 
and overall yields, as we have seen, and will acount for some of the outliers showing 
very low incomes, even among farmers who sowed larger areas, in the figures. There 
are however other paradoxes in the economics of maize production which are not 
easily resolved given the unequal nature of social relations analysed in Chapter 5. On
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one hand, small farmers might be able to obtain relatively high positive net incomes per 
hectare, but low absolute inccxnes compared with larger farmers because of the small 
size of the farms and area sown. On the other hand, medium and large farmers might 
expect to earn absolutely higher incomes from maize (if not necessarily higher incomes 
per hectare) than small farmers, but social and technical conditions of production might 
also affect them, especially with pressures to use more purchased inputs to improve 
yields.
6,23 Models and realities o f making a net income from maize production
Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 have shown some of the social and technical difficulties in 
making a net cash income from maize production. Paradoxically, this analysis was 
confirmed by the models used by the DRI to promote increases in maize output and 
productivity by technical change and commoditization of production processes. 
Comparing my data with those used by the DRI is thus both interesting and revealing.
The documentation for the DRI estimated costs of production for different size farms 
and different cropping systems before and after any changes in techniques of 
production to be introduced by the rural credit project. These data, which I have 
summarized in Table 6.10, were based on models. Nevertheless, when I carried out iny 
interviews, many of the proposals made by the DRI to increase output were already 
being used.
The improvements proposed by the rural credit project involved the following 
processes:
(i) for a farm sowing up to 3 Has of maize - animal and mechanical traction; 
moderate use of chemical inputs and insecticides;
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(ii) for farm sowing up to 7 Has of maize - animal and mechanical traction; improved
technical iiqxuts (seeds, fotilizers, chemical pest and weed controls);
(iii) for a farm sowing up to 14 Has of maize - mechanical traction; high level of 
technical inputs; storage and maize drying capacity.
These changes required purchased inputs and the likely use of hired labour. Thus costs 
of production would be higher than previously (also pointed out in the project 
document). For example, the small 3 Ha farms would purchase more inputs and would 
have to hire more labour 'to maximize the marginal product of all the factors of 
production which previously were under-used or not used at all' (MRN et al, 1984, 
122; my translation).
However such changes would not necessarily bring about increased net income from 
maize (although yields and ouQ)ut would grow) as is evident from Table 6.10. The 
changes in the farm models assume a somewhat smaller area sown with maize. In fact, 
the net income for small farms sowing 2.5 Has after changes in technology and 
increased used of hired labour proved negative in the model The proposals were, 
however, dependent on the growth of diversified farming in which farm income as a 
whole would improve, even if maize were not especially lucrative. Thus, on such a 
farm, beans would make about Lpsl40/Ha (net) and further income would be made 
from vegetables and fruit trees according to the model. Even so, net income would still 
only total about Lps8-900 per annum for the whole farm according to the documents 
{ibid, 122-123) - whereas an permanent agricultural labourer earning the minimum 
rural wage of LpsS/day might expect to earn up to Lpsl,350 per aimum .^
^ This figure is calctdatcd firont a standard measure o f 270 annual working days, often used in 
Honduras for rural labour. Of course, much rural labour is seasonal or temporary and would not
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Table 6.10 Comparison of expected costs and net cash income from maize before and after 
technological change through rural credit for different maize farm models (1984)
BEFOEB AFTER
Oldfarm
model
(area
m m ù
Costs* of
prodctn
LpslHa
Value** of 
maize sales 
LpslHa
Net income 
per hectare 
Lps
New farm 
model 
(area 
sown}
Costs* of
prodctn
LpsiHa
Value** of 
maize sales 
LpsiHa
Net income 
per hectare 
Lps
<3 B as 210 286 76 <2.SBas 795 715 -80
3’7H as 484 572 88 895 858 -37
7^14 Has 690 744 54 d-72 Has 895 1030 135
* Includes interest on loans except for 3 Hectare model before project implementation 
** The value of sales in this table assumes a fixed price ofLps286IMT or Lps.29lkg. This is somewhat 
below the prices received by farmers I interviewed. However, prices of inputs had also increased since 
the document was written in 1984, so these incotne figures can be taken as a guide.
Source: calculated from MRNIDARCOICEEIBOOM, 1984, Section 4.3
Furtherm ore, the calculations for net income cited in Table 6.10 were based on the 
assum ption that the total crop w ould be sold. Thus if maize (or beans) were retained 
for household consum ption, net cash income would be less than the total possible net 
incom e o f Lps8-900. Although m ost food needs might be expected to  be m et by the 
diversified farm model, in practice, as we have seen, farmers often had maize food 
deficits because they had to  sell considerable quantities to  repay debts. If  everything 
w ere sold, food purchases w ould quickly use up income, even before other 
expenditures were taken into account.
D ata  for the 6-7 hectare farms also show a decline in net income from maize, while 
those for 12-14 hectare farms were the only data to show an increase in net income. 
The am ount o f net incom e was very small for such farmers however. Again, it was 
in c h e d  that the survival o f maize production was based on the existence o f a 
diversified farm  and credit to finance production.
earn the yearly wage quoted from this type of work. Nevertheless the comparison puts a perspective 
on the value o f farm income in these models.
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For all these farm models, and for many of the farmers I interviewed, institutional credit 
was key to sustaining this type of production. But as I have shown in Chapter 5 and 
analyse further in Chapter 7, rural credit can bring its own problems and risks for 
producers, including increasing dependence on comnKxlities in production and as well 
as dependence on the commoditization of output to repay loans.
The realities of many maize farms were also rather different from these models and had 
more varied outcomes. First, all the farmers I interviewed were using some purchased 
inputs in production, although there was variation in use and quantity both by farm size 
and whether a farmer was in the credit programme or not (Chapter 5, Section 5.4). 
Thus farmers experienced a range of technological strategies (and means of obtaiiting 
inputs).
Second, comparison of the model with my own estimates of mean and median costs, 
sales and net incomes for similar farm groups across the two villages reveals some 
interesting differences (see Tables 6.11-6.13). Although costs were as high as, or 
higher than, those in the model before technological change, they were not as high as 
after implementation (Table 6.11), suggesting that farmers used fewer technical inputs 
or less paid temporary or permanent labour than calculated in the model. However, the 
cost data are only partially comparable because the DRI data include a putative cost for 
all labour required even if part were supplied by the farmer, whereas my data include 
only the cost of wage labour. This difference also partly explains why the DRI costs 
were so high  ^and the net incomes so low. Even so, even if part of the labour were 
supplied by the farmer, this consumption fund supplied from credit during production 
would still have to be repaid at harvest
^  Except for 3 Ha farms for which labour cannot have been costed, and for which no credit (and 
therefore no interest) was assumed.
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Table 6.11 Comparison of cash costs* ofproductionlHa before and after technological change 
through rural credit with mean and median cash costs* o f production Jbr maize among farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87 (LpslHa)
DRI model Chichicaste and Jutiapa
Farm model 
(maize area 
sown)
Before After Maize area 
sown
Mean Median
23-3 Has 210 795 <3 Has 366 351
3-7 Has 484 895 3-7 Has 508 500
7-14 Has 690 895 7-14+ Has 621 650
* Includes interest on loans
A similar observation can be made about sales (Table 6.12). The value of sales by
farmers was higher than those expected before project implementation but lower than
expected with technical change. Given that prices for maize in the year of interview
were higher than when the model was conceived, average output and yields were
clearly not as high as might have been expected in the project. In practice, there was a
range of yields among farmers, as well as prices received for maize .^ These differences
were affected by the social as well as technical conditions in which different types of
farmer produced maize, and which I analysed in Chapter 5.
Table 6.12 Comparison of value of maze saleslHa before and after technological change through 
rural credit with mean and median values o f maize sales among farmers interviewed in Chichicaste 
and Jutiapa. primera 1986-87 (LpsiHa) ■
DRI model Chichicaste and Jutiapa
Farm model 
(maize area 
sown)
Before After ■ Maize area 
sown
Mean Median
3 Has 286 715 <3 Has 576 614
7Has 572 858 3-7 Has 655 630
14 Has 744 . 1030 7-14+ Has 880 781
The result is that net incomes from maize (Table 6.13) were generally somewhat higher 
for the farmers I interviewed than in the model, basically because of the lower cash
^ Prices are analysed in Chester 7.
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costs of production. However, some qualifications are necessary. The mean and 
median net incomes for my 3 Ha farmers are deceptively high. This is because I 
followed the method in the model of subtracting cash costs of production from sales. 
However, my own calculations of total net income include the cost to deficit farmers of 
having to buy maize. In this group there were several farmers who were in this 
position. The "real" mean and median incomes of this group are thus estimated at 
Lps 114/Ha and Lps61/Ha respectively. The much lower median net income for this 
group also shows that there was a spread of values for these farmers, including 
negative net incomes. This observation also applies to the 3-7 hectare group where 
there were also some negative as well as positive net incomes among the farmers I 
interviewed. Thus the real estimated mean income for the farmers I interviewed was 
only Lps 147/Ha.
Table 6.13 Comparison of net incomeslHa before and after technological change through rural credit 
with mean and median net incomes fiom maize among farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and 
Juticqta, primera 1986-87 (LpslHa)
DRI model Chichicaste and Jutiapa
Farm model 
(maize area 
sown)
B^ore After Maize area 
sown
Mean Median
3 Has 76 -80 <3 Has 210* 213*
7 Has 88 -37 3-7 Has 158 87*
14 Has 54 135 7-14+ Has 259 262
* See text for comments on these figures
Unpacking these data shows how varied individual incomes could be and therefore how 
risky maize production was for many farmers in trying to obtain positive returns to 
costs of production. Even allowing for some margin of error in data collection and 
interpretation, there was a considerable range in actual net incomes from maize, 
including net income deficits among farmers who received project credit and were 
using improved technologies.
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Finally, there were no built-in pre-harvest maize losses in the models. With the increase 
of maiz muerto, supposedly from using improved seeds, pre-harvest losses were a 
serious threat to income as well as consumption, particularly among small farmers. 
Moreover, the models did not take into account how the debts incurred in 
commoditizing production and output might affect farmers' capacities to sustain this 
type of production.
62.4 Returns to labour
Evaluating the net income (positive and negative) received by maize farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa provides a picture of what kinds of return to 
farmers' labour were possible or common. In the following calculations, I have only 
included small and medium farmers as none of them hired permanent labour on their 
farms. To do this I first estimated the absolute labour days that they, as farmers, put 
into maize production. This was done by taking the CONSUPLANE blanket figure of 
73 person days/Ha for maize (CONSUPLANE, 1978, 37) and subtracting the amount 
of labour provided by temporary workers based on intdview data. Thus again, I am 
using estimates and the patterns below should be taken as a guide.
Looking only at farmers' own labour time. Figure 6.5 shows a gradual but not 
consistent tendency for days worked per hectare by small and medium farmers to 
decline with increasing area sown (or in other words, an increased use of temporary 
hired labour, as was indicated in Chapter 5, Section 5.2). The relatively low values for 
own labour use among some of the smallest farmers is a reminder that they also carried 
out wage work and hired temporary labour. A noticeable outlier is the final value 
which indicated a high number of own labour days/Ha. This was an ambitious and hard­
working medium farmer who was determined to try and expand his output with project
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credit. Overall, the variation reflects individual circumstances and strategies for 
producing maize.
Did the reduced labour time for positive net incmne farmoa mean that there were 
higher returns to the farmer's own labour with increasing area in maize production? In 
practice there was considerable variation, as indicated by Figure 6.6. It was possible to 
obtain relatively high returns to farmas' labour on small plots and low returns on large 
plots. At the time of interviewing, the wage rate for day labouras was Lps5, so the 
figures suggest that most small and medium maize farmos with positive net incomes 
obtained a return to labour that was better than doing wage work. However, these 
returns did not make maize farmers necessarily better off if they did not earn equivalent 
returns when not growing maize, nor on a year in year out basis, as returns would 
fluctuate with losses and yields and changes in relative prices.
However, if the negative net income farmers are included in the picture (Figure 6.7), 
returns to labour in maize production look much less secure. Furthermore, if the 
amount of farmers' own labour time per hectare is plotted against returns to labour 
(Figure 6.8), daily net incomes from maize look decidedly vulnerable. Although the 
range of values shows that it was possible to put in considerable labour time in mai%A 
production for high as well as low or negative returns, there was also a gradual 
tendency for returns to labour to decline with increases in own labour time.
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Figure 6 J  Relationship between maize area sown and use of 
own labour by all small and medium farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
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Note to Figure 65:17 values are present here; there are in fact 18, bia two are identical (2 farmers 
with 2.1 Has who worked 73 days on their farms).
Figure 6.6 Returns to own labour by maize area sown among 
small and medium positive net income farmers in Chichicaste 
and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
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Figure 6.7 Returns to own labour by maize area sown among 
all small and medium farmers, Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 
primera 1986-87 ■
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Note to Figure 6.7: there were two farmers with a negative return to labour ofLps-Hday, both sowing 
1.4 Has o f maize, so they show up as a single value on the grc^h; there were in fact 8 negative net 
incomes among small and medium farmers, not 7 as appear here.
Figure 6.8 Relationship between labour time and returns to 
own labour for all small and medium maize farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and J u ti i^ , primera 1986-87
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6.2.5 Large maize fanners
Large farmers have not been scrutinized so far in this analysis. How did they fare? I
have not attempted to calculate returns to labour among these farmers because of the
prevalent use of permanent farm workers. However, with the rider added earlier that
profît is an unquantifîed component of income for large farmers, interviews showed
that although large farmers generally received total net incomes which far exceeded
those of small and medium farmers because of their greater scale of production (Table
6.14), income per hectare was equally variable - from a negative net income per hectare
in one case to one of the highest incomes per hectare overall in another. However,
although one large farmer made a loss, the average net income per hectare of these
large farmers was still greater than that of the small and medium farmers (see Table
6.13 above; the 7-14+ Ha maize area category comprised the same farmers).
Table 6.14. Average net mcomes from maize (means and medians) o f farmers interviewed in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size group (both villages) Mean net income (Lps) Median net income (Lps)
<1-5 260 182
5-50 673* 268*
50+ 5.613 4.850
* The disparity between the mean and median for medium farmers in particular reflects the effects of 
a few high incomes on the mean, although several farmers had negative or low net incomes as 
reflected in the median - confirming the risk and vulnerability analysed above.
Also important in evaluating the position of large maize farmers was that they all had 
several other major sources of income. Large cattle herds were notable in all cases, 
and some had small businesses as well as engaging in trade. They were thus able to 
move their resources around, as well as make substantial changes in crop and cattle 
production. Thus the farmer with the negative net income from maize was planning to 
reduce maize production and invest more in cattle. Two other farmers were also 
expanding their cattle herds. Although making a positive net income from maize, one 
of these farmers had already reduced his maize area from 21 to 8.4 Has because he was
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not satisfied with the returns. By contrast, a fourth was planning to rent some land to 
increase his maize output
62.6 Conclusions
My analysis has shown that obtaining cash income from maize was relatively risky and 
potentially marginal for many small and medium farmers, including occasionally for 
large farmers who could also incur cash losses. Although some small and medium 
farmers obtained a return to labour more than the agricultural wage, for several farmers 
with positive net incomes, returns were considerably lower. Furthermore, there were 8 
small and medium farmers who had negative net incomes. That some small and 
medium farmers obtained high yields and returns to labour did not mean that all such 
farmers could regularly earn positive or adequate incomes from maize.
Although making income from maize was possible but risky, it did not however follow 
that the smallest farmers were always those most at risk. Much depended on their 
individual circumstances, especially whether they could obtain some measure of 
security against harvest and financial losses through their relationships with wealthier 
farmers. However, the absolute amount of money such producers could make from 
maize was obviously limited by their small scale of production. Furthermore, several 
medium farmers were also unable to make a cash income frx>m maize because of their 
debts to the credit programme (analysed in Chapter 7), making them particularly 
vulnerable if their harvests failed. Finally, large maize farmers also had variable 
experiences. Money could be made from maize, but maize production could also 
render returns which farmers perceived as unsatisfactory compared with earnings from 
cattle. The difference for this group of fam^rs was that they had other options: with 
land and ready access to credit, they could invest in otha  ^crops or livestock as well as 
non-farm businesses.
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6 3  C oncluions
What further conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for the nature of food 
insecurity among maize farmers? Putting together information on apparent 
consumption deficits and negative net incomes, reveals that 12 out of the 28 farmers 
interviewed were known to have suffered one or the other, and half suffered both 
(Table 6.7 above). Although the sangle cannot be said to be representative of faimors 
in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, it is an indication of the problems and risks and how they 
occurred.
Combining this information with that on loans which farmers had made to produce 
maize, other sources of finance for maize production, and other maize and income 
sources, puts an added perspective on the relative food security and insecurity of these 
deficit farmers (Table 6.15). Thus at least 9 of the 12 had some form of debt relations: 
institutional loans, pre-harvest sales, or loans of inputs fix>m a landowner. While all 
these farmers grew other crops for consumption or cash income, half also carried out 
wage work for other fanners. In some cases (5), there were other members of the 
fiunily or household who may have helped to provide maize for consumption. Thus, 
overall the picture indicates the points of vulnerability (income and/or consun^tion 
deficits and dependence on loans) as well as the means ly  which farmers helped to pay 
for maize production or make up their shortfalls in consumption or income. While this 
picture confirms the perspectives of the DRI - that maize farming was not particularly 
lucrative - it also points to some of the social relations which made it so, in particular 
the means of access to sources of finance and resources for production which were 
analysed in Chapter 5. The next chapter analyses the problems of indebtedness furtiier, 
and whether and how social relations might have affected the prices farmers received 
for maize.
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Table 6.15 Perspectives on the food security and insecurity o f consumption andJor income deficit 
farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farmer
(1)
Consump­
tion 
deficit (2)
Net 
income 
deficit 
after 
harvest 
sales (3)
Made pre­
harvest 
sales (4)
Recvd 
institl. 
credit (5)
Other 
loans (eg 
of inputs) 
(6)
Other 
sources o f 
maize (7)
Other 
sources of 
farm 
income (8)
Sources of 
off-farm 
income (9)
AM Yes Yes Father Beans Wage
work
JAC Yes Yes Yes Yes Sons? Beans,
veg
Wage
work
JC Yes Yes Yes Veg Wage
work
JS Yes Yes Yes Beans,
veg
Wage
work
GF Yes Yes Yes Beans,
veg
Wage
work
RR Yes Yes Beans,
fruit
Petty
trading
FC Yes n.d. Yes i.d. Sons? Beans,
toms
S-SÙHas
FR Yes Yes Yes Sons? Beans,
cattle
Wage
work
MA Yes Yes Yes Beans
NL Yes Sons? Beans,
cattle
Store
CU Yes Yes Yes Beans,
fruit,
cattle
Store
5 0 ^  Has .........
VM Yes Yes Beans,
cattle
Total
(12)
9 9 3 5 4 5 12 10
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A p p e n d ix  6,1
Maize losses incurred by farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87 (percent o f
harvested maize)
Farm size 
group 
(Has)
Number in 
group
<10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 No data *
CMchkdSte
<1-5 1 1 3 3
5-50 6 2 1 3
50+ 3 3
<1-5 5 1 4
5-50 4 1 1 1 1
50+ 3 1 1 1
* Six o f the farmers for whom there are no quantitative data indicated that their losses were low, 
moderate or high. In Chichicaste, one small farmer indicated low losses and a medium farmer had 
very high losses, while two o f the large farmers said their losses were very low. In Jutiapa, one small 
farmer said he had moderate losses while a large farmer reported that his losses were low.
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Chapter 7
R e p r o d u c in g  m a iz e  i n  E l  Pa r a îs o : d e a u n g  w it h  d e b t  a n d  
OUTPUT MARKETS 
Introduction
Sustaining maize production depended on farmers' capacities to continue financing 
themselves as well as providing maize for consumption. Even if farmers earned 
positive net incomes firom maize, in practice, many farmers would have spent at least 
part of their cash income on consumption needs, and thus further loans would be 
needed to cover farmers' cash costs of production in the future unless they were paid 
for by other income sources. Reproducing maize was therefore a complex and often 
precarious process. As Chapter 6 showed, maintaining consumption and income 
entitlements from maize was difficult for many farmers, particularly small ones. The 
need to sell maize, and the need to buy commodities to produce maize, put pressure on 
many farmers' limited resources and capacities for meeting consumption needs and 
making a net income, especially if crops were affected by pre-harvest losses.
This chapter argues that some of these pressures arose finom the personalized debt 
relations established with other farmers who provided loans. Others stemmed fi-om 
being incorporated into commodity circuits involving the use of institutional credit. 
Thus, there were different ways in which farmers could be squeezed in terms of sirrçle 
reproduction (Bernstein, 1977). In addition, prices received for maize affected farmers' 
cash incomes. However, the relationship between the social and economic status of 
farmers and prices received is also complex; time of sale was a particularly important 
aspect but this in turn was affected by farmers' social positions.
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I first analyse how maize (annas wae affected ly  dieir means of financing production 
and the perspectives for sustaining access to finance. I then look at whetha social 
differentiation affected the prices received for maize and what âgnificance this might 
have for different ^ e s  of maize faima. Bnally, I draw some conclusions about the 
relationship between food insecurity and class relations among maize farmers.
7,1 Debt relations and reproducing access to finance for make production
At the beginning of the last chapta, I stated that diffaent types of indebtedness were 
one of the most important processes in undermining farmers' abilities to keep enough 
maize for their own consumption and to reproduce and expand maize production. The 
question, then, is how and why did maize farmers with consurrq>tion deficits or negative 
net incomes continue in production?
Different Qrpes of credit - and hence debt relations - played a key role in reproducing 
maize production in Chichicaste and Jutiapa in the 1980s. Sustaining access to loans of 
different types was therefore important for farmers' livelihoods in maize. However, 
these debt relations could also have contradictory effects on farmers productive 
capacities. The burden of repayment could be difficult to meet for some small and 
medium farmers. Hrst, pre-harvest sales put pressures on ccmstnnption and income as 
we have seen in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. Second, anall and medium farmers who had 
institutional credit often had substantial loans to rqtay, meaning that they would have 
to make maize sales whether they wished to or not to try and cover their debts.
I would argue that both these groups of farmers experienced a type of forced sales or 
forced ctmunerce (Bhaduri, 1983; Bharadwaj, 1985). The former were similar in 
nature to those described in the literature, that is, they woe based on ties and debts to 
otiier farmers and landownos. However, I also suggest that debt relations resulting
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from the modernizing attempts of rural credit schemes inq)licitly acted to force some 
faimas to sell maize needed for their own consumption. This could even be regarded 
as a form of *instituti(xialized forced ctMximerce'.^  As shown in Chapter 6, recipients of 
rural credit were encouraged to commoditize their production processes as well as 
commoditizing their output. A number of farmers were left in difficult and 
contradictory situations because, on one hand, they needed credit to continue to 
purchase inputs and hire machines, while, on the other hand, repaying the amnwnt 6f 
loan received was not always posable from maize sales and debt relations could 
jeopardize future access tt> credit.
Summarizing data from Chapter 5, finance for maize production came from pre-harvest 
sales, rural credit schemes such as the DRI, BANADESA, and the gift or loan of 
inputs. Looked at by farm size group, mdy 4 out of 12 small farmers received 
institutional credit (one of whom who also had a grocery store), while 9 out of 10 of 
the medium farmers interviewed and 100% of the large farmers had institutional 
(Table 7.1).
Given the Ifonduran government policy concerns (as well as those of campesino 
organizations - see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2) relating to the importance of rural credit 
for financing small as well as medium and large farmer maize production, I analyse the 
effects of receiving institutional credit and compare the outcomes with those of farmers 
receiving personalized loans. How did the different types of institutional credit actually
I  am aware that this is an unusual way o f characterising the term 'forced commerce’. It could be 
validly stated that the trtuisaction involved Ui an institutionalised loan is based on a freely agreed 
contract involving specified repayment by a particular tme. and moreover does not involve exchange 
relations o f an interlocking nature. However the relationship o f small farmers to credit schemes 
involves an mplicit power relation with the creditors and agreements about the use o f resources 
which might be against farmers’ better judgements. This is elaborated further in the text. Moreover, 
btclusion and exclusion from credit schemes can also involve other issues than financial need and 
credit-worthiness (see Chapters, Section 5 3).
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help farmers during the productive period? Did they fare better in terms of 
consumption and cash income than those making personalized loans and or pre harvest 
sales? To what extent were they in a better position to continue producing maize or 
not?
Table 7.1 Ways o f financing maize production among fanners interviewed in Chichicaste and 
Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size 
group 
(Has)
Total BANADESA DRI Pre­
harvest
sales
Loan of 
inputs
Wages Other
income
sources
<1-5 12 4 3 3 1 1
5-50 10 1 8 1
50+ 6 6
Total 28 7 12 3 3 1 2
An important aspect of receiving institutimial credit was that many farmers among 
those interviewed in both villages seemed to receive more money than they apparently 
needed to cover their estimated costs of production (see Table 7.2). Given that labour 
costs were included in extensionists' estimates for DRI participants, part of the 
intention might have been to ensure that small and medium farmers had a consumption 
fund. However, it also imposed a considerable repayment burden on these farmers. A 
number mentitxied the need to limit their debts in the future. By contrast, at least half 
of the large farmers interviewed took out less credit than they needed to cover costs. 
Thus those with greater resources to invest in production were those most able to talce 
out proportionately smaller loans.
Tfd>le 72 Extent o f coverage o f costs o f production by institutional credit among maize farmers 
interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Number o f farmers with this percentage o f costs covered by insiiiutiunal credit
Farm size 
group (Has)
Number 
receiving 
institl. credit
25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 100+% No data
<1-5 4 4
5-50 9 1 2 6
50+ 6 1 2 1 2
Total 19 1 3 3 10 2
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Loans may have been high for other reasons than the inclusicHi of a cash value on all 
labour costs. Although credit needs were in part directed to the q>ecific circumstances 
of particular farmers, the pospecdves of the project assumed that there would be 
increased use of chemical and mechanical inputs (as well as that the technical changes 
would require more paid labour). This led to further assumptions about how much it 
would cost to produce a given area of maize at a given technology use.
That assumptions about costs did not always mateh farmers' own perceptions is 
indicated ly  the fact that some farmers «ily withdrew part of the loans that they had 
been offered, either because the amount of nxHiey was not actually needed or because 
they did not want to accrue a debt that they could not repay. Li fact, 5 out of the 12 
farmers who received credit fiom the DRI, took out lower loans than their files 
indicated. This conforms to the findings of Cuevas and Graham (1984) who analysed 
different types of institutional credit and suggested that 'the client follows the advice of 
the official when filling out the loan forms, but requests payments according to his/her 
own idea about the level of debt desired' {ibid, 14; my translation). Farmers who had 
other resources to heÿ finance production, such as a business, also tended to be 
cautious about withdrawing too much credit. One such farma" stated that he only 
withdrew enough to buy his inputs and to invest in a kn^sack spray. All other costs 
were covaed by his otha incane sources, in tins case a grocay store.
Farmers receiving credit from BANADESA did not in general receive much more than 
their costs of production, and in several cases, less. Although they were generally large 
farmers, they may have been subject to more stringent accounting. Large farmers 
accounted for most of the credit given to maize ly  BANADESA. Such farmers were 
aq>ected to have relatively high costs of production and, although they may not have
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been seen as a security risk in the way that highly vulnerable small farmers might, loan 
recuperation was a problem for a national bank with limited funds. Thus one large 
farmer complained that he had to put up collateral of Lps 40,000 to borrow Lps 
20,000. Furthermore, BANADESA charged higha intaest rates than the DRI. 
Farmers might thus have been more careful about how much they withdrew.
In what sense did credit provided by the DRI assist or aeate problems for small and
medium maize farmers? Analysing farmers' abilities to repay their loans when interest
is included suggests that only 5 out of the 12 who had borrowed from the DRI were
able to make repayments from maize sales alone (Table 7.3). Of the remainder, 3
fanners could have repaid their loans if they had saved the difference between what
they borrowed and their apparent cash costs of production. However, one of these
farmers had a maize consumption deficit and would have had to buy maize as well. His
total payments would have left him with a negative income. In practice, it was more
likely that credit was used as a consumption fund before harvest
Table 7.3 Ability o f small and medium farmers receiving DRI credit to repay loans from maize sales, 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farm size group 
(Has)
Number 
interviewed in 
group
Could repay loan 
plus interest from 
total maize sales
Could repay lorn 
plus interest if 
saved difference 
between loan and 
cash costs
' Could not repay 
loan by these 
means
<1-5 4 1 1 2
5-50 8 4 2 2
Total 12 5 3 4
There were also 4 farmers who could not repay their loans either from maize sales or 
by saving their excess credit. Among these four, there were two in Chichicaste and 
two in Juti^a, each including a small and medium farmer. Interview data revealed that 
the cash debts of the two Chichicaste farmers were far more acute than those in 
Jutiapa. Both the Chichicaste farmers were known by the DRI extensionists to be in
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difficulty about repaying their loans. If their loans were to be repaid, they would have 
had to use incœne from other crops (beans, and vegetables in one case) and, for the 
small farmer, frmn wage work. However, it was unclear that they were able to do this 
and the project was still in the process of deciding what how to handle their debts when 
I was doing my fieldwork. The farmers' own perspectives on their situation were as 
follows:
GF had had a poor maize harvest. He had attempted to raise extra 
money to repay debts by buying beans when they were cheap [with 
some of his loan?] and adding them to his own to sell at a high price to 
the IHMA. It was unclear how much money he had been able to make 
because of the transport costs he had had to pay. GF was doubtful 
about trying to obtain further credit from the DRI.
MA had also had a poor harvest and had had to sell all his maize to 
repay at least part of his loan. He said that ncmnally [in other words, 
before taking out an institutional loan] he could expect to harvest 
sufficient maize to cover costs and household consumption leaving small 
amounts of maize to pay for other basic consumption items.
The response of the DRI to indebted farmers, or those who had exerienced serious pre­
harvest losses or been unable to cover their loans from sales, was ambivalent On one 
hand, extensionists stated that small farmers with loans often did everything they could 
to repay debts, even if it meant having a consumption shortfall of maize or other food 
crops. It was suggested that such farmers were prepared to e7q>erience poverty and 
food insecurity now to ensure access to resources (or finance) later. Extensionists 
implied those farmers deserved support but in practice it was difficult to do so because 
of their relative vulnerability. Extensionists w»e less sympathetic to farmers who had 
other resources for example, in the case of a Jutiapa medium farmer who had 
considerable land, some cattle and a store. The same ^plied to another medium 
farmer in Chichicaste who had not repaid his loan at the time of interviewing:
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This farmer was rather reluctant to talk about all the details of his 
indebtedness. He said that he had suffered severe pre-harvest losses. 
He was vague about how he was planning to repay his debts.
However the DRI policy on indebted farmers was unclear. The programme was only in
its second year when I interviewed farmers and decisions on loans seemed to be made
on a case by case basis. However, the politics of rural credit are sensitive. Integrated
rural development projects were being given considerable publicity at the time and they
were supported by foreign aid. It was inqwrtant to try and make them succeed (and
make them look as though they were succeeding) as well as not let farmers down.
Nevertheless, it was also apparent that there were problems with how the programmes
were run and the assumptions behind them. That one or two farmers receiving loans in
the programme had decided not to take out all their credit, (and, in one case, a small
farmer had decided to reduce the area of land that he rented for sowing maize to keep
his financial commitments at a more manageable level), indicated that several farmers
had burned their fingers the previous year:
RR was an active, ambitious and hard-working small farmer. However, 
because of his debts, he was going to ask for a smaller loan in 1987-88. 
Although his debts were much lower than some of the other indebted 
farmers, it was unclear whether this farm^ would be able to repay his 
loans conq)letely. However, he had adopted some of the diversification 
targets proposed by the DRI and was growing finit trees - relatively 
high value crops compared with maize but with a much longer gestation 
period. He also engaged in petty trading.
Some farmers who had other sources of income deliberately did not take out credit or 
reduced their dependence on credit For exan^le, one medium farmer in Jutiapa would 
sell a cow to help finance production. In the past he had sold land. He also had a 
grocery store but he claimed it did not finance maize. Another medium farmer in 
Chichicaste who received credit from the DRI, as well as one of the Jutiapa large
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farmers who had credit from BANADESA, both said that other economic activities 
helped to finance maize so that they did not have to rely so heavily on loans.
The extent of indebtedness among farmers receiving institutional credit and the 
frequently low levels of positive net income from maize (which would also be needed 
for other expenditures) meant that it was critically inqwrtant to be able to maintain 
access to some sort of finance for future maize production. However, it was not 
necessarily possible or easy for an indebted farmer to continue to obtain institutional 
credit. The commoditization of agricultural inputs and ouq)uts generally required by 
institutional credit (even if farmers in practice made choices about how much they 
decided to spend on ctxnmodities) created an insecure «tvironment for reproducing 
maize among many of the anall and medium maize producers interviewed, which is 
why I would characterize their position as one of Insecure transformation' (see the 
introduction to Chapter 6). Such farmers thought they had (or were being persuaded 
that they had) possibilities of increased output by using credit, but for some, the 
process was a high risk strategy.
The position of small farmers who received no institutional credit was however no less 
complex, especially for those who whose access to resources was circumscribed ly 
exchanges based on personalized relations. For the latter, farmers would be able to 
maintain access to land as long as they were able to pay rents (where required) and 
provide labour for the landowner. There was interest on both sides in maintaining the 
relationship. In cases where the anall farmer had been able to take advantage of the 
large farmer’s access to credit by obtaining inputs from him, the tie was reinforced and 
a series of obligations established which the small farmer would have to meet. The 
danger, then, was when or if that personalized relationship broke down - either because 
the small farmer could not meet debts or because of some other disagreement. (I cited 
one such case in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.5.) However, as long as it could be
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maintained, the relationship created an element of security for the small farmer to be 
able to continue producing maize, even though it might have imposed limits on the 
farmer’s productive capacities. In other words, such farmers were suspended in what I 
have called ’secure stagnation' (Chapter 6).
What about the one medium and 6 large maize farmers who all received credit from 
BANADESA? Six out of the 7 were known to be able to repay their credit from maize 
sales. However, unlike most of the farmers who had credit from the DRI, for three of 
the large farmers, at least, loans did not cover their costs of production which were 
partly financed by other on- and off-farm activities. However, all but one the farmers 
was able even so to make a positive net income from maize. However, if maize 
farming resulted in a loss or inaifficiaidy satisfactory returns as far as the farmer was 
concerned, resources could be invested in other activities. For these maize farmers, 
growing maize was part of their whole farm strategy to expand income (or profits). If 
they experienced 'insecure transformation', they had the option of changing their 
strategy.
Nevertheless, even for these farmers, access to credit was key to sustaining production. 
Although all the fanwrs had substantial resources in land, cattle and other economic 
activities, all of them required credit to purchase agricultural inputs and they also used 
it to mechanize their farms in some cases. However, their attitudes towards continuing 
to invest in maize were variable. One complained about the amount of collateral he had 
to put up to obtain his loan. Two others thought that maize was not a good 
investment One of them said: 1 generally sow maize, but not because it is profitable'. 
A fourth was careful to limit the amount of nwney he loaned for maize. This farmer 
probably summed up the large farmers' concerns when he said that 'the main problems 
[with maize production] are the costs of inputs, machinery, spare parts, and grain 
prices.'
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7.1.1 Concluions
This section has shown the vulnerahili^ of many of the small and some of the medium 
farmers to indebtedness, whether to institutions or through personalized relations with 
other farmers. However, small, medium and large farmers were in very different 
resource positions with respect to the kinds of decisions they could make about maize 
production. What characterized the small and some of the medium producers was the 
relatively limited margins of choice and the inherent risks they faced in using formal 
credit to finance production.. For example, one medium farmer stated Maize and beans 
are not profitable but I don't want to invest in other things because of the risks'. For 
these farmers, there were several key problems: how to retain adequate maize for 
consunq)tion; how to earn adequate cash income from maize; how to repay debts; how 
to continue financing maize production; how to manage a debt cycle which might be 
induced or reinforced by unequal relations with landowners or by entering into credit 
relations with banks and other institutions.
Finally, although it has not been my purpose in this thesis to analyse the overall
household economies of the faroters interviewed, the data analysed in Chapters 5-7
r
suggest that maize production and consumption were of necessity supported by other 
economic activities for many farmers (including large ones). Appendix 7.1 indicates 
the extent to which farmers engaged in other farm and off-farm activities in both 
villages. For all farmers, other staple crops such as beans were key sources of food 
while vegetable production was often regarded as a source of cash income (see also 
Column 8 in Table 6.15 on maize consumption and/or income deficit farmers in 
Chapter 6). As well as being able to sustain their cycles of infmmal loans and sources 
of assistance, wage work was an important source cash income (and therefore food) for 
small farmers. In addition, different members of the farmers' households were often 
engaged in a variety of productive activities which provided labour, food and income.
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For example, several farmers mentioned sons who would return periodically to help on 
the farm; others had daughters working as domestic servants in urban areas who were a 
source of remittances to the countryside; the wives of small farmers interviewed often 
engaged in small-scale vegetable production or food processing and trading.
I am unable to comment on the extent to which different cash income streams, 
including remittances, helped to sustain access to land and other resources for maize 
production as opposed to reinforcing the dqrendence of such households on markets 
for purchasing food and other needs. Certainly, for small farmers in particular, for 
whom maize was dieir main food staple, reproducing the conditions for maize 
production and ctmsunqrtion was even more impcntant than being able to cover all 
consurnption requirements from farming, or to make a positive net income. Such 
farmers did not c^erate with a different rationale from other farmers. Their productive 
c{q>acities were considerably constrained by social relations and they adopted strategies 
(including depending on loans and favours) to keep producing at least part of their 
maize needs.
To summarize:
(i) Most farmers need continued access to credit and loans tt> finance maize production; 
loans could be reduced ly  a few medium and most large farmers because they had 
alternative sources of income.
(ii) Small and medium farmers, unable to rq>ay debts to financial institutions because of 
harvest losses or too higb loans, were at risk of not being able to maintain access to 
finance on a systematic basis; such farmers experienced what I have termed "insecure 
transformation'; some tried to reduce their risks by not withdrawing all their loans.
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(iii) Large farmers could also e^qterience indebtedness but had the possibility of 
changing their farming strategies by investing capital in other crops, livestock or 
business.
(iv) Small farmers who were dependent on their relations with large farmers and 
wealthier relatives to help finance their production could find themselves in a continued 
cycle of obligations and indebtedness. Howevo*, as long as the relationship with the 
patron could be sustained, such farmers would survive and reproduce their maize in 
conditions of 'secure stagnation'.
(v) The conditions of indebtedness which affected many small and some medium 
farmers were also associated in some cases with the need to sell maize they needed for 
consumption. Although for some this was the result of tied transactions - such as pre­
harvest sales or the need to repay loans from landowners - in other cases the 
institutional debts forced farm^s into this position.
7,2 The social relations o f maize prices^
In principle, prices received for maize could have an effect on indebtedness. When 
production involves considerable use of purchased inputs (and when policies to 
promote increased output encourage the use of purchased inputs), the relative 
movement of prices for inputs and outputs will affect farmers abilities to make an 
income from maize .^ However, the overall effect of prices on farmers' abilities to repay 
debts or make an income from maize is affected by the quantities of maize produced
^ Discussion on maize prices in this section and Chapters 7 and 8 generally refer to LempiraslKg 
which makes comparison between wholesale and retail prices easier, although in some instances I  use 
the wholesale measurement o f metric tonnes rather than kilogrananes.
^ This is the basis o f the study by Aguirre and Tablada (1989).
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and sold. Large farmers selling substantial quantities of maize could benefit 
considerably from higher prices whereas the benefit to a small farmer may be quite 
marginal, Thus, because of the differentiated nature and outcomes of maize farming, 
prices for maize can have differential effects on farmers' incomes and their abilities to 
repay loans.
There have been several attempts to analyse the potential or actual effects of maize 
prices on maize farmers at a macro-economic level, including the effects of state 
intervention, and which I have referred to in Chapter 2 (for example, Aguirre and 
Tablada, 1989; Economic Perspectives, 1986; Hanrahan, 1983; Larson, 1982; Pollard 
et al, 1984; USAID, 1978b). There have also been other studies which have looked at 
market organization (for example, IRI, 1985; Loria and Cuevas, 1984). I shall return 
to some of the issues raised in (Chapter 9. My concern here is an issue on which less 
empirical work has been done in Honduras and which does not appear in this literature, 
namely, whether the social differentiation of maize farmers was reflected in their 
receiving different prices for maize, and, if this did occur, why. I argue that although 
there is evidence that different farm size groups in Chichicaste and Jutiapa received 
different average prices, the relatively lower prices received by small farmers seemed to 
be a function of their need to sell their maize as soon as possible after harvest when 
prices were lowest^, to repay debts and/or to provide cash income for other 
cmisumption items. I look first at some of the perceptions farmers had of how prices 
affected them and then analyse the prices they actually received.
^ The urim m  harvest period starts in September. However, because o f cultivation practices which 
often leave maize standing in the fields until the beans have matured, maize is often not sold until 
DecemberlJanuarylFebruary.
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72.1 How maizie farmers saw prices
Among problems menticmed by maize farmers, prices were often one. Several
interviewees in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, especially large farmers who were particularly
concerned to run profitable enterprises (and also had the choice of investing their
capital in other products), conq>lained about prices of inputs and the cost of producing
maize. Others complained about the prices received for their output. In Jutiapa, where
at least two medium farmers and one large famter had difficulties making a positive net
income from maize, farmers were asked to say what they thought the main problems
with maize production were, and typical comments were as follows:
It is not profitable to sow maize because the selling price does not 
respond to costs' (large farmer)
The main problem is grain prices' (small, medium and large farmers)
Traders take advantage of the poverty of producers' (small farmer)
The main problem is having to sell maize at harvest time to pay back 
debts [in other words, instead of being able to wait until prices rise]' 
(medium farmer)
The government should not inqwrt grain but increase prices to 
producers' (medium farmer).
WhUe there was concern about maize prices right across the spectrum, grouping the 
comments by type of farmer as in Table 7.4 below reflects the particular conditions 
they faced. For large farmers, the costs of production were an important issue, 
particularly the cost of inputs. One large farmer in Jutiapa said that, although he had 
three permanent workers, he spent more on technical inputs than labour. The problem 
was exacerbated when crops were affected by pests or diseases. This farmer's 
complaint was his main reason for deciding to increase his cattle herd rather than 
investing further in maize production. The relatively high absolute investment incurred 
by large farmers as well as the costs per hectare were clearly a concern. As Chapter 6,
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Section 6.2 indicated, large farmers' net incomes per hectare were not automatically 
more favourable than those for small or medium farmers even if their absolute net 
income was much higher. However, for these farmers, the critical issue was how maize 
fared in relation to other crops or livestock.
Table 7.4 Some perceived problems with reproducing maize production by type o f farmer (Jutiapa),
1987
Small farmers Medium farmers Large farmers
Maize prices Maize prices Maize prices
Traders take advantage of 
farmos' poverty
Post-harvest debts Relationship between maize 
prices and costs of inputs
Government maize imports 
undermine prices
For medium farmers, prices received for output were also a concern, but the problem 
of repaying loans at harvest time generally forced such farmers to sell when prices were 
relatively low.^ As indicated in Table 7.4, attempts to increase and commoditize 
output were perceived by some as being undermined by government import policies. 
Although I do not discuss government import policies, farmer perceptions of the effects 
of government imports on prices (accurate or not) might well have influenced the 
extent to which medium farmers in particular (who wo’e also able to produce marketed 
supluses) would have been prepared to invest more in, and increase their output of, 
maize.
I
A small farmer comment in the table was that traders take advantage of small farmers' 
poverty Çlos comerciantes aprovechan de la necesidad). That traders took advantage 
of their poverty was such a commonly held belief among poor farmers and campesino
^  It was an irony that the DRI intended to provide and improve farmers’ storage while many project 
participants wotUd not have been able to take advantage o f it because they needed to sell most o f their 
harvest to meet debts.
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organizations that it cannot be simply dismissed Analysing whether and why small, 
medium and large farmers actually received different prices for maize provides some 
insights into this belief even if it does not offer a cmnplete explanation.
722 Differentiated farmers: differentiated prices?
Collecting adequate and meaningful price data was not easy. One problem was what 
farmers were prepared to say, because it revealed information about their incomes. A 
second problem was accuracy in reporting prices received or time of sale. However, 
using the data available, it is possible to identify anomalies and interpret data more 
meaningfully by asking different questions and presenting the data in different ways. I 
have done this with nine graphs which I now discuss.
Taking farm size as a proxy for wealth, one might expect to see an increase in prices 
with farm size if the belief that traders paid lower prices to poor farmers were true. I 
have plotted these data in Figures 7.1 and 7.2<*. I initially present the data separately 
for each village because there was a slight difference in overall price levels: for 
Chichicaste, the average price including pre-harvest sales was Lps.34/Kg and 
Lps.36/Kg without (Lps340 and 360/MT respectively); in Jutiapa, the average price 
including pre-harvest sales was dightly higher: Lps.35/Kg, and Lps.37/Kg excluding 
pre-harvest sales (Lps350 and 370/MT). These differences can probably be explained 
by the fact that there were more sales among interviewees in Jutiapa made to traders 
coming from main market centres such as Choluteca and Tegucigalpa than in
^ The data in these and subsequent figures include pre-harvest and harvest prices, except where 
specified; they do not include the estimated prices for further sales used in Chapter 6 to calculate 
total income from sales. I  comment on later sales at the end o f this sub-section.
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Chichicaste where wholesale prices were higher than in Danlf that year^. In addition, 
more sales in Jutiapa than in Chichicaste exteiuied into February and March when 
prices had increased.
In Figures 7.1 and 7.2 prices are plotted by farm size ranking for each village. Both 
scattergrams show an inctxiclusive relationship between farm size and prices received. 
Among the outliers, the noticeably lower prices received at the smaller farm end of the 
spectrum in both villages were for pre-harvest sales. The relatively low price at the 
larger farm end for Jutiapa represents a quantity of damaged maize sold by a large 
farmer who made three sales in all. For one of his other sales, he received the highest 
price of all farmers.
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Figure 7.1 Chichicaste: prices receivedfor maize by farm size 
ranking, primera 1986-87
4 6 8 10 12
Farm size raiding (16 farms)
14 16
^ One medium farmer in Jutiapa stated that traders from the South (Choluteca) gave a better deal 
than local traders, acting fairly about weights and not quibbling over the quality o f the grain.
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Figure 72 Jiüiapa: prices received for maize by farm size
ranking, primera 1986-87
4 6 8
Farm size ranking (12 farms)
10 12
Note to Figures 7.1 and 7.2: the number o f price values is higher than the number o f farms because 
some farmers made more than one sale.
These data neither support nor refute the argument that larger farmers received higher 
prices than smalla* ones. However, if the data are averaged by farm size group we 
begin to see some patterns emerging. I again take the two villages separately. Figures 
7.3-7.S show grouped data for farmers interviewed in Chichicaste. In Figure 7.3, price 
data for farm size groups have been averaged and are compared. In the bottom set of 
bars, all pices are included and the bars show a clear price difference for small, 
medium and large farmers, with small farmers receiving the lowest prices. But when 
pre-harvest sales are excluded, as in the top set of bars, the average price for small 
farmas increases and becomes identical to that received by medium farmers.. Traders 
(or other farmers) might take advantage of poor farmers through pre-harvest 
transactions, but the relationship between harvest maize prices and wealth is not so 
clear from these data.
In Figure 7.4, the farm size groups have been changed slightly. I have incorporated 
one small farmer, who had a grocery store and whose farm size did not adequately
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reflect his relative wealth, into the medium farmer group. Looking at the lower set of 
bars, this leaves the small farmers with a lower average price than the medium or large 
farmers (who begin to approximate each other). However, removing the data for pre- 
harvest sales again (in the top set of bars), the differences between small farmers and 
the others are not so great.
Figure 7.5 makes a further regrouping. This time, the small farmer group comprises 
only those with no institutional credit in the bottom set of bars on the assumption that 
credit might have enhanced their wealth and bargaining status (or conversely, that those 
with no institutional credit might be the poorer farmers surviving through personalized 
relations to landowners, and possibly traders). In the top set of bars, pre-harvest sales 
are again excluded. The results approximate those for Figure 7.4, again showing that 
small farmers in Chichicaste seemed to receive lower average prices than medium and 
large farmers, but that the difference was not so great when pre-harvest sales were 
excluded.
Figure 73 Chichicaste: average prices received for maize by 
farm size group, primera 1986-87
Nop-harv
All prices
028
Lj Medium
032 034
Lps/Kg
036 038
Note to Figure 73 (see also Figure 7.6):
All prices = average prices received for maize for all farmers in farm size group.
No p-harv = no pre-harvest prices, i.e. average prices far farm size groiqi excluding those received 
for pre-harvest sales.
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Figure 7.4 Chichicaste: average prices received for maize by
adjustedfœ m  size groups, primera 1986-87
Nop-harv
Adj. grps
O Medium
Small
Lps/Kg
Note to Figure 7.4:
Adj. grps = adjusted groups, i.e. prices received by one 'small'farmer moved to medUum farmer 
group; average prices for small and medium farm size groups are therefore different from the 'all 
prices' category in Figure 7.3.
No p-harv - as for Figure 73, but with adjusted groups.
Figure 73 Chichicaste: average prices received for maize by 
farm size group (small farmers with no credit), primera, 1986- 
87
No p-harv
No credit
LJ Medium
Small
Lps/Kg
Note to Figure 73 (see also Figure 7.7):
No credit = small farmer group includes only those who receive no institutional credit; medium 
farmer group as for Figure 7.4.
P-harv -as for Figures 73 and 7.4 but excluding small farmers with institutional credit.
Significance tests were carried out to confirm that pre-harvest sales were the key 
problem for small farmer prices in Chichicaste. A One-tailed t-Test comparing all small
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farmer with combined medium and large farmer prices proved significant when the 
small farmer group was adjusted (in other words, when the wealthier 
farmer/storekeeper was removed) and all prices, including pre-harvest prices, were 
taken into account (Figure 7.4)^. This was also found to be the case when only small 
farmers without credit were considered and, again, all prices were take into account 
(Figure 1.5Ÿ- As soon as pre-harvest sales were removed from the data, there was no 
significance in the relationship between small farmer prices and those of other farmers.
Was the pattern similar in Jutiapa? The Jutiapa data do not lend themselves to the 
same degree of regrouping. However, it is possible to do some permutations. Figure 
7.6 shows average prices by farm size group. Again, small farmers received lower 
average prices than medium and large farmers (bottom set of bars). However, medium, 
not large, farmers actually had the highest average prices, and when pre-harvest sales 
data are removed (top set of bars), small and large producers actually received the 
same average price^O If the small farmers are regrouped as in the Chichicaste data to 
include only those with no institutional credit (Figure 7.7), price differences between 
the small and the other farmers were more marked (lower bars) but the small farmers' 
average price was actually slightly higher than the large farmers' average price when 
pre-harvest sales are excluded (top bars). However, the average price data are on the 
basis of only two anall farmer sales in this last comparison and are therefore a very 
limited data set
^  Results: t - 1.98; P(T<st)sX)39:t Critical-1.83
^  Results: t = 1.96: P(T<=t) = .046: t Critical = 1.89
That medium farmers in Jutiapa seemed to obtain the highest average prices may be related to 
idiosyncracies in the large farmers’ data, far example, that one farmer received a very low price far 
some damaged maize.
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Figure 7.6 Jutiapa: average prices received for maize by farm
size group, primera 1986-87
No p-harv
All prices
LJ Mechwn
Small
LpslKg
Figure 7.7 Jutiapa: average prices received for maize by farm 
size group (small farmers with no credit), primera 1986-87
No p-harv
No credit
LJ Medium
Small
Lps/Kg
As might be expected from these graphs, when One-tailed t-Tests were done on the 
raw data, no significance was found in the reladtmship between farm size and prices 
received in Jutiapa, especially given that there was only one pre-harvest sale reported. 
This result also adds to the inq)ression from earlier analysis that the Jutiapa small 
farmers interviewed were somewhat better off than those interviewed in Chichicaste.
Overall the relatitxiship between farm size and price may seem a weak one when 
looking at limited data sets. Even so, there is enough evidence in my data to continue
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asking the question whether traders take advantage of poor producers at harvest time, 
although not to substantiate the contention. When pre-harvest trade is taken into 
account, the associaticm seems clear, indicating that this was when traders (or other 
fanners) took most advantage of farmers' poverty.
The influence of pre-harvest sales on average prices for small farmers does however 
suggest that time of sale was a key factor in price. For many small farmers, even apart 
from pre-harvest sales, there is a despoate need for cash so that maize has to be sold 
immediately at harvest whatever the price. Richer farma% may be able to stagger their 
sales, covaing debts and then waiting until the price rises. So, the problem for small 
farmers may not be that they are given lower prices than others at any point in time, but 
that they have to sdl their maize when marlœt prices are low anyway.
Looking again at my data ly  time of sales, it is posâble to show that prices increased 
during the mondis that farmers sold maize. The reported sales for Chichicaste 
interviewees extended from November 1986 to February 1987, and for Jutiapa, from 
Octobo: 1986 to March 1987. In this instance, I have the data for the two villages on 
the same graph, and have ordered them ly  month of sale for 19 farmers for which the 
data were coirqtlete. Vfithin each nKmth, prices are plotted in ascending order on die 
assunqition that price increases were actually occurring in the market (see Figure 7.8). 
Pre-harvest sales were excluded as they took place at a fixed price much earlier in the 
crop tycle. As one might expect, Hgure 7.8 shows a generally positive association 
between increases in prices received and later sales. There are however some outliers 
which need explaining. One farmo’ in Chichicaste appeared to obtain a high price for 
his maize in November (he made an early sale because he did not plant a bean crop to 
grow against the maize). However the pice was much higher than the apparent 
whrdesale price for Danlf gathæd DRI extensimtists for that period and may be 
inaccurately rqxxrted. Anotho^ January value recorded in Jutiapa may also be
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inaccuratdy reported as it also far exceeded the wholesale price quoted by the DRI. It 
also creates an inexplicable jump in the general trend.
The question, then, was whether the time of sale was associated with farm size (still 
using this as a proxy for wealth). To plot this scattergram, I ranked the 19 farms ly 
farm size, and ranked the months from 1 to 7, 1 being September, which is considered 
the first harvest rwnth but when little maize is sold, and 7 being the following March, 
which was the latest reported sale in my data. The resulting Figure 7.9 does show a 
tendency for later sales to be associated with larger farm sizes, although it does not 
provide incontrovertible evidence. (The correlation coefficient calculated for these data 
was only .41.) Again there are outliers. For exanq)le, the two smallest farmers did not 
make the earliest sales, in fact, they were relatively late compared with other small 
farmers. These were two farmers whom I have mentioned in previous sections, who 
sold most of their crop and had other maize farmas in their household units. They also 
had borrowed inputs as well as land, and did wage work. That they were not the sole 
providers and had these means of financing their maize production probably allowed 
them not to sell their maize at the earliest opportunity. (In addition, their wage work 
might have delayed their own harvesting.) Another outlier is the early sale of some 
maize by one of the larger farmers. This was a sale of damaged maize and has been 
mentioned above.
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Figure 7ft  CMcMcaste and Jutiapa: prices received for nusize 
by month c f  sale, primera 1^6-87
Chichicst
L] Jutima
Month
Figure 7.9 Chichicaste arui Jutiapa: relationship between 
month maize was sold and farm size, primera 1986-87
5 10 15
Farm size ranking (19 farms)
20
Although plotting time of sale and farm size resulted in a weak positive correlation, the 
relationship between farm size and time of sale remains as issue. For both villages, the 
lower values in the early months of harvest were mainly prices received by small or 
medium farmers who had ccmsumptitxi or inccane deficits. However, not all farmers in 
this positi(Hi in fact sold early, either because they had other sources of maize in the 
household or otho: sources of inctxne with which to resolve dieir debts. Nevertheless,
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fanners reporting February sales at higher prices tended to be medium farmers without 
deficits. Large fannm who may have sold relatively early were able to stagger their 
sales, covering most of their debts with their first sales. Although estimates for later 
prices received have not been taken into account for these and one or two medium 
farmers (see Foomote 5), that some of these farmers were able to make later sales from 
their surplus maize would have increased the average prices received by medium and 
large farmer groups. The difference in prices between small and larger farmers was 
thus even wider than the original comparisons made in Figures 7.3 and 7.6. However 
this analysis shows that the key factor affecting this difference was time of sale.
Although it would be easy to conclude that the extent to which small farmers received 
low prices was sinq)ly a function of time of sale, I contend that it was actually a 
function of the overall social relations of production and exchange. For example, one 
small farmer in Chichicaste made pre-harvest sales to finance production. Another sold 
his maize in December to finance Christmas/New Year expenditures (his overall net 
cash income from maize was negative and his situation had been exacerbated by heavy 
harvest losses; this farmer also did wage work). In Jutiapa, a small farmer who made 
very early sales in October, sold to a local landowner who was known to make pre­
harvest purchases and trade in maize as well as farm. The small farmer had been 
supplied with some of his inputs from the landowner it is likely that there was an 
outstanding debt. Another anall Jutiapa farmer who sold part of his maize early was 
involved in the rural credit scheme and was one of the ctmscientious small farmers 
often referred to by extensionists who struggled at all costs to repay his debts so as to 
continue receiving credit for the following season. This farmer stated that his credit did 
not stretch to paying labour to harvest his beans and so he had sold some maize early to 
recuperate his costs. Even some medium farmers (notably two in Chichicaste) made 
early sales to repay institutional loans.
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723 Summary and conclusions
The main points can be summarized as follows:
(i) There was a tendency for prices received for maize to increase with farm size, but 
once pre-harvest sales were removed from the data, the relationship between farm size 
and prices was a weak one; there was however an association between time of sale and 
higher prices, and a weak association between farm size and time of sale.
(ii) The pressures to make early sales arose from conq>lex processes in the social 
relaticMis of production and exchange. These included the different types of 
indebtedness analysed in Chapter 6 and Section 7.1 of this chapter.
(iii) Pre-harvest sales to finance production costs were a key point at which small 
farmers' poverty was linked to low prices received for maize.
(iv) Farmers selling early after harvest tended to receive the lowest prices and these 
were often, but not always, small and medium farmers with consumption/income 
deficits.
(v) Large farmers had the optitm of storage and delayed sales at higher prices for part 
of their crop, not open to many medium and most small farmers.
(vi) Changes in prices were thus likely to have differential effects on maize farming 
because of the different social and technical conditions of production and exchange. 
Large farmers were likely to benefit mcne from price rises.
Tliere was a series of pressures on small farmers in particular which meant that their 
relatively early sales (and hoice lowo  ^prices) in several cases could not be explained as 
a function of time alone, nor, going back to the original contention that traders take 
advantage of poor farmers, rinq)ly by looking at the relationship between the farmer
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and trader. No doubt some traders took advantage of these pressures, and farmers 
who were tied into debt relatitms with landowners providing land or other inputs (and 
also trading locally in maize in stxne cases - see Chapter 9) might have been particularly 
vulnerable when it came to time of sale and prices received. Obviously the most 
vulnerable wae those who had to make pre-harvest sales merely to finance production.
73 Conclusions: food insecurity and class relations
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have analysed the social relations of production and reproduction 
of maize, focusing in particular on processes of exchange and their effects. 
Throughout, there have been two key focal points of analysis: (i) the social hierarchies, 
commoditized, personalized and non-commoditized relations which might charactoize 
exchanges over resources for production between small and large farmers, especially in 
Chichicaste, and which create linkages between their production and reproduction 
strategies; and (ii) how the reproduction of maize of different types of farmer has been 
affected by cwimoditization of production processes and ouq)ut, and by attempts to 
finance production and increase output through institutional credit. I have tried to 
show how non-linear, coirq)lex and variable these processes are and what their effects 
have been for the cq)acities of maize farmers to stay in production and provide enough 
maize for household consumption needs.
The chapters have shown that these exchange relations resulted in indebtedness for 
many small and some medium farmers which undermined their entitlements in 
consumption and income, and potentially threatened their access to land. The routes to 
indebtedness were either based on perstxialized relations with large farmers and 
landowners, or on the exigencies of institutional loans. The continuing risk and 
vulnaability faced by these farmers in trying to reproduce maize production and 
consumption left them potentially or actually food insecure, even though many of them
I l l
were under pressure from rural credit programmes to increase output for the market to 
help meet national maize needs.
Although ny arguments are based on small data sets, there are many maize farmers (if 
not the majtnity) facing the difficulties analysed anoong those in Qiichicaste and 
Jutiapa. Hence, it would now be valuable to draw some preliminary conclusions on 
food insecurity and class relations. These conclusions would undoubtedly apply to 
analyses of the social relations of production and exchange in other parts of Honduras.
I have so far avoided putting class labels on farmers in Chichicaste and Jutiapa. Yet the 
farmers I interviewed wae in very different social positions bodi in their access to 
resources and their capacities U> reproduce maize production and gain access to maize.
Putting labels on different types of maize farmer tries to encapsulate a corrqrlexity of 
social relations which may change over time. Furthermore the realities were more 
complex implied by the labels. However, my labels offer a deq>er understanding of the 
social positions of maize farmers than categories based on access to land and farm size, 
and those based on techniques of production, because they take into account the 
processes ly  which farmers gain access to resources (including labour) for production 
and how production (and consumption) is reproduced. Thus they offer an inroad into 
analyâng and understanding food insecurity among maire farmms and provide a basis - 
for rethinking policy issues, an issue I return to in the Conclusions to the thesis.
Appendix 7.2 provides a summary of the ^ecific characteristics of different social 
posititms in Honduran maize farming. My first category is that of semi-proletarian 
producers or farmers. In Chapter 1 ,1 suggested that semi-proletarian producers were 
those peasants using fiimily labour and oigaging in single reproduction ... whose 
survival depends on doing wage work for others'. I also pointed out that although 
semi-proletarian farmers could evoitually become dispossessed of their mean of
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production, wage work could also be a means for sustaining production of farmers' 
own crops.
I would now define semi-proletarian maize farmers in Honduras as those farmers with 
small amounts of land, often rented, who depend for their survival on wage work as 
well as farming. In ny  view, 6 of the 7 small farmers interviewed in Chichicaste fell 
into this category as well as one or two other farmers in both Chichicaste and Jutiapa. 
However semi-proletarian production of maize in Chichicaste also had other 
characteristics. Although it took place within commoditized relations, it also relied on 
personalized and as well as non-commoditized relations for its survival. Thus such 
farmers were often in dependent relaticms of exchange with landowners who provided 
them with small plots (sometimes for rent payment and sometimes not), hired them as 
labour, and might 'help' them with the loan of inputs for farming. The relationship 
rested on debts and obligations and ensured access to labour for the landowner. 
Because of the relative wealth of the landowner, and the ongoing cycle of indebtedness, 
there was an irrqrlicit power relation built into the social hierarchy of which both soni- 
proletarian farmers and landowners were a part. Thus, semi-proletarian farmers 
fi%quentiy dqrended on the patrrmage of landowners to be able to rqrroduce maize (as 
well as other crops), especially as they often had consumption and/or income deficits 
after harvest. They might also rely on other forms of indebtedness to continue 
financing their production, such as pre-harvest sales. These farmers were gripped in a 
cycle of 'secure' stagnation which could however be threatened if relations with patron 
landowners and empltyers broke down. Although they continued to produce maize, 
they faced underlying threats to their production and exchange entitlements and hence 
the possibility of actual or wcffsened food insecurity.
My investigation of semi-proletarian maize farming also erqtlodes one commonly held 
belief - that such farmers do not themselves use wage labour. The use of temporary
279
wage workers was common among such farmers, and further research would probably 
reveal that it was directly related to the farmers' own need to do waged work on a 
regular basis.
My second category is that of petty commodity producers. In Chapter 1 ,1 pointed out 
that conceptualizing petty commodity production was an area of ongoing debate and 
cited, on the one hand, Friedmann (1980) who defined it as fully commoditized 
production under capitalism except in the use of labour, and on the other, Bernstein 
(1990) who states that petty commodity producers are both c^italists and workers at 
the same time; they own or have access to means of production which they "put to 
work" with their own labour...' (ibid, 72). While accepting the basic ideas behind these 
definititxis, I added that forms of production categorized as PCP are also pursued as 
active strategies for survival where other «nployment and income-earning activities are 
scarce.' Furthermore, the conditions for the survival of petty commodity production 
can be highly unstable.
Petty commodity production characterized nearly all the medium farmers I interviewed 
in both villages as well as most of the small farmers interviewed in Jutiapa. (Only one 
small farmer in Jutiapa carried out wage work on a systematic basis.) However, labour 
was also partly commoditized because it was hired on a temporary basis. Nevertheless, 
the general characteristics of petty commodity production in combining capital (or 
means of production) and 6mily labour to produce commodities were broadly present 
with their own specific manifestations, as were the different potentials for engaging in 
ârrq)le reproduction or accumulation among the petty commodity producers 
intoviewed. For exanq)le, 4 of the 5 small farmers in Jutiapa whom I would call petty 
commodity producers, were only just surviving at the level of simple reproduction. 
Even among some medium farmers in both villages, petty commodity production was a 
precarious existence threatened with debt. However, some petty commodity producers
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satisfied their ctHisumption needs and made a net income above wage rates (in one 
case, substantially so). Furthermore, several petty commodity producers had other on- 
farm and off-farm resources of food and income.
Thus petty commodity production of maize in Honduras in the 1980s was unstable and 
varying in its cq>acity to sustain simple reproduction without falling into debt or 
resorting to wage work. For these reasons I characterize it as insecure transformation'. 
Many siich farmers were being persuaded to try and 'transform' their production using 
rural credit and adopted new technologies and techniques of production at high risk. 
The policy pressures to increase and strengthen this form of production, which I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, certainly pushed some of the petty commodity producers in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa into new forms of debt relations. Thus even petty commodity 
producers could experience entitlement loss, as well as gain, and some could be 
threatened with food insecurity.
Finally, I come to the category of commercial farmers. All the large farmers I 
interviewed fell into this category. I did not try to ccmceptualize such farmers in 
Chapter 1, and in some respect their social positicxr within maize fanning is much 
clearer in its social relations than semi-proletarian and petty commodity production. 
On one hand, such farmers had access to large amounts of land (often through 
inheritance but also through occupation and purchase), their main concern was to make 
profits from maize which they attempted to do with commoditized and mechanized 
farming (including the use of permanent wage labour), and their future investment 
decisions with respect to maize depended on how much money they could make from it 
compared with other activities. (While axnmerdal farmers were engaged in expanded 
reproduction, they could also experience indebtedness in maize production. However, 
their substantially greater access to resources gave them more options for production 
as well as collateral to cover their debts.) On the other hand, such farmers were also
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often engaged in personalized exchanges w ith their tenants and w orkers, as well as 
employing (non-com moditized) family labour, usually in their adult sons who would 
hope to  inherit land. Commercial maize farmers also had implicit and actual pow er to 
influence the lives o f their workers and tenants as well as other aspects o f village life.
H ow  do these class categories relate to  my initial classification o f small, medium and 
large farm ers, and w hat are the overall implications for the social positions o f the 
farm ers interviewed in the two villages? Reclassifying m y original groups only modifies 
them  slightly in the case o f Chichicaste - one small farm er is pu t in the petty commodity 
producer group and one medium farm er is seen as semi-proletarian - whereas m ost of 
the small farmers in Jutiapa w ould now be seen as petty comm odity producers (Table 
7.5). This classification does reinforce the view that, among those interviewed, (i) 
small farm ers in Chichicaste tried to  sustain their own farming with wage work, while 
those in Jutiapa were m ore self-sufficient^^; (ii) the relations between small and large 
farm ers in Chichicaste w ere m ore personalized than those in Jutiapa. H ow ever, such 
generalizations should also be treated with caution given that my data are based on a 
lim ited num ber o f interviewees and m ay be idiosyncratic. M ore im portant from  an 
Table 7.5 Social positions of maize farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987
Chichicaste
Small* 1 7 Semi-proletarian*
Medium* 6 6 Petty commodity*
Large 3 3 Commercial
Jutiapa
Small 5 2 Semi-proletarian
Medium 4 7 Petty commodity
Large 3 3 Commercial
* Note that although the numbers are the same, the actual farmers in these groups are not identical
It is also possible that there was a clearer division between farming and wage work in the heart of 
the Jamastrân Valley than in Chichicaste, given that there were some very large farms and that 
commercial crops such as tobacco were grown.
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analytical perspective is that the social positicxis of fannas and their relations to each 
other are dynamic: the precaiiousness of much petty commodity production, especially 
among those with small areas of land, could easily drive farmers into seeking wage 
work or alternative sources of income; equally semi-proletarian farmers might be able 
to change their positions through rural credit or by organizing themselves collectively 
(see Chapter 8).
These conclusions do not attempt to encapsulate all the dynamics of social relations of 
production and exchange in maize farming. However, the issues they raise have policy 
implications. These will be addressed in my concluding chapter.
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Ch a p t e r s
R e p r o d u c in g  m a iz e  i n  c o l l e c t iv e  g r o u p s : E l  P a r a Iso  
AND Sa n t a  BAr b a r a  
Introduction
This chapter departs from focusing on individual maize farmers and looks at production 
by collectively-organized campesino^ groups. Although the activities of organized 
groups were not the main focus of my research, their «reiiences raise a numb»* of 
pertinent questions for this thesis. For example, did organized groups, which were 
often formed ly  semi-proletarian farmers, break with the reproduction patterns found 
among such farmers? To what extent did maize production continue to depend on a 
similar combination of non-commoditized, personalized and commoditized relations to 
those of semi-proletarian fiarmas? To what extent were collectively-organized farmers 
better able to produce adequate maize and make an income from it than, say, semi­
proletarian farmers or even petty commodity producers? Was debt as serious a 
problem for them as for semi-proletarian and some petty commodity producers? Were 
collectively organized farrrms in a bettra' position to reproduce or expand their maize 
production?
hi diis chapter, I argue that obtaining land through collective struggle cut through the 
land-labour exchange relations found between semi-proletarian and commercial maize 
farmers. However, there were differences between the groups in their capacities to
 ^ As pointed out in Chapter 1, campeàno is roughly translated as peasant. However, the issue o f 
campesino identity is complex: as mentioned in Chapter 5. the largest landowner in Chichicaste 
considered himself a rampesino because o f his humble origins.
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produce and reproduce maize, and the extent to which their new endowments in land 
were accompanied by changes in other ownership and exchange entitlements benefiting 
food security. The disengagement from previous social relations could leave some 
groups vulnerable to debt and unable to produce adequate maize for consumption. 
Members of such groups no longer had ties with landlords which might have provided 
some measure of security (although making improvement of productive capacities 
difficult). Even so, exchange relations with local landlords might still be established to 
obtain loans. While collective work was often a prerequisite for groups to be given 
institutional credit, it was often difficult in practice to obtain official loans. However, 
richer and more established peasant groups seemed to occupy social and economic 
positions with some similar characteristics to petty commodity maize producers. They 
also experienced similar advantages and disadvantages in their credit and debt relations 
with state banks or extension projects.
However, for all groups, the collective solidarity of struggle over land and the 
subsequent collective nature of the enterprise - no matter how variable this collective 
element might be - provided a new arena for exchange relations of a less hierarchical 
nature than those experienced by semi-proletarian farmers. The political or ideological 
principles which guided internal organization as well as relations with outsiders and the 
state, gave some internal solidarity and cohesion as well as the possibility of taking joint 
action in relation to external forces. Even so, there was also potential for 
differentiation within groups which will be made evident below.
The analysis in this chapter is based on my interviews with collectively-organized 
groups in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, and Quita Sueno, Santa Barbara. The chapter first 
briefly situates my analysis in the context of peasant organization in Honduras and 
distinguishes three types of production unit. I then analyse land/labour relations in 
maize production, groups' experiences of income and debt, and how they manage
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consumption. Finally, I look at whether collective organization had any effect on prices 
received for maize.
8,1 Peasant organization and types of production unit
The struggle for land by landless and land-poor peasants and the existence of an 
agrarian reform programme in Honduras in the 1970s and 1980s provided 
opportunities to organize production on a collective rather than an individual basis. 
Thus a key distinction between semi-proletarian maize farmers and campesino groups 
was the different strategies for obtaining land. The former commonly engaged in 
reciprocal but hierarchical relationships with landowners to obtain it, while organized 
groups were more often in dispute with landowners over access to land. This struggle 
was directed to disrupting landlord-tenant-wage worker relations, and had the general 
aim of alleviating landlessness and providing adequate livelihoods.
The struggle for land by groups was implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, a political as 
well as an economic project Although groups orgaitized to obtain land because they 
were poor and had inadequate means of livelihood, the struggle for land was situated 
within a broader context of unequal land distribution, land concentration accompanied 
by the ftagmartation of small farms (see Chapter 4), and a growing rural population (in 
spite of rural-urban migraticm) arrmng whom at least 40% were technically landless in 
the 1980s (see Chapter 2). Groups often faced opposition from landowners, who had 
historically been represented strongly in the state whaeas campesinos and small 
farmers had not (Fonck, 1972). Nevertheless, since the 1960s, when rural landless 
began mobilizing to obtain land, campesino organizations have put pressure on the 
state to irrqrlement land reform (see also Chapter 2; Ruhl, 1984a). However, because 
of the close relationship between land and power* national organizations of campesino
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groups have often been in confrontation as well as negotiation, with both the state and 
local landowners.
This thesis cannot provide a potted history of land reform and the role of peasant 
organizations in Honduras. Much has been written about this already (for example, 
Brockett, 1987b; del Cid, 1977; Parsons, 1975; Pearson, 1980; Posas, 1979; Ruhl, 
1984a, 1985). For this analysis, the critical aspect is whether the disruption of 
landlord-tenant-wage worker relations and the group action and solidarity around 
obtaining land created new forms of producing and reproducing maize which enabled 
farmers to make a livelihood and meet consumption needs.
For the analysis which follows, it is useful to distinguish between different types of 
organized groups and situate those I interviewed. It has been common practice in 
parastatal organizations such as the INA (National Agrarian Institute [for agrarian 
reform]) to distinguish three types of economic unit resulting from collective 
organization. These have been the basis of an informative study on such units by Good 
(1986), who analysed some of the social and technical conditions of production of (and 
economic problems facing) (i) empresas consolidadas (literally, consolidated 
enterprises); (ii) empresas semiconsolidadas (semi-consolidated enterprises); and (iii) 
empresas no consolidadas (non consolidated enterprises). For ease of terminology, I 
shall call them 'commercially established groups', 'commercializing groups' and 
'struggling groups'.^
Commercially established groups are basically those producing permanent, export crops 
such as sugar cane or African palm, although members may produce food crops for
^ Unfortunately, neither the word 'enterprise' nor the word 'group' adequately characterizes the 
range o f productive units involved: enterprise creates the idea o f a capitalist firm, while group does 
not in itself indicate the nature o f the unit.
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their own consumption. They are usually located in fertile areas of the north and south 
of Honduras, have had consido-able financial support fiom state programmes and have 
been increasingly integrated into financial, input and output markets. They are often, 
but not necessarily, large cooperatives. Their members tend to be employed all year 
round in the activities of the enterprise, and the use of temporary and even permanent 
wage workers is common (ibid, 43). There is usually a specialization of tasks within 
the production unit and Goud suggests that internal differentiation is evident (op cit).
Commercializing groups may also be cooperatives. Goud states that they have a more 
diversified agriculture, combining the production of tree and citrus finit crops with the 
commercial production of basic grains (maize, rice, beans and sorghum) and cattle 
(ibid, 71). These groups have not experienced the same extent of state support and 
investment as commercially established groups. Some of the finit crops can also 
present high risks if markets have not been developed. The reproductive capacities of 
such groups can be rather firagile (what I would call 'insecure transformation'). Goud 
suggests that such units can occupy the labour of their members for most of the year, 
although incomes would not be as high as in commacially established groups. His 
study indicates that hiring wage workers is exceptional (op cit).
Finally, what I call struggling groups are characterized by Goud as follows (ibid, 94). 
He suggests that they primarily engage in production of food staples for direct 
consumption. In practice, all groups sell part of what they produce, whether 
collectively or individually, so this characterization by Goud of the type of production 
must be intended to indicate the prime purpose of farming activities and/or that such 
enterprises only engage in sirr^le reproduction. Features of snuggling groups include 
probable access to relatively poor or hilly land, lack of institutional credit, inadequate 
employment possibilities within the production unit and the heed for continued wage 
work for others (op cit).
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Although there was some variation in the local and migratory nature of group 
membership, a common characteristic of all types of group was the semi-proletarian 
origins of those who joined them. Predominantly male, members had generally been 
tenant farmers who had combined farming with wage work either locally for 
landowners or migrating seasonally to do tasks such as coffee picking. Some members 
might also have been sharecroppers or colonos.
How do these characterizations (which Goud develops in a series of case studies) help 
in understanding the dynamics of reproducing maize in the groups I interviewed? 
Although there were differences between the groups I researched, they did not always 
fit easily into these models. In the broadest of terms, two groups could possibly have 
been characterized as 'commercializing' while the remainder were 'struggling'. 
However, these characterizations do not actually reveal the complexities of the 
conditions facing the groups, nor their strategies for reproducing maize. For example, I 
shall argue that the struggling groups divided into two types: those who were closer to 
conditions of petty commodity production (PCP), and those whose conditions had 
some similar characteristics to those of semi-proletarian farmers-^ . These conclusions 
are summarized in Table 8.1 below. Even so, the collective nature of production (and 
decisions about use of resources and distribution of output and income) makes it 
problematic to insert groups easily into particular types of production which may also 
be carried out by individual farmers, as this chapter will show.
^  It is even more complicated trying to make these distinctions between groups within a sectorial 
(such as the Quita Sueno groups - see Chapter 3, Section 32 and Section 82 below) who had similar 
conditions o f production to each other biu among whom some appeared more su c c è s^  than others.
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T(d)le 8.1 Initial categorization o f groups interviewed, 1987 and 1988
Commercializine Strusgling
• PCP Semi-proletarian
Chichicaste 1 1
Jutiapa 2
Quita Sueno 9 1?
8,2 Reproducing collectively-organized nutize production in El Paraùo and 
Santa Bdrbara
I now turn to my own case studies and analyse their capacities to produce and 
reproduce maize. In 1987 I interviewed two groups in Chichicaste and two in Jutiapa 
(which I sometimes refer to as 'the groups in Jamastrân'). Three of the four groups 
were affiliated to national peasant organizations and the fourth was independent. Three 
had also recently been established at the time of interview (between 1983 and 1985) 
and the fourth had been in existence since 1969 (Table 8.2). The membership of this 
group included sons and sons-in-law of the original members. All the groups had fewer 
members at the time of interview than when they started - the process of establishing a 
group, obtaining land and setting up collectively-organized production is demanding of 
participants' commitment and resilience, and many leave .^ For all the groups, the main 
crops were maize and beans. Two groups owned or looked after cattle, and other 
crops such as plantains or vegetables were grown.
In 1988,1 interviewed 10 groups in Quita Sueno, Santa Bârbara. They all belonged to 
the same national federation and formed w  organizational unit called a sectorial. This
^ A report for the World Bank on the agrarian reform programme discussed the problem o f desertion 
o f settlements. However, it pointed out that attrition rates were natch lower among groups 
characterized above as commercially established than for other groups. The report also linked 
desertion to the type and amotuu o f land acquired by the groups: The heaviest rate o f desertion took 
place hi the South...This is not surprishig inasmuch as the average cultivable land assigned per family 
was little more than two hectares and this is a very droughty area’ (World Bank, 1983,26).
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w as significant because they had undertaken jo in t action to  obtain 390 H as o f land 
which w as divided equally betw een the groups (see Table 8.2). They had only been 
established on their land fo r 2-3 years when I interviewed them. They also grew  maize 
and beans, and frequently vegetables; one had a small cattle herd; various other income- 
generating activities were undertaken (for exam ple, one group had a billiard parlour).
Table 8 2  Collectively-organized groups interviewed in Chichicaste, Jutiapa and Quita Sueno, 1987
and 1988
Group Number o f members Date obtained land Land area of group 
(Has)
Chichicaste and Jutiam
LC 23 1984/85 196
NC 19 1983 70
CL 13 1984 37
EE 24 1969 141
Quita SueHo
EM 15 1986 39
LA 21 " "
FM 16 " "
FI 18 "
F2 16 "
BV 13 "
EL 15 "
LL 12 " "
AL 11 " "
LF 14 " "
8.2.1 Land/labour relations
H ere I first com pare the extent to which groups had greater security o f land tenure than 
sem i-proletarian farm ers (from  which the groups' members had originated), the relative 
am ounts o f  land that groups had access to  and how land was distributed and used. I 
then analyse w hether new  social relations with respect to  access to  and use o f  labour 
had been established com pared with the exchange relations o f land and labour 
experienced by m any semi-proletarian m aize farmers.
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(i) Land tenure
The types of security and insecurity of land tenure faced by groups were qualitatively 
different fiom those of semi-proletarian farmers. On one hand, land had been 
collectively occupied and (in these cases) occupation had been recognized by state 
institutions. On the other hand, access to land by groups had some insecure features. 
For example, although all the groups interviewed in both regions were legally 
established on the lands they occupied, they did not necessarily have land titles.
In Jamastrân, the groups had obtained land which had been expropriated fiom local 
landowners and three of the four had legal documents to guarantee their occupation of 
the land. However, one group had rq>utedly been under threat of expulsion by the 
Honduras National Cattle Owners Federation (FENAGH). The fourth, and oldest 
group, which should have had a land title, was then in dispute over compensation 
payments being made to the former owner of the land which the group now occupied. 
The group had discovered that the land was national rather than private land. This 
situation was symptomatic of the type of land colonization and expansion of pasture 
which took place between the 1950s and 1970s, when considerable national land was 
brought into farms whether legally or not (see Chapter 4).
Although these groups had some problems in the precise status of their lands, in other 
ways they had greater security of tenure than semi-proletarian farmers. The fact that 
these were organized groups who had taken collective action to obtain land, and in 
three cases had the support of national federations, as well as persuading government 
bodies and parastatal organizations to acknowledge their claims, all provided a degree 
of legitimacy. The groups were entities recognized by government agricultural 
extension offices, the INA, and, in one case, the agricultural development bank, 
BANADESA. These institutions were prepared to consider them for credit and
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incorporate them into technical assistance programmes. Although this recognition did 
not offer conq>letB protection from possible ejq>ulsion, the groups had an 
acknowledged right to farm the land they had obtained.
Group membos were careful to distinguish their relatitmship to the land and their new, 
organized, campesino identities fiom those of semi-proletarian farmers. The Quita 
Sueno groups were particularly clear on this issue. Histmically, they identified clearly 
with a particular class of producers whose social position was defined by tiieir type of 
access tt> land and use of labour. They qwke of tiiemselves as having been campesinos 
organizados sin tierra, or organized landless peasants, (as opposed to campesinos sin 
tierra no organizados, unorgartized landless peasants, i.e. landless workers or sani- 
proletarian farmers), and having become campesinos organizados [con tierra], or 
organized peasants [with land].
As new collective 'owners' of land, the Quita Sueno groups saw themselves as a distinct 
category firom those unorganized semi-proletarian farmers who continued to rent land, 
as well as finom pequenos parceleros. A pequeho parcelero was described as a farmer 
who might have had up to 20-25 manzanas (14-17.5 Has) of land. Groups said about 
such farmers: 'es campesino pero con su propia tierra y no organizado - he is a 
campesino but with his own land and not organized'. A nunaber of group members 
stated that they had rented land fiom pequenos parceleros in the mountains and had 
also worked for them, ht try terms, a pequeho parcelero was a relatively prosperous 
petty commodity producer, particularly if the farmer was able to rent out land and/or 
provide temporary wage work for others.
However, many manbers of groups had previously rented land fiom terratenientes - 
landowners who might have had anything fiom 50 manzanas (35 Has) upwards 
(according to tite views of informants). Terratenientes were cattle farmers (gcmaderos)
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or Acy might have onnbined cattle wiA oAer crops Çterratenientes nuSs avanzados', 
or "more advanced'). Some of Ae latter would have coneqtonded to n y  ccmunercial 
maize farmos who combined maize production wiA cattle and possibly oAer 
commercial crops. The land which Ae Quite Suefio groups now occupied had 
belonged to a large terrateniente who had owned land in Ae rmuntains as well as the 
valley, and several of Ae groups' members had been his tenant-workers. The amount 
of land held by landowners m Ae valley was substantial: estates of 700-1,400 Has were 
mentioned. The unequal land distribution in Ae area was obvious. Given Ae massive 
difference between Ae pequenos parceleros and Ae terratenientes in access to 
resources, it gave Ae groups some justification in calling Ae former campesinos.
In principle, access to Ae land occupied by Ae Quite Suefio groups was secure. The 
INA had made Ae allocation to Ae groups after Aey had been squatting on Ae land, 
and Ae groups had had Ae backing of Aeir national organization as well as a local 
cooperative offering techniod services. However, Aey repented cases of oAer groups 
rq>eatBdly occupying land and being thrown dS  elsewhere m Ae area, often wiA Aeir 
crops burnt NevaAeless, Ae settlement of tiiis land and its strong organizational 
harking gave Ae groups some security and allowed Aem to plan Aeir activities. Thus 
each group made its own decisions about land use and orgaitized its own finances, 
while Aere were joint plans between all Ae groups in Ae sectorial to develop storage 
and marketing. The fact that Aey had been involved m collective action to obtain Ae 
land, had been allocated equal Aares of it and lived m close proximity to each oAer 
gave Aem an inaportant degree of cohesion.
(ii) Access to, distribution and use o f land
Did groups actually fare betta* than semi-proletarian farmers wiA respect to Ae 
amount of land available to Aon? The groups in Jamastrân had an average land area
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per m em ber o f  betw een 2.9 to  8.5 H as (see Table 8.3). This was greater than that of 
farmers I w ould categorize as semi-proletarian in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, whose 
average farm  size w as only 1.8 Has. H ow ever, w ith one exception, groups did not 
divide up their land to  be w orked individually by the members. Three o f the four 
groups had collective plots o f between 20 and 30 Has, leaving individual families with 
.7-1.4 H as (1-2 manzanas) each (Table 8.3). This division o f land within the group 
assum ed that the family p lot was adequate to  provide personal consum ption needs, 
while the collective p lot was considered a source o f  group income. By contrast, plots 
o f 1-2 H as w ould have had to  provide income as well as consum ption needs for semi­
proletarian farmers.
Table 8.3 Distribution o f land by collective and individual use among groups interviewed in
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, 1987
Group Average land per 
member (Has)
Land allocated fo r  
collective use (Has)
Estimated size o f 
individual plots (Has)
CkicMcasfe
LC 8.5 28 .7-1.4
NC 3.7 28 .1**
Jutiapa
CL 2.9 24 .7
EE 5.9 43* 3.5***
* Rocky woodland used fo r grazing 
** Estimate
*** The group has given individual responsibility fo r collectively-financed productive activities - see 
text
Similarly, in Quita Sueno, the am ount o f  land available per head to  group members was 
also m ore than they w ould have had access to  as semi-proletarian farmers. Although 
all groups had the same area (39 H as), they had different memberships and thus 
distribution w as not actually uniform. H ow ever, the land available w ould have given 
m em bers access to  about 2 o r 3 Has. Again, all these groups w orked a collective plot, 
although with considerable variation in size, and thus, in practice, the land available for 
individual use was m uch less.
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Although organized groups did not invariably have plots Aat Aey worked collectively, 
and such plots often varied in size, Aere were several reasons for Aeir existence. 
Banks and credit instiAtions generally gave loans for activities for which Aere was a 
financial plan and collective responsibility for its execution. However, Goud suggests 
Aat groups also preferred to have collective raAer Aan inAvidual responsibility for 
loans {ibid, 113), given Ae relatively high risk of indebtedness. There were also social 
as well as economic reasons for growing crops collectively: it was part of Ae ideology 
of breaking wiA notions of private property and individual gain (or loss); and it helped 
to maintain social cohesion wiAm Ae group. NeverAeless, boA Aese aspects o f social 
ofganizatiim had Aeir problons. Li inactice, it could be hard for members of a group 
to sustain Ae break fiom inAvidualism (and Ae goal of private ownership of land 
\riiich many produces aqnre to), particularly if Ae group dynamics were not actually 
cohesive, or if Ae group had difficulty administering its collective economy. The 
leaders of om  Chichicaste group said:
It is difficult to maintain our collective ideas and consciousness when
each family has its own, individual problons, for example, differences in
Ae size of families and Aerefore different economic needs.'
The experience of one Juthgxa group suggests that dedsions about collective land use 
were based on tactical measures to satisfy boA inAvidual and collective needs, as well 
as some sense of collective respmribility. This group Ad not have a coUectively- 
worked plot (EE in Table 8.3). It was a long-established group which had become a 
cooperative. It had changed Ae oiganizatitm of its productive work because members 
had been apaAetic about woridng on Ae group plot. AlAough Ae group obtained 
credit cm Ae basis of a collective initiative, it had decided to Avide Ae reqmnsibilities 
for farming between Ae members. Each was obliged to grow at least S manzanas (3.5 
Has) of maize. The inputs were bought collectively using Ae creAt, but Ae land was 
worked inAvidually unA Ae harvest, which was carried out togeAer. Fifty per cent of
300
Ae maize produced on Ae plots would go to Ae members responsible for cultivating 
them and 50% would be used to pay back Ae loan and cover oAer group eiqienAtuies. 
In effect, each member or maize producer would meet personal income and 
consumption needs from a minimum of 1.75 Has of land (about Ae average amount of 
land available to Ae semi-proletarian farmers I interviewed). However, loans and costs 
of production were covered from Ae output of Ae oAer 1.75 Has. FurAermore, Aat 
Ae group could obtain creAt collectively and take collective responsibility for 
repayment made each member's econcnnic position stronger than if Aey had operated 
as inAviduals.
Different decisions about land allocation for collective use w«e also evident among Ae 
()uita Sueno groups. My data for 8 of Ae groups^, plotted in Figure 8.1, suggest Aat 
Ae size of collective plots declined wiA increasing availability of land per member, 
alAough this association was not very strong as inAcated by Ae ouAers. There might 
have been several reasons affecting groups' decisions about land Astribution; what 
groups ware able to obtain creAt for^, and wheAer increased abundance of land per 
member created a greater sense of inAvidual security or a propensity to take inAvidual 
risks in productive activities.
^  Data were incompietejbr two groups. 
^  I  discuss this question further below.
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There were oAer aspects to land tenure and use which suggest Aat alAough groups 
consciously tried to maintain some degree of collective organization and consciousness, 
Aey also engaged in commercial patterns of exchange over land which mirrored 
practices of inAvidual farmers. For example, members of Jutiapa group, EE (see Table 
8.3), kept cattle as well as growing maize (and beans), and rented land fiom a local 
landowner who provided pasture for Aeir cattle at Lps6/head. AnoAer group in 
Chichicaste (NC) had made a different arrangement. This group rented out part of its 
own land to a cattle owner. The group was in some financial difficulties and had no 
cattle of its own. However, group members looked after Ae tenant farmer's cattle for 
payment, alAough Ae group had to cover Ae costs of essential tasks such as putting 
up fencing. In oAer words, this was a commercial arrangement in which the group 
took on some of Ae risks of cattle rearing (whereas Ae landowner renting land to 
group EE had no hand in caring for Aeir cattle).
These different arrangements reflected differences in Ae two groups. Group EE was 
relatively commercially successful (as will be seen) and fell into my category of 
'commercializing' groups. Group NC had an outstanding loan wiA Ae DRI and was
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trying to make money from a hierarchical arrangement characteristic of the social and 
technical division of labour in cattle production, which has been analysed by Howard 
Ballard (1988). According to her study, it was cœnmon practice for young cattle to be 
cared for 1^ rdatively small or medium farmers who took on the risks of disease and 
death, while large farmers had the main reqwnsilnli^ for fattening and sale to slaughter 
houses (in which lay the hipest returns to investment). Thus although I assume that 
this arrangement was financially beneficial overall to the group, it involved monbers in 
hierarchical and risky exchange relaticms about which they erqxressed unease^.
A third group in Jamastrân (LC - also in Chichicaste) had a different kind of land 
problem. This group was relatively recendy established, had acquired a considerable 
land area but had few of its own resources (except labour). Only 65 of its 196 Has 
were fit for cultivation.^ Group members managed to sustain a collective plot as well 
as individual ones, but had to finance production from pre-harvest sales.
Thus although there were many differences between groups and semi-proletarian 
farmers in terms of access to and use of land, the relatively greater and more secure 
access to land by groups did not necessarily exclude relations of hierarchical exchange, 
especially if a group was in a vulnerable position because of indebtedness. Howevor, if 
there were any threat of dispossession from land, groups were able to take collective 
action. While tins action was not always successful, there was greater potential for
^ This group was also in a coi^ictive situation wiüt heal landowners (members o f FENAGH), the 
reasons for which were unclear, but they fe lt threatened by the possibility o f espulshn from their 
land. The arrangement over cattle pasture with a local farmer may have been a means o f protecting 
their land as well as a commercial agrtxment.
^  There was some concern in the early 19Ws that groups were not using the land edhcated to them. 
The World Bank study menthned in Footnote 5 pomted out that much o f the land edhcated to groups 
was not extuallyfitfor cultivathn and that, in practice, groups tended to use a high proportion o f the 
land that was (World Bank, 1983,27-28).
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securing continued access to land than for individual farmers renting small plots. Most 
importantly, when the group had secured its land, the organization and use of that land 
depended on internal decisions and priorities of the group which, in principle, involved 
processes of internal democracy and joint responsibility.
(in) Labour
A Itey dimension to reproducing maize among semi-proletarian farmers was doing 
wage work. Key questions for collective groups, then, are to what extent access to 
land ly  groups obviated this necessity or whether new land-labour relations were 
established. A further issue is to what extent groups wa^e able to meet their own 
labour needs in maize production, both individually and collectively.
Members of groups in both regions were trying to break with their semi-proletarian 
pasts. In particular, the groups in Quita Sueno, whose members had long histories of 
landlMsness and w a^  work, had a developed awareness of social relations of land 
tenure and use of labour in Santa Barbara and other parts of Honduras. As with many 
organized groups, they strove to set up new, collectively-organized and relatively equal 
social relations. These attitudes and perceptions meant that group members were often 
reluctant to talk about any wage work they still carried out, as well as discuss the 
implications of oiq)loying wage workers thanselves. Vfith respect to the latter, it was 
as if thare wac a moral weight - inq>licitly ratha: than aq>licitly expressed - not to 
employ mozos (temporary wage workers). Enq)loying the labour of others was 
referred to with some unease, as was the use of the groups' own labour in projects 
which were not considered part of the expected activities of organized campesinos or 
which mig)it be tear as taking money from fellow campesinos.
Looking first at the use of group membars' own labour, the break with the semi- 
proletarian past was more sucessful with some groups than with others. However,
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even among those who still carried out wage work, the crucial difference between them 
and semi-proletarian farmers was that the wage relation was no longer connected with 
exchanges over gaining access to land. Thus, in Jamastrân, the struggling Chichicaste 
group, LC, still carried out wage work for part of the year. Recently established, wage 
work was part of its survival strategy. The constraints on this groups' activities meant 
that, in effect, its members continued to be semi-proletarianized, but wage work was 
directed to financing other productive activities and consumption needs, not as part of 
an exchange relationship to obtain land.
Interviews with the Quita Sueno groups gave the impression that they had generally 
broken the wage labour relation in terms of their own employment However sources 
among service organizations working with the groups suggested that members did 
make up cash income needs fiom wage work more often than they wished to indicate. 
That some groups had outstanding debts (which I discuss below) would give grounds 
for their members undertaking wage labour. However, only one of the ten groups 
actually admitted to doing any wage work. This group sowed the smallest total area of 
maize of all the groups (although it was not the smallest in membership) and had 
chosen to keep cattle (which require little labour) on part of its land. Other sources 
said that this group was also had an outstanding loan to repay. Members of the group 
stated: 'We do day-labouring if we are short [of money]. We do ground clearance or 
pick coffee. We can't get work in tobacco processing - they don't like groups.'^
^ Ttds commeta also indicates some o f the potential limits on groups obtaining wage work. Their 
collective ability to organize probably posed a threat in situations where factory conditions prevailed, 
such as in tobcxco processing, whereas casual day-labouring on farms was easily controlled by 
landowners, especially in a context o f high un- and underemployment.
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Given the general ethos of collective work and responsibility (and not exploiting 
others), did groups enploy wage labour themselves? Goud's study suggested that 
commercializing and struggling groups rarely, if ever, employed others. However, 
among the groups in Jamastrân, one (the cooperative, EE, in Jutiapa) regularly 
employed wage workers to "help out' as well as using the labour of women and children 
in certain tasks, such as fertilizing, spraying pesticides, and harvesting beans (which is 
wecy laborious). The Chichicaste group, NC, which let out part of its land to a cattle 
farmer, also hired seasonal workers, but only for certain tasks in the bean crop. I 
estimated that the first of these two groups probably had a real labour shortage for its 
productive tasks. Using the global figures for estimating labour requirements in maize 
and bean production (73 days/Ha and 63 days/Ha respectively [CONSUPLANE, 1978, 
37]) which I employed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, and using 270 days/year for labour 
availability among members of the group^ ,^ the group seemed to be short of about 44% 
of its labour needs for crops alone (in other words, discounting their cattle). Taking 
into account that this is only an estimate, and that family labour was used in some 
tasks, there was still a likely need for the group to hire others on a temporary basis to 
carry out all its productive activities.
However, labour hiring by groups was not necessarily a result of labour shortage. 
Using the same technique, the Chichicaste group, NC, mentioned above, was estimated 
to have only a small labour shortage. The group seemed embarrassed to admit that 
they employed others to work for them. By contrast, a second Jutiapa group was very 
proud that all its productive work was carried out internally by the group. Hiring or 
not hiring labour was clearly a point of principle as well as labour availability.
This is for members only, not for their families.
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Thus, it was possible for fonnerly semi-proletarian farmers to become labour hirers 
whilst they dedicated their time to other activities. For example, in Quita Sueno, some 
groups claimed that they needed to employ temporary workers in maize production 
because they did not have the labour time required for all the tasks. My own estimates 
of labour availability and labour needs, calculated as above, indicate that only two 
groups might have had a small labour shortage for both maize and beans. However, 
almost all the groups grew vegetables as well and it was generally the smaller groups 
(in terms of membership) who stated that they employed others. The most notable of 
these was the group which had set up a billiard parlour, although it was unclear how 
much labour was required to run it. This group stated that it employed wage workers 
in both collective and individual maize production - a decision which might have been 
based on the available cash in circulation from its other activities rather than on a 
shortage of labour within the group. However, some groups also stated that they spent 
considerable time in meetings associated with the organization of the sectorial as well 
as groups' own affairs, and it was clear that the processes involved in this way of life 
and in collective enterprise demanded extra time and energy of a type not required in 
individual households and farms.
(iv) Summary and conclusions
The experience of these groups shows that access to land did not necessarily mean that 
members of groups no longer needed to engage in wage work. However, wage work 
was no longer performed as part of an arrangement to obtain land. Furthermore, some 
groups became wage labour hirers. Thus these land and labour accounts also 
demonstrate ways in which collectively-organized groups were differentiated from each 
other and how they might set up different exchange relations either to survive or to 
maintain their productive activities within the group. As I shall show, there were other 
areas of exchange in reproducing maize, particularly in the area of debt relations, which
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indicate that some 'struggling' groups shared some similar craiditions to semi- 
proletarian farmos. while others seoned to be more lilœ collectively-organized petty 
commodity producers.
Among the Quita Sueno groups, with equal amounts of land but unequal manberships, 
there w«e différait strategies with respect to how much land was allocated to 
collective work and whether wage labour was employed or not. Whetho* the different 
strategies with respect to land and labour use ingilied some new differentiation 
developing between the groups, perhaps involving individualization of production 
processes, was hard to say at the point of fieldwork. However, as we shall see later in 
later sections, there were other hints that a new differentiation was occurring.
O J  Debt relations and income from maize
Critical issues for semi-proletarian farmers and petty commodity maize producers were 
indebtedness and the nature of exchange relations affecting the financing of maize 
production, as well as being able to repay debts and retain maize for consumption. 
How did coUectivdy-œganized groups finance their maize production? Did groups 
have to rely on personalized loans and pre-harvest sales as semi-proletarian maize 
farmers did? To what extent was their e^qrerience of access to institutional credit 
subject to the same pressures as those of petty comnaodity produco-s? Did groups 
make positive net itteomes fix>m maize?
(i) Financing production
Although organized groups could in principle obtain institutional credit for collective 
plots, group members and extension workers stated that groups often had great
308
difficulty in negotiating loans, especially from banks^ .^ In some cases, there might 
have been political reasons for denying groups credit; in other cases, groups might have 
been unable to demonstrate a viable economic plan. However, an inqwrtant reason for 
restricted access to institutional credit was that export and pamanent crops - generally 
produced by commercially established groups - were given priority by both state and 
private banks (Goud, 1986, 119). Furthermore, Goud states that BANADESA, which 
was the main funding bank for collectively-organized groups, would only finance the 
production of basic grains such as maize if the group requesting credit were legally 
constituted (for exanqrle, as a cooperative) or belonged to a regional cooperative which 
could administer the loan {ibid, 121). In addition, as trœntioned above, both banks and 
groups preferred collective responsibility for the loans: from the banks' point of view, 
because there would be greater likelihood of repayment; from the groups' perspective, 
because debts would be shared.
In both El Parafso and Santa Bârbara, there were integrated rural development 
programmes (DRIs) committed on paper to providing collective groups with credit and 
technical assistance. In Jamastrân, two of the four groups had received credit for maize 
production through the DRI (Table 8.4), while the struggling group, LC, in Chichicaste 
hoped to obtain credit from the DRI in the future. In 1986-87, this group had 
negotiated pre-harvest sales with the wife of a commercial farmer in Chichicaste. (The 
group also financed its activities with wage work.) The other Chichicaste group (NC) 
had also made pre-harvest sales in addition to obtaining institutional credit. However, 
the group stated that this loan was for other needs than maize production. This group 
had a serious debt problem, as we shall see. The fourth group, the cooperative, EE, in
Goud estimated that about 30% o f groups in the 'agrarian reform sector' received no credit at all 
(1986.119).
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Jutiapa, which I ccmsider a cmnmercializing group, had access to regular credit from 
BANADESA.
Td>le 8.4 Sources t f  finance for maize production among groups interviewed in Chichicaste and
Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Group Sources o f finance for maize production
LC Pre-harvest sales; wage work
NC Credit fiom DRI
CL Credit fiom DRI
EE Credit fiom BANADESA
Most of the Quita Sueno groups, who were relatively recendy established conq>ared 
with 3 of the 4 the Jamastrân groups, had also obtained some form of institutional 
credit since their inception although sources included the agricultural extension 
activities of some church programmes as well as the DRI in Santa Bârbara, 
PRODESBA - Prcyecto de Desarrollo Rural de Saraa Bârbara (Table 8.5). 
PRODESBA was similar to the integrated rural development project being run in El 
Paralso.^^ This project aimed to provide *Lps 20,400,000 [of agricultiual credit] to 
about 7,500 producers through loans to 2,900 individual farmers, organized in 160 
A gricultural Committees, 3,200 beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform programme 
belonging to 80 setdements and about 1(X) women's and youth organizations' 
(SECPLAN/USE-PRODESBA, 1987,6; nty translation). This was to take place over 
a seven year period of rural development in the department of Santa Bârbara, from 
1985-92. At least 7 of the Quita Sueno groups had received finance for maize 
production from PRODESBA at some point since 1986.
ji  WKK jointly financed by the International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmetUi the Central 
American Bank for Econome Integration, a German NGO, and the Honduran government.
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Table 8 5  Sources o f credit reported by 10 Quita Sueno groups since inception (1986-88)
Source o f credit PRODESBA Catholic Church Mennonite
Church
No data
Number o f groups 7 3 2 2
Note: some groins received credit from more than one source
PRODESBÀ's own evaluation of its credit programme reveals shortcomings which 
were fam iliar from the experience of the DRI in El Parafso (SECPLAN/USE- 
PRODESBA, 1987). The credit programme was designed to increase production and 
productivity (and incomes) by allowing producers to improve their techniques of 
production. The main target population of the credit scheme was described as having: 
'a high rate of illiteracy, little custmnary use of technical inputs (seed, fertilizers, 
herbicides, pesticides), low risk techniques of production resulting in low yields, 
subsistence agriculture, use of family labour, anall plots of land (around 2 Has), etc' 
{ibid, 13; my translation) and was to comprise mainly farmers in the hilly areas. The 
evaluation was, however, critical of the technological packages designed by the 
research department of the MRN (Ministry of Natural Resources) which, it says, were 
based on the needs of medium and large farmers who were able to carry out 
mechanized production in the valleys.
In fact, a very small proportion of the money assigned for credit by PRODESBA was 
distributed in the first two years of the project (1985 and 1986). Several problems were 
identified:
(i) the lack of training of officials assessing producers for credit and the slowness and 
inefficiency of allocation
(ii) the lack of preparation of recipients in using the technological packages
(iii) the low take-up of credit by producers who feared the risks involved
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(iv) in the case of organized groups who had received land through the Agrarian 
Reform programme (such as those in Quita Sueno), the bureaucratic processes: groups 
had to have a recommendation from the INA before BANADESA would consider their 
applications to the credit scheme. Many groups never received credit because of the 
slowness of the INA in approving their applications.
Given the small number of mganized groups receiving credit in the schone (only 9 in 
1986), the ()uita Sueno groups were rather fortunate to have obtained credit from 
PRODESBA according to the perspectives of this report.
Evidence on informal access to credit such as pre-harvest sales among the Quita Sueno 
groups is sketehy. Only two groups mendmed making pre-harvest sales but these 
were sales by individual group members, made during critical times. It was unclear to 
whom these sales w«e made. One group said that pre-harvest sales were much less 
crxmnon than when they rented land (when pre-harvest sales were frequent) because 
thoe was less trust between people’. Bearing in mind that pre-harvest sales were 
usually made between people who had othw, hioarchical, ties over access to land 
and/or labour, the breaking of these ties with group organization and access to land 
was likely to have provided fewer opportunities for personalized relations between 
farmers of differential wealth. Two groups mentitxied that traders occasionally bought 
green harvests at half-price but this seemed infrequent. However, yet another group 
mentioned that members of groups sometimes had debts to settle with each other after 
harvest, which again suggests some degree of differential wealth within or between 
groups, although the extent of this was unclear.
As with all maize farmers, collectively-organized groups needed ready cash for 
purchasing inputs. Reinforced or not by credit packages, groups in Chichicaste and 
Jutiapa regularly bought inputs and hired machines (see Table 8.6). It will be noticed
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Tfble 8.6 Agricultural ir^ut use by collectively-organized groups interviewed in Chichicaste and 
' Jutiapa. primera 1986-87 (number oferouDS)
Input Owned Hired or 
purchased in 
1986-87
Not used ' No data
Seed 4
Weedkiller ■ 4
Urea 4
Chemical
fertilizers
1 3 '
Insecticides 4
Oxen 2 1 1
Tractor 1 2 1
Shelter 1 3
Sacks 4
from the table that one. group actually owned its own tractor. This was the 
'commercializing' group, EE, in Jutiapa which had been able to finance mechanization 
with its credit from BANADESA. By contrast, the one group which did not use a 
tractor frnr any tasks was the struggling group (LC in Chichicaste) which had made pre- 
harvest sales to heÿ finance production. Interviews indicated that diis group also used 
less weedkiller and fertilizer than even small farmers, as well as less than that used ty 
the other groups (see Table 8.7). This group had protebly been forced to keep its 
costs down. The other Chichicaste group (NC), which was relatively better established 
and had received institutional credit fiom the DRI, showed a peculiarly low use of urea 
but was the only group which bought chemical fertilizer. In contrast to individual 
farmers, chemical fertilize was hardly used by the groups (although chemical fertilizer 
use among individual small farmers was also rare).
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Table 8.7 Comparison of average quantities of biochemical inputs used by small, medium and large 
maize farmers and collectively-organized groups interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera
1986-87 (KgslHa)
Farm size group 
(Has)
Weedkiller Seed Urea Chemical
fertilizer
Chichicaste
<1-5 1.98 2.1 123 19
5-50 1.84 9.7 127 43
50+ 2.2 17 130 108
Group LC 1.4 15.6 75 0
Group NC 1.76 13.2 88 58
<1-5 1.56 13.3 130 13
5-50 1.13 10.7 130 16
50+ 1.78 19.8 152 87
Group CL 1.95 18.2 130 0
Group EE 2.6 16.25 130 0
The experience o f the Quita Sueno groups suggests that credit acted to  influence 
decisions about which crops to  grow as well as reinforcing the use o f commodities in 
production. In spite o f  the PRODESBA report's critique o f the technological 
packages, farmers receiving credit were expected to  improve their techniques of 
production by using m œ e (purchased) technical inputs. As with all farmers interviewed 
in Chichicaste and Jutiapa in El Parafso, the groups in Quita Sueno generally used 
herbicides and fertilizers in maize production, with a high frequency o f using chemical 
fa tilize rs  as well as urea com pared with farmers in Jamastrân (see Table 8.8). In the 
year o f  interview, there was also a greater tendency to  select seed from  harvests than 
am ong the Jam astrân groups^^. A t least three o f the Quita Sueno groups had bought 
oxen with their credit and m ost, if not all, groups hired the use o f tractors for at least 
part o f  their ploughing. The resulting yields from  these techniques were generally
These might have been idiosyncratic data. Groups might have bought seed for the year prior to 
the selection year - alternating between bought and selected seed was quite common. However, 
groups regular selection o f seed might have accounted for the apparently low incidence of mak 
muerto in this region.
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considerably higher than those achieved among the groups in Chichicaste and Jutiapa 
(compare the data in Table 8.9 with those in Table 8.11 below). The yields suggest 
that ground fertility was higher in the Valley of Quimistân than in the Valley of 
Jamastrân. In addition, information from interviews indicated that there was apparently 
no problem with mafz muerto.
Table 8.8 Agricultural input use by 10 collectively-organized groups interviewed in Quita Sueno, 
primera 1987-88 (number o f groups)
Ir^ut Owned now or 
selected
Hired or 
purchased in 
1987-88
Not used Incomplete data
Seed 7 1 3
Weedkiller 10
Urea 10
CherrUcal
fertilizers
8 2
Insecticides 1 3 6
Oxen 3 1 1 5
Tractor 8 2
Table 8.9 Average maize yields by type o f ground reported among groups interviewed in Quita
Sueno, primera 1987-88
Hillsides without 
fertilizers
Hillsides with 
fertilizers
Flat land without 
fertilizers
Flat land with 
fertilizers
Average yield 
(MTIHa) 1.8 3.3 3.4 4.3
As well as inducing the use of particular technologies in maize production, credit 
relations might also affect overall work organization and cropping patterns. The credit 
offered to the Quita Sueno groups from PRODESBA seems to have been short-lived. 
Six of the 7 groups who stated having received credit had only benefited fiom it for one 
year, and the other for two. Some groups said they had fallen into debt. However, the 
groups had access to other sources of credit outside PRODESBA, especially those run 
by the church (Table 8.5). This part of Santa Bârbara and the neighbouring community 
of Macuelizo had an active Catholic Church with a programme of supporting grass-
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roots projects. In addition, the Mennonite Church ran a social programme which also 
provided credit. Credit received fiom these sources tended to be towards diversifying 
crop production and thus was also directed to vegetables or other marketable crops 
such as tomatoes. These credit schemes affected groups' decisions about what to 
produce and how to use collective plots. For «tangle, one group stated that their 
tomato patch (financed by church credit) had now become their only collective plot. 
All maize was to be produced individually. Another group, which also only had a very 
small collective plot (2 Has), had received credit from the Mennonites for three years. 
This group claimed that the Mennonites tended to promote individual rather than 
collective work.
(Ü) Making a net cash income from maize
Li estimating groups' net cash income fiom maize production, the same qualifications 
and caveats ^ply to calculating costs and net incomes as for individual farmers (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2). However, making estimates for groups was even more 
difficult than for individual fanners because of the combination of collective and 
individual maize plots. The data analysed below focus on what the groups considered 
their collective domain ratha* than on individual farmers' plots. Collective plots, or 
areas assigned for collective use and benefit, and collective sales, were the main sources 
of cash income for the groups, as well as the productive activities for which they could 
justify their credit applicatitms, even if they involved individually-allocated plots of land 
and division of proceeds between individuals and the group as in the case of group EE 
in Jutiapa. In genial, it was difficult to estimate whether groups would be able to 
make further maize sales fipom their harvests, or calculate the quantities of maize that
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might have had to be purchased to meet ctmsunq)ti(xi needs during the yearM Thus 
my estimates below are based on (a) cost estimates which include inputs, any wage 
labour, and interest on cash loans, and (b) maize sales made up to the point of 
interview.
As I did not collect detailed quantitative data on costs and sales for groups in both 
regions, I focus primarily on the evidence fiom Chichicaste and Jutiapa. I show the 
estimates I calculated for net cash income per hectare and net cash income per member 
(effectively, per household). These data are compared with the model drawn up tty the 
DRI for groups' production of maize with credit, and with the mean and median 
incomes of individual farmers.
Considering net income alone, I would classify the two Jutiapa groups as 
'commercializing' (especially as tiiey were making a positive net income and not doing 
wage work for others) and the two Chichicaste groups as 'struggling*. Looking at the 
left side of Table 8.10, my estimates show that three groups had a positive net income 
fiom maize. The two Jutiapa groups made a positive net income per hectare and an 
even higher net income per member, with the cooperative, EE, making considerably 
nune per monber than the othw group. Although the coopo-ative was a long- 
established and relatively wealtiiy group, these data should be treated with some 
caution because it was difficult to estimate the costs of running their own equipment 
The tiiird group with a positive net incmne (LC) was the most recently-established 
group of the four. For this group, net inctnne was very low. In fact, this group barely 
broke even, had sold most of the maize it produced and had a consumption deficit Its
Although group members were generally entitled to dispose o f their awn maize as they wished (or 
needed) to (includmg sale), member^ own p h ts were assumed to be for household consumption and 
personal subsistence needs. However, there were indications from interviews that some individual 
households had diffkidty meeting their consumption needs.
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costs o f production were much low er than for other groups, but equally, it had lower 
yields (see Table 8.11 below); furtherm ore part o f its maize was unavailable either for 
consum ption o r sale because o f its pre-harvest debt. The second Chichicaste group 
(NC) had a substantial negative net income. That they had combined pre-harvest sales 
w ith formal credit also suggests that the group was in a financial pickle. In interviews, 
this group indicated that it had internal problems which were affecting its productive 
activities.
The tw o struggling groups in Chichicaste were how ever in different positions. The 
overall resource base o f the negative net income group, NC, was stronger than the 
o ther group's. N C was longer-established, received institutional credit and had 
diversified its productive activities into plantains as well as grains. The problems faced 
by this group w ere organizational as well as economic, whereas for the group, LC, its 
lim ited capacities to use its land were apparent
Table 8.10 Net income from maize production estimated for groups interviewed in Chichicaste and 
Jutiapa, primera 1986-87, and net income of equivalent farm model designed by the DRI
Groups interviewed Project model**
Group Costs*
ofprodn.
LpslHa
Value of 
sales 
LpslHa
Net 
income 
per Ha 
Lps
Net
income
per
member
Lps
Costs*
of
prodn.
LpslHa
Value of 
sales 
LpslHa
Net 
income 
per Ha 
Lps
Net
income
per
member
Lps
Chichicaste
895 915 20 55
LC 312 328 16 19
NC 553 308 -245 -360
Jutiapa
CL 536 992 456 842
EE 420 774 354 1446
* including interest on loans 
** Source: MRN, 1984,133-134
That there were differences betw een the two villages is not in itself significant except in 
the sense that Jutiapa was generally a m ore prosperous area with better land for 
cultivation than Chichicaste, as discussed in earlier chapters. The land available to the
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Chichicaste groups was classified as undulating, while the Jutiapa groups had flat 
ground. Yields among the Jutiapa groups were higher than those of the groups in 
Chichicaste (see Table 8.11), those of the group, LC, being particularly low, partly 
explained by differences in technology use (see Table 8.7 above). However, as 
important were the specific conditions of production and exchange of the different 
groups which had enabled them to invest money and labour in maize in different ways, 
as well as processes such as the internal dynamics and strategies of the groups, and 
factors such as length of time that members had been working together. Thus, at the 
one extreme was the struggling and recently-established group, LC, financing maize 
production through pre-harvest sales and wage work and using relatively basic 
technologies compared with other groups. At the other, was the cooperative EE, long 
enough established for the children of the miginal members to be running it, receiving 
credit from BANADESA for relatively mechanized production, combining both 
individual and joint responsibility for output
Table 8.11 Maize yields for collective plots among groups interviewed in Chichicaste and Jiaiapa,
primera 1986-87
Group Yield (MTIHa)
LC 1.2
NC 2.2
CL 2.3
EE 3.3*
* Average for all members o f the group
It is again insmictive to compare my estimates for the groups with the data used for the 
DRI's farm noodel for groups or cooperatives (right side of Table 8.10) with the caveats 
about different calculations for labour costs made in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3. The 
model used for groups or cooperatives assumed the cultivation of 54 Has of maize with 
technologies and techniques of production financed by credit fiom the DRI, and a 
group membership of 20 (MRN, 1984, 133-134). Coincidentally, the average area
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sown for the four groups I interviewed was 56 Has, also with an average membership 
of 20.
Again the costs of production assumed in the model were considerably higher than 
those estimated for the interviewed groups, as was the value of sales. In addition to 
putting a cash value on all labour used, the estimated costs probably anticipated a 
higher use of technical inputs and hire of machinery than used Ity the groups that I 
interviewed, while the sales were based on assumed yields of 3.2 MT/Ha, whereas only 
one of the groups that I interviewed achieved tiiis level (see Table 8.11 above). 
However, the net incmne per hectare and per monber calculated by the DRI did not 
foresee the range of net incmnes estimated fiom the data given tty the interviewed 
groups. In fact, as in the models for individual farmers, it was estimated that groups 
would potentially earn very little net income from maize. The assumption behind the 
group model was, again, that farming would be diversified with the use of credit, and 
that maize and beans crops would be cornbined with high value crops such as fruit and 
vegetables (which were estimated as bringing a net return of about Lps2-3,000/Ha). 
Nevotheless, the overall net inccane per manber for all cropping activities would tmly 
be Lps1,052 according to the DRI (ibid, 134) - less than I estimated for a rural 
labourer in permanent wage work (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3).
There are several points arising from this comparison. First, as concluded in Chapter 6, 
there were apparentiy considerable discrq>ancies between models and realities. 
Second, it was clear that agronomists considered maize a low income activity, even 
though groups were bong encouraged to plant a substantial area of land with maize, hr 
part, the model reflected assumptitms about the markets for agricultural products in 
Honduras: the high demand for maize compared with fruit and vegetables, and the 
relatively high value of finit and vegetables compared with maize. Thus large marketed 
surpluses for maize were needed, whereas only limited quantities of finit and vegetables
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could be absorbed by the market^  ^(a point also made by Goud in his discussion of the 
risks faced by commercializing groups who produced fruit crops [Goud, 1986,71]).
How did the groups' ctq)acities to make a net income from maize compare with 
individual farmers'? On this occasion, I compared the estimated average net incomes 
for classes, as opposed to farm size groups, of individual farmers (as summarized in 
Table 7.5 at the end of Chapter 7) with average net income per group member. 
Making this comparison for the groups as a whole shows that group members did 
considerably better on average than semi-proletarian farmers (who had negative net 
incomes fiom maize) although not as well as petty commodity producers (Table 8.12). 
Comparing the net incomes of individual farmers with only the struggling and 
commercializing groups shows struggling groups doing as badly as semi-proletarian 
farmers and commercializing groups doing considerably better than petty commodity 
producers, although the net incomes for the former may be somewhat inflated by the 
underestimation of one group's costs. Nevertheless, making this comparison indicates 
the variable nature of income from collectively-organized maize and the differences 
between groups.
Table 8.12 Average net incomes (means and medians) o f individual farmers by class (both villages) 
and members o f collective groups* interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farmers Mean net income (Lps) Median net income (Lps)
Semi-proletarian -104 -181
Petty commodity 802 767
Commercial 5,613 4.850
A ll group members 495 448
Struggling group members -171 -171
CommercUdidng group 
members
1114 1114
* Interest on loans was taken into account
Furthermore, fruit and vegetables are higMy perishable compared with maize, and adequate 
storage was certainly not generally available in the 1980s. Problems in marketing fruit and 
vegeudfles have been documented by HU. 1985.
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What did these net income stories imply for loan repayment? One group had made pre- 
harvest sales and repaid its debts with maize. The other three had institutional loans. 
The group, NC, which had a negative net inctxne had not been able to repay its loan to 
the DRI and had not been offered further credit at the time of fieldwork. Both the 
Jutiapa groups had taken out substantial loans to finance maize production which, 
according to my estimates, were just covered by their harvest maize sales, but only 
barely in one case. Both groups had been able to repay their loans (one to the DRI and 
the other to BANADESA) and were expecting to receive further credit.
The narrow margins between income from harvest sales and loans for these two groups 
suggests that they were given finance according to models of production rather than 
their actual circumstances. Goud's study reinforces this point. He pointed out that 
financial plans for making loans to groups were based on packages that had been 
prepared beforehand by banks and that loans did not always correspond to needs 
(Goud, 1986, 123). He also suggested that 'in many cases, credit is considered [by 
groups] more as an institutional subsidy rather than operating capital: the systematic 
financing of labour [included in the budget plans] reinforces this attitude' (op cit; my 
translation). It was certainly apparent fiom my interviews with the groups that the 
institutional credit they received exceeded their estimated costs of production (which 
did not include costings for their own labour). One Jutiapa group clearly stated that it 
had not needed all the loan allocated to it by the DRI.
Thus the abilities of the four collective groups in Jamastrân to make an income from 
maize were similar in some respects to the experiences of both semi-proletarian and 
petty commodity producers. It was possible but risky for groups to make positive net 
incomes finom maize, and to repay their debts, but the process could also be precarious 
and left two of the groups in financial difficulties (one more seriously than the other). 
Furthermore, these groups were as dependent as individual farmers on continuing
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finance to reproduce maize production, whether from institutional credit or more 
personalized sources.
I did not collect detailed data on income and debt stories for the Quita Sueno groups. 
The different sources of institutional credit available to the Quita Sueno groups allowed 
them to manage and negotiate debt relations in a more flexible way than the groups in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa. However these different options could have other 
consequences such as potentially increasing differentiation within and between the 
groups. For exanq)le, credit from church sources allowed groups to diversify their 
productive activities, but some of these projects seemed to be associated with more 
individualized work practices. That group members sometimes had debts to settle with 
each other after harvest also indicates the existence of relative wealth within (and 
perhaps between) the groups.
I used estimates of overall costs of production made by 6 of the 10 groups interviewed, 
and calculated the value of sales using the prices they quoted and estimates of the 
quantities sold (which were made by the local cooperative which worked with the 
groups) to arrive at a guide to net cash inctxnes from maize production before any 
other debts were taken into account^^ (Table 8.13). Net incomes per hectare and per 
member compared favourably with average net incrxnes for the Jamastrân groups as a 
whole (Table 8.10) although they were not as high as those of petty commodity 
producers or of the commercializing groups in Jamastrân in most cases (Table 8.12). 
However, the net incomes for Quita Sueno groups would not have been so high if the 
cost of loans were taken into account.
In other words, costs did not include interest on loans.
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Table 8.13 Estimated net income from maize production by 6 groups interviewed in Quita Sueno,
primera 1987-88
Group Estinuaed costs o f 
producthn* 
LpslHa
Estimated value 
o f sales** 
LpslHa
Estimated net 
income LpslHa
Estimated net 
income 
Lpslmember
EM 430 1.037 607 567
FM 430 739 309 559
FI 500 940 440 684
BV 500 743 243 597
LL 640 1200 560 1494
AL 715 946 231 336
* Based on estimates per manzana by group; exclude interest on loans
** Based on estimated sales data from heal cooperative and prices cUed by groups
The data in Table 8.13 do not reveal the intonal social relations through which maize 
was reproduced in Quita Sueno. Fch* exanq>le, the group EM, which had the lowest 
costs of production, and had partially financed its productive activities as well as 
consumption fiom wage work, was stated to have outstanding debts. Yet this group 
did not apparently obtain the lowest net income fiom maize. By contrast, the group 
AL had set up a Inlliard parlour and employed wage wwkers in both collective and 
individual maize production. One consequence was that it had the highest costs of 
production and the lowest cash income fiom maize. Thus processes of differentiation 
in decisions about use of resources and in their outcomes were occurring among these 
groups, but are not revealed by data on net incomes fiom maize alone.
(iii) Summary and conclusions
This section has shown that although there was evidence that some groups still relied 
on personalized relations with landowners, to whom they made pre-harvest sales to 
finance maize production, most groups tried to obtain access to institutional credit. 
Only in one case were pre-harvest sales made as a group to finance collective maize 
production. However, the occasional use of pre-harvest sales among members of the 
Quita Sueno groups also suggests that individuals within groups could run into 
difficulties even if groups had strategies for maize farming which apparently made
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positive net incomes. These individual difficulties might have been cyclical and linked 
to otho: issues such as family size and the ability of individual plots to provide adequate 
maize for consumption and other needs.
In Table 8.1 at the beginning of this chapter, I characterized groups according to 
whether they were 'commercializing' or 'struggling'. The data on net incomes in this 
section reinforce the suggestion that the two Jutiapa groups could be classified, so far, 
as commercializing with respect to maize ^ oduction, while the two Chichicaste groups 
were in various conditions of struggling to reproduce maize. In the table, I suggested 
that one of these was closer to the ctmditions of semi-proletarian farmers while the 
other was in a similar position to many indebted petty commodity producers.
The experiences of the Quita Sueno groups also suggest that differentiation can occur 
between groups with similar conditions as well as within groups. Although at least 6 of 
the 10 groups appeared to make a positive net income from maize, it is difficult to 
categorize the sectorial as a whole as commercializing. The groups had rather insecure 
access to institutional credit for maize production and at least one group admitted to 
doing wage work, while others probably also did so. Groups were managmg to 
reproduce maize as well as market part of it, but rather precariously.
823 Managing consumption
A characteristic of many semi-proletarian famters and some petty commodity 
producers was that they could not retain enough maize for their own consumption 
needs. For semi-proletarian farmas, access to wage work was essential for survival 
while some petty commodity producers may have had opportunities to earn income 
from other crops or livestock, or in petty trading and artesanal activities.
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How much maize groups had been forced to sell to repay credit, and to what extent 
they able to balance their income or debts with maize consumption needs, were more 
difficult to establish than with individual farmers because of the combination of 
collectively-farmed areas and plots under individual control. I evaluate the positions of 
the Jamastrân groups as follows.
(i) The struggling grotq*, LC in Chichicaste, had had to hand over about a third of its 
harvest in repayment of its pre-harvest loan and seemed to have sold the rest At the 
time of interviewing (end of April), the group was having to buy maize for domestic 
consunqttion and therefore had a ctmsunqttion deficit which would have lasted until the 
beginning of the next harvest in September. This consunqttion deficit could only have 
been financed by the group's wage work. However, the group also hoped to obtain an 
institutional loan for tiie next season's maize which would have provided members with 
a consumption fund.
(ii) The second struggling group, NC in Chichicaste, which was also trying to 
commercialize its production, claimed to have lost 40% of its maize harvest because of 
matz muerto. Of the remaining harvest, 30% was handed over in repayment of pre­
harvest loans, and 38% was sold in the market. This group had a negative net income 
from harvest sales and an outstanding debt to the DRI, but had not sold all its outyut 
after harvest as the first group had. About 1 MT of maize per family had been left for 
domestic consumption. Although this was more than the notional yearly maize 
requirements^^, the group claimed it was going to have to buy maize before the next
Calculations o f the necessary basic diet suggest a minimum amount o f 83.6 Kgs o f maize per head 
per year (Menchû, 1982, quoted in SIECA, 1983,18). This amount is based on the components o f a 
minimum balanced diet. Many people in the rural areas do not eat such a diet. Thus it has been 
calculated that for the lowest income bracket in the rural areas, 92.71 Kgslheadlpa is the actual 
average level o f consumption (FAO, 1988,14). For the members o f these groups, maize and beans 
would have been the most important staples in the daily diet, and given their low levels o f income, I  
use the FAO figure, rounded to 93 Kgs. TMs does not differentiate for consumption by age or gender
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harvest. Thus the problem for this group was its outstanding debt: more maize would 
have to be sold to repay the loan from the DRI. Although members had kept back 
about 19 MTs of maize from their harvest, they would have had to sell about 18 MTs 
(or find the equivalent value elsewhere) to cover their estimated debts. Thus, this 
group would also appear to have had a ccxisumption deficit overall unless it had been 
able to finance its maize debts in other ways.
(iii) The first commercializing group, CL in Jutiapa, seemed to have managed its affairs 
well from an ideological perspective as well economically. The collective plot was 
used for commercial maize production and individual plots for domestic needs. The 
group had sold all its collectively produced maize and kept the output from individual 
plots for domestic consumption. Up to the year they were intoviewed, they had never 
had to use any of the collectively produced maize for consumption needs.
(iv) Finally, the second commercializing group, EE in Jutiapa, presented an even better 
outcome based on individually-managed plots. Sixty-six per cent of the harvest had 
been sold at harvest, leaving about 109 MT. This quantity was much more than needed 
for domestic consumption which meaned that the group had considerable maize in hand 
for further sales.
Combining the outcomes on income and consumption, I obtain the overall picture 
presented in Table 8.14. The two commercializing groups were viable on the three 
counts of credit repayment, net inccwne and adequate consumption. One group would 
be able to make extra income from further maize sales, and both would be able to
and shoidd be considered an overestimate. However, a certain amount o f maize is always kept for 
other expenditures and emergencies, and using this figure as a consumption estimate is not 
unreasonable. I  have assumed families to have an average o f 6 members in my calculations, a 
standard measure in Honduras in the 1980s.
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reproduce their maize production if they continued to obtain credit in future seasons 
(and everything indicated that they would). For the two struggling groups, resolving 
debts meant that they were forced to sell most of their maize harvests, as well as repay 
debts in kind in one case, and they would have had little or no income from maize, as 
well as insufficient maize for domestic consumption.
. Table 8.14 Chichicaste and Jutiapa: consumption, income and loan repayment outcomes among 
groups interviewed, primera 1986-87
Group Had enough 
maize for 
domestic 
consumption after 
sales
Made net income 
from maize
Could repay loans 
from harvest sales
Could make 
further maize 
sales
LC No Yes (just) n.a. No
NC At time of 
interview only
No No No
CL Yes Yes Yes n.d.
EE Yes Yes Yes Yes
n.a. = not applicable • this group repaid its pre-harvest loan with maize 
n.d. = no data
These consumption, inctxne and debt relations further confirm the differentiation of 
collectively-organized groups. On one hand, strategies for sustaining maize production 
included some of the exchange relations characteristic of semi-proletarian farmers; pre- 
harvest sales and wage work. On the other, groups experienced some of the problems 
and achievements of individual petty commodity producers. Institutional credit could 
be a risky strategy if other aspects of the group's survival were also at risk (for 
exarrqrle, lack of internal cohesion or political threats, as well as harvest losses). 
However, under more stable or established conditions, groups could also combine 
collective and individual work with institutional credit and 'in^roved' techniques of 
production to provide adequate quantities of maize for consumption needs and make a 
net cash income.
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To what extent was this differentiation evident among the Quita Sueho groups who had 
much more sim ilar conditions of production? I asked groups to evaluate their own 
consumption needs (gasto) and I compared their estimates with those for output and 
sales. Some groups indicated family sizes when they made their estimates. The data 
for 6 groups^^ showed that all but one would have been able to cover most of their 
consumption needs providing that they did not have to use the maize to cover other 
debts or emergencies (see Table 8.15). The margins between sufficiency and deficit 
were very narrow, as groups pointed out in interviews. For example, families with 
more than 5 or 6 people might have had insufBcient maize from their own plots to 
cover consumption rieeds (see the data for groups FI and AL in the table), and financial 
crises among all families might (xily be met by selling extra maize and creating a 
consumption deficit
Teible 8.15 Estimated yearly maize consumption needs for 6 groups interviewed in Quita Sueno,
primera 1987-88
Group Stated maize 
needs per 
household (Kgs)
Estimated maize 
retcdnedfor 
consumption 
(KgslHH)*
Consumption
bidance
Comments
EM 818 973 155 n.d.
FM 873 716 -157 n.d.
FI 818 960 142 Family of 5
2182 -1222 Family of 8
F2 1091 1136 45 n.d.
EC 818 848 30 n.d.
AL 909 992 83 Family of 4-5
1636 -644 One family of 11
n.d. = no data
* Estimated using overall production data provided by the local cooperative worldng with the groups
The other data were incon^lete.
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Hie data on consumption reveal a tricky area in managing group production and 
ctmsumption of maize. Collective plots were usually for commercial production and 
individual plots for domestic consumption and other domestic needs. However, the 
allocation of land between the two sets of plots could affect people's productive 
capacities and capacities to provide for consumption: what was optimal for group 
income might leave individual families in difficult circumstances and vice versa. In 
Edition, groups only seemed to be able to conqiensate for individual problems (for 
exanqile, differences in land availablity resulting from differential family or group size) 
by informal loans between members. However these problems were recognized by the 
groups. They had thus decided to set up a collective storage system for the sectorial 
from which groups and individuals would be able to buy back maize at reasonable 
prices as well as make further sales after the harvest period. Although differences 
existed between groups and individuals, there was still the political will to resolve these 
problems in a collective manner.
This and the previous section suggest that for many groups there was a fine borderline 
between (i) making a net income and indebtedness, and (ii) food security and food 
insecmity in maize. Their increased entitlements compared with those of semi- 
proletarian farmers, especially in access to land and potential and actual access to 
institutional credit, did not necessarily ensure food security in maize. Nevertheless, 
these different conditions of exchange under which land and finance were obtained did 
allow the possibility of irr^noving productive capacities: two Jamastrân groups had 
established maize production on an ectxiomically viable basis, providing they could 
continue to obtain credit on a seasonal basis, while the Quita Sueno groups were 
managing to survive and were planning projects on the basis of continued maize 
production in the future. In the face of adversity, collective organization could assist 
these groups to take joint action either to resolve internal problems or face external
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conflict Although collective organizaticxi was not a panacea for the food insecurity 
problems faced by semi-proletarian maize farmers, it had been able to improve the 
conditions of production and exchange for some.
82.4 Collective organization and prices
Among individu^ farmers, both semi-proletarian farmers and petty commodity 
producers were under pressure to sell their maize at harvest time to reimburse debts. 
For some semi-proletarian farmers, maize sales were linked to other exchanges over 
land, labour or agricultural inputs, as well as pre-harvest sales. Petty commodity 
producers were usually under pressure to repay their loans from the DRI. However, in 
general, it was observed that the longer farmers could hold on to their maize, the higher 
was the price they could obtain.
The experience of groups shows similar characteristics. As with individual farmers, 
groups had to sell their maize at harvest time to repay debts. Key questions are (i) 
whether groups, as collectively organized units  ^were able to obtain higher prices for 
m aize than individual semi-proletarian farmers and even petty commodity producers, 
and (ii) whether they were able to sell their m aize later than individual farmers (and 
thereby obtain higher prices). I can only make these comparisons for the groups and 
individuals in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, as I do not have data for individual farmers in 
the Quita Sueno area. I can, however, look at the time of sale for both sets of data, 
and in the case of the ()uita Sueno groups, I can make some comments about the 
impact of collective organization on pices received for maize.
To compare data in Chichicaste and Jutiapa, I have again used the classifications 
adopted at the end of Chapter 7 and compare price data for semi-proletarian farmers 
(SIT) and petty commodity producers (PCP) with those of the four groups. I make a 
comparison with (xily two classes of individual farmers because a key question about
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groups' capacities to reproduce maize was whether they were able to improve on their 
earlier conditions as semi-proletarian farmers. I have also excluded all pre-harvest 
sales, both by individual farmers and by groups. To sin^lify comparison of time of 
sale, I have attributed numbers to months: thus September (the first harvest month) = 
1, while March = 7.
The evidence suggests that, although the prices obtained by groups for maize fell within 
the general ranges of prices received by semi-proletarian and petty commodity 
producers as a whole (Table 8.16, Cblumn 3), group prices were nevertheless higher 
than the averages for semi-proletarian farmers in both villages and comparable to 
average prices received by petty commodity producers (Column 2). It is impossible 
from these data to know whether the higher prices obtained by the groups were due to 
their collective bargaining power with traders. One Jutiapa group obtained a 
particularly high price for its maize (Lps.44/Kg or Lps440/MT) with a relatively early 
sale (January, or month S - see Column 4). It is possible that this information was 
misreported, but the group had sold to a single trader with warehouses in the south of 
Honduras (while other groups sold to several traders) and might have been able to 
negotiate a special deal.^  ^ The sales data reported do however indicate that groups as 
a whole were able to make later maize sales than semi-proletarian farmers (Column 4). 
This suggests that the collective nature of their organization was able to withstand the 
pressures to make too early sales to repay debts, and that internal resources within the 
groups enabled them to cover other cash needs until sales were made.
This group’s history o f output market relations indicated a surprising awareness o f the importance 
o f negotiation. Members had established relations with the IHMA, with a cooperative which would 
buy maize, as well as with traders from the main market centres in the region o f Tegucigalpa and 
Choluteca.
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Table 8.16 Comparison o f prices received for maize and time o f harvest sales o f semi-proletarian 
farmers and petty commodity producers with collectively-organized groups interviewed in Chichicaste
and Jutiapa, primera 1986-87
Farmers
a )
Average price 
(LpslKg)
(2)
Price range 
received (LpslKg) 
(3)
Average time o f 
harvest sales 
(4)
Range o f times o f 
sale 
(5)
indm dual fa n m fs
SPF, Chichicaste .35 .30 - .39 4.7 3-5.5
SPF, Jutiapa .33 .33 2 2
PCP, Chichicaste .38 .33 - .44 5.7 5.5-6
PCP, Jutiapa .38 .28 - .44 5.5 4-6.5
..................................................
LC, Chichicaste .39 6
NC, Chichicaste .38 5.5
CL, Jutiapa .44 5
EE, Jutiapa .36 i.d.
i.d. = incomplete data
Analysing the data provided by the Quita Sueno groups adds some weight (although 
not conclusive) to the argum ent that collective organization m ight have been associated 
w ith obtaining higher prices. Given that the Quita Sueno groups had many similar 
conditions o f  production to  each other, but m ade different choices about how much 
land to  sow and harvest collectively, their sales experiences at harvest time can be 
com pared, in particular: w hether the size o f collective p lot was associated with prices 
received fo r maize; w hether time o f sale was the main factor affecting prices received; 
and w hether there w as any evidence that groups with larger collective plots were able 
to m ake later m aize sales.
I did no t have consistent information on these issues for all the 10 groups but was still 
able to  m ake some com parisons. First, there was a weak, positive correlation (with a 
coefficient o f  .42) betw een prices received for maize and the size o f collective plots 
(Figure 8.2). This w eak correlation is apparent on the basis o f data provided by 5 
groups, some o f  which m ade m ore than one harvest sale at different prices. Collective 
p lo t sizes ranged from  4.2 H as to  11.6 Has. Second, there was a strong positive 
correlation (w ith a  coeffient o f  .8) between price and time o f sale (Figure 8.3), which is
333
to be e?q)ected from the earlier analysis of data from individual maize farmers. The 
ç/myiatinn in Figuie 8.3 is based on data from 7 groups, again with more than one sale 
hfting tnartft at different times (and prices) ly  4 of the groups. Third, time of sale and 
size of collective plot were also weakly and positively correlated as shown by Figure
8.4 (the coefficient was .45). These data were reported by the same 5 groups as in 
Hguie 8.2 and some groups made more than one sale.
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What can be concluded from these data? As with individual farmers, if groups could 
hold on to their maize, they could obtain a higher price (Figure 8.3). Some groups 
adopted the strategy of selling part of their maize early to meet immediate debts and 
cash needs and storing the rest to obtain a higher price in February or March. From the 
interviews, there was no particular relationship between this strategy of double sales 
and the size of plot, although in general the size of plot did seem to have some weak 
association with the ability to make later sales (Figure 8.4). As with the groups in 
Chichicaste and Jutiapa, however, it is difficult to judge whether the size of collective 
plot is linked to the internal strength of the group, decisions to delay sales and/or the 
ability to bargain collectively with traders.
This brief analysis suggests that collectively-organized groups were able to obtain 
higher prices for maize than semi-proletarian farmers, and thus had improved on earlier 
exchange relations in this respect. The fact of collective organization, and the greater 
quantities of maize produced and sold on a collective basis, increased the possibility of 
delaying sales as well as potentially enhancing bargaining positions with traders. 
Although the groups that I interviewed had different ctq)acities for reproducing maize.
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these relatively higher jnices as well as increased collective control of production and 
distribution of output would have improved dteir food securi^ over that of semi- 
proletarian fanxKTS, if mily marginally in smne cases.
83  Conclusions
These case studies have shown that, through collective organization, the groups 
interviewed had generally broken with their semi-proletarian pasts and had established 
thanselves in maize production with varying degrees of collective and individual work, 
and varying capacities to produce and reproduce maize. The evidence of these groups 
also shows that reproducing maize was not solely dependent on commoditized 
exchange relations. Ntm-commoditized relations were evident in labour use, while 
pnstmalized relatitms characterized exchanges between group members (for example, 
in loans) as well as the more hierarchical exchanges smnetimes set up with local 
landowners. On one hand, groups expressed internal solidarity of a voluntary nature 
and, in many cases, tried to develop maize production on the basis of collective effort 
involving reciprocity of an equal rathor than hierarchical nature. On the oth» hand, 
some groups had consciously adopted an individualized tqrproach to organizing maize 
production, and some had developed oth* commercial activities which involved 
making money from exchanges with members of other groups.
Although the conditions of producing and reproducing maize by organized groups 
paralleled those of semi-proletarian and pet^ commodity producers in some respects, 
they also had some fundamental differences:
(i) more or less assured access to land (different from most semi-proletarian farmers)
(ii) political or ideological principles which guided internal organization as well as 
social relations witii outside individuals and agents
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(iii) collective «ganization leading to internal solidarity and cohesion
(iv) the possibility of taking joint action in relation to external forces.
Groups were, however, different from each other in their capacities to reproduce maize 
as well as adopting differrait production strategies. I have followed the analysis of 
Goud (1986) in classifying groups' reproductive capacities, although I have used my 
own terminology. Even so, as with any categories, groups do not necessarily fit neatly 
into a particular classification. Nevertheless, among the groups that I interviewed, it 
seemed that at least two (in Jutiapa) had partially consolidated their activities on a 
relatively secure financial footing and were able to sustain maize farming, make a cash 
income and provkle adequate maize for consumption, with the posribilify of continued 
access to credit to finance seascmal cash outlays. I have called these two groups 
'commerdaliring'. For the ranaining groups, reproducing maize was more or less 
precarious. The experience of the Quita Sueno groups was uneven: within the sectorial 
some were 'struggling' while others showed evidence of taking steps towards being 
commercializing groups. Hnally, the two Chichicaste groups were both 'struggling' but 
for diffaent reasons. Thus, while some struggling groups exhibited semi-proletarian 
characteristics by doing wage work to survive, others expaienced sim ilar pressures and 
difficulties in rqnoducing rmize to many petty commodity producers. This was largely 
because such groups who were attempting to commercialize their production with the 
help of institutiaial loans could easily become indebted through harvest failures or 
organizational and administrative problems.
As well as problems faced in reproducing maize, there were also signs of some 
differentiation among groups such as those in Quita Sueno, especially in decisions over 
land use and organization of work. Individualization of work practices seemed to be 
occurring in some groups. Furthermore, some groups had set up commercial activities
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within the sectorial, including small stores where members could exchange maize as 
well as cash for basic products such as soap or salt. The question is whether these 
were enterprising initiatives from which all could benefit, or whether they would 
become a source of gaining differential wealth and control over resources. Differential 
wealth was already evident in that members of groups could make loans to each other 
and, while little is known of the terms of such loans, they might ultimately prove 
divisive.
These diverse experiences suggest that it is difficult in practice to make direct 
comparisons either between the struggling and semi-proletarian categories, or the 
commercializing and petty commodity produciiig categories. However, although none 
of the groups could be said to be experiencing 'secure stagnation' in the same sense as 
semi-proletarian farmers, 'insecure transformation' characterized the production and 
reproduction strategies of many of the groups interviewed.
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Ch apter9
MAIZE MARKETS AND MAIZE PRODUCTION 
Introduction
Although output markets are one of the end points in a chain of exchanges for maize 
farmers, they have a special significance in the reproduction of maize production and 
consumption. First, the reproduction of cmnmoditized maize production requires, and 
is based on, the existence of maize markets to recuperate costs and continue the 
production cycle. Second, markets are the main mechanism through which waged 
consumers, non-maize producing farmers and deficit maize farmers gain access to 
maize .^ How maize markets function is therefore an essential part of understanding the 
reproduction of maize as a whole.
As pointed out in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3), an area of debate not given much 
consideration in the literature on Honduras in the 1980s was the social relations 
through which markets function, and the social hierarchies and power relations which 
might affect the nature of market transactions. My analysis focuses on these issues and 
asks the questions: (i) how did the organizatitm and operation of maize msurkets affect 
maize farmers in the 1980s, in particular the food security of semi-proletarian farmers 
and vulnerable petty commodity producers? (ii) did maize trade, which functions within 
a cash economy, also exhibit some of the personalized charac^sdcs present in maize 
production?
Other mechanism include personal exchanges between relatives, donations and food for work.
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I argue that, as in production, social relations in maize markets in the 1980s were 
highfy conmxxiitized but poscmalized relations were an integral part of the 
commoditization of maize output and helped to secure traders' profits. Although there 
was little evidence that oligopolies or monopolies existed natimtally in maize markets, 
control ova: certain types of local maize market was apparent and could affect farmers. 
Thus, although I concur with other writers on Honduras (for example, Pollard et al, 
1984; Lcnia and Cuevas. 1984; IRI, 1985) that maize markets were competitive, I 
argue that personalized relatiors also affected the workings of some markets and 
certain types of exchange. Aloig with much of the recent literature on markets, this 
coidusion «rntests the notion that corrmoditization is a linear, inqrersonalmng 
process. While there was considerable fluidity in these relations, personalized relations 
enabled the flow and turnover of maize between different types of trader, allowed some 
degree of collusion when deârmble for traders, permitted pre-harvest purchases and tied 
transactions in local areas, and secured services and contracts from others engaged in 
maize trade.
In Honduras, these relatimrs existed in markets whose participants were differentiated - 
largely by wealth, and, to a certain extent, Ity task - and in relation to a highly 
differentiated farming sector. Thus, although I agree with the literature on Honduras 
titat There is a marked absence of intricate networks of commission agents, sub-agents, 
financiers, and merchant traders cmnmon in other parts of the world' (IRI, 1985, 252), 
'informal networks' referred to by the same authors (op cit) not only played an 
important role in the operation of maize trade, but could have differential effects for 
participants.
In this chapter, I adopt a notion of markets which are structured Ity social relations, 
including social hierarchies and power, ideas raised Ity Bhaduri and Bharadwaj (1983, 
1985) and also discussed in much of the recent literature (for example, Hewitt de
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Alcântara, 1993; Mackintosh, 1990; White, 1993). Mackintosh usefully distinguishes 
between meanings of 'the market' which are often embedded in studies such as those 
carried out by the World Bank: the market as a process of buying and selling 
(associated with an ideological stance based on private property), different markets as 
abstract models of buying and selling, and markets as sets of institutions and ways of 
buying and selling (1990, 46-47). In this chapter, I am predominantly concerned with 
markets and their effects on farmers as in the third meaning, while looking at the 
implications for understanding maize markets (second meaning) and the role of the 
market more generally (first meaning). This follows Hewitt's notion that 'markets are 
culturally and politically specific institutions' (1993, 3). She points out that social 
hierarchies and relations of subordination in rural economies in the Third World mean 
that "private trade is [not] necessarily synonymous with free markets' {ibid, 6) and that 
therefore one cannot refer to markets as if they constituted a 'single exchange 
environment' {ibid, 7). These ideas do not deny that markets provide the institutional 
settings for the exchange of comnxxlities, but they do suggest that commodity 
exchange is affected by the different social relations and hierarchies in which it takes 
place, and will therefore benefit some participants more than others.
The chapter first describes the context of Honduran maize markets, in Section 9.1. 
Section 9.2 looks at farmer-trader relations, the social relations of price setting and 
some of their implications. In Section 9.3,1 analyse the profitability of m aize trade and 
the differential wealth of traders. Hnally, Section 9.4 analyses the relationship between 
differentiation and personalized processes of exchange in some of the mechanisms for 
securing profits from trade.
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9.1 Types of market^  trading worUb and terminologies
The growing and differentiated demand for marketed maize in Honduras has increased 
opportunities for making profits from trade. There are different markets for maize and 
different kinds of participants in those markets making money from transporting, 
storage, buying and selling. This section outlines the most important processes, 
necessary background for Sections 9.2-9.4.
9.1.1 Types of market
The weight of maize in low income diets was important for maize traders in the 1980s. 
In rural areas, maize was probably the only staple which was accessible (in financial 
terms) as well as available ,^ although sorghum was eaten in some areas (and cassava in 
some coastal parts). In urban areas, the use of wheat flour had grown (see Table 9.1) 
but the continuing high consumption of maize, particularly among low income groups, 
indicated that it was the cheaper food (as well as the customarily preferred one among 
many people). For traders (and farmers with surpluses), this meant that, in principle, 
Aere was a constant and ready market for maize.
Ttdfle 9.1 Per capita consumption o f food grains in urban and rural areas, 1967-68 and 1978-79
(Kgslyear)
1967-68 1978-79
Food Urban areas Rural areas Urban areas Rural areas
Maize 79 75 56 85
Rice 9 4 16 12
Wheat bread - - 12 3
Sorghum 3 9 1 10
Source: Johnson, 1988,242, Table 95 (data from IHMAICEE, 1981)
2 In times o f hunger or severe incapacity to obtedn food, ‘tortillas con saT (often mixed with 
sorghum) were sometimes the only food.
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However, although the demand for m aize is widespread across Honduras, it is also 
responsive to changes in income. On one hand, the limited purchasing power of low 
income people can potentially put a ceiling on demand, particularly if maize prices rise 
relative to income or wages. On the other hand, Honduran economists have calculated 
that maize has a negative income elasticity, and is quickly substituted (by rice or wheat) 
if and when incomes rise (Aguirre and Tablada, 1988,12 and Table 1.13).
In spite of its income elasticity, the social factors involved in maize consumption (such 
as availability and preferred diet), the generally limited purchasing power in relation to 
other grains of many maize consumers, as well as the existence of maize deficit farmers 
and other demand for maize in rural areas, continued to make maize a highly 
marketable commodity for personal consumption in the 1980s. Among traders 
interviewed in Danlf and San Pedro Sula, several indicated that, of all the goods that 
they sold, maize was their most important source of daily earnings. San Pedro Sula 
traders, in particular, reported a tremendous expansion in market activity over the 
previous twenty years (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3).
Another important component of demand in the 1970s and 1980s was from industry.^ 
In the mid-1980s, there were four main types of industrial processing using maize as a 
key input: animal feeds, maize flour for domestic use, packaged maize snacks, and the 
production of starch. Within the industrial sector, the growth in production of animal 
feeds was the principal source of demand for maize. Although there were several 
companies producing animal feeds, a high proportion of the demand for maize was
^ National statistical sources suggested that industry accounted for 20-30% o f total demand in the 
1980s.
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concentrated in one firm. Interviewing the manager of this conq)any revealed that its 
activities had grown at 10-15% per annum from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.^
Part of the expansion of maize markets was because of population increase, and within 
that, a growing waged and informal sector in rural as well as urban areas which needed 
to buy maize. There were also non-maize producing farmers (and their workers) who 
bought maize. For example, in El Parafso, coffee farmers were an important 
component of rural demand, larger coffee farmers sometimes establishing contractual 
deals with local traders, and even becoming involved in m aize trade themselves. There 
was also local circulation of maize in rural areas, directly between farmers and between 
farmers and traders. As well as obtaining maize firom local traders, deficit maize 
farmers might buy maize fiom neighbours or landlords, or be lent or given it by 
relatives.
9.12 Trading worlds and terminologies
The analysis and argument in Sections 9.2-9.4 is based on information from interviews 
with traders in Danlf, El Parafso (1987), in the industrial city of San Pedro Sula in the 
department of Cortés in Northern Honduras (1988), and fix>m the interviews with 
individual and collective farmers as well as data fix>m secondary sources. Danlf was the 
main market centre for El Parafso and for the fanners in the Jamastrân Valley. All 
maize leaving the valley, whether destined for the Danlf market or for Anther afield, 
had to be transported through Danlf. San Pedro Sula was the main site for the maize 
trade in the high output areas of the northern regions. It was also the main (but not 
(xily) market centre for maize grown in the Quita Sueno area of Santa Barbara. There
^ The firm obtained substantial amounts o f maize from imports and also used sorghum as a maize 
substitute when necessary.
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were several market places in San Pedro Sula compared with a single one in Danlf. 
Traders supplied maize to deficit areas of Honduras and many of the companies which 
bought maize for industrial purposes woo located in or near San Pedro Sula.
As well as having different positions in maize trade in terms of geography and size of 
market, thoe were differences between the traders interviewed in the two locations. In 
both places, 1 intoviewed traders with fixed positions in the market place, most of 
whom were wholesalers. In Danlf, many of these traders were women who had been 
engaged in some form of business for most of their lives, while in San Pedro Sula the 
majority were men, many from humble origins in the countryside. In Danlf, the 
rdatively small size of the market meant that nâany tradors combined retailing with 
wholesaling of grains as well as other goods. In San Pedro Sula, there was a clear 
division of labour between wholesaling and retailing. However, maize wholesalers also 
traded other goods as well as grains. Many had contracts with local con^anies to store 
and supply large quantities of tins and packaged goods to retailers.
The relatively rural nature of Danlf compared with the urban conglomeration of San 
Pedro Sula resulted in othw differoices. Large wholesalers in Danlf had dieir own 
tranqtort (trucks) to collect maize fiom farmers or to take it to Tegucigalpa, whereas 
San Pedro Sula wholesales relied almost oitirely on indqtendent truckers 
{transport^tas). Because of the quantities of maize that they bought and sold, some 
San Pedro Sula traders also obtained bank credit and used commercial warehouses for 
storing maize. This appeared not to happen in the mid-1980s in Danlf, although local 
bank officials were trying to encourage the larger wholesalers thoe to do the same. 
These general characteristics and differences are summarized in Table 9.2.
345
Table 92  General characteristics ofDanll and San Pedro Sula traders interviewed, 19S7 and 19SS
General characteristics Danlt traders San Pedro Sula traders
Wholesaled all goods No Yes
Wholesaled maize Yes Yes
Retailed maize Yes No
Large local market No Yes
Supplied maize outside area Yes Yes
Own bansport for collecting 
maize
Among large traders Generally no
Bought maize from itmerant 
traders and truckers
Yes Yes
Used commercial storage 
(’deposits’)
Genoally no Some did
Had bank accounts and kept 
internal financial records
One or two More common ^
Used bank credit Possibly one or two Some did
There are many layers and functions within maize trade, some of which relate to 
seasonal changes in the markets, and others to the types of market in which traders ' 
work. The overl^ping divisions of labour in maize trade and maize flows have been 
documented by marketing studies as early as 1976 (Luna Morân) and in the 1980s ly . 
the IRI Research Institute (1985) and others. The following description combines the 
information from these studies with that provided in interviews with traders, 
industrialists and IHMA^ poronnel.
The sirrçlest pattern is that a trucker or itinerant trader (see Table 9.3) buys maiTP 
fiom the producer, then sells it to a wholesaler who sells it to a retailer. Some large 
farmers and collectively-organized groups or cooperatives sell directly to the IHMA, 
and some truckers and other t^ e r s  also supply the IHMA as well as industry (the 
main animal feeds company is said to be supplied largely by itinerant traders). In 
villages, there may also be juntadores who are usually large maize farmers and/or 
traders, and who buy maize from other local farmers to sell further to other traders.
^  Jnstituto Hondureno de Mercadeo Agricola or Honduran marketing board.
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Table 93  Trader terminology
Honduran term Termluse Functions
JuntadoHes) Juntador(es) Local traders who buy maize 
firom producers and sell it 
further, to itinerant traders, 
wholesalers, the IHMA or 
industry.
Transportistas, camioneros 
(’coyotes’)
Truckers Own their own trucks/lorries but 
no capital; transport maize for 
payment of transport costs (per 
sack).
Comerciantes (’coyotes’) Itinerant traders Traders who may or may not 
have own transport but have 
cash; buy maize &om farmers or 
other traders to sell to 
wholesales or industry (or the 
IHMA).
Condsionistas (’coyotes’) Comisionistas Have no cash or transport; may 
go with itinerant trader or 
wholesaler to look for maize, or 
link up wholesalers, itinerant 
traders and truckers in the 
market place; get paid 
commission.
Mayoristas, bodegueros Wholesalers or traders Have cash or credit, and storage; 
may have transport; buy maize 
and wholesale it to retailes or 
industry; may buy maize directly 
fiom producers, juntadores or 
itinerant traders. May also buy 
firom the IHMA.
Minoristas, detallistas Retailers Buy maize fiom wholesalers 
and/w producers, Juntadores, 
itinerant traders and the IHMA; 
retail maize in relatively small 
amounts to consumers.
Itinerant traders and wholesalers may be the same people. Wholesalers can also hire 
independent truckers to buy or fetch maize. Truckers, who usually only have transport 
but no capital, may also travel accompanied by another trader who has capital but no 
transport or storage, or by a comisionista (see Table 9.3). If the second trader is not a 
wholesaler, he or she buys maize and then looks for a purchaser - a wholesaler or an 
industrial company. A comisionista offers to find buyers and sellers and receives a 
commision. San Pedro Sula traders reported that comisionistas operated in the market
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place to 'match' itinerant traders and truckers with wholesalers. Itinerant traders, 
truckers and comisiomstas are often called coyotes - a pejorative name given to a 
trader who roams the countryside looking to buy maize as cheaply as possible.
There are thus many possibilities for differentiation between locations and types of 
market for maize, as well as between traders, and many opportunities for overlapping 
functions and flexible responses. Traders can put their ctq}ital or assets into different 
activities depending on seasons and market possibilities, a difficult and often impossible 
task for farmers. The question is what the links are between the dynamics of different 
market places and markets for maize (rural, urban, industrial), how exchange of 
commodities takes place between the different types of trader operating in these market 
places and markets, and how different types of maize farmers are affected by these 
processes. Below I focus on selected aspects, relating them to Honduran and other 
debates.
92 Farmers* interaction with markets and prices
Price changes and their effects comprise one of the most frequently addressed areas of 
analysis in the Honduran litoature on maize and other grain markets.^ In this section I
^ Studies have taken place to establish the elasticity o f demand and supply o f grains (Aguirre, 1988; 
Aguirre and Tablada, 1988), determine whether prices show evidence o f inefficiency in allocation of 
resources (Aguirre and Tablada, 1989; Hanrahan, 1983; Quezada and Scobie, n.d.), ascertain who 
actually benefits from price differentials and changes (Hanrahan, 1983; Pollard et al, 1984), and 
establish whether state intervention through the IHMA's guaranteed price and stabilizcaion 
programme actually has positive iffects for producers and consumers (Economic Perspectives, 1986; 
Hanrahan, 1983; IRI, 1985; Loria and Cuevas, 1984; Pollard et al, 1984). Conclusions from these 
studies include that: (i) there is both inefficiency and efficiency in the allocation o f resources in maize 
production; (ii) farmers obtain between 50 and 60% o f the final maize price (although there is some 
debate about whether this position is deteriorating or not, and whether 50-60% is an adequate 
percentage or not); (iii) price intervention by the IHMA has generally protected urban consumers 
from sharp price rises, but mainly benefited large farmers and possibly traders, while small farmers 
have not gained; some analysts have also argued that price intervention has impeded efficient 
(dlocation o f resources.
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argue that establishing prices involved different social processes in different markets 
and maiket places in which some participants boiefited more than others. Analysing 
these diffoences helps to e>q>lain how the food insecurity of semi-proletarian farmers 
and some petty commodity producers seem to have been reinforced by the operation of 
maize markets. It also suggests that the needs of diffoent types of farmer in the 1980s 
could not be met by a sin^e price policy which assumed uniform conditions of 
production and exchange.
92.1 Farmer-trader relations and prices in El Paraiso and Santa Bârbara
In analysing prices received by farmers in Chapters 7 and 8 ,1 established that there was 
a positive relationship between price and time of sale, and that time of sale tended to 
have some association with type of farmer. A further issue is whether prices were 
affected by farmers' relations with traders.
This issue was taken up in part by Lcnia and Cuevas (1984) who wanted to establish 
whetho* prices were soiding the wrong signals to basic grains farmers because national 
output had been stagnating in the early 1980s. They interviewed a cross-section of 
farmers and traders across the country, concentrating on high output areas and areas 
where there were many small' (up to 35 Has in their study) and medium' farmers (35- 
70 Has); large' farmers were described as having over 70 Has {ibid, 17). This study 
found that farmers made sales based on the best price that they were offered: the cmly 
or nearest buyos accounted for cmly 24% of sales in the case of maize. Loria and 
Cuevas concluded: 'acccnding to our results, price-conyetition seems to predominate in 
tire marketing of basic grains at the farm level' {ibid, 20).
Although tins study was much more extensive in its geographical sccqte than my own, it 
was unclear how many voy small maize faxmos woe intoviewed given the 
classificaticm of the farm size groups. Furthermore, although 24% nearest or only
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buyers may not appear a high figure overall, it could still indicate that particular 
communities - or types of farmer - were affected by monopolies or oligopolies in local 
markets. (Loria and Cuevas do not indicate which farmers were in the group that sold 
to nearest or only buyers.)
I cannot draw strong conclusions from my own data, but they raise some issues about 
the role of farmer-trader relations in establishing prices. If I compare type of farmer in 
both villages with the origins of traders to whom these farmers sold their maiyp 
(including pre-harvest sales), I find that just under half of semi-proletarian farmers 
(SPF) made sales to local purchasers (same village), and that the majority of petty 
commodity producers (PCP) and commercial farmers (CF) sold to traders fiom the 
market centres of Danlf, Tegucigalpa and Choluteca (Southern Honduras) (see Table 
9.4). The origin of maize purchasers is not significant in itself, except to suggest that 
the marketing networks of semi-proletarian farmers were relatively confined. 
However, relating prices received to origin of traders (where both sets of data are 
known) suggests that higher prices were paid by traders fiom the three market centres 
rather than local purchasers. In Table 9.5, I have shaded the area for price of 
Lps.34/Kg and above (Lps.34/Kg was the average price received by all SPF when pre­
harvest sales were removed). It can be seen that the shaded area comprises entirely 
sales made to trado's from outside the local villages.
Table 9.4 Origin o f maize purchasers by number o f sales and type o f farmer, among individual 
farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa. primera 1987-88
No. o f 
sales
Same
village
Nearby
village
Danlt Other in 
EF.
Teguci­
galpa
Cholu­
teca
No data
SPF 11 5 1 0 0 2 0 3
PCP 18 1 1 6 1 5 4 0
CF 10 0 0 3 2 4 1 0
All 39 6 2 9 3 11 5 3
EF. = El Paraiso
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Other interview  data provide an even m ore com plex picture o f the relationship between 
farm ers, purchasers and prices. First, no farm ers sold m aize to the IH M A  in the year o f 
interview, irrespective o f  price, size o f farm  o r receipt o f  institutional credit. (I return 
to this point.) Second, many farm ers knew  the traders they sold their maize to, even if 
they w ere not local. H ow ever, although a few farmers stated that they always sold to  
the same trader, m ost seem ed to  m ake decisions about sales from  season to  season. 
This inform ation concurs with Loria and Cuevas's view that few  sales were actually 
fixed beforehand: they concluded that although traders often bought maize in the same 
geographical areas and from  the same farmers, com petition between traders was 
sufficient to prevent clientilism  and price-fixing {ibid, 36).
Table 9 5  Prices received by individual maize farmers interviewed in Chichicaste and Jutiapa and 
origins o f  purchasers (where known), primera 1987-88
Lps/Kg Same
village
Nearby
village
Danli Other in El 
Paraiso
Tegucigalpa Choluteca
.17 3
.22 1
.28 1
.30 1 1
.32 1
.33 1 2 2
.34 Î
.35 1 Î
.36 1
.37
.38 1 1
.39 Î 1
.40 2
.41 1
.42 Î
.44 1 1 a
.46 1
Third, how ever, there were m any interconnections between farm ing and trading in local 
comm unities, including betw een Danlf and the villages. The following profiles o f some
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of the local purchasers of maize, most of whom bought maize fiom a number of the
farmers interviewed, support this view:
Wife of local commercial maize farmer, Chichicaste: bought maize fiom 
local farmers, including pre-harvest purchases.
Itinerant trader fiom Chichicaste: had a truck and bought and sold maize 
in Chichicaste; also sold maize in Tegucigalpa; reputed to deal in pre- 
harvest purchases; also had a house in Danlf.
Farmer/trader fix>m Chichicaste: had land in Chichicaste and house in 
Danlf; sowed grain and had cattle; had truck and warehouse.
Commercial farmer, Chichicaste: made pre-harvest purchases.
Farmer/trader, Jutiapa: cattle and grain farmer, bought maize at harvest 
time; possibly largest trader in Jutiapa; had reputation for making pre- 
harvest purchases.
Local merchant and trucker, Jutiapa: had store and cafe; had truck and 
bought grain locally to sell in outlying communities and Danlf.
Farmer/trader, Jutiapa: sowed maize; bought and sold maize on a small 
scale in his own house.
On one hand, these activities could result in many possitnlities for agreements between 
farmers and traders, and therefore conqietition.^ On the other hand, it was apparent 
that commercial maize farmers often engaged in trade, mainly as local juntadores who 
sold further to itinaant traders, wholesales or industry. It was thus important for 
Juntadores to make sure that prices tiiey paid to local farmers were lowe than those 
they received fiom other purchasers. That many were reputed made pre-harvest
7 Loria and Cuevas aiso investigated whether there vtere fbumcial links between traders andjarmers 
and concluded that less than 10% o f maize farmers had received advance payments from traders to 
seal an agreement to purchase. This practice seemed to be a diminishing one because traders 
considered it badfor business. Informal agreements to purchase were made but often broken because 
o f price conqtetithtt (19S4. 25, 27). It should be noted, however, that Loria and Cuevas were 
referring to traders in general and not to relations between conanercial farmers and small farmers 
and tenants, from whom they also bought maize.
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purchases would make economic sense in this context. V^tness the following account
provided by a fannerArader himself:
This farmer sowed 140 Has of maize, beans and sorghum, of which 35 
Has had been rented from [a majw landowner in the valley]. He had 
been farming for 18 years and trading for 10. The grain he traded in 
most was maize. He bought maize in the area to sell to [a large animal 
feeds company in Tegucigalpa] aiui had had contracts to supply diis 
comq>any for 10 years. He hardly evor sold maize to the IHMA because 
of their quality requirements. He reckoned to produce about 5,000 
sacks of maize [about 455 MT] but bought another 2,000 sacks to resell 
as well. He bought maize at Lps30/sack and sold it at Lps35. He said it 
was (Nily worthwhile buying grain at harvest time, when i»ices were 
low, or buying pre-harvesL
These processes were particularly important for semi-proletarian farmers. To the 
extent that they engaged in personalized relaticms with load traders, made pre-harvest 
sales and had to sell maize early at harvest-time, semi-proletarian farmers were lilœly to 
receive lowo* average prices than petty commodity producers and commercial farmos. 
Furthermore, my interviews suggest that these conditions often ctundded.
In general, inrorpreting price data and their assumed relatitmship to social variables 
needs treating with caution. For exanple, interview data firom the groups in Quita 
Sueno indicate that perceptions of which traders would offer the best prices was not 
necessarily borne out by reality. A number of groups thought that better prices could 
be obtained 6om traders coming from the main industrial and market city of San Pedro 
Sula than from local traders. In practice, the data reported show that the highest prices 
were received firom local traders or from those elsewhere in the department (Santa 
Barbara town) and further in the rural west (La Entrada and Copdn) (Table 9.6). 
However, although these price levels are partly related to the time of sale, they may 
also indicate that groups were unable to secure deals with traders from San Pedro Sula 
in the year of interview.
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Table 9.6 Relationship between prices received for maize by groups in Quita Sueno and origin of
traders, primera 19R7-88
' Prices received for maize by gromos (LpslKg) and number o f groups
Origin o f 
trader
.28 .31 .33 .35 .36 .39
Copân 1 1
Smta
Bdrbara
1
La Entrada 1
Local
villages
1 1 1 2
San Pedro 
Sula
1 1
Note: some groups had more than one sale with traders from different places; some groups did not 
report the origin o f the traders they sold maize to and are not included here.
The experiences of these groups also illustrate the limits and possibilities of farmer- 
trader relations among semi-proletarian farmers who had become organized. Groups 
commented that the number of traders in the area had grown considerably since the 
days when members worked as tenant farmers. When group members lived in the 
mountain villages, they used to sell maize to juntadores (as well as pre-harvest to their 
landowners). Now that the groups were located on the main route between San Pedro 
Sula and the west of Hondiuas, they had access to many types of trader. Some groups 
thus took advantage of the diverse participants in the market. Several groups sold to 
three or more truckers and itinerant traders. Another sold part of its harvest to a local 
cooperative and another part to large coffee farmers who bought maize to resell to 
small coffee producers. Yet another group sold part of its maize to a cattle rancher 
from Copân as well as to a trader from San Pedro Sula. No groups sold maize to the 
IHMA. It was claimed that the procedures were too bureaucratic and costly. Equally, 
groups did not try to sell directly to the animal feeds industry based in San Pedro Sula 
for similar reasons, although some of the traders they sold maize to undoubtedly did.
On one hand, the expansion of maize markets and the different types of commercial 
outlet for maize gave the groups greater opportunity to negotiate sales because of the
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competition between traders, and because groups were a ready and accessible source of 
maize. On the other hand, groups had institutional loans to repay at harvest time, and 
there would have been pressures to sell at least part of the harvest very quickly. Thus, 
although there was some weak positive association between the amount of collectively 
produced maize and prices received (Chapter 8, Section 8.2), the extent to which 
groups actually could take advantage of joint action to negotiate prices with traders 
was limited at diat stage in their history.
922 Access to other markets: institutional alternatives
Although there were différait opportunities for negotiaticm in private maize trade, it 
seems apparent from these data that the social processes involved (including those 
analysed in previous chapters) could help to determine who benefited from trading 
transactions. However, analysis of other market possibilities also suggests that semi­
proletarian farmers, and even petty comnKidity producers, were unlikely tt> benefit from 
them. One such alternative was the IHMA.
As outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3, the purpose of the IHMA in the 1980s was to 
provide guaranteed prices for maize (and other grains) to farmers and to stabilize prices 
to consumers by selling maize at a ceiling price, using imports if necessary. Guaranteed 
prices were fixed at harvest time and mnained the same during the farming year. It 
was assumed that this type of intervention would provide incentives to farmers to 
increase output.
Chapter 2 also discussed some of the problems faced by the IHMA. Aom the farmers 
point of view, the transaction costs of selling maize to the IHMA were higher than 
selling to local traders, because farmers had to transport their grain to an IHMA 
granary and often wait long periods to make tiieir sale (Lotia and Cuevas, 1984, 24). 
Farmers did not necessarily lecrâve the guaranteed price because of deductions for the
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poor quality of their maize. Payments by cheque meant that farmers also had to wait 
until banks processed them. In addition, for fanners with credit from BANADESA, 
loan repayments would be deducted, which could act as a disincentive to sell maize to 
the IHMA. However, because the IHMA operated as part of BANADESA's loan 
recovery programme, it favoured purchasing from these farmers, and credit-holders 
featured prominently among those farmers who did seU to the IHMA {ibid, 40).
These problems were substantiated by interviews among maize farmers in El Parafso 
and Santa Bàrbara. No farmers had sold their maize to the IHMA in the year of 
interview^. In Jamasuitin, the IHMA price in the Danlf granary that year was lower 
than the prices many farmers interviewed obtained from private traders.^ The 
somewhat higher price in the Tegucigalpa granary would have been offset by transport 
costs. But transporting maize to the granary in Danlf would not have been financially 
viable for many semi-proletarian farmers. Even commercial farmers were generally 
reluctant to sell to the IHMA because of time and cost: of the two largest commercial 
farmers interviewed, one stated that he would never sell to the IHMA because of the 
costs of transport; the other had once been kept waiting for two weeks in Tegucigalpa 
and had eventually taken his maize to an industrial company. Another bitter experience 
was recounted by a commercial farmer in Jutiapa: during the 1984-85 harvest, he had 
taken his maize to Tegucigalpa but the IHMA had only accepted two lorry-loads. He
’ ^  Several had sold beans to the IHMA, however. The IHMA's price was far higher than the market 
price that year. One commercial maize farmer in Jutiapa had actually been buying up all the beans 
from local small farmers and selling them further to the IHMA. One petty commodity producer 
interviewed in Chichicaste had also tried to finance his maize cash deficit by buying beans and selling 
them in the market with his own to the IHMA. Another had also sold his beans to the IHMA and then 
bought beans for family consumption in the market because they were cheaper.
^  IHMA prices for maize from September 1986 to August 1987 were Lpsl6IQuintal in Danli and 
Lpsll/Quintal in Tegucigalpa, or Lps35IKg and Lps37!Kg respectively. These prices were for maize 
with not more than 15% humidity, 2% impurities and 5% damaged grain. Poorer quality maize than 
this would exchange at lower prices.
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sold his other two lorry-loads to an industrial conqrany but had had to wait 6 months 
for payment which meant that he could not repay his bank loan on time.
Among petty commodity producers, one fanxter knew that he was entitled to sell up to 
a given quantity of maize to the IHMA because of his loan from BANADESA, but 
stated that he could obtain a better price from two traders to whom he regularly sold 
his surplus. Petty commodity producers who had received institutional credit from the 
DRI also considered the possibility of making joint sales to the IHMA. In Jutiapa, a 
group of them met with IHMA representatives, were given a price for a given quality 
of selected maize and were told that the IHMA could buy only 20% of their output 
because of the extent of ma(z muerto. The farmers rejected the deal and after aborted 
negotiations with an animal feeds company and a savings and loan federation, they 
opted for individual sales to private traders.
Collectively-orgartized groups gave similar feedback. One group in Quita Sueno 
recounted how they had sold maize to the IHMA one year and had received 
Lpsl4/Quintal (Lps308/MT or Lps.31/Kg) rather than the advertised guaranteed price 
of Lps 17/Quintal (Lps374/MT or Lps.37/Kg). Furthermore, for every Quintal sold to 
the IHMA, they had to pay Lpl in transport costs.
I suggest that the IHMA served to reinforce social differentiation among maize farmers 
in the 1980s. Guaranteed prices were only attractive if they were sufficiently higher 
than market prices after deducting transaction costs^^. However, only commercial 
farma-s and those petty commodity producers receiving credit from BANADESA 
would be likely , to sell to the IHMA under these circumstances. Furthermore,
Loria and Cuevas found a much higher rate o f sales to IHMA than I  did, but this is probably 
because the average farm sizes were higher in their sample: their data might also have been affected 
by the locations o f the farmers interviewed, as well as relative prices in the year o f their study.
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commercial fannos were able to choose different options, while the conditions under 
which many petty commodity producers and most semi-proletarian farmers sold maize 
meant that the IHMA was an unlikely purchaser. Furthermore, even if IHMA prices 
were considerably higher than market prices, local traders would be unlikely to raise 
their own prices to such farmers, knowing that these farmers did not have access to the 
IHMA option. (On the other hand, traders could buy locally at lower prices and then 
sell to the IHMA.) Furthermore, farmers who were net purchasers of maize would be 
worse off if retail prices for maize rose above the prices they had received.
Another alternative was selling to agro-industry which bought maize at fixed prices 
during the harvest period. One marketing study suggested that agro-industry had an 
inportant influence on market prices in the north of Honduras: 'Agro-industry, the 
major user of basic grains, is heavily concentrated in the San Pedro Sula area. It is this 
concentration of demand, coupled with wholesale markets in that area, which 
establishes general price level [ric] for basic grains in Honduras' (IRI, 1985, 273). 
Although I have not seen econcnnic analysis to substantiate this statement, the IHMA 
manager in San Pedro Sula, and many San Pedro Sula wholesalers agreed with it
Among farmers I interviewed, (xtiy the largest sold to compaities. For most farmers, 
similar problems involved in selling to the IHMA prevailed: high transaction costs, and 
delayed realization of payments. Moreover, processing firms received truckloads of 
grain, not the small quantities sold by semi-proletarian farmers and many petty 
commodity producers. Thus, apart from cmnmercial farmers, those who mostly sold to 
industrial firms were truckers, itinerant traders and wholesalers.
Although the quantities of maize required by industry were considerable, I also found 
limited evidence of contractual arrangements with farmers and trader to secure grain 
(see, for exanqrle, the account in Section 9.2.1). As in market relations in general, the
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apparent desire for flexibility and keeping options open seemed prevalent Thus the 
m anager of the largest animal feeds company stated that he had a few large, 'friendly' 
commercial farmers who supplied maize on a regular basis. By contrast, he preferred 
not to make deals with traders.
However, it appeared that deals could be made in other ways, based on personal 
relations between buyers and sellers. For example, one San Pedro Sula industrialist 
gave the following account about a trader I later interviewed:
This trader supplies several conq)anies who process maize. 
Theoretically, they pay him Lpl/sack but in fact they fix a price with him 
and then he is able to make substantial profits by buying maize well 
below the price being paid by the companies. He has 20-30 ox^loyees 
and two sons who work witii him and he hires truckers. He probably 
makes about Lps60,000 a month during the harvest period.'
When I went to interview the trader, he was talking to a manager of a maize processing 
factory he was said to supply. However, he was reluctant to discuss his relations with 
industry and stated that he only sold maize to retailers: however it is possible that those 
who come here to buy maize sell it to industry'. It was possible that much of the maize 
he handled never entered the warehouse but went straight firom farmers via Ids' 
truckers to industry
These interviews do not prove that perstxialized processes of securing maize at fixed 
prices by industry were generalized. However they do indicate that such processes did 
occur between firms, commercial farmers and some traders, in which each would share 
the benefits of relative prices in wholesale markets, those set by the IHMA and those
Although my industrialist infomumt denied it, his company also bought maize from this trader.
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set by industry, as well as sharing the margins between the farmgate price and the final 
price of sale.
9 2 3  Conclusions
Looking at these farmer-market relations indicates that prices do not result from a 
linear and impersonal relationship between stqq)ly and demand but are affected ly 
social relations and hierarchies. Particular prices can be arrived at through different 
routes and mechanisms. Prices can also have different rifects for different participants 
in markets. My fieldwork suggests that semi-proletarian farmers in particular were 
lilœly to benefit least from these different routes, which reinforced their need to engage 
in pasonaUzed and non-commoditized relations b> reproduce maize.
From a macro-economic perspective, this discussion shows that there are limits on 
using aggregate price data to analyse and understand the effects of price changes in the 
economy. For example, the Central Bank of Hondmras publishes yearly wholesale 
prices for maize. These data (in so far as they are accurate aggregates) may have some 
use in a time series in conjunction with other aggregate price data to show overall price 
trends and xelaticHis between comnoodities. However, to evaluate how diffœnt prices 
might affect the productive cq>acities of diffoent types of farmer, as well as who else 
might benefit from them, requires analysing the social relations of exchange in different 
markets and market places.
9 3  The profUabittty of maize trade
A particular policy concon in Honduras was the extent to which markets operated 
efficiently. Much of this concern was based on analysis of price margins. This section 
argues that analysis of prke margins can provide insights into who benefits from trade.
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However, looking only at price margins can be misleading in trying to understand the 
nature of competition and its effects.
An example of the type of concern expressed is evident in a marketing study by the IRI 
Research Institute, which stated: The markets for agricultural products in Honduras 
are in the last stage of a transition from "subsistence farming" to the "specialization and 
trade" system...If the market instituticxis perform the required marketing functions 
effectively and efficiently proper signels [ric] will be directed toward producers 
prompting them to use more than the 20% of potentially useful land that now is in 
cultivation' (IRI, 1985, 3). The study went on to say:
Participants in the marketing channels represent a agnificant number of 
people who by their contributicxi to the increasing value of products 
merit their fair share of the proceeds allocated by the marketing system.
The more complete and modem the marketing system the more services 
are performed and therefore the share of the consumers [ac] dollar 
taken by those dealing with the product after it leaves the place of 
production will increase. Thus the farmer's share of the consumer's 
dollar will decline but for a good and sufficient reason. Honduran 
farmers receive about 50% of the consumer's dollar and this has been 
interpreted to reflect an unfair distribution of market receipts. In other 
counfries with a highly developed marketing system, farmers receive 
only 38% of the consumers [sic] dollar but are much better off than 
those who receive 50% in countries with primitive markets' {ibid, 3-4).
I cannot pursue all the issues contained in this quotation. However, one key point is 
whether traders add value to products. They add value in transporting maize and 
providing storage, and in so far as they improve the quality of maize in drying it 
However, the process of buying and selling, while allowing maize to be circulated and 
distributed through markets, does not in itself add value to or transform products. 
Second, the ccxnparison of benefits of more or less dficient markets to farmers in the 
United States (in this case) and Honduras does not take into account the very different 
conditions of production (as well as trade) in both countries, and particularly the extent
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of commoditized farming practices and subsidies to farmers in the United States (nor 
that many U.S. farmers have been in crisis in the last decade). Such comparisons 
should therefore be treated with caution. Furthermore, large margins to trade are not 
necessarily evidence of efficiency, or of provision of more extensive services, as they 
can be created by monopolies and oligopolies.
However, as pointed out by IRI, there was concern about whether traders' margins^  ^
showed evidence of inefficiency (or monopoly/oligopoly) in markets, and about the 
general fairness' of trade in Honduras. Furthermore, it was also quite commonly 
expressed among farmers that traders 'buy cheap and sell dear'. This statement 
reflected the fact that traders could make money from maize while many farmers could 
not, and that when deficit farmers came to buy maize, they had to pay a price in 
considerable excess of what they had received for their output
93.1 Price shares and profit margins
My own analysis of secondary price data between 1978 and 1986 indicates that farmers 
tended to receive an average of 60% of the final retail price of maize (Johnson, 1988, 
181 and Table 80). Pollard et al, who analysed secondary pice data fiiom 1966-1982 
estimated a lowest figure of 44% in 1971 and a highest of 80% in 1976 (1984, 77, 
Table 32). Using their data and my baseline of 1978 gives an average of 63% for 
farmers' share of the retail price between 1978 and 1982, thus similar to my own 
calculations.
The terms price share and margin seem to be used interchangeably in the literature. However, as 
the IRI study points out, the calculation o f margins includes costs such as transport, sacks and so on 
(ibid. 257). In this sub-section I  am therefore using the term margin to refer to gross rather than net 
margin.
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In practice, there must be considerable variation in diis percentage between different 
types of farmer, times of sale and regions of the country. For exanq)le, I compared the 
lowest prices reported Ity farmos in Chichicaste and Jutiapa (on the assun^tion that 
traders "buy cheap and sell dear") with wholesale and retail data collected Ity the 
Ministry of Natural Resources [Agriculture] in Danlf, Tegucigalpa and Choluteca (in 
the south of Honduras) for January/February (the most ctnnmon months of farmgate 
sales among interviewees). My results show a similar percentage to the average of 
63% calculated above for January/February sales, whereas the proportion of retail 
prices received tty farmers with the lowest prices in Febraary was already higher than 
this average (Table 9.7). (This again confirms that the later the sale, the more farmos 
can benefit from price changes.) Notably, the highest parentages received by farmers 
were against retail prices in Danlf - retail prices were higher in Tegucigalpa and 
Choluteca because of tranq»ort costs and more active markets. These data should, 
however, be treated with some caution. The secondary data have been subject to 
smoothing and averaging and do not reflect the daily process of price changes which 
affects both farmers and traders.
Table 9.7 Percentage o f retail prices in nearest market centres received by CMclUcaste and Jutiapa 
maize farmers with lowest farmgate prices, primera 1986-87
Chichicaste Jutiatm
JanlFeb 1 Feb Jan/Feb I Feb
Percentage o f retail price
Danll 65 75 65 75
Tegucigalpa 58 70 58 67
Choluteca 60 73 60 69
Average 61 73 61 70
Source: calculated from time series price data gathered by the Ministry o f Natural Resources and own 
field data
Making profits from trade depends on price differoitials - the difference between 
lowest prices paid by traders and the highest selling prices they could obtain. In this 
respect, traders were, and are, bettor able to take advantage of cyclical price changes
363
than farmers. Farmers' resentment that traders could make a quick profit merely fay 
exchanging goods that farmas had laboured months over to produce was 
understandable.
The nature of cyclical price trends is demonstrated in Figure 9.1 which shows price 
changes in Danlf for 17 months in 1986-87. The peak wholesale and retail prices 
occurred in July and August before the new harvest appeared. As soon as the new 
harvest started to emerge in September, prices dropped dramatically. (There was also 
a dip in April/May because of the second harvest produced in the north of the country.) 
Although these trends vary in extent and locaticm each year, traders and large 
commercial farmers with storage can benefit from the price changes.
. Figure 9J DarUt: bi-monthly w ^lem le and retail maize prices, 1986-87
0.7
0.6
03
0.1
wholesale
Retail
Month
Source: time series price data gathered by Ministry o f Natural Resources
As well as the proportion of final price received by farmers, some analysts of price 
margins in Honduras have been concerned about an apparent reallocation over time of 
the difference betwera farmgate and retail prices in favour of wholesalers. Although 
not all are agreed on diis trend, Pollard et al have suggested that it may call into
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question the degree of competitiveness aipong wholesalers (ibid, 81). Plotting yearly 
data of the proportion of final price that was received by wholesalers from 1965/66 to 
1987/88, (using the same source as Pollard), shows an increased percentage going to 
wholesalers between the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Figure 9.2). Between the late 
1970s and the 1980s, however, there does not seem to be a notable change: the 
percentage of the final price received by wholesalers was generally between 80-90% in 
the 1980s.^^
Analysing the monthly wholesale price data for the 5 intervening years between the 
Pollard study and my own suggests that the percentage of the final price taken by 
wholesalers fluctuated seasonally as well as yearly. Figure 9.3 shows that it was rather 
less during the main harvest months (November-January) and more diuing the scarcer 
periods. Even so, analysing the data 6h which this figure is based showed that 
wholesalers' share did not fall below 77% of the final price.
Thus, assuming an average 63% o f the retail price received by farmers, I  estimate that the 
wholesale share o f the difference between farmgate and retail prices fluctuated annually from about 
55-80% in the 1980s.
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with storage, delayed sales would probably give them a higher share of the final price. 
While wholesalers appeared to obtain a lower average share of the final price at 
harvest-time because of competition (Figure 9.3), they could make money fiom 
considerable turnover. Figure 9.3 also suggests that there was less competition 
between wholesalers during the non-harvest period, when those wholesalers with 
access to long-term storage would have had greater control over the market. (Some 
wholesalers stated that they sold most maize during the scarce periods.) Finally, 
retailers appeared from these data to do less well in the scarce period. If true, this may 
have been because of measures by the IHMA to stabilize prices n> consumers. (I return 
to retailers' margins below.)
Aggregated price data conceal a range of transactions and trends (as well as the social 
relations that underlie them). Within trends, prices can vary considerably, suggesting a 
large number of (often small) fluctuations in price during a particular period. This is 
borne out by analysing my field data in relation to official data for one month in 1988, 
and which, on the surface, appear to contradict part of the above discussion. From a 
small case study combining my field data fiom San Pedro Sula with those fiom the 
Chamber of Commerce, I was able to estimate and compare profit margins for 
wholesaling and retailing traders. Table 9.8 gives the purchasing and selling prices per 
metric tonne for four wholesalers and the retail prices for May 1988 gathered by the 
Chamber of Commerce (which turned out to be static). These traders bought and sold 
maize at three different sets of prices during the month, each transacting a slightly 
different deal. Assuming that the maize was sold as soon as it was bought, and no 
storage costs were involved, gross profit margins ranged fiom 2.86-5.7% of the 
wholesale purchasing price. If unloading and loading costs are taken into account 
(calculated at Lps7.12/MT), net profit margins would then have ranged fiom 1-3.86% 
of the purchasing price. These would be equivalent to net profits of Lps3.88/MT to
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Figure 9.2 Yearly wholesale prices as a percentage o f retail 
prices, Honduras 1965166-1987188
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Figure 9 3  Monthly wholesale prices as a percentage o f retail prices, 
Honduras 1982183-1986-87
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Source: calculated from time series price data provided by the IHMA
Several points can be concluded from  these data. They suggest that wealthier farmers 
and traders could benefit from  the price fluctuations characteristic o f Honduran maize 
m arkets, w hereas deficit farmers, in particular, would suffer. For commercial farmers
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Lpsl4.88/MT. For the San Pedro Sula wholesalers, daily turnover ranged from about 
9 to 27 tonnes, resulting in a minimum net profit of about Lps35/day to Lps402/day. 
(Minimum gross profits would have been about Lps99 and, maximum, LpsS94 a day.)
In these data, the overall share of the retail price received by wholesalers ranged from 
72-76%, slightly less than the lowest figure of 77% calculated fiom IHMA's data on 
monthly price changes above. These wholesale prices might have been relatively low 
because of the arriving postrera harvest in the north of Honduras at that point. One 
result was that gross profit rates for retailers were much higher than for wholesalers. 
For retailers, buying maize at a range of Lps396-418/MT and selling it at Lps550, gave 
gross profit margins of 32-29% of the purchasing price.
Table 9.8 Estimated profit rates fi>r four wholesalers interviewed in San Pedro Sula, May 1988
Traders Trader 1 Trader 2 Trader 3 Trader 4
Wholesale 
purchasing price 
(LpsIMT)
385 385 391 396
Wholesale selling 
price (LpsIMT)
396 407 407 418
Gross profit rate 2.86% 5.7% 4.1% 5.6%
Porterage
(Lps/MT)
7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12
Net profit rate 1% 3.86% 2.3% 3.75%
Retail price 
(LpsIMT)
550 550 550
V
Wholesale 
purchasing price 
as % of retail
. 70% 70% 71% 72%
Wholesale selling 
price as% of 
retail
72% 74% 74% 76%
Source: calculated from own fieldwork data and data provided Chamber o f Commerce, San Pedro 
Sula
However, these margins can create a deceptive impression. Retailers' turnover is 
relatively low compared with wholesalers' (and is not usually measured in tonnes). For 
example, interviews with traders in Danlf (who both retailed as well as wholesaled 
maize) indicated that typical retailing rates ranged finm 15 to 350 Kgs a day. San
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Pedio Sula retailers would have had much higher turnovers because of the size of the 
market. Nevertheless, let us assume that the Danlf traders had bought and sold maize 
at the wholesale and retail prices quoted in Table 9.8. Gross daily profits from retailing 
would have ranged from Lps 1.95 at the lowest retailing margin to Lps52.5 at the 
highest (see Table 9.9), considerably low» than those fm wholesalers^^.
Table 9.9 Estimates o f hypothetical daOy gross profits for retailers in Danll. May 1988*
Lenuoiras
Daily sales &> 15 Kgs Daily sales 0> 350 Kgs
Purchasing price 
Lowest 
Highest
.40
.42
.40
.42
Selling price 55 .55
Minimum gyossprofU (55 - .42 
xKgs)
1.95 45.5
Maximum gross profit (55 - .40 
xKgs)
2.25 52.5
* Based on data in Table 9.8 and interview data from Dtmll traders
Returning to wholesalers' profits, than are several inqrlications from these data. The 
first is that wholesalers' profit margins based on immediate turnover were actually quite 
low. This means that (i) substantial quantities of maize would have to be moved for 
large total profits to be made, and (ii) there would be good reason, from the trader's 
point of view, to store maize until prices rose well above the purchasing price. 
Mechanisms of securing turnover are discussed in Section 9.4. A rough guide to the 
kind of profits that might be expected from obtaining bank credit to purchase and 
commercially store maize is given in Table 9.10.
Let us assume that a San Pedro Sula wholesaler bought maize at Lps418/MT in March 
of 1988 (aft» the main harvest and before the second harvest iri the north) and stored it
As several Danll traders engaged in both wholesale and retail, in practice, their total profits from 
maize wovdd have been higher.
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to sell when maize was relatively scarce again. If he or she sold it in San Pedro Sula 
between June and August, they would obtain between Lps37 and 121/MT in gross 
profits (Table 9.10). These profits would be reduced by commercial storage costs but 
would still give a profit margin of 8.3-28%, much higher than the margins from 
immediate sales (see Table 9.8 above). However, the wholesaler would also have to 
pay interest on the loan to purchase the maize. It is difficult to make accurate 
calculations because the anx)unt charged would depend on the period of the loan. 
Assuming an interest rate of 14% (approximate for the mid-1980s), the wholesaler 
would have to store the maize until at least July to make a profit, and preferably until 
August (or 5 months) to make a higher profit margin than from immediate sales. This 
would involve tying up capital which perhaps only some of the large wholesalers were 
prepared or able to do (see also Section 9.4.3 below).
Table 9.10 Sm  Pedro Sula: potential profits from storing maize commercially, 1988 (LpsIMT)
Month June July August
March purchasing 
price
418 418 418
San Pedro Sula 
wholesale selling 
price*
455 484 539
Gross profit 37 66 ■ 121
Net profit (gross profit 
minus storage costs)
34.8 63.8 118.8
Profit rate (percentage 
of purchasing price)
8.3% 15.3% 28%
* Data provided by Ministry o f Natural Resources 
932  Evidence of trader wealth
The IRI study noted above suggested that Honduran traders did not receive a 
particularly high share of the final price for maize (and other agricultural products) 
compared with traders in a highly developed marketing system' such as in the United 
States. As well as suggesting that Honduran markets were not perfoiming the services
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to circulation that they should be, this statement also iogilies that Honduran traders did 
not do particularly well out of trade.
In this respect, my field observations did not always tally with what traders recounted 
nor with what others told me about them. For example, the inqrressions given by 
traders in Danlf and San Pedro Sula about their activities were often contradictory. 
Some of these contradictions were related to their respective trading worlds.
Thus, of 7 trad»s interviewed in Danlf, 2 thought business was bad, another stated that 
profits were low, and the majori^ claimed that turnover was slight These interviews 
took place in June, just after the sowing period for the next main crop, and after the 
second harvest from the north of the country. Maize would have been coming into 
Danlf at this point from other market centres, although large commercial farmers in the 
area might also have been selling stored maize. The abiliQr to make money from maize 
during these periods was a point of differentiation between stallholders, selling a variety 
of goods and retailing as well as wholesaling maize, and those with substantial 
warehouse capacity, specializing in grains. Thus several of the former complained that 
large traders could buy and sell more conq)etitively because of their scale of operation, 
while one of the large wholesalers in Danlf stated that the sowing or scarce period was 
when he did most business. The smaller traders in Danlf frequently expressed that they 
felt out-manoeuvred in the market place by the large wholesalers.
The trading world of San Pedro Sula contrasted sharply with that of Danlf. I 
interviewed only wholesalers and deliberately chose those who had a reputation for 
high turnover. For these 9 traders, maize was constant business. The overwhelming 
impression given by San Pedro Sula wholesalers was that the number of participants in 
the market place had grown and that trade was very competitive. Obsoving them 
generally gave a picture of intense activity:
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Saturday, 12am; busy store with 5 people working as well as owner, and 
several people buying things; two lorries outside.
Saturday, 5pm; people coming all the time to buy...had three or four 
people working there; had sold 20 sacks of high priced beans that day 
[worth about Lpsl,800].
Sunday, 2pm; trader works extremely hard and always very busy; sells 
everything; received a quantity of maize while I was waiting...
Wednesday, 3.45pm; lots of lorries, maize on the pavement etc...during 
the interview there arrived several respectably-dressed clients, a lorry 
which came to unload, someone who came to buy maize, and a small 
truck from [a rice mill].
But not all wholesalers exuded an appearance of intense movement:
Wednesday, 4.30pm;...he was in the hammock when I arrived. His 
employees, including some of the [adult] children were playing cards.
The warehouse didn't look much but he said they had substantial storage 
space behind.
Saturday, 4pm; there was was little activity in the warehouse. Only one 
person was there, resting on the sacks. But [the wholesaler] was in his 
office, talking to the manager of [a maize processing company].
Appearances could be deceptive. The first of these last two traders was long- 
established, still had a thriving business but had also diversified into farming. The other 
was one of the main suppliers of maize to industry.
Certainly, among San Pedro Sula wholesalers, estimated earnings indicated substantial 
wealth from maize trade. No large wholesaler interviewed appeared to have had a 
turnover of less than Lps8,000 a year according to my calculations, and some may have 
had a turnover as high as Lps200,000 a year fixrm maize. According to other 
informants, some wholesalers may have made even more. Nevertheless, even though 
traders made profits, there were different degrees of wealth and considerable 
differentiation among traders, which were evident from their personal histories.
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Data from Danlf indicate that thoe were several routes into trading, differences in 
traders' success in business and influence over the activities of other traders. Table 
9.11 reveals that all the traders for whom there were data had had huinble beginnings, 
and several had long-standing experience of commercial activity. A numb» had started 
with qwall loans or small investments, while two had received loans from one of the 
major traders in the town. The wealdii» the trad», the more specialized the activities 
became: the noajmity traded other goods in addition to maize, although maize was a 
key activity in terms of earnings, while trad»s 6 and 7 specialized only in grains. These 
were tiie largest traders in the town.
Looking at data for San Pedro Sula show some similar patterns (Table 9.12): small
beginnings in cmmi»ce, while at least 2 of the 9 had been truckers and itinerant
traders. In addition, most had begun their working lives in the rural areas and were
migrants to San Pedro Sula:
Bom in Ocotopeque [in the west of Honduras] but was brought up in 
San Pedro Sula. He had started in petty trade when he was 10: "I ran 
around all ov» the place [buying and selling].''
Bom in El Progreso [near San Pedro Sula]. He was a driv» for S years.
Then he bought his own tmck and worked for 10 years as an itinerant 
trad».
Brnn in El Progreso. He had framed there and still had a faun. He 
worked for IS years as an itinerant trader.
B<nn in Santa Bdrbara. He went to Cortés to cut sugar cane and then 
he started trading in San Pedro Sula. He started to buy land in the 
countryside and now combines trading and farming.
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Table 9.11 Histories o f traders interviewed in Danli. 1987
Trader Number o f 
years as a 
trader
Previous
occupation
How started 
trading
Other trading 
activities
Other
activities
1 6 months GrocCT, 
seamstress & 
pinata-mdker
Loan from 
trader 7 and 
savings
Other grains 
and spices; 
artesanal 
goods
Artesanal
work
Wholesaled and r^ tcMed
2 20 Seamstress Bought 
contents of 
market 
position from 
previous trader
Drygoods; 
other grains; 
household 
goods
n.d.
3 14 n.d. Had private 
loan
Drygoods; 
other grains; 
household 
goods
n.d.
4 3 Tobacco
processing
Sold some 
land
Drygoods; 
other grains; 
household 
goods
Farm
5 8 Clothes pedlar Used savings Drygoods; 
other grains; 
household 
goods
n.d.
6 Many years n.d. Loans from 
family and 
other traders, 
including 
trader 7
Other grains n.d.
7 Since
childhood
n.d. n.d. Other grains Owned land; 
had cattle
n.d. = no data
Evident from  these testim onies was that, in spite o f  small beginnings, these wholesalers 
had m anaged to  m ake money from  trade and had built up their wealth in a way that no 
semi-proletarian farmers o r petty  comm odity producers could do unless they likewise 
m anaged to diversify their activities. Furtherm ore, although, for many traders, business 
activities which had begun with petty trade in rural areas were now  located in a urban 
centres, links with the countryside were often maintained. Owning land, cattle and 
growing crops was a way o f  investing profits from  trade. In addition, purchasing land
374
for productive (or non-productive) purposes was a way of saving or building up an 
insurance for the future, as well as making extra earnings. Landed property was also an 
accepted way of enhancing social status.
Table 9.12 Histories ofwholesalers interviewed in San Pedro Sula, 1988
Trader Number of 
years as a 
trader
Previous
occupation
How started 
trading
Other trading 
activities
Other
activities
1 3+ n.d. n.d. Tins; 
packaged 
foods; odier 
grains
Farm
2 10 years in 
San Pedro 
Sula
In commerce 
since 
childhood
Savings Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
n.d.
3 23 n.d. n.d. Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
n.d.
4 9 Driver and • 
itinerant trader
Savings Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
n.d.
5 19+ in San 
Pedro Sula
Commerce Savings Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
Planning 
poultry farm
6 1? Farming; 
itinerant trader
Savings Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
Farm
7 1? Forestry n.d. Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
n.d.
8 33 Farming Savings Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
Farm
9 1? Sugar worker, 
petty 
commoce; 
farming
Savings Tins; 
packaged 
foods; other 
grains
Farm
n.d. = no data
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Investing in land and agriculture was not the only outlet for traders' profits. There 
were also instances of traders' investing in industrial processing. For example, one 
former trader and his son, who had counted among the large wholesalers of San Pedro 
Sula, had subsequently established a factory to make animal feeds fiom maize. The 
company also acted as a distributor for concentrates, as well as for the national bottling 
plant. The traders had diversified their investments, using the networks they had 
already established.
93.3 Conclusions
Maize trade often had low margins - suggesting consid»able competition, particularly 
during harvests - but it could be highly profitable if traders could achieve a high 
turnover and/or store maize until prices rose. Because of cyclical price fluctuations, 
different types of trader, as well as commercial farmers, therefore benefited at different 
times. Although there was ccxisiderable differentiation of traders by wealth, there was 
also social mobility in maize trade, evinced in the contrast between many traders' 
humble beginnings and the later use of their profits to invest in other activities.
9.4 The social relations of securing profits
Understanding the extent to which traders were competitive and obtained 'fair' margins 
(even if many farmers were not able to make money fiom maize) requires analysis of 
the mechanisms used by traders to secure profits in output markets as well as of prices. 
This section argues that personalized as well as commoditized relations between traders 
and other buyers and sellers of maize played a role in securing access to maize and in 
ensuring profits. However, personalized relations were also located in the social 
hierarchies of trade.
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Between traders and fanners, one mechanism of securing profits has already been 
discussed in previous chapters, that of pre-harvest sales. This mechanian depended on 
social hierarchies in the villages and the lack of resources for maize production faced by 
semi-proletarian farmers. Another mechanism was the role of unweighed purchases, a 
widespread practice related to the more general social hierarchy between production 
and trade, in oth» wtnds, the relationship between a fiequoitly non-profit maiHng 
sphere and a profit-making one. An IHMA <^6dal recounted how unwei^ed 
could provide an extra earning for traders. Sacks are ostensibly equivalent to 2 
Quintales (Lbs 200, or 91 Kgs), and prices are agreed per sack. However, a full sack 
actually contains about 7 medios^^ ©r about 224 Lbs (102 Kgs). Traders would buy 
unweighed sacks and then sell them weighed to earn extta money on the deal. Thus 
when I analysed the wholesale and retail price data given me by some Danlf traders 
(who perfimned both fimctions), I found that tiiey were very similar (and apparently 
negative in some cases - in other words, the trader seemed to be exhanging mairf. at a 
loss). Recalculating the prices they gave me according to differential weights maH  ^it 
evident that this was one way of making a profit
However, social relations between traders, differentiated by task and wealth, and 
between traders and other purchasers of maize also played a role in securing profits. 
Relations between buyers and sellers have usually been discussed in the literature on 
Honduras in terms of ’marketing channels’ (for example, IRI, 1985), charted to show 
how maize reaches its final destination after leaving the farmgate. Although such 
descriptions of maize flows in&cate diff»»it trading chains (see Section 9.1 above), 
they do not explain the relatitms between participants. The BRI study and Loria and 
Cuevas (1984) also looked at differentiation by task in maize trade (trucking,
A mediais 32 Ufs or d)out 15 kgs.
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wholesaling, retailing) and pinpointed areas in which these functions overlap. Loria 
and Cuevas also examined to what extent participants in the market make agreements 
to buy fiom or sell to each other or financed each other. They found that although 
agreements were often made, they were difficult to enforce because of competition 
(1984, 36). Moreover, their data suggested that financing between traders was 
infi^quent (ibid, 33).
However Loria and Cuevas did not distinguish between types of trader in reaching 
these conclusions. In contrast, I would suggest that a social hierarchy does exist 
between traders in which personalized relations play a role in smoothing transactions. 
These processes were evident in the relations between wholesalers and 
truckersAtinerant traders, between wholesalers themselves and industry, and in relations 
to forms of finance.
9.4.1 Wholesalers and truckersHünerant traders
Relations between wholesalers and trackers/itinerant traders revolved around the 
importance of transport in trade. Wholesalers did not necessarily have their own 
transport, but they did need to be able to command the tran^ort of others.
Among the 7 Danlf traders, for example, 3 had no form of transport and did not hire it 
One of these only retailed maize (sending her husband out to buy a sack by bus while I 
was interviewing her). The other two were relatively small traders who bought fix>m 
itinerant traders coming in to Danlf. Of the other 4, two also regularly bought fix>m 
itinerant traders. But both these traders also hired truckers to buy or fetch maize from 
producers, and one would use truckers to supply clients in Tegucigalpa. The remaining 
two traders were said to the the largest in Danlf. Both had more than one truck of their 
own, as well as using other truckers to transport maize. Both these traders acted as 
suppliers to industry in Tegucigalpa.
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The predominant practice among San Pedro Sula wholesalers seemed to be to avoid 
paying for the maintenance of vehicles, and even to avoid tranqiort costs altogether. 
One source fiom a former large trading fiunily stated that maize did not even have to 
enter the warehouse for transactions to take place: wholesalers would singly transfer 
the load from one truck to another truck in connection with a sale to another trader or 
processing company. However, of the 9 wholesalers interviewed in San Pedro Sula, 3 
had no trucks of any sort, 3 used to have them but no longer did and only 2 still had 
their own trucks but did not genoally use them for transporting maize. All these 
traders used hired truckers or bought maize from itinerant traders. One longstanding 
trader explained that she and ho" husband used to have their own lorries but had found 
that it was more profitable not to. Another trader explained that when he sold maize to 
other traders in the deficit south of the country, the trader from the south would send 
transport to pick it up. San Pedro Sula traders only seemed to hire transport to pick up 
maize when it was scarce.
The relationship between wholesalers and itinerant traders and truckers was therefore 
an important one and securing maize supplies from truckers and itinerant traders 
involved a number of personalized as well as commoditized processes. One process 
was through financial arrangements. Several San Pedro Sula wholesalers loaned money 
to itinerant traders and truckers to buy maize although much depended on personal 
links and relations of trust, as weU as the state of the market:
Trader stated that itinerant traders operated with their own money (not 
with the banks) but that wholesalers would also lend money to trusted 
traders and truckers.
Trader stated that he (xtiy lent money to traders and truckers to go and 
look for maize when it was scarce.
A former trader informant stated that itinerant traders often had to wait 
for payment from wholesalers. Howev^, if maize was scarce, traders
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would do anything to buy it and would then be more likely to lend 
money to truckers or traders to look for grain.
In contrast, one San Pedro Sula wholesaler stated that he did not like lending to 
truckers and itinerant traders because there was no guarantee that he could recuperate 
the money.
There was less evidence of these practices in Danlf. Nevertheless, an employee of one 
large wholesaler there stated that his boss commonly lent money to truckers and other 
traders. This informant also said that the wholesaler 'worked with' (in other words, 
loaned money to) friends who had trucks and who bought maize for him. However, 
the financial arrangements between wholesalers and truckers could work the other way. 
It was said of the same wholesaler:
If he did not have ready cash at the time of purchase, the itinerant 
traders would leave the maize and come back for payment at the end of 
the day. They would be paid that day's purchasing price for maize.
9.42 Trading between wholesalers^  and between wholesalers and industry
Although traders were generally concerned to buy and sell maize quickly, for reasons 
such as storage problems or the maize deteriorating in quality, the often small price 
margins involved in wholesale transactions made buying and selling the maximum 
amount of grain in the shortest time an irrqwrtant profit-making strategy. Several 
traders said they did not like to keep maize for more than about a week.^ <^  To achieve 
a rapid and high quantity turnover, traders needed good contacts with other 
wholesalers and industrial firms.
Although keeping maize in circulation was undoubtedly essential to making money, these 
comments helped to create the impression that the traders did not hoard maize or manipulate prices 
by creating false scarcity, o f which they were often accused in the press.
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The precise nature of social relations between wholesalers themselves, and between 
wholesalers and industry was not always clear and traders tended to be cautious about 
revealing their links and networks. The overall impression was that traders combined 
fluid and flexible arrangements with more formal agreements. Witness this brief 
account given by informants about the networks established by one of the Danlf 
wholesalers:
He works with large traders in Tegucigalpa and has contracts with the 
animal feeds industry and institutions involved in food aid. He has 
worked in trade since childhood and now has several warehouses and 
trucks. He can move around quickly [ie respond quickly to situations].
He buys from everyone, but especially from small and medium 
producers. He only trades in maize.'
This wholesaler was located in a rural market town. His success as a trader was highly 
dependent on links which involved forms of patronage: he had patrons in Tegucigalpa 
and he in turn was patron to a local network in the Danlf area. As well as receiving 
loans from Tegucigalpa traders, he would also make loans to traders and others in 
Danlf. Thus although this wholesaler was working in a comnxxlitized maize market 
which responded to supply and demand and was affected by its wider insertion into 
national markets, his ability to make money from maize was built on social relations 
and informal agreements with numerous actors and agents.
Understanding how this wholesaler maintained his activities and made profits from 
maize required digging below the surface of his apparently empty warehouse when I 
visited it. This underlines how difficult it is to judge the operation of trade by 
appearances, or to chart its relationships in flow diagrams. Although I would hesitate 
to describe this wholesaler as having an oligopoly, he had an important role in trade in 
the Danlf area and its connections to Tegucigalpa.
381
Also apparent from this case is that although most Danlf traders adopted a diversified 
strategy and retailed as well as wholesaled maize, the really substantial wholesalers 
established networks outside their local markets as well as within them. This was 
particularly itrqrortant given the limited nature of local markets. Thus the two 
supposedly largest traders in Danlf both sold maize to industrial companies in 
Tegucigalpa.
By contrast, the city of San Pedro Sula itself constituted an important source of 
demand - in the urban market for domestic consumption and from the various maize 
processing firms. Although wholesalers occasionally mentioned having contracts with 
industry, most traders and industrial managers itrq)lied that arrangements were 
informal. However, some San Pedro Sula wholesalers indicated that they never 
attempted to sell maize to industry because firms already had their established suppliers 
among other traders.
As well as meeting the substantial demand for maize in the San Pedro Sula area, 
wholesalers also supplied maize to other parts of the country. Establishing contacts 
and sales outside the immediate markets was increasingly backed-up by access to, 
efficient means of communication and payment, especially among San Pedro Sula 
wholesalers. Telephones and bank accounts were evident. One wholesaler stated that 
he would take orders (by phone) fix>m Choluteca traders, they would then deposit the 
money in his bank account, and send a truck u> fetch the maize.
However, social relations between wholesalers involved elements of collusion and 
irrq)licit agreements as well as competition. For exairqrle, wholesalers in San Pedro 
Sula were known to check out prices with each other. Who would be the first to 
engineer a change was never clear, but one infmmarit stated that when prices were 
about to change, there was a reverberaticm around the market. As Loria and Cuevas
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have also said: 'A lack of direct communication was observed...However, there was 
perfect knowledge about prices paid, for instance, each wholesaler knew the price 
offered by his neighbour* (1984, 36). However, while traders in a given market might 
agree to sell maize at the same or a similar price, they would also be buying at different 
prices from itinerant traders and farmers. Equally, they might also strike individual 
deals with other wholesalers, retailers or firms to whom they sold maize. Thus 
elements of collusion, personalized relations and competition were closely interlinked.
9.4.3 Informal and insHtuHonaUzed credit relations
Making quick purchases and taking advantage of price differentials did not necessarily 
require ready cash, as implied above. Fw example, the manager of an IHMA granary 
stated that traders often went to their warehouses with no nmney. They would sdl 
goods all rrxniting, and then buy grain again in the aftmnoons with the proceeds. 
Alternatively, interviews with traders revealed that some wholesalers bought maize on 
credit: for exanaple, one large wholesaler in Danlf had the practice of buying maize on 
credit fiom farmers and then paying tiiem when she had the nooney. This process was 
only operable with commercial fiumas. Furthwnore, large local coffee producers 
bought maize on credit firom her and did not pay her back until the coffee harvest
One sttny told was particularly illustrative of the arrangements that could operate in 
such situations. A large landowner and farmer in the Danlf area was known also to 
function as a rrnddlanan in coffee as well as maize. He bought maize on credit fiom 
the wholesaler mentitmed and resold it to the coffee farmers who also supplied coffee 
to his mill. Furthermore, he had rented storage belonging to a local cooperative 
(purpose-built for the co<^)erative's own use) and was using it to sune the large 
quantities of maize he was proposing to sell to the coffee cultivators.
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This kind of arrangement was possible in areas where rural and urban relations were 
still closely interwoven and where there was intimate personal knowledge of local 
people and possible transactions, often based on social hierarchies. However, there 
was a gradually growing trend for large wholesalers to engage in institutional forms of 
finance from banks. Thus, on one hand, traders had developed flexible means of 
financing trade through their links with truckers, other wholesalers and some 
commercial farmers and could hence manage to turn around large (or even small) 
quantities of maize without necessarily having ready cash to hand. On the other hand, 
although they continued to work with informal credit and loans with trusted clientele, a 
growing number had bank accounts, used cheque books, obtained bank loans and had 
more financially accountable systems.
Access to bank credit depended partly on the size of traders' enterprises. This was 
because credit was linked to storing grain in commercial warehouses. Such storage had 
drying facilities and wholesalers were able to maintain the quality of their maize, 
meaning that it would still be a saleable product in later months and the bank would be 
able to recuperate its credit.
Thus the smaller traders of Danlf financed their activities themselves or borrowed from 
other traders locally. Howcvct, two of the large wholesalers were mooted either 
already to be using bank credit or to be planning to. Even so, they expressed caution 
about the risks they might be taking. One said that she feared the commitment. 
Although such views were also expressed by San Pedro Sula wholesalers, a number 
had bank credit or had tried to obtain it. Nevertheless, only two of the younger 
dynamic traders indicated that they were actually happy having such a commitment to 
banks.
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This degree of caution contrasts with Loiia and Cuevas's findings. Out of their 50 
interviewees, 20 or 40% claimed to use some institutional credit in trade {ibid, 33). 
My interviewees may have been particularly reticent in talking about their relations to 
financial institutions. Alternatively, several may have been sufficiently wealthy to 
finance trade themselves or from other business activities (see Section 9.3.2).
9.4.4 Conclusions
The processes of securing profits involved social differentiation by wealth and task 
among traders, different mechaitisms of trying to increase differentials between 
purchasing and selling prices, some oligopolistic elements, particularly in rural markets 
and small towns, and some elements of collusion and implicit and explicit agreements 
over sales and prices. Financial relations were often key to these processes - who 
could finance whom through loans or delayed payments. Although personalized 
relations based on differentiation enabled networks of buyers and sellers and profits to 
be secured, they were situated in highly crannaoditized and competitive markets which 
meant that there was considerable fluidity between different types of exchange.
9.5 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated the following points:
(i) Maize trade was differentiated by type of market and type of trader; these markets 
and the functions of participants in them overlapped and provided many opportunities 
for making profits from exchange.
(ii) Establishing prices could operate in different ways and was affected by different 
social processes; commadal farmers had many more possibilities of making 
transactions in different markets than petty commodity producers and semi-proletarian
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farmers; in particular, semi-proletarian farmers tended to have constrained possibilities 
for sales which were often made to local traders and farmer/traders, for somewhat 
lower prices than other farmers; at the otha- extreme, commercial farmars with bank 
credit could take advantage of guaranteed prices at IHMA granaries (if they were 
suffidaitly higher than maiket prices) and fixed prices in industiy, as well as having a 
wider network of relations with private traders.
(iii) Analysing price margins and shares of the final ^ c e  attributed to trade (and 
different types of trader) is only one dimension of assessing the competitiveness and 
effectiveness of maize markets; the social relations between traders themselves and 
between trado^ and other participants in the market, and the personalized elements that 
these relations often involved, are an important part of obtaining and securing profits.
The relationship between maize [noduction and maize trade depends on marketed 
surpluses and the existence of urban and rural demand. An irony in this relationship is 
that marketed surpluses are partially constituted fiom sales of maize needed for 
ccxisumption by indebted farmers, while the demand for maize (apart from industrial 
demand) arises fixmi the daily crmsunqrtion of low inoxne people who have frequentiy 
migrated fiom rural areas because tiiey were unable to continue producing maize, as 
well as those who could not produce (or retain) sufficient maize for their own 
crmsumption.
However, changing output maiket operations alone could not solve the problems in 
reproducing maize faced by many semi-proletarian farmers, as well as some petty 
commodity produces, in the 1980s. Although semi-proletarian maize farma% wore 
affected ly  market variables, such farmers were not able to respond easily to price 
changes: it was difficult for them to increase their output in response to price increases; 
it was also difficult for them te transfer tiidr assets into other activities if prices fell.
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Traders, however, could stand to benefit fiom price increases, even if differentially, 
while price controls could only have marginally detrimental effects for them because of 
the relatively weak interventions by the IHMA, and the importance of personal 
networks and personalized deals in trade. Hie significance of state intervention in the 
1980s was to have some control over the extremes of price flnctnarinns - for producers 
or consumers - through its own national purchase and foreign import policies. 
However, for policy-making in the arena of producer-market-consumer relations, a 
single price policy, or deregulation without targeted controls would have little effect in 
reducing the food insecuri^ feiced by many maize farmers.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POUCYIMPUCATIONS 
I now draw out some theoretical conclusions and policy iinplications.
TheoreticiU conclusions 
(i) Class relations
My analysis of the production and exchange relations of maize has enabled me to 
highlight some class characteristics of maize producers. The thesis adds to 
understanding class relations and social differentiation in the countryside by looking at 
how access to land is related to access to labour, technology and finance through the 
production and exchange relations of a particular crop. Furthermore, it focuses on 
farmers' capacities to reproduce maize production, and on the mechartisms through 
which different types of maize production Ity different groups of farmers are sustained 
or changed. It also pinpoints some of the dynamics of social differentiation by showing 
how social groups in the Honduran countryside interact, the effects of agencies such as 
the state, and how such relations may serve to reinforce or undermine different social 
positions and productive capacities.
I have arrived at a characterization of the class relations of farmers involved in 
Honduran maize production in the 1980s Ity moving from concepts to empirical 
observation back to concepts. The categories I arrived at are not identical to the anall, 
medium, large farmer categories often used with respect to food staple production. For 
example, 1 called most of the 'small' maize farmers interviewed in Jutiapa petty 
commodity producers. As well as showing that land area is only one criterion in 
understanding social relations of production, my conclusions on social differentiation 
also demonstrated diffonences between farmers in the two villages in Jamastrân. '
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Class categories are not immutable. As well as acknowledging the effect of wider 
processes of economic and social change which impinge on social relations, I have tried 
to demonstrate that the constitution of class relations is an active process. In other 
words, maize farmers in Honduras are active participants in their social relations with 
others and help to mould the nature and type of exchanges in which they engage. Thus 
the existence of commercial and semi-proletarian maize farmers is interdependent, but 
relations do not go uncontested. This was most apparent in the formation of 
collectively-organized groups and peasant organizations, but negotiation over rights 
and obligations could also take place between individuals.
My analysis also reinforces the idea that petty commodity production is an unstable 
form of production. On one hand, semi-proletarian maize farmers in Honduras in the 
1980s could become petty commodity producers; on the other hand, petty commodity 
producers could experience acute difficulties in surviving the demands of increased 
incorporation into the market. This leaves an unresolved issue: whether capitalist 
development will ultimately result in the existence of commercial (if family-based) 
farming and wage labour, or whether its uneven development will continue to provide 
spaces for both semi-proletarian and petty commodity production.
This analysis has further methodological implications. I have drawn some conclusions 
about class relations by focusing on the production and reproduction of a particular 
crop. My conclusions from this approach do not claim to encapsulate the entirety of 
Honduran rural classes relations: other studies in Honduras have made important 
contributions to this area. However, I have looked at social relations in an important 
area of Honduran economic and social life and perhaps such an approach could be 
applied to other activities in the countryside and urban areas.
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(ii) Commoditization
In analysing the reproduction of maize production, I focused on processes of exchange. 
A key area was thus commoditization and how it affected the relations between 
farmers, as well as what impact policy interventions had on the commoditization of 
production.
The thesis has shown that commoditization is a non-linear process. It adds to analysis 
by Latin American writers of the impact of commoditization on peasant livelihoods, 
and to the European debates in the 1980s about the natme of commoditization (for 
example. Long et al (ed), 1986). It also supports the analysis of uneven development 
in markets discussed in the South Asian literature (for example, Bharadwaj, 1985), as 
well as the work of writers such as Brass (1986) on the appearances and realities of 
commoditized and non-Commoditized relations.
My analysis adds to this work by looking further at the different ways commoditized 
and non-commoditized processes can be combined and can act as a further point of 
differentiation between maize farmers. Thus my approach is different from those which 
distinguish between subsistence and commercialized maize production by comparing 
farmers' relations to output markets, and those which categorize maize farmers on 
assumed use of purchased technological inputs. By analysing the different types of 
exchange involved in producing and reproducing maize, it is possible to observe the 
extent of commoditization and non-commoditization in maize farming practices within 
and between different types of farm.
As Brass also discovered, apparently non-commoditized relations can be a hidden form 
of commoditization. For example, the loans of agricultural inputs made by commercial 
farmers to semi-proletarian farmers seem, on the surface, to be non-commoditized form 
of exchange because they do not take place in competitive conditions in the market.
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However, such loans would not be possible without the existence of financial and 
commodity markets, through which commercial farmers were able to purchase more 
agricultural inputs than they needed, and on the basis of which the loans to (and 
payments from) other farmers were made. For this reason, I have chosen to call such 
exchanges "personalized relations': on one hand, they depended on commoditization, 
and, on the other, they relied on the existence of social hierarchies and the ability to 
make exchanges on a personal basis. I summarize these different relations in the table 
below. However, as my analysis has shown, in practice the distinctions overlap and 
change.
Non-conmoeUtized. personalized and commoditized relations in Honduran maize farming in the 1980s
Characteristics Examples
Non-commoditized Outside the market and 
conditions of competition; no 
cash exchange; based on 
reciprocity (may be unequal); 
benefits may also be unequal.
Family labour
Labour exchange Çmano vuelta') 
Voluntary laboiu
Personalized Within or connected to markets; 
exchange involves cash for 
goods/services; also involves 
arrangement/agreement based 
on personal ties, rights and 
obligations (often implicit); may 
be equal or hierarchical.
Land/labour exchanges
Loans of inputs firom 
landowners to SPF
Pre-harvest sales
Commoditized Within markets and conditions 
of competition; exchange for 
cash/otiio’ commodities; 
obligations are payment/delivery 
of goods/services; personal 
relations not necessary.
Wage labour
Purchase of agricultural inputs 
Maize sales
That commoditized and non-commoditized processes exist simultaneously is not 
necessarily evidence of types of production with essential differences. In Honduran 
maize production, I found that personalized and non-commoditized relations were 
combined with commoditized ones as strategies for survival (simple reproduction) and 
accumulation. These strategies were partly a response to the uneven development of 
input and output markets. They were also responses to the highly unequal access to
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resources experienced by maize farmers, and its related social differentiation. Thus, 
although non-commoditized and personalized relations can be present in situations of 
relative social equality, they are reinforced by social difference and the ability to 
command favours, gifts and obligations, as well as the possibility of making a gain firom 
them (such as in pre-harvest sales).
Finally, my study has shown that, for some of the farmers interviewed, output was 
commoditized through forced sales and sales of maize required for consumption. This 
is a different approach from that which focuses on 'produccion comercializable' or 
'marketable output' as though it were entirely real surpluses. For farmers interviewed, 
the commoditization of output was closely linked to debt and obligation rather than to 
the existence of marketed surpluses in two important ways. Some debts were incurred 
through informal loans - for example of agricultural inputs - involving hierarchical ties. 
With some qualifiers, I have also used the term institutionalized forced sales' to 
describe the implicit social hierarchy and complexities involved in institutional loans 
and the conditions under which farmers often had to sell maize needed for consumption 
to repay debts. The nature of any coercion involved was not necessarily obvious. The 
first was based on moral force and rights and obligations involved in commercial and 
semi-proletarian farmer relations (although violence or dispossession could in principle 
be threatened). Although interlinked transactions were not evident in the second, 
farmers were often under pressure to participate in credit schemes in which loan models 
appeared to be based on total commoditization of production processes (resulting in 
high estimates of costs of production), and where many farmers found they needed to 
sell maize required for consumption in order to repay debts and stay in the scheme.
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(iii) Markets
The discussion of commoditized output brings me to the nature of exchange relations in 
Honduran maize markets. As stated above, commoditization is non-linear and the 
development of markets is an uneven process. These characteristics have also been 
analysed by other writers, including in the institutional economic literature (for 
example, Bardhan, 1989).
My analysis adds to literature on the concrete and political analysis of markets (for 
example, Hewitt de Alcântara (ed), 1993; Mackintosh, 1990; White (ed), 1993) by 
demonstrating that although maize was highly commoditized in Honduras in the 1980s 
and there was competition between traders, exchange in the market also involved 
personalized relations. This observation is significant for understanding markets in 
developed as well as developing capitalist economies. However, in Honduras, 
personalized relations were built on social hierarchies and abilities to command the 
services of others as well as optimize gain fiom particular transactions. 
Acknowledging these processes suggests, one, that institutional arrangements are not 
static, and two, that personalized relations can occur in conditions of competition. 
Indeed, the latter also suggests that personalized relations can even aid competition (as 
well as help secure profits), a point which problematizes notions of market efficiency 
based on abstract models.
These observations thus also adds to the literature on markets in Honduras. My 
analysis, has looked at some of the ways in which personalized relations could affect 
transactions over maize sales, from pre-harvest sales to the restricted marketing 
networks available to semi-proletarian farmers to the implicit deals and collusion that 
could be perceived at times between traders and/or traders and industrialists.
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I am unable to link these relations directly to price determination (except in the instance 
of pre-harvest sales). However my analysis of price data suggests that social relations 
should be taken into account in interpreting prices and price movements (for example, 
the relationship between the social positions of maize farmers and timing of sales, and 
hence prices received). In general, my analysis of prices suggests that there was 
considerable competition in maize markets around harvest-time, and this competition 
was reinforced or aided by the social nature of the transactions made. At other times of 
the year, price competition was less evident. Producers making pre-harvest sales were 
then at the mercy of those who had some control over local markets, especially farmer- 
traders. Prices to consumers, whether the urban poor or deficit producers, might also 
have been affected by those who had the capacity to store grain. However, as 
suggested by my analysis in Chapter 8, the IHMA may have been able to influence 
prices to consumers in scarce periods more than it could aid semi-proletarian farmers, 
especially those who made pre-harvest sales.
Thus my evaluation of maize markets suggests that evidence of competition in small 
price margins could hide evidence of social relations which were based on social 
differentiation, hierarchies and power. In Honduran literature, the role of power in 
relation to agrarian relations based on unequal distribution of land has always been a 
key element, but less so in analysis of markets.
Although I have not tried to develop the concept of power in this thesis, my research 
adds to literature which explores the role of power in exchange relations (for example, 
Olsen, 1993). The types of power I have identified are located in the realms of 
manipulation and authority, rather than force or coercion {ibid, 87). In addition, 
Olsen's distinction between being manipulated (or forced) by someone and manipulated 
(or forced) by circumstances {ibid, 88) were also found in Honduran maize farming. 
For example, semi-proletarian farmers were forced by someone (commercial farmers)
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and also by circumstances (lack of access to resources) to sell maize needed for 
consumption to repay debts. Likewise, petty commodity producers were forced by 
circumstances (the need to continue access to credit) to repay debts by selling maize 
required for consumption, with the implicit 'someone' residing in the institutional credit 
programmes set up by a government ministry.
My analysis of exchange relations in Honduran maize farming has thus raised some 
issues of methodology in relation to understanding social hierarchies and power 
relations. Exchange could be culturally embedded and involve moral obligation as well 
as economic interest (Rival, 1992). For example, although commercial farmers stood 
to gain from land/labour exchanges or fiom pre-harvest sales, semi-proletarian farmers 
who rented or borrowed land and provided labour also had rights embedded in their 
relations with commercial farmers. These rights were not explicitly stated or bound in 
legal codes. They were implicit in the unequal reciprocity involved in the exchange and 
were expressed in the language used to describe the relationship ( he helps me with...', 
'he gives me...', I help him with...'). The recording and analysis of such exchanges 
requires a multi-disciplinary approach to fieldwork as well as a multi-disciplinary 
theoretical or conceptual fi'amework for analysing the role and significance of exchange 
in developing capitalist economies.
(iv) Food insecurity
I have addressed food insecurity by analysing the risks, threats and vulnerabilities facing 
maize farmers in Honduras, in particular through processes of exchange. This 
approach borrows from Sen and fiom recent analyses of exchange relations, 
particularly in a South Asian context, but adds to this literature by focusing on the 
reproduction of entitlements and the mechanisms through which reproduction is 
threatened (or secured).
395
This approach sees food insecurity as a process of vulnerability creation and 
reinforcement rather than a phenomenon resulting from serious food shortages or acute 
lack of income (and therefore ability to command food) resulting in visible hunger and 
starvation. The type of food insecurity I identify and address in this thesis involves a 
constant precariousness with respect to growing and consuming food staples and being 
able to sustain these processes without constant indebtedness and threats to 
entitlements. In the case of Honduran maize farming, this process is based on social 
inequalities in the countryside.
In this context, a key area of analysis is the strategies pursued by the food insecure (and 
potentially food insecure) to reproduce maize production, as well as the obstacles to 
achieving it. I have looked at how farmers balanced security and risk, and how they 
were affected by the social relations of survival and of intensifying production. My 
concepts of secure stagnation and insecure transformation try to encapsulate some of 
the contradictions inherent in this balancing act. On one hand, semi-proletarian farmers 
were caught in relations which impeded their productive capacities. On the other, they 
engaged in hierarchical exchanges with commercial farmers to secure land, access to 
cash income from wage work and the loan of agricultural inputs. On one hand, petty 
commodity producers hoped to increase their productive capacities through credit and 
technical assistance. On the other, their potential for raising yields and increasing 
output was threatened by institutional indebtedness. For semi-proletarian farmers, the 
use of 'secure' to describe their position is thus somewhat ambiguous: security had its 
price and could be threatened by technological change, debt and social breakdown in 
commercial-semi-proletarian farmer exchanges. For petty commodity producers, 
insecurity did not characterize all farmers, but neither did transformation: studying 
maize production suggests that this form of production could lead to loss of 
entitlements as well as to potential improvements in livelihoods.
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Policy implicaHons
(i) Land
In Chapter 2 of Ais thesis, I identified three policy areas with respect to land which 
affected or would affect maize production: land reform (or redistribution of land), land 
titling and the creation and reinforcement of land markets. The first largely preceded 
my research, the second was ongoing during my stay in Honduras (1986-88), and the 
promotion of land markets appeared on the policy agenda in the early 1990s. 
Following Bharadwa j (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3), the question is not sinçly whether a 
land policy is needed but whether it has the desired effects.
A key issue is the highly unequal distribution of land (Chapter 4). Although the land 
redistribution effected by the 1975 land reform law was limited (and much land 
distributed was newly colonized land), the land reform law did enable a considerable 
number, of landless and semi-proletarian farmers to secure means of production. 
Moreover, the experiences of the collectively-organized maize producers analysed in 
this study suggest that collective action on land could have positive results for such 
farmers, even if there were difficultues and contradictions.
Although security of tenure is also a key issue for land policy, applying a land titling 
programme of the kind enacted in the 1980s was unlikely to resolve problems in access 
to land of semi-proletarian farmers, principally because they often rented private land 
(or land controlled or 'owned' by individual farmers) and because the size of their plots 
was very small. (Land titling would only apply to those who had national land, for 
which the lower limit for titling in the 1980s was 2.5 hectares.) Land titling could 
however reinforce the position of petty commodity producers with access to national 
land, as well as help to consolidate the holdings of commercial farmers with mixed 
tenure.
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The prospects of a programme which reinforces land markets helping the sort of semi­
proletarian maize farmers identified in this study are therefore not very optimistic. As 
explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1), the Ley para la Modernizaciôn y el Desarrollo 
del Sector Agricole^ passed in 1991 was designed to encourage the exploitation of 
unused land, and to allow renting out, joint investment and sale of land, as well as 
increase institutional support for agricultural production. However, this supposed 
freeing up of landholdings and land use requires legal titles to land, which depend in 
turn on the speed and effectiveness of the land titling programme.
One possible effect is that the reinforcement of land markets could result in increased 
rents (even though the agricultural modernization act was intended to facilitate 
renting), while encouraging the purchase and sale of land could potentially put prices 
for plots of land outside the reach of many petty commodity producers, as well as semi­
proletarian farmers. Such developments are likely to be reinforced because the 
importance of returns to land and land productivity wiU grow as land becomes further 
commoditized. Export crops and other higher value food crops are likely to expand, in 
so far as there are markets for output. If the value of land increases sufficiently, 
landowners may gain more from selling land than from investing in production.
This policy area is complex and politically sensitive. Inequalities in the Honduran 
countryside affected the productive capacities of petty commodity producers as well as 
semi-proletarian farmers in the 1980s. It is unclear if these laws will reinforce petty 
commodity producers in the 1990s but they are likely to undermine the entitlements of 
semi-proletarian farmers, for whom either land redistribution or the creation of other 
employment opportunities is necessary.
Law for the Modernization and Development o f the Agricultural Sector
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(ii) Credit
There are many problems in applying rural credit programmes in contexts of inequality. 
One is who receives loans. It was not always evident from my research that recipients 
of project as opposed to bank credit were those necessarily most in need of it 
However, the difference in interest rates between project and bank credit indicated that 
interest rates were judged by policy-makers to affect farmers' capacities for loan 
repayment as well as the demand for credit. There was therefore good reason to 
extend the availability of project credit to a wide range of farmers at lower rates of 
interest (even if these interest rates were still high enough in practice to prevent many 
farmers from taking out institutional loans). An associated problem was that many 
farmers fell outside the arena of institutional access to credit because of their type of 
access to land and the small-scale of their production. Thus rural credit did not 
generally reach those semi-proletarian farmers and petty commodity producers with 
small amounts of land, some of whom turned instead to informal sources of credit in 
pre-harvest sales at extremely high interest rates.
My thesis identified other difficulties in providing credit to highly differentiated maize 
farmers. On one hand, access to credit could free farmers from some of the social 
relations of dependence on patrons, whether wealthier family members, neighbours or 
commercial farmers. This was particularly important given that such relations usually 
depended on social hierarchies and differential benefits from the exchange. On the 
other hand, the way credit was calculated and allocated, and the assumed 
commoditization of inputs, labour and output, could result in high loans compared with 
farmers' capacities to repay them, especially if farmers experienced high pre-harvest 
crop losses.
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The relationship between who receives credit, types of collateral, levels of funding and 
levels of interest rates continues as a point of debate in Honduras in the 1990s (Thorpe, 
1993). Measures launched by the Honduran government in the early 1990s to cancel 
agricultural debts to BANADESA (ibid, 147-148) may have benefited those petty 
commodity producers who were able to obtain state bank loans as well as commercial 
farmers. However, within the structural adjustment programme of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in Honduras, interest rates were liberalized and the costs of credit increased 
(ibid, 150-151). This would have affected petty commodity maize producers and 
commercial fanners directly, but could also affect the terms on which semi-proletarian 
farmers and some petty commodity producers borrowed money and made other types 
of loans informally, especially if their creditors depended in turn on institutional sources 
of funds.
The main tension the 1990s rural credit debates has been between allowing the market 
to determine who receives credit and using state intervention to restrain interest rates. 
For semi-proletarian farmers and many petty commodity producers, the question is how 
they could viably receive credit on terms that would enable repayment. The type of 
semi-proletarian farmers and vulnerable petty commodity producers identified in this 
research could only properly benefit from rural credit (i) if it were made available on 
terms that funded essential inputs at low interest rates, and (ii) if problems in access to 
land were addressed at the same time. For semi-proletarian farmers, loans of inputs 
from commercial farmers (as opposed to pre-harvest sales) could remain the best short­
term credit option in the absence of institutional possibilities.
(iii) Technical assistance
Policy issues related to technical assistance are closely related to rural credit 
programmes in Honduras. This association raises a further policy dilemma. One is the
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assumptions made about technology use and the appropriateness of technology 
changed leinfcnced Ity credit and technical assistance. Anotho* is the increase in use of 
purchased inputs requiring farmers to take out loans.
Technical assistance was bound up with government attempts to increase national 
output as well as improve livelihoods in the 1980s. It is therefore not surprising that 
the main means for inceasing maize output and yields were centred on improved seeds, 
fertilizer and other biochemical inputs, and some changes in other techniques of 
production, such as mechanical ploughing. There were also attempts to change age­
long practices such as burning off stubble and weeds Ity ploughing them in and/or 
putting cattle on the land before preparation. In spite of this, use of weedkiller was 
common among both credit recipients and non-recipients.
However, as wy analysis has shown, not only did such practices result in high cash 
costs of production for many farmers, but, in El Parafso, maize fringus was prevalent 
and a source of pre-harvest losses (and hence difficulties in repaying cash loans). These 
problems rake questions about the orientation of the technical Ksistance policies 
applied in the 1980s. Although thore were some attempts to develop other farm 
practices which did not involve high cash inputs and which used indigenous varieties of 
maize, these practices were not prevalent and or much promoted by those working in 
the DRIs.
The question is conq>lex as many of the technical changes were labour-saving (thus 
increasing productivity), while more 'appropriate' farming practices often required 
considerable labour input. If more labour time were to be spent in maize farming, 
labour would have to be adequately remunerated. However, maize is not a high value 
crop. This dilemma is further complicated by the fact that many farmers supplanent
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their farm income with wage work: more time spent on the farm using 'appropriate' 
farming techniques could be an additional problem for them.
Although the DRIs tried to organize committees of participants, it was not evident at 
the time of my research that farmers had much influence on the assumptions being 
made in credit and technical assistance packages. Time-consuming though it may be, in 
process and results, working with farmers' committees and collectively-organized 
groups^ to resolve some of these issues may be part of the way forward.
(iv) Output markets and pricing
My study suggests that the nature of maize output markets, how prices are determined, 
and what effects they have, need some re-evaluation. The importance of social 
processes needs to be taken into account in policies designed to make the functioning 
of markets more efficient and in decisions whether to regulate or deregulate prices.
These considerations are not evident in the reform of output markets which has taken 
place since this study was carried out. Domestic prices for agricultural products have 
been liberalized within Honduras's structural adjustment programme, although some, 
such as grains, have been subject to intervention if they fall outside price bands. The 
rationale behind price liberalization was to increase agricultural output, based on the 
assumption that prices would rise and provide incentives to farmers. Market prices for 
maize did rise (Thorpe, 1992, 144), in principle benefiting petty commodity producers 
and commercial farmers (assuming costs of production did not experience equivalent 
increases), but potentially undermining net incomes from maize for farmers who had to 
purchase maize for household consumption.
^ For example, '...sitting, asking and listening: leaning from the poorest, learning indigenous 
technical knowledge; joint R andD; learning by working...' (ChanAers, 1983,209).
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Another reform accompanying price liberalization has been to reduce state-held storage 
by the IHMA except for grain reserves and to make the IHMA a market facilitator 
(Chapter 2. Section 2.3.3). Given the limited impact of the IHMA on output markets 
and prices during the 1980s, this might seem a logical step. However, the alternative 
outlets for maize sales are still problematic for farmers, especially those semi- 
proletarian farmers with limited networks and bargaining power.
Furthermore, other experiences suggest that the liberalization of prices and allowing the 
private sector to have an increasing role can have contradictory effects. These have 
been documented for Nicaragua where extensive state intervention in grain markets 
was dismantled and liberalized. Although price structures in Nicaragua during the 
1980s led to parallel markets as well as the retention of maize for domestic 
consumption rather than sale (Dore, 1988), liberalization with the change of 
government encouraged the re-emergence of farmer/traders and allowed large urban- 
based companies to benefit from trade (Spoor, 1992). In the case of Honduras, Thorpe 
suggests that the main beneficiaries of price liberalization have also been traders {ibid, 
120).
My analysis of the social context of trade in the 1980s suggests that these effects could 
be predicted. Maize production and trade were differentiated on the basis of each 
activity's ability to realize profits. Within production and trade, there was also 
considerable differentiation which resulted in differential benefits for semi-proletarian 
farmers, petty commodity producers and commercial farmers, on one hand, and 
different types of trade, on the other. Those with established commercial operations 
and networks, control over a series of subordinate relations, and ability to move capital 
into different activities were those most likely to benefit from liberalized markets.
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If an output market and pricing policy is to try and meet the needs of semi-proletarian 
farmers and petty commodity producers of maize in Honduras, the social processes 
which influence exchange need to be taken into account. The effects of price changes 
need to include analysis of the non-commoditized and personalized aspects of 
exchange, and the role of social hierarchies and power. Again, this is a complex issue 
because personalized exchange relations, in particular, rely on commoditization and can 
therefore affect and be affected by price changes. Assumed non-commoditized 
relations, such as the use of household labour, may also affect prices as well as be 
affected by price changes. If household labour were no longer required, alternative 
productive activities for that labour would be needed. On the other hand, resorting to 
increased use of household labour because of price conditions could also put a burden 
on household livelihoods (as well as potentially affect wage rates).
Above all, price policies need to take into account the underlying social and economic 
conditions of production and exchange. The key challenge is how to develop an output 
market and price policy for maize and other food staples that meet the needs of poor 
fanners and consumers without having to resort to food hand-outs. Such a policy 
would depend on other structural changes to improve semi-proletarian and petty 
commodity producers' access to resources for production and/or other employment 
possibilities.
(v) Lessons for food security
To develop adequate responses, food security policies have to take into account the 
social conditions and causes of food insecurity among particular groups of the 
population. I have tried to demonstrate this by focusing on a particular crop and 
analysing the difficulties in producing and reproducing it. Equivalent studies of other 
elements of livelihood strategies in both urban and rural areas would demonstrate the
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complex relations which circumscribe many people's capacities to ensure adequate 
access to food as well as forming the basis for action. Thus analysing and articulating 
these processes is necessary among organizations which purport to represent the food 
insecure as well among the policy-makers in government, financial institutions and aid 
organizations.
How can policies be developed to increase the entitlements of the food insecure as well 
as ensure that they are not undermined by measures to reactivate economic growth in 
an era of structural adjustment? In Chapter 1 ,1 pointed out that policy involves many 
processes of negotiation (and confrontation) over contested issues. However, it has 
not been easy for the food insecure and organizations representing vulnerable sectors of 
the population to contribute to the formulation of food security policies in Honduras, 
although it is evident that economic reactivation cannot improve the position of the 
food insecure unless social and economic inequalities are also taken into account
A common approach to food insecurity under structural adjustment has been to target 
food programmes. Although immediate relief can be brought (and there are 
experiences where productive activity and livelihood possibilities have resulted when 
part of the goal has been to address social inequalities^), such programmes do not 
generally solve longer-term livelihood issues or change the social relations and 
inequalities that affect people's access to resources and benefits from production.
A longer-term approach to food insecurity might be to establish an active and 
collaborative targeted programme of working to improve rural and urban livelihoods. 
With respect to maize and other food staple production, such a policy would include (i) 
a targeted land policy involving farmer organizations, (ii) a targeted credit policy within
^ Television interview with Gita Sen, 1991.
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an institutional framework which provides mechattisms for regulating interest rates and 
enforcing clear guidelines about credit use and repayment, and (iii) farmer participation 
in decisions about crop production and thé development of technological capacities. In 
more general terms, it would include developing targeted employment opportunities in 
urban as well as rural areas.
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